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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the perspective of French Canadian nationalist Henri 
Bourassa during the First World War from 1914-1918. Bourassa was one of the best-known 
voices rejecting the war’s purpose and value in Canada. He consistently offered detailed and 
in-depth analytical critiques of the war.  He first accepted Canadian participation from August 
1914 to January 1916, but his position gradually shifted from cautious support to outright 
rejection. This dissertation argues that Henri Bourassa has traditionally been understood as a 
domestic commentator in Canada, but during the war years he wrote in the pages of his 
newspaper Le Devoir to address a wide variety of international issues. He was one of a few 
Canadians who looked out to the world and interpreted global events for his readers. Historians 
have already recounted in detail his thoughts about the Ontario bilingual schools crisis, 
conscription, the December 1917 election, and the Easter Riots of 1918. This work examines 
Bourassa’s thoughts on diplomacy between the belligerent nations and that of Pope Benedict 
XV, international events like the Easter Rising in Ireland and the American entry into the war. 
It re-examines his domestic commentary concerning the Canadian home front in light of his 
position on international issues, especially his growing anxiety over militarism and the 
deterioration of Canadian democracy. He believed that the war, which was ostensibly fought 
for democracy and liberty, was drastically changing the Allied nations and transforming them 
into the sort of autocratic states against which they fought. This thesis concludes that Bourassa 
adopted an intellectual approach to the war that deconstructed its impact at home and abroad, 
and stands as one of Canada’s foremost thinkers during the war years. 
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Introduction: Bourassa’s War 
 
Canada was at a breaking point during the “old-fashioned” winter in the final month of 
1917, when weather stations logged record low temperatures and snow swept across the 
continent.1 Amidst the deep freeze, Canadians went to the polls to pass judgment on Robert 
Borden’s wartime government. After more than three years of the Great War’s unrelenting 
industrialized warfare, the country was immersed in one of the bitterest electoral campaigns in 
its history. Canadians stood opposed over the future direction of the war. On the one side, 
Prime Minister Robert Borden wished to impose conscription; on the other, Liberal leader Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier desired a referendum on the issue which he believed he would win. Candidates 
for both parties evoked vitriolic patriotism and many ridings were harshly contested between 
Borden’s Unionist coalition (of Conservatives and pro-conscription Liberals) and those 
Liberals who stayed loyal to Laurier. The “party-truce” declared at the war’s outbreak in 
August 1914 was a distant memory. 
In the midst of the election campaign, French Canadian nationalist Henri Bourassa 
advised readers of his newspaper that no party in Ottawa was worth trusting. He counselled 
French Canadian nationalists to reject Borden’s conscription policy, but admitted that Laurier 
was little better. Both had betrayed the country and the values that had shaped the Dominion 
over the last fifty years. On 8 November, he instructed his readers about the great perils of the 
election: 
Le programme unioniste, c’est l’antithèse de tout ce que nous aimons, de tout ce 
que nous croyons, de tout ce que nous voulons. C’est la synthèse de tout ce que 
                                                 
1 Charles F. Brooks, “The ‘Old-Fashioned’ Winter of 1917-18,” Geographical Review, 5, no. 5 (May, 1918): 405-
414. December was one of the coldest on record and temperatures across the Dominion dropped between 10-
30 degrees lower than normal, see Canada, Census Statistics Bureau, Canada Yearbook 1918, (Ottawa: Bureau 
of Statistics, 1918) 163. 
2 
 
nous détestons – hommes, idées et tendances – dans les deux partis. ... 
Adversaires résolus du ministère de coalition, de toute sa politique et de tout son 
personnel, nous acceptons le programme de M. Laurier dans la mesure où il se 
rapproche de nos principes et de nos idées; nous le repoussons partout où il 
concorde virtuellement avec celui du ministère.2  
Laurier was the best of a bad lot. The years of war had changed Canada’s government and its 
people. Hundreds of thousands of Canadians had fought and continued to fight in the trenches 
of France and Belgium, and the outcome remained uncertain. New government powers 
expanded the state’s role in private and public life. Though the enthusiasm that marked the 
beginning of the war in 1914 had subsided, it had left an inedible mark on the Canadian people, 
particularly English Canadians, many of whom continued to support a seemingly unlimited war 
effort. They still believed that victory in Europe outweighed the war’s growing cost. 
Conscription, Bourassa alleged, was yet another sign of the war’s dire consequences for 
the nation. It epitomized the growing militarism demanded by the war that Bourassa feared. He 
saw little allowance for his liberal values that enshrined the rights of the individual, adherence 
to the law, equality, and tolerance in wartime Canada. Instead, the imposition of conscription 
forced individuals to fight in a war that they did not support. In the December election, he 
hoped only that Laurier might win and “s’[entourer] et [entourait] son parti de barrières assez 
hautes et assez solides pour empêcher que les brigands ... ne viennent de nouveau jeter le 
désarroi dans la bergerie, en corrompant les bergers, en muselant les chiens et en décornant les 
béliers.”3 It was a holding action in stark contrast to the idealistic vision of a unified Canada 
that he held when war broke out. Bourassa only wished to avoid greater fissures in Canadian 
unity, a breakdown in social order, and to stop any further transformation of the Canadian 
Dominion from the one he had dreamed of in 1914. His condemnation of the largely English 
                                                 
2 Henri Bourassa, “Le ‘Devoir’ et les Partis Actuels,” Le Devoir, 8 November, 1917, 1. 
3 Henri Bourassa, “Le ‘Devoir’ et les Partis Actuels,” Le Devoir, 8 November, 1917, 1. 
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Canadian Unionist Party was no surprise, nor was his reluctant support of Laurier who, he 
alleged, had betrayed the liberal principles that Bourassa had once admired in his former 
leader. It was the response that everyone expected of Canada’s most famous dissenter. 
Bourassa’s polemic reflected his experience of the war. From the war’s outset, he had 
cautioned against an overreaching war effort. In September 1914, he promised his audience 
that he would conscientiously examine the issues of the war, especially ones other 
commentators ignored. His duty to the public good demanded that he resist the wave of 
popular enthusiasm found in newspapers across the country. When it was clear that the 
government had no interest in moderating its military and economic contributions, and as other 
Canadians refused to heed his warnings, he rejected participation entirely in January 1916. The 
following year, Bourassa was the loudest voice against Prime Minister Borden’s introduction 
of conscription. Facing a government that seemingly had no sympathy for French Canada and 
had ignored Bourassa’s perspective for three years, the journalist urged his supporters to vote 
for Laurier’s Liberals. Laurier lost the election as English Canada voted overwhelmingly for 
Borden’s Unionist Party, but the province of Quebec voted for Laurier. The country seemed 
irrevocably divided along French-English lines. 
The pressures of wartime split the seams of Canada’s Confederation. Its French and 
English peoples each avowed their ability to decide Canada’s direction in the war as they 
accused the other side of disloyalty to the “true” Canadian nation. To Bourassa, the 1917 
election embodied the worst of the First World War’s transformative intensity.  
* * * 
“People do not ‘have’ ideas,” John Lukacs advises historians, “they choose them ... It 
may be important what ideas do to men, it is often even more important what people do with 
4 
 
their ideas.”4 The process by which Bourassa chose his ideas (and the beliefs he held as a 
result) was a long one.  This study deals with the second part of Lukacs’ counsel: what 
Bourassa did with his ideas. It examines Bourassa’s actions during the Great War and focuses 
specifically on the commentary he offered to Canadians, though primarily French Canadians 
because of the language in which he most often wrote. His beliefs compelled him to offer his 
commentary to his readers through his chosen medium, his newspaper Le Devoir, even during 
the worst of the war’s political maelstroms. 
The name of his newspaper evokes the purpose that directed his efforts. He explained 
the decision at Le Devoir’s founding almost eight years earlier in January 1910. Bourassa 
began his periodical because he wanted to awaken in his fellow citizens a commitment to 
public duty, which included religious duty, national duty, and civic duty. In his first editorial, he 
explained that “notre ambition se borne à chercher à faire de notre mieux ce que nous 
prêchons: le devoir de chaque jour.”5 The tagline attached to his title encapsulated his mission: 
“Fais ce que dois!”6 His idealistic goals were somewhat undermined by his first editorial’s 
belligerent title, “Avant le Combat,” as he prepared to enter a fierce political debate over the 
creation of a Canadian navy. From the beginning, he committed himself to public reflection 
without shying away from argumentative commentary. His willingness to defy popular opinion 
equally defined his writing during the First World War. 
Bourassa was rarely an innocent bystander to the country’s discord. His own 
commentary, as well as that of his opponents, fuelled one-sided uncompromising views of the 
war. Critics in English and French Canada accused him of treasonous disloyalty while 
                                                 
4 John Lukacs, The Future of History, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2011) 123. 
5 Henri Bourassa, “Avant le Combat,” Le Devoir, 10 January, 1910, 1. 
6 For more on the decision behind Le Devoir’s naming, see Réal Bélanger, Henri Bourassa: Fascinant Destin d’un 
Homme Libre (1869-1914), (Québec: Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2013) 280-281. 
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repeatedly appealing to the government to censor his writing. Bourassa offered little to sooth 
their outrage. His inflexible stance denounced Canadians who offered reasons to support the 
war as immoral hypocrites, though they believed their views as earnestly as he believed in his 
own. His opponents failed to convince him that political and social issues that predated the war 
had disappeared. Instead, Bourassa rejected their plea for new attitudes to confront Canada’s 
role in the European conflict. To him, the Great War was a war like any other, requiring a 
reasoned response measured by Canadian interests and values.  
This dissertation examines the nature of his reaction on the Canadian homefront 
through four years of war. Bourassa continued to address the issues he had prior to 1914. 
Throughout the conflict, he wrote about equality between French and English Canadians, the 
pervasive influence of imperialism, and the necessity of a liberal Canadian nationalism. The 
war also pushed him to examine international issues that he previously ignored. He devoted 
many pages to peace proposals, like the diplomatic efforts of Pope Benedict to end the conflict 
or American President Woodrow Wilson’s neutrality and subsequent shaping of the peace that 
ended the war in 1918. Bourassa addressed events outside of Canada like the 1916 Easter 
Rising in Ireland, the 1916 American election, and the American entry into the war in 1917. 
Global affairs affected Canadians as they never had before, and Bourassa was one of the few 
voices in Canada who critically examined them. As these global events changed the Canadian 
nation, so too did Bourassa’s ideas. 
This study cannot fully describe the life, beliefs and times of Henri Bourassa even 
within the short period of the First World War. There were many facets to Bourassa’s public 
life. Over the course of his prolific career, he wrote articles on political, economic and social 
issues to a small but attentive audience. The sheer volume and variety of his work makes it 
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difficult to explore in its entirety. It is similarly challenging for the historian to explain 
Bourassa’s influence on Canadians during the Great War. The polarized politics of wartime led 
him and his opponents to extremes, existing on the periphery of supporting and rejecting of the 
war, often resorting to hyperbole if not outright intellectual dishonesty to assert their respective 
cases. The war years were busy ones at home and abroad, and the work published by Bourassa 
was understandably dense. Under the shadow of the Great War, Canadians treated solutions to 
old problems and new ones with an urgency that belies their complexity. The war did not 
initiate many of the issues that Bourassa raised, but when cast in the light of a struggle for the 
survival of Canada and its European allies, debates over them were intensified. 
This is not a history of Canada and the war, nor is it a history solely of Henri Bourassa. 
It is a history of his beliefs about Canada and the war and the ideas he put forward to his 
readers. It is important to heed John Locke’s warning from his study of St. Paul: “He that 
would understand St. Paul right, must understand his terms, in the sense he uses them, and not 
as they are appropriated by each man’s particular philosophy. ... until we, from his words, paint 
his very ideas and thoughts in our minds, we do not understand him.”7 This work endeavours 
to present Bourassa’s ideas as he understood them. It interrogates what a Canadian who read 
Bourassa’s words would understand about the war. How would they comprehend Canada and 
its place in the world?  
This work studies the depth of Bourassa’s public analysis but pays strict attention to 
chronology. Public commentary is in its nature reactionary: writers commented on the events 
and issues of the war as it unfolded. Thus any history of Bourassa’s thoughts on the war must 
                                                 
7 John Locke, “A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, 
Ephesians,” The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, (London: Rivington, 1824 12th ed.). Vol. 7, xx-xxi. 
Accessed 11 October, 2014, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1556. 
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consider the war itself. The successes and failures of the homefront, battlefront and 
international diplomacy shaped the form, content and tone of his articles. This work does not 
intend to offer a comprehensive exploration of Bourassa’s ideas; in some cases, domestic 
topics are not explored as other historians have already examined them in detail. In the 
following pages, new details about the Canada and the world that Bourassa envisioned are 
developed. It follows Bourassa’s war, and it is within the structure and pace of his public 
analysis that this work examines Canada and the First World War. 
* * * 
As an influential figure in Canadian history, Bourassa has elicited much attention from 
historians, even before his death in 1952. His prolific career8 and far reaching influence means 
that he is included in histories not focused on him specifically. Any general text of Canadian 
history mentions him alongside Laurier and Borden. A history of Quebec, or Canadian 
Catholicism, or Canadian nationalism, or the First and Second World War, usually includes a 
discussion of Henri Bourassa. The debates in which he engaged over the “solution” to the 
“problem” of French-English relations in Canada have not yet been resolved, and help explain 
his prominence in Canadian history, but those debates led historians to critically examine his 
role as a domestic commentator. As a result, the historical literature focused specifically on 
Bourassa is usually narrow. A few scholars have broken from this trend, but most consider 
Bourassa an inward-looking French Canadian nationalist, for better or for worse. 
 Two contrasting views characterized early historical scholarship. One is Elizabeth 
Armstrong’s Crisis of Quebec, 1914-18, published in 1937, which was the first major historical 
                                                 
8 A bibliographical overview of Bourassa’s work was published in 1966 with the help of his daughter; see André 
Bergevin, Cameron Nish and Anne Bourassa, Henri Bourassa. Biographie. Index des écrits. Index de la 
correspondance publique, 1895-1924, (Montréal, Éditions de l’Action nationale, 1966). 
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work to deal with French Canada during the war.9 Bourassa played a large role in her analysis 
of the province. Her view of Bourassa is ultimately negative, but she does not fail to 
acknowledge his influence. Describing him as a “mixture of sincere patriotism and 
demagoguery”10 though not a “narrow bigot or a fanatical partisan,” Armstrong recognized that 
his countrymen viewed him as “a real Frenchman in the cultural rather than the political sense 
of the word, one who combined grace with courage, logic with wit and deep learning with 
eloquence.”11 This does not lessen the criticism that she levied against him. Armstrong 
condemned Bourassa’s rejection of Ottawa’s wartime policy and glossed over the detailed 
analysis that he offered.  
The rise of extreme nationalism in the 1930s heavily influenced Armstrong’s 
conclusion that Bourassa was a dangerous domestic threat.12 In her words, Bourassa dreamt of 
a “French Canada as a proselytizing force which … [would] bring the American continent back 
to the arms of Rome and to the glories of French civilization.”13 Armstrong used the terms 
“passive” and “active” nationalism to describe Quebec and argued that the war saw a brief flare 
of active nationalism, spurred on by Bourassa. As a result, she treated Bourassa and his fellow 
nationalistes as anomalies in French Canada who preached moderation while breeding radical 
action. They were not representative of the true “passive” French Canadian nationalism. The 
“crisis” of Quebec then was not a conflict of language, or culture, or even loyalty; it was the 
                                                 
9 Elizabeth Armstrong, Crisis of Quebec 1914-1918 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1937). Though many 
writers wrote about the Canadian war experience during and immediately afterwards, and included sections on 
Quebec and Bourassa, such as Castell Hopkins’ Canadian Annual Review, publications from the Canadian 
War Records Office, memoirs, or journalistic accounts. 
10 Armstrong, Crisis of Quebec, 96. 
11 Armstrong, Crisis of Quebec, 143. 
12 See the Carleton Library Edition of Armstrong’s work (1974), and the introduction by Joseph Levitt, viii. 
13 Armstrong, Crisis of Quebec, 53. 
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crisis of nationalism without restraint allegedly advocated by Bourassa and nationalistes.14 
Bourassa and his cohorts, she posited, could never live in harmony with English Canada. 
Instead, 
[the] Nationalists were convinced that the great majority of French Canadians 
believed that Canada had done enough for the Dominion war effort and that their 
sole obligation was to fight for their own native country. To force them to fight 
against their innermost conviction was to make revolutionaries out of the 
population of Quebec.15  
For Armstrong, the only acceptable Canadian nationalism could not stray across the edge 
between tradition and revolution. That would mean a denial of French Canada’s history. By 
pushing across it, the nationalistes became more than aberrant in her view; they became 
abhorrent. French Canadian nationalism must be inherently conservative, she alleged, couched 
in the safety of ensuring their survival to keep it well away from the modernized, horrific 
fanaticism of her time. Armstrong’s work was a shallow history in which Bourassa does not 
provide answers to political or cultural problems or react to unfolding events. He is a 
dangerous catalyst for French Canada, but one without agency. 
Robert Rumilly, best known for his voluminous history of Quebec, expressed a more 
positive portrayal of Henri Bourassa in a dedicated biography of the nationalist leader.16 
Almost hagiographic, Rumilly essentially credited Bourassa with creating modern Quebec 
nationalism. The book is a painstakingly detailed biography of Bourassa, but contains little 
critical historical inquiry. Take his analysis of Bourassa’s role in opposing conscription that is 
                                                 
14 Though this term and its implications are present throughout the work, see the introduction by Levitt for a 
succinct overview, Crisis of Quebec, Carleton Library Edition, v-xviii. 
15 Armstrong, Crisis of Quebec, 180. 
16 Robert Rumilly, Histoire de la province de Québec, (Montréal: Valiquette, 1940); Robert Rumilly, Henri 
Bourassa: La vie publique d’un grand Canadien, (Montréal: Éditions Chantecler, 1953).  Before Rumilly’s 
work, a brief analysis of Bourassa’s nationalism appeared in 1951, see Marine Leland, “Quelques observations 
sur le nationalisme d’Henri Bourassa,” Report of the Annual Meeting / Rapports annuels de la Société 
historique du Canada, 30, no. 1 (1951): 60-63. 
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typical of his writing: “Bourassa développe une pensée équilibrée dans un monde affolé. Il 
reste seul de sang-froid dans le déchaînement des passions.”17 Though offering intense detail 
on Bourassa’s actions, there is no questioning of why Bourassa acted the way he did. The use 
of purple prose between quotes from Bourassa or simple descriptions of what he was doing 
provides an invaluable narrative of Bourassa’s life but offers little analytic depth. Without 
investigating Bourassa’s motivations, Rumilly failed to take a key inquisitive step.  
Born in 1897, Rumilly was a committed nationalist, friends with Maurice Duplessis, 
and wrote extensively on the history of French Canada from the 1930s to his death in 1983. 
Both personal experience and ideological leanings obviously influenced his work on Bourassa. 
He was one of the founding members of the French Canadian Academy, formed to combat the 
colonial influence of both Britain and France on Quebec society.18 He presented Bourassa as a 
heroic figure in his monograph: “Je connais de jeunes Canadiens français qui, lorsque la 
situation nationale leur paraît décourageante, se réconfortent en pensant: << Il y a eu Bourassa 
! .. >> Ainsi Bourassa, le grand Bourassa que nous venons de perdre, continue de nous 
protéger.”19 The conclusion consoled grieving French Canadians that Bourassa’s spirit would 
live on in a new generation. As one historian noted, Rumilly’s history had the air of being 
incomplete and superficial, but he “rediscovered” Bourassa after his death and made him as 
captivating a figure to Quebec as he had been in life.20 
The contrast between Armstrong and Rumilly’s depictions of Henri Bourassa greatly 
affected historians who followed them. In one, he was a dangerous instigator and in the other a 
                                                 
17 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 577. 
18 Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1760-1945, (Toronto: MacMillan, 1956) 1076-1077. 
19 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 791. 
20 Anne Bourassa and Patrick Allen, “Le Bourassa de Rumilly: Deux appréciations,” in La Pensée de Henri 
Bourassa, F.A. Angers, ed., (Montréal: L’Action nationale, 1954) 198. 
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stalwart saviour of the patrie. While they describe his positions and his actions, they minimize 
their analysis of his ideas and the war’s impact on them. Instead, Bourassa ia a simplified 
character cast in a predetermined role, more useful as an influential force on the historical 
outcome than as an individual influenced by his experience. These two historians are key in 
comprehending the historiography surrounding Bourassa, which is marked by a different 
understanding among French and English Canadian historians. Equally, they reveal the 
problem of examining Bourassa in the First World War. He was not simply a Quebec 
nationaliste discussing domestic issues, but a legitimate and powerful dissenter who discussed 
international events with the same clarity and fervour as Canadian ones. 
Bourassa’s death in 1952 and the centenary of his birth in 1968 produced brief flurries 
of academic interest in his career.21 Joseph Levitt’s Henri Bourassa and the Golden Calf, 
published in 1969, represented the first serious academic monograph on the iconoclastic 
journalist. Levitt largely ignored the impact of the Great War, focusing instead on specific 
aspects of Bourassa’s career, and the nationaliste program for Quebec.22 By the 1970s, English-
                                                 
21 For example, see Martin P. O’Connell, “Ideas of Henri Bourassa,” Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science 19 (August 1953): 361-76; Martin P. O’Connell, “Henri Bourassa and Canadian 
Nationalism,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1954); F.A. Angers, ed., La pensée de Henri Bourassa, 
(Montréal: L’Action nationale, 1954). This is a published version of an issue of L’Action nationale that 
appeared in January, 1954; André Laurendeau, “Henri Bourassa,” in Our Living Tradition, R.L. McDougall 
ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962); James I.W. Corcoran, “Henri Bourassa et la guerre sud-
africaine (suite),” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française 19, no. 1 (1965): 84-105; V.C. Smith, “Moral 
Crusader: Henri Bourassa and the Empire, 1900-1916,” Queen’s Quarterly, 76, no.4 (Winter 1969): 635-47. 
An important non-academic contribution is Casey Murrow, Henri Bourassa and French-Canadian 
Nationalism: Opposition to Empire (Montréal: Harvest House, 1968). There are numerous theses that touch on 
Bourassa, some of those which specifically address the man are Warren Alexander Clubb, “Henri Bourassa 
and the First World War,” Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1974; and Charles Michael 
MacMillan, “Majorities and Minorities: Henri Bourassa and Language Rights in Canada,” Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1979. 
22 Joseph Levitt, Henri Bourassa and the Golden Calf: The Social Program of the Nationalists of Quebec 1900-
1914, (Ottawa: Les Éditions de l’Université d’Ottawa, 1972). Joseph Levitt, “La perspective nationaliste 
d’Henri Bourassa, 1896-1914,” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française 22, no. 4 (1969): 567-82. It is 
worthwhile to read Richard Jones’ reply to Levitt’s article, see Richard Jones, “La perspective nationaliste 
d’Henri Bourassa, 1896-1914: commentaire,” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française 22, no. 4 (1969): 582-
6. Joseph Levitt, Henri Bourassa on Imperialism and Bi-culturalism, 1900-1918 (Toronto: Copp Clark 
Publishing Company, 1970); Joseph Levitt, Henri Bourassa – Catholic Critic (Ottawa: Canadian Historical 
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speaking historians had reclaimed Bourassa as an important predecessor to the bicultural and 
bilingual world of post-1967 Canada and its iconic Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau. 
General histories, such as Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook’s overview of early twentieth 
century Canadian history, portray Bourassa prominently as an antagonist to English Canada 
and an important catalyst for the development of a modern Canadian identity.23 Historians have 
distilled Bourassa to his vision of a bilingual and bicultural Canada at the expense of his other 
views.  
The works of Ramsay Cook throughout the 1960s and into the 1990s demonstrate the 
compelling nature of Bourassa’s ideas on French and English Canada. In the midst of growing 
animosity between French and English Canadians as Quebec experienced the Quiet Revolution 
and a neo-nationalist separatist movement emerged, Cook published his 1966 book, Canada 
and the French Canadian Question. Each chapter explored different elements of Quebec’s 
history in Canada and its different forms of nationalism. Bourassa understandably played a 
large role in some chapters, which was mirrored in much of Cook’s future work.24 Cook 
                                                 
Association, 1976). Levitt’s chapter “Henri Bourassa: The Catholic Social Order and Canada’s Mission,” in 
Idéologies au Canada français 1900-1929, Fernand Dumont, Jean Hamelin, Fernand Harvey and Jean-Paul 
Montminy eds., (Quebec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1974), 192-222, ably demonstrates how easily the 
war can remain absent from otherwise comprehensive works, notably on 217. Jean Drolet’s succeeding 
chapter is similarly revealing, “Henri Bourassa: Une analyse de sa pensée,” in Idéologies au Canada français 
1900-1929, 223-50. 
23 Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1974) 274 and throughout. Michael Oliver, The Passionate Debate : The Social and Political Ideas of 
Quebec Nationalism, 1920-1945, (Montreal: Vehicule Press, 1991) also includes an excellent discussion of 
Bourassa’s role, though again purely within the realm of Quebec-Canadian politics.  Oliver’s book was 
originally written in 1956, but only published in 1991, as a result it has an older view of Bourassa that is not 
informed by the French-English tension of the 1960s, but still reflects on them with some hindsight. 
24 Ramsay Cook, Canada and the French Canadian Question, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966); Ramsay Cook, 
Provincial Autonomy, Minority Rights and the Compact Theory, 1867-1921, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969); 
Ramsay Cook, The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays on Nationalism and Politics in Canada, (Toronto: Macmillan, 
1971); Ramsay Cook, Canada, Québec and the Uses of Nationalism, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1986). Some of his most famous articles on Quebec appear in Ramsay Cook, Watching Quebec, Selected 
Essays, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005). For a more complete bibliography of Cook’s 
books and articles, see Michael D. Behiels and Marcel Martel, eds., Nation, Ideas, Identities: Essays in 
Honour of Ramsay Cook, (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2000) 233-237. 
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compared the nationaliste Bourassa to his neo-nationalist descendants like René Lévesque and 
the Parti Québécois, as well as his “successors” who were epitomized in the bilingual and 
bicultural policies of the Liberal Party and Pierre Trudeau. Bourassa’s antagonistic role during 
the war was minimized, if not ignored.  
In another vein, Susan Mann has offered several works on the history of Quebec to 
English Canadian audiences that mention Bourassa frequently. Mann’s study of Quebec in the 
1920s and the Action Française25 offers valuable insight into Bourassa’s views on feminism 
and women, which is otherwise understudied in the literature.26 Since the works of Mann and 
Cook however, English Canadian scholarship on Bourassa has stagnated. 
French Canadian historians have discussed Bourassa more recently and in greater 
detail. Réné Durocher’s 1971 article focused exclusively on Bourassa’s relationship with the 
Catholic Church during the war.  He used Bourassa’s correspondence to shed light on his 
disagreement between him and the Church hierarchy, but does not address other aspects of 
Bourassa’s war experience.27 Réal Bélanger’s entry in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography 
furnished an in-depth study of Bourassa but he limits the journalist’s role in the war to two 
paragraphs.28 The entry was a preliminary version of Bélanger’s two-volume biography of 
                                                 
25 Susan Mann, The Dream of a Nation a social and intellectual history of Quebec, (Toronto: Gage Publishing 
Ltd., 1983); Susan Mann, Action française: French Canadian nationalism in the twenties (Toronto, University 
of Toronto Press, 1975); Susan Mann, “Variations on a nationalist theme: Henri Bourassa and Abbé Groulx in 
the 1920’s,” Historical Papers, no.1, 5 (1970): 109-19 
26 Susan Mann, The Dream of a Nation, 184-200; Susan Mann, “Henri Bourassa et la question des femmes,” in 
Marie Lavigne and Yolande Pinard, eds., Les femmes dans la société québécoise: aspects historiques 
(Montréal: Boréal Express, 1977) 109-24; Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, “Henri Bourassa and ‘The Woman 
Question,’” Journal of Canadian Studies, 10 (1975): 3-11. See also, Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, “Nationalism, 
Feminism and Canadian Intellectual History,” Canadian Literature, 83 (Winter 1979): 7-20. 
27 René Durocher, “Henri Bourassa, les évêques et la guerre de 1914-1918,” Canadian Historical Association 
Historical Papers 6 (1971): 248-75; see also, René Durocher, “Un journaliste catholique au XXe siècle: Henri 
Bourassa,” in Pierre Hurtubise et al eds. Le laïc dans l’Église canadienne-française de 1830 à nos jours, 
(Montréal, 1972) 185-213. 
28 Réal Bélanger, “Bourassa, Henri,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online. Bélanger’s article has many 
additional titles dealing with Bourassa than listed here, particularly French languages sources. 
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Bourassa. The first volume was published in 2013 and covers the years between his birth to the 
outbreak of the First World War in 1914, while the second volume is forthcoming. It is without 
a doubt the most comprehensive and detailed work on Bourassa since Rumilly.29 Bélanger 
explores Bourassa’s upbringing and the first half of his political career while including a 
myriad of other details throughout.  
Sylvie Lacombe’s La rencontre de deux peuples élus, published in 2002, critically 
contrasts the religious nationalism of French Canada and the imperial nationalism of English 
Canada. Bourassa is the dominant figure used to analyse French Canada’s “ambition 
nationale.”30 Though her specific discussion of the First World War is brief, her analysis of the 
“hierarchical relationship” between Bourassa’s liberal political beliefs and conservative 
religious ones, as well as her concluding summation of his religious nationalism, offers 
sophisticated scholarship on Bourassa.31 Lacombe further examines Bourassa’s contradictory 
beliefs and their transformation during the war, which she argues had a radicalising effect upon 
him.32 Yet, even as Lacombe deepens our understanding of Bourassa and French Canadian 
                                                 
29 Réal Belanger, Henri Bourassa: Le fascinant destin d’un homme libre (1868-1914), (Quebec: Presses de 
l’Université de Laval, 2013). Bélanger also addresses Bourassa’s ideas in Réal Bélanger, “L’élite politique 
canadienne-française et l’Empire britannique: trois reflets représentatifs des perceptions canadiennes-
françaises,” in Imperial Canada 1867-1914: a selection of papers given at the University of Edinburgh’s 
Centre of Canadian Studies conference, May 1995, Colin Coates, ed., (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 
Centre of Canadian Studies, 1997) 122-140. 
30 Sylvie Lacombe, La rencontre de deux peuples élus : comparaison des ambitions nationale et impériale au 
Canada entre 1896 et 1920 (Sainte-Foy, Québec : Presses de l’Université Laval, 2002), 10. As a Quebec 
academic, Lacombe is unique in that she also discusses English Canadian imperialists through a nationalist 
lens, rather than simply a colonial one, a thesis Carl Berger argued three decades previously in Carl Berger, 
The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1970), 259. Ramsay Cook makes this point in his review of Lacombe’s book in Revue 
d’historique de l’Amérique française 56, no. 4 (2003): 557-60. 
31 Lacombe, La rencontre de deux peuples élus, 19-26, 37-124. For her discussion of Bourassa and the First World 
War, including his reaction to American neutrality and subsequent entry into the war, see 107-24. Her 
conclusion to the section of the book on Bourassa is both concise and informative, 122-4. Lacombe has also 
published “Henri Bourassa, un prophète ultramontain contre l’aplatissement moral du monde,” in G.Routhier 
and J.-P. Warren, eds., Les visages de la foi. Figures marquantes du catholicisme québécois, (Quebec: Fides, 
2003) 133-145. 
32 Sylvie Lacombe, “Entre l’autorité pontificale et la liberté nationale: l’anti-impérialisme britannique d’Henri 
Bourassa,” in Le Devoir : Un journal indépendant (1910-1995), eds. Robert Comeau and Luc Desrochers 
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nationalism, her work underplays his role a Canadian intellectual and commentator in the midst 
of the First World War.  
Some general intellectual histories of Quebec have addressed Bourassa’s ideas more 
broadly, notably the work of Yvan Lamonde, and offer French-speaking audiences more insight 
into the intellectual context surrounding Bourassa’s analysis than is available to English 
speakers.33 A few other French language works on Bourassa have appeared as popular 
histories, while the literature on the history of Le Devoir touches on his formative role in 
creating the newspaper.34 As with English Canadian works, Bourassa is a dominating figure in 
French Canadian history, and there are references to him in many studies of Quebec and the 
20th century.35 
The focus by both French and English Canadians on Bourassa’s domestic role has 
hampered an all-encompassing historical study of him and diminished some of his most 
impressive writing of the war. Most studies that touch on Bourassa’s thoughts during the war 
do so completely removed from the context of the war’s events. Since historians often focus on 
the domestic aspect of his editorials, it is understandable that they would not address his 
writing on the international aspects of the conflict. As a result, a reader of Canadian history has 
an incomplete picture of Bourassa’s life from 1914-1918. Few historians convey the 
                                                 
(Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1996), 273-81. She refers to his points of radicalisation in fn.3, 
273. 
33 Yvan Lamonde, Histoire Sociale des Idées au Québec 1896-1929 vol. II, (Quebec: Éditions Fides, 2004) 37-47 
addresses Quebec during the war, but Bourassa is present throughout. 
34 The most comprehensive work on Le Devoir is Robert Comeau and Luc Desrochers, eds., Le Devoir: un journal 
indépendant (1910-1995), (Sainte Foy, Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1996). A collection of 
Bourassa’s articles was published with some comment by its editor, see Pierre Anctil, ed., Fais ce que dois: 60 
éditoriaux pour comprendre Le Devoir sous Henri Bourassa 1910-1932, (Québec: Éditions du Septentrion, 
2010). A popular history of Bourassa was written by a journalist, Mario Cardinal, Pourquoi j’ai fondé Le 
Devoir: Henri Bourassa et son temps, (Montréal: Libre Expression, 2010). 
35 Many general French language studies exist, such as Paul André Linteau, René Durocher and Jean-Claude 
Robert, Histoire du Québec contemporain, de la Confédération à la Crise (1867-1929), (Montréal: Boréal 
Express, 1989). 
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exceptional nature of Bourassa’s reasoning and coherence on a wide variety of subjects during 
the turbulent war years. As Bélanger recently noted, Bourassa was one of Canada’s great 
wartime thinkers, and historians have not yet thoroughly examined the depth and breadth of his 
perspective.36 This study addresses this historiographical shortcoming by explicitly 
interrogating Bourassa’s wartime discourse and the events of the war that defined his 
experience. 
* * * 
The full story of the evolving philosophy of history after the Second World War and the 
path towards what historians over-excitedly call the “History Wars” of the 1980s and 1990s can 
be found in other works. Here it is sufficient to outline the methodology that underlines this 
work: contextual relativism. Gordon Wood describes contextual relativism emerging as a 
synthesis of the debates between modernist and post-modernist historians. It is grounded in 
“the reality of the past and our ability to say something true, however partial, about the past.”37 
Contextual relativists accept the post-modernist conclusion that we cannot escape the 
subjective influence of looking at the past from the present, but rejects the contention that we 
cannot write anything objective about the past. As Wood notes, such an approach 
“[undermines] the ground for any historical reconstruction at all.”38 While contextual relativists 
are informed by the postmodern warning that it is impossible not to impose our vision onto the 
past, they echo the traditional historical endeavour of recreating the past as it was, to the best 
of our scholarly ability.  
                                                 
36 Réal Bélanger, “Henri Bourassa and the First World War,” paper presented at the 1914-1918: The Making of 
the Modern World, Bill Graham Centre, University of Toronto, 30 July, 2014. 
37 Gordon Wood, The Purpose of the Past: Reflections on the Uses of History, (New York: Penguin Books, 2009) 
134. 
38 Gordon Wood, The Purpose of the Past, 5. 
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The challenge of the historian is to take the enormity and infinity of human experience 
that forms “the past” and translate into the written word. The responsibility to reconstruct the 
past as accurately as possible is paramount, but it is matched by a duty to make the past 
understood by our readers. In an attempt to address that concern, this book straddles biography 
and intellectual history. It discusses the complicated and often messy web of intellectual beliefs 
of an individual, Henri Bourassa, but tempers it with a chronological narrative of the First 
World War. Both intellectual history and historical biography have influenced the presentation 
of history contained within these pages, and both deserve some exploration. 
Like many historical fields, it is difficult to draw the borders of intellectual history and 
say, every book in this box is intellectual history, and everything outside of it is not. Still, if any 
definition is to be used, the best might be that from Robert Darnton. In a famous essay, he 
argued for four categories of intellectual history: 
the history of ideas (the study of systematic thought, usually in philosophical 
treatises), intellectual history proper (the study of informal thought, climates of 
opinion and literary movements), the social history of ideas (the study of 
ideologies and idea diffusion), and cultural history (the study of culture in the 
anthropological sense, including world views and collective mentalités).39 
Canadian historians offer a wide breadth of intellectual histories ranging across Darnton’s four 
categories.40 The earliest trend in Canadian intellectual history scholarship expressed 
“nationalism and the search for consensual values.” Michael Gauvreau has examined the 
                                                 
39 Robert Darnton, “Intellectual and Cultural History,” The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in 
the United States, Michael Kammen ed., (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) 337. Ramsay Cook presents 
common objections to Darnton’s list, see Ramsay Cook, “Canadian Intellectual History: What Has Been 
Done?,” Les Idées en mouvement: perspectives en histoire intellectuelle et culturelle du Canada, Damien-
Claude Bélanger, Sophie Coupal, Michel Ducharme, eds., (Quebec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2004) 
17. 
40 Ramsay Cook uses Darton’s definition to categorize Canadian Intellectual History in “Canadian Intellectual 
History: What Has Been Done?,”; Damien-Claude Bélanger and Michel Ducharme present a longer list of 
works, see their “Nouvelles orientations en histoire intellectuelle et culturelle du Canada: bibliographie 
sélective,” Les idées en mouvement: perspectives en histoire intellectuelle et culturelle du Canada, 263-272. 
The 2004 collection Les idées came out of a conference on Canadian intellectual history and the chapters 
within are a worthwhile read for any interested in Canadian intellectual history. 
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legacy of a generation of nationalist Canadian historians after the Second Word War, 
concluding that scholars writing intellectual history searched “for intellectuals as essential to 
the elaboration of a national consciousness and the idea that conflict must ultimately be 
resolved into consensus in order to produce a viable Canadian nation.”41 English and French 
Canadian historians sought to conflate individuals into a coherent national consensus, though 
in differing terms coloured by ongoing academic input on debates over Quebec sovereignty. 
Thus, when social historians questioned elitist and nationalist narratives in the 1980s, the 
predisposition of intellectual history towards national narratives made it an unfortunate 
casualty of the criticisms of “history from below,” even as that approach expanded historical 
study in new fruitful directions.  
As “history from below” expanded to become the dominant historical approach, fewer 
French and English historians wrote intellectual histories. The most successful of those that did 
took the “culturalist turn” and their research shifted from the individual to their institutional 
contexts and a social history of ideas that looked at “discourses, texts and representations in 
social experience or ‘practices,’” though many still clung to a need to explain Canada’s 
national consciousness in some form.42 For Gauvreau, intellectual histories that persist in 
ahistorically linking themselves to the development of national consensuses should give way to 
those that examine ideas within institutional context, such as the church, the university, or the 
state. In effect, the future of Canada’s intellectual history should be informed by the questions 
that social history poses about “hierarchy, sources of authority, disparities of power, and lines 
                                                 
41 Michael Gauvreau, “Beyond the Search for Intellectuals: On the Paucity of Paradigms in the Writing of 
Canadian Intellectual History,” in Thinkers & Dreamers: Historical Essays in Honour of Carl Berger, Gerald 
Friesen and Doug Owram eds., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011) 53-57. Allan Smith made a 
similar argument a decade earlier when he argued that even transnational and transborder histories implicitly 
reinforce “the sense that nation-maintenance was a matter of constant work and attention,” see Allan Smith, 
“Organizing Ideas and How They Work: The National-International Binary,” Les Idées en mouvement, 52. 
42 Michael Gauvreau, “Beyond the Search for Intellectuals,” 80. 
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of social tension and conflict in their own society.”43 
There has been much overlap between intellectual history and historical biography in 
Canada. The study of an individual can, as Clarence Karr noted, “reveal the complexity and 
interplay of thought as well as the origins of ideas.”44 This overlap meant both were open to 
similar criticisms.  In 1980, Robert Craig Brown anticipated social history’s critique of 
biography to a meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, warning that  
Biography must stand on its own. ... The biographer needs to ... disclose with 
sympathy and candor, and with such literary grace as he can command, as much 
as he can discover of his subject’s private and public life [and not to] satisfy the 
needs of the social historian ... [or] some contorted hybrid of biography and the 
monograph in social, political, economic, or cultural history.45  
Unfortunately for Brown his affirmation was poorly timed. In the 1980s historians moved 
away from trying to reconstruct the past of an individual. The “cultural turn” was already in 
motion when Brown gave his talk and new histories sought to deconstruct the past.  
Over the next three decades the same concerns from social history that Gauvreau raised 
about intellectual history were applied to historical biography. The 2000 issue of the Revue 
histoire de l’Amérique française debated the value of biography in that light. Among other 
topics, the authors discussed how historical biography must borrow from different 
epistemological and methodological approaches if it is to remain relevant. Yves Gingras 
concluded that historians undertaking biography still suffer from a deficient “tool box” “qui 
empêche les historiens de résoudre les problèmes qu’ils s’obstinent à poser,”46 while Hélène 
Pelletier-Baillargeon was more positive, reflecting that “histoire - et tout particulièrement la 
                                                 
43 Michael Gauvreau, “Beyond the Search for Intellectuals,” 54. 
44 Clarence Karr, “What Happened To Canadian Intellectual History?” Acadiensis, no.2, 18 (Spring 1999): 173. 
45 Robert Craig Brown, “Presidential Address: Biography in Canadian History,” Historical Papers, no.1, 15 
(1980): 7-8. 
46 Yves Gingras, “Pour une biographie sociologique,” Revue histoire de l’Amérique française no.1, 54 (2000): 
131. The rest of the articles can be found in the same issue, 67-131. 
20 
 
biographie historique - n’en finit jamais, elle non plus, de réactualiser les jeux de la liberté et 
du pouvoir dans la trace discontinue laissée par un destin singulier sur son époque et dans la 
mémoire de ses contemporains.”47 Though biography was a less popular method of historical 
analysis, they argued it still had much to offer Canadian historians in their explorations of the 
past. 
The Dictionary of Canadian Biography and the Journal of Historical Biography 
continued to publish concise and illuminating sketches of historical figures that highlighted its 
value as a narrative form, but most Canadian historians moved away from studying individuals 
in the way that Craig Brown outlined. Susan Margarey pointed to three important questions for 
biographers in 2008: Public or private? Individual or Society? Truth or beauty?48 If a journal 
like Historical Biography is any indication, historians today write works on the private and 
public life on an individual, reflecting on society, while offering what “truth” they can. Much 
like intellectual history’s broadening scope from purely a history of ideas to the history of 
ideas’ impact on society, historical biography has moved from an inward perspective of an 
individual life, to one which uses individuals as a lens to study larger questions: a sort of social 
history of the individual. 
Considering these developments during the last three decades of Canadian scholarship, 
an intellectual biography that does not reflect on broader societal themes sits in an awkward 
milieu between the two fields of intellectual history and historical biography. This work is a 
study of Henri Bourassa during the First World War that traces its impact on his beliefs about 
Canada and the world. It emphasizes the terrible consequences of the conflict through one 
                                                 
47 Hélène Pelletier-Baillargeon, “La biographie: un subtil alliage d’histoire et de littérature,” Revue histoire de 
l’Amérique française no.1, 54 (2000): 80. 
48 Susan Magarey, “Three Questions for Biographers: Public or Private? Individual or Society? Truth or Beauty?,” 
Journal of Historical Biography no.1, 4 (2008): 1-26. 
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man’s experience of it -- even removed as he was from the front lines. As a biography, it 
recounts a period in his life that seems to separate his rising political influence and activity in 
the years before the Great War from his diminishing role afterwards. As an intellectual history, 
it strives to reveal the transformative nature of the war on a single individual (an intellectual). 
It does not seek to insert Bourassa’s beliefs into a historical narrative of the French or English 
Canadian war experience: it simply examines his beliefs as they were expressed at the time.  
There is no doubt that Bourassa was a national figure who understood the national and 
international currents of his age, but the extent to which he influenced those currents is not 
explicitly questioned here. This book does not reflect on the nature of his society or his times 
other than through Bourassa’s own analysis of it. Given the different (and perfectly justifiable 
and worthy) direction of most Canadian scholarship, it is better to look for inspiration outside 
of Canada’s borders towards other works reflecting on intellectual history and historical 
biography. 
While Darnton’s definitions are useful to understand how to categorize other works, it 
is less helpful as a methodological approach for a “history of beliefs.” In trying to discuss 
Bourassa’s beliefs during the war, Mark Bevir’s The Logic of the History of Ideas offers some 
useful directions. Unlike Canadian intellectual historians, who have largely ignored the 
“linguistic turn” in favour of the cultural one,49 Bevir’s book is rooted in the philosophical 
debate over the meaning of language and texts for historians.50 He describes the complex 
                                                 
49 Gauvreau, “Beyond the Search for Intellectuals,” 55. 
50 Recently, the Journal of the History of Ideas had a section reviewing Bevir’s work, see “Post-Analytic 
Historicism,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 73 4 (October, 2012):. Bevir fits between foundational and post-
structuralist positions on the history of thought, though as Daniel I. O’Neill points out in his article in the 
collection above, Bevir clearly distinguishes himself from the Cambridge School associated with Quentin 
Skinner and J.G.A Pollock, see Daniel I. O’Neill, “Revisiting the Middle Way: The Logic of the History of 
Ideas after more than a Decade,” Journal of the History of Ideas, no. 4, 73 (October, 2012): 584, 589-591. 
Bevir concisely summarizes his ideas in his contribution: “The Logic described and defended a post-analytic 
historicism. As a historicist, I argued that human life was ineluctably historical, so explanations of ideas, texts, 
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process of establishing an intellectual history of beliefs. It must put together what Bevir calls a 
“spherical jigsaw,” where “each piece of the jigsaw, each belief, belongs where it does by 
virtue of the pieces around it. The puzzler completes the jigsaw by joining all the pieces 
together to form a single picture which then makes sense of each individual piece.”51 Bevir 
balances synchronic belief, where a single belief exists in one moment as part of a wider web 
against the background of inherited traditions, with a diachronic one, the examination of 
multiple beliefs changing over time. He uses the term “dilemma” to describe situations that 
challenge beliefs and when individuals must exercise their agency in transforming or 
maintaining them. In examining the origins of a web of beliefs and the dilemmas that 
individuals encounter, historians can trace how and why those beliefs change over time.52 
There is a growing literature discussing Bevir’s approach.53 Bevir’s advice that 
“historians should assume that people meant what they said unless there is evidence to the 
contrary” has an appealing simplicity to it,54 but critics have not accepted his emphasis on 
believing an individual’s words over a textual interpretation. Vivienne Brown has criticized 
Bevir’s approach and emphasized that historians must search for unintended and deeper 
                                                 
actions, and practices should rely on historical narratives, not appeals to formal classifications, correlations, 
systems, or models.... In the Logic, I defended a radical historicism, according to which human life consists 
solely of a flux of activity without any basis in a formal structure or teleological movement. There are just 
particular individuals engaged in particular actions in accord with their particular beliefs and desires. My 
radical historicism restated the idea that explanations of human life should take the form of historical 
narratives. Yet, because I rejected developmental perspectives with their presumed continuities, I gave a 
nominalist analysis of aggregate concepts (such as ‘‘language,’’ ‘‘discourse,’’ and ‘‘structure’’) as referring 
only to the contingent beliefs and actions of particular individuals,” Mark Bevir, “Post-Analytic Historicism,” 
657-658. 
51 Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 191. 
52 Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, Chapters 5-6. For his emphasis on individual agency and its role in 
shaping intellectual thought, see 49. 
53 In addition to the articles of the Journal of History Ideas, also see the articles included in a special issue of 
Intellectual History Review, titled “Post-Analytic Hermeneutics: Themes from Mark Bevir’s Philosophy of 
History,” 21 1 (March 2011): 1-119. 
54 Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, 150. 
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meaning in textual sources.55 Bevir’s webs of beliefs may be a worthwhile method for writing 
intellectual history, but they must be balanced by the context of an individual’s “life and 
environment.”56 Examining individuals without context risks their own objectivity, or that of 
the historian, overwhelming the factual nature of academic writing. Attention to both allows 
historians to attempt to reconstruct accurately a “history of beliefs.”57 
Historical biography requires a similarly nuanced approach. One of the conclusions of 
Bevir’s philosophical discussion of intellectual history is that by examining the individual 
                                                 
55 Vivienne Brown, “On Some Problems with Weak Intentionalism for Intellectual History,” History and Theory, 
41 (May 2002): 198-208. Bevir positions himself as a weak intentionalist in that an author’s intention can be 
ascertained through an examination of their “web of beliefs” via works/texts and the meaning of their 
statements changes for each individual, be it author or reader. Brown rejects examining the author since 
fundamentally there is “there is no “object” of which the historian can seek to give an adequate account other 
than the work/text itself,” (207) as only texts exist as part of the historical record, not the author themselves. 
James Connelly summarizes this specific disagreement between Bevir and Brown as “whether they think that 
intentions can be inferred from texts or whether intentions are used to help us understand or explain texts,” in 
“The Meaning of Intention and Meaning in Mark Bevir and Vivienne Brown,” Intellectual History Review, 
no.1, 21 (March 2011): 104. Still, A.P. Martinpuinch has a clearer rejection of Brown’s criticism: 
“identification of the hermeneutic meaning depends to a large extent on identification of the literal meaning of 
a text because it is strong evidence of the hermeneutic meaning. Identification of the hermeneutic meaning is 
the goal; identification of the literal meaning is one of the means of achieving that goal. So the objection that 
‘authorial intention ordinarily is an epistemological redundancy’ rests on the mistaken belief that the author’s 
intentions are the means of discovering interpretation rather than its goal,” A.P Martinpuinch, “A Moderate 
Logic of the History of Ideas,” Journal of the History of Ideas, no.4, 73 (October, 2012): 611. 
56 Jonathan Floyd, “Why the History of Ideas Needs More Than Just Ideas,” Intellectual History Review, no.1, 21 
(2011):42. Floyd advises Bevir to place himself between the “material and the ideational,” just as he has 
positioned himself between empiricism and postmodernism, and determinism and autonomy. 
57 In this sense, I am rejecting specific methodological or theoretical approaches to history, other than general ones 
of studying “beliefs” (intellectual history) and an individual (historical biography) to reconstruct a facet of past 
experience as much as the sources allow against the backdrop of social and political contexts (contextual 
reconstruction). Thus I use Bevir’s philosophy of history to partly inform this decision as well as justify it. It is 
important to note that Bevir’s defence of radical historicism in 2012 that “human life consists solely of a flux 
of activity without any basis in a formal structure or teleological movement” and that “purely natural processes 
happen temporarily to have produced a species that acts, and that thinks about its actions; that is all. Human 
history consists solely of the flux of activity. There are no structures (not even structures of difference) that 
explain this activity, nor—ultimately—are there meanings that redeem it,” is not one I wholly accept; Bevir, 
“Post-Analytic Historicism,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 658, 665. Martinpuinch’s critique of Bevir’s 
approach is far more useful for a historian. He writes that “Bevir is right to defend objectivity, right to reject 
the idea that there are ‘given truths,’ and right to deny the possibility of a logic of discovery; but wrong, I 
think, to give the impression occasionally that he gives up on truth altogether, especially since he thinks 
historians can have ‘accurate knowledge of past intentions,’” and Martinpuinch continued, “even if Bevir is 
right to say that ‘human life consists solely of a flux of activity without any basis in a formal structure or 
teleological movement,’ he is not right in concluding that this flux cannot be categorized by words or ideas 
that human beings construct. ‘Aggregate concepts’ that refer ‘only to the contingent beliefs and actions of 
particular individuals’ nonetheless have some general application. And these constructions are generally not 
divorced from reality”; A.P Martinpuinch, “A Moderate Logic of the History of Ideas,” 619, 624. 
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reaction to “dilemmas” when they change or confirm their belief grants them the agency of 
shaping their beliefs independent of an impersonal force or model of history. This human 
element to history is at the core of historical biography as well.  
Recently J.M. Sardica defended historical biography in Rethinking History after several 
decades of criticisms from historians who had discarded it as a parochial and exclusionary 
vision of the past. He emphasizes “the purposes and value it allows as an instrument of 
knowledge” that supports a “‘conventional’ and reconstructionist approach to historical 
biography.”58 He argues that historical biography can achieve the goal of “history from below” 
as much as it once fulfilled the “history from above” that preceded it. Its ability to reflect on 
larger questions of history while combining a more literary and communicable style is 
worthwhile. Historical biography, he notes, “represents a worthy academic work aimed at the 
greater public, a resurrection of one individual life and also a gateway to a larger understanding 
of one given frame of time and space with its prevailing social, cultural, moral, political, 
institutional and economic realities.”59 The history of a single life uses a different lens for its 
examination of the past. Its utility is only reinforced when confronted with the “all too 
fragmented and liquid present day societies and intellectual structures [as] the writing of past 
lives becomes a sort of necessary connecting thread, providing human sense and moral lights to 
map regular lives and model inspirations to inform future options.”60 Historical biography, 
though limited in scope, allows readers to immerse themselves in an individual’s view of the 
world that is entirely biased. Though this narrow view diminishes the scope of historical 
analysis, in return it provides an individual certainty about what was known and not known.  
                                                 
58 J.M. Sardica, “The content and form of ‘conventional’ historical biography,” Rethinking History: The Journal 
of Theory and Practice, no.4, 17 (2013): 383-384. 
59 J.M. Sardica, “The content and form of ‘conventional’ historical biography,” 393. 
60 J.M. Sardica, “The content and form of ‘conventional’ historical biography,” 396. 
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Thus the following chapters are inspired by Bevir’s philosophy for intellectual history 
and Sardica’s affirmation of historical biography. It is not a complete intellectual history of an 
idea belonging to a group nor a complete biography of a single individual. It describes Henri 
Bourassa’s web of beliefs about the conflict and the dilemmas he encountered that transformed 
him. His views on imperialism, French and English Canada, religion and international affairs 
all informed his analyses of Canada’s war experience. Each were the result of a long 
contemplative career and the events of the war impacted them. As we will see, the Bourassa 
who emerged from the war in 1918 was not the man who entered it in 1914. This simple and 
factual observation reveals nothing of his struggle to stay loyal to his beliefs, of the complex 
politics, desires, and fears of wartime Canada, or the terrible power of modern war over the 
societies that fought them. Bourassa would know of these all too well by war’s end, but in 
1914 he carried none of those burdens. 
* * * 
The first chapter of this dissertation reviews Bourassa’s life before the war. It 
introduces the major events that defined his career. From his entry onto the federal stage as a 
member of Wilfrid Laurier’s Liberal Party in 1896, it traces his growing dissatisfaction with 
Laurier’s treatment of French Canada. Bourassa did not accept Laurier’s moderation towards 
imperialist ideology, particularly when he allowed volunteers to fight in the Boer War. 
Bourassa believed that Laurier’s acquiescence to Britain’s request for aid set a dangerous 
precedent that forever committed Canada to British foreign endeavours. Imperialism’s growing 
influence on Canadian politics pushed Bourassa to look for other allies within his home 
province. As an influential member of the French Canadian nationalistes, he began his role as a 
non-partisan commentator on Canadian politics. He was deeply involved in national events like 
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the debate over a Canadian Navy, the 1911 election, and continuing debates over the role of 
French Canadians in Confederation. This chapter also explores the intellectual and historical 
context of Bourassa’s career that subsequently shaped his response to the First World War. 
Chapter Two turns to the first months of the war. It presents Bourassa’s initial support 
for Canadian involvement as he asked for moderation and a limited war effort, but ultimately 
affirmed that the war was worth fighting. It details the response of his English and French 
Canadian critics, as their hostility played a crucial role in isolating Bourassa from the rest of 
the country. In the last months of 1914, he alone critically examined the war. Not even fellow 
nationalist J.S. Ewart was prepared to contravene the dominant Canadian narrative developing 
about the war. Bourassa presented to his readers a detailed exploration of the causes of the war, 
which according to him was not simply the defence of Belgium but reflected British interests in 
Europe as well as Russian claims to Constantinople. He urged his fellow Canadians to 
approach the war in pursuit of Canadian -- not British -- goals. Although some commentators 
agreed Bourassa had a right to express his views, his attempts to communicate his thoughts on 
the war to an audience in Ottawa nearly caused a riot in December 1914. The year ended with 
Bourassa realizing that English Canada cared little for the substance and tone of his arguments. 
Chapter Three deals with 1915 as Bourassa searched for other voices in the world that 
opposed the war. He reviewed the work of Britain’s Union of Democratic Control as well as 
the efforts of Pope Benedict XV to mediate the conflict. Events like the Battle of 2nd Ypres and 
the sinking of the Lusitania, which convinced others of the war’s necessity, had little impact on 
the French Canadian journalist. Instead, he scorned the Canadian war effort that only seemed to 
grow more extensive and encompassing. That December, he published his first major book on 
the war, Que Devons Nous à l’Angleterre?, which summarized his opposition to the conflict. 
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He furnished a wide-ranging historical review of Canadian history to argue that Canada had no 
obligation to fight Britain’s war. Britain was obliged to defend Canada, but there was no 
reciprocal relationship. By unquestioningly approving Canada’s entry into the war, Bourassa 
believed that an “imperialist revolution” was taking place. Its transformation of the Canadian 
nation could not continue unimpeded, and Bourassa vowed to continue combatting its 
influence. 
Chapter Four explores Bourassa’s correspondence with his cousin serving in the 
Canadian army, Talbot Mercer Papineau, in the summer of 1916. It begins with Bourassa 
disavowing any support for the war in January at the annual celebration of Le Devoir’s 
anniversary. From this point onward, Bourassa’s writings become increasingly hostile to the 
forces supporting the war in French and English Canada, including the Catholic episcopacy. He 
published another book, Hier, Aujourd’hui, Demain, that repeated his arguments from 
December. Bourassa expanded his arguments about the nature of the imperialist revolution to 
include its influence on Quebec’s Catholic hierarchy. He also envisioned what the war’s end 
might look like, and emphatically supported independence from Britain. His half French 
Canadian and half American cousin, Talbot Papineau, had joined the Canadian forces in August 
1914.  Papineau’s time in the trenches profoundly affected his political beliefs about the war 
and he wrote to Bourassa urging him to change his views.  Bourassa dismissed Papineau’s 
arguments, as they paid no attention to Bourassa’s deep exploration of the war from the 
previous months. Papineau lectured him about the war’s meaning and significance without any 
knowledge that Bourassa had already set out a contrary position to Papineau in great detail. 
Chapter Five focuses on Bourassa’s examination of international issues. He affirmed 
support for the worldly perspective of Pope Benedict in August 1916 and studied the goals and 
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plans of the Union of Democratic Control. In December, he detailed the peace proposal from 
Germany and the Allied response to it for his readers, asking that it be considered honestly if 
only because it held the possibility of ending the terrible conflict. Likewise, he supported 
President Wilson’s request that the belligerent nations clearly explain their war aims. In the 
early months of 1917, the United States was gradually more involved in the war and eventually 
entered it that April. Bourassa, who often visited the United States at this time, offered a 
comprehensive perspective of American politics and the reasons why they had entered the war 
after three years of neutrality. Bourassa analysed these international events in far more depth 
than any other Canadian writer did. In his assessment, the failure to achieve peace and the 
American entry further emphasized the futility of the war and the growing threat of militarism. 
Chapter Six returns to the homefront as Bourassa confronted Canada’s enactment of 
conscription legislation in May 1917. Forced military service was an important element of a 
militarist society, and Bourassa opposed it at all costs. Prime Minister Robert Borden’s 
involvement in the Imperial War Cabinet, which nominally gave a voice to Canada in imperial 
affairs, was of little importance to Bourassa unless it was matched by a reasonable policy 
focused on Canada’s national interests. The ineffectiveness of Borden’s new role was clear 
when, upon his return to Canada, he announced that there would be Canadian conscription. 
Bourassa warned that society could only withstand so much pressure before something broke. 
He foresaw violence and unrest if conscription was imposed upon people who could not 
express themselves democratically. The journalist denounced the lacklustre debate in the House 
of Commons when few federal politicians turned against the war that made conscription 
necessary. Violence that erupted in Montreal that summer confirmed Bourassa’s fears. 
Chapter Seven covers the final months of Bourassa’s commentary during the war. It 
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analyses his reaction to Borden’s election legislation in August and September 1917, as well as 
Borden’s successful efforts to forge a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals in favour of 
conscription. Bourassa and Laurier reunited after almost two decades to oppose the 
conscriptionists, with both perceiving the dominance of English Canadians as a threat to 
Canada’s national unity. If English Canadians controlled Parliament, they could pass 
legislation without any concern for French Canadian views. After Borden won the election that 
December, Bourassa lamented the isolation of French Canada – isolated because they alone 
had stayed loyal to the Canada of 1867, while the rest of the country embraced militarism and 
total war. Bourassa’s writing became increasingly dissentious as he continued to hope for a 
peaceful end to the war. As men were called up for conscription in March 1918, riots broke out 
in Quebec. Bourassa urged for calm, anxious that social unrest might turn towards rebellion or 
revolution. The Easter Riots were quelled, but the federal government passed new censorship 
laws as a result. Bourassa voluntarily agreed to stop writing in Le Devoir, and his commentary 
ceased from April 1918 until the end of the war. 
By war’s end, Bourassa was not the same man as the one who had witnessed the war’s 
beginning in 1914. His liberalism, once firmly entrenched in a classical British form, shifted 
left as he aligned with the views of radical liberals and socialists in Britain opposed to the war 
– though he perhaps did not realise it. His nationalist dream of a Canadian identity that united 
its French and English peoples seemed impossible after the crisis over conscription and the 
December 1917 election. His vision of bilingual, bicultural and liberal Canada that he had 
fostered for decades was dimmed. Bourassa emerged from the war doubting the capability of 
humanity to resolve the problems that plagued it. Instead, he turned towards his Catholic faith 
as the last bastion of rationality and hope for a broken world. It seemed to him that only the 
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compassionate stance of Pope Benedict XV survived the war uncorrupted. Elsewhere, the 
war’s sacrifices and totality left no space for moderation, sound judgement, or good will. 
Though he never set foot on the battlefields, Bourassa’s war was still a traumatic and haunting 
experience. 
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Chapter 1: Fais ce que dois! (1867-1914) 
 
Born in 1868, Henri Bourassa was the grandson of famed Lower Canadian rebel and 
republican radical Louis-Joseph Papineau. As one biographer notes, he had politics in his blood 
and it coloured every aspect of his life from an early age.1 His father, Napoléon Bourassa, was 
an artist and married Papineau’s daughter, Azélie, who died six months after the birth of Henri. 
His mother’s death left a gap in Henri’s family but his relatives stepped in to help raise the 
intelligent boy. His uncle Augustin-Médard Bourassa, an ultramontane Oblate missionary, 
exposed him to his library at a young age. The young boy read the works of Catholic writers 
Louis Veuillot, Joseph de Maistre, and Jules-Paul Tardivel, all of whom would influence his 
intellectual development. Henri Bourassa recalled that it was “dans la bibliothèque de mon 
oncle et dans la lecture de L’Univers, que j’ai puisé pour toujours mes notions sure le rôle de 
l’Église dans la société, sur les relations qui doivent exister entre l’Église et les chefs civils.”2 
Bourassa’s early exposure to the ultramontane vision of Catholicism had a lasting effect, 
marking him with deeply devout faith.  
Catholicism had played a powerful role in the history of French Canada. French 
colonists settled along the St. Lawrence in New France during the 17th century before the 
British conquest during the Seven Years War in 1759. Known simply as “the Conquest,” 
British rule was relatively benign. Most of New France’s ruling class fled and left behind 
Catholic priests and bishops, who took on the role of guiding the conquered canadiens. Under 
their leadership, the former colony refused to fight alongside the Americans during their 
                                                 
1 Réal Bélanger, Henri Bourassa: Le fascinant destin d’un homme libre (1868-1914), (Quebec: Presses de 
l’Université de Laval, 2013) 16. 
2 From his Mémoire speeches in 1943, where Bourassa recounted his life to audiences in Quebec, as quoted in 
Réal Bélanger, Henri Bourassa, 4. 
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revolution or in the War of 1812 a generation later. French Canadians existed together with 
their neighbouring colony of Upper Canada and the Maritime colonies on the coast as part of 
the Second British North America.  
In the aftermath of the failed rebellions of 1837-38 that advocated for republican and 
secular control, the Catholic Church emerged as an even more powerful force in Quebec 
society and politics. The fading influence of the Rebellions’ republican Patriotes and the union 
of Lower and Upper Canada in 1841 marked the defeat of Quebec’s liberal political elite. In 
place of a liberal national identity, conservative nationalism arose as “the Catholic Church took 
over the moral and political leadership required to define the nation.”3 A Quebec identity tied 
to the survival of Catholicism, the French language, and Quebec culture soon emerged among 
the Canadian minority. Known by the term survivance, this connection of language and 
religion to their cultural and national purpose, or what Sylvie Lacombe terms “national 
ambition,”4 became central to their identities. So much so, that Lacombe has termed French 
Canada (and Quebec in particular) not as a nation-state but as a “Church-Nation.” Lacombe 
writes that “the quasi-state like exercise of extra-institutional functions by the Church was 
made possible through the liberalization of the religious sphere and by the fracturing of civil 
society along confessional lines.”5 By the late 19th century, the Catholic Church had become 
the dominant social and cultural institution of French Canadian society. The religiosity of its 
citizens defined many of their political struggles. 
Among its most fervent believers were Ultramontane Catholics such as Henri Bourassa 
                                                 
3 Sylvie Lacombe, “French Canada: The Rise and Decline of a ‘Church Nation,’” Quebec Studies, 48 (Fall 
2009/Winter 2010): 138. 
4 Sylvie Lacombe, La rencontre de deux peuples élus : comparaison des ambitions nationale et impériale au 
Canada entre 1896 et 1920, (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2002) 10. 
5 Lacombe, “French Canada: The Rise and Decline of a ‘Church Nation,’” 145-46. 
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and his uncle Augustin. Ultramontanism was first a term used to describe location, as any 
Catholics north of the Swiss Alps were “over the mountain” from Rome. Over time it became a 
description for all European Catholics who looked to Rome for direction. French Canadian 
ultramontanists, like Bishop J.J. Lartigue of Montreal, his successor Ignace Bourget, and 
Bishop L.F. Laflèche of Trois Rivières, believed their sacred duty was to protect and preserve 
French Canadian Catholicism in North America. Laflèche released a booklet of articles in 
1866, Quelques considérations sur les rapports de la société civile avec la religion et la 
famille, where he outlined the role of Catholicism in Quebec society. He defended the “mission 
providentielle” that had formed and sustained the Catholic state in North America and 
proclaimed that French Canadian survival in North America was their solemn Catholic duty.6 
Laflèche’s ideas had a lasting impact on Quebec Catholicism as future generations of thinkers 
and practitioners adopted his views. They reflected the observation of Michael Gauvreau and 
Nancy Christie, who write that “religion is not an identity, it is an ideological system. ... [It is] 
a set of structured ideas that specific groups and institutions attempt to make authoritative in 
various historical contexts as the dominant formulator of social values.”7 For Ultramontane 
Catholics like the Bourassas, the Catholic Church’s expression of those social values were 
beyond reproach. There was no power greater than God, and his representative on Earth was 
the Pope, who was the voice of God in human affairs. Bourassa’s initiation into these ideas 
would colour his political beliefs for his entire career. 
Bourassa was exposed to other less conservative strains of thought as well. His aunt 
                                                 
6 Louis-François Laflèche, Quelques considérations sur les rapports de la société civile avec la religion et la 
famille, (Montréal, 1866) 47. See also, Nive Voisine, “LAFLÈCHE, LOUIS-FRANÇOIS,” in Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, vol. 12, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed October 4, 2014, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/lafleche_louis_francois_12E.html. 
7 Michael Gauvreau and Nancy Christie, “Modalities of Social Authority: Suggesting an Interface for Religious 
and Social History,” Histoires Sociales/Social History, no. 36, 71 (May 2003): 15. 
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Ezilda Papineau helped raise the young Bourassa, and even as she instilled in him a lifelong 
belief in ultramontanism, she introduced him to non-French writers like Walter Scott and James 
Fenimore Cooper. By the age of nine, he had read Émile Keller’s Histoire de France and a 
French translation of John Lingard’s History of England. Often the young Bourassa listened to 
debates between his father and his father’s friends about the social and political problems of 
the day. He excelled in his studies under the supervision of private tutors and as a student at 
various schools. For two years, he attended the Catholic Commercial Academy in Montreal, 
and briefly enrolled at the École Polytechnique in 1885, then switched focus to religious 
studies at the Holy Cross College in Massachusetts where he perfected his English. Bourassa 
drifted from career to career, even attending law school in the late 1890s, but never settled on 
one profession or the priesthood. Instead, he gained wide-ranging knowledge of many subjects 
and a keen passion for debate and critical thinking. Eventually, he found his calling in politics.8 
On 22 November 1885, he was among the crowd that gathered to hear French Canadian 
politicians rally the province against the execution of Métis rebel Louis Riel. Riel had brought 
Manitoba into Confederation in 1870 while securing the rights of its Métis and French 
Canadian Catholic peoples against English Canadian domination. Part of the deal was the exile 
of Riel from the young Dominion for the murder of a Protestant, Thomas Scott. Fifteen years 
later, he returned to lead a Métis rebellion in Saskatchewan and proclaimed himself a 
messianic prophet leading his chosen people to freedom.9 This time authorities caught Riel and 
                                                 
8 Réal Bélanger, Henri Bourassa, 13-14. 
9 For some of the traditional literature on Riel, see George Stanley, Louis Riel, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 
1963) and Thomas Flanagan, Louis ‘David’ Riel: Prophet of the New World, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1979). More recently, Riel has been re-envisioned as a Métis Father of Confederation and a sort of 
prototypical modern Canadian, see Jennifer Reid, Louis Riel and the Creation of Modern Canada: Mythic 
Discourse and the Postcolonial State, (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 2008). Adam Gaudry 
has critically addressed both John Ralston Saul and Jennifer Reid’s treatment of Riel as a Métis Canadian in 
“The Métis-ization of Canada: The Process of Claiming Louis Riel, Métissage, and the Métis People as 
Canada’s Mythical Origin,” aboriginal policy studies, no. 2 2 (2013): 64–87. Geoff Read and Todd Webb 
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tried him for treason. French Canadians were outraged. They believed that Riel’s madness 
obviated his responsibility and the government had equal blame in rousing the rebel Métis to 
action. Riel’s unquestioned indictment in the eyes of the English Canadian press alongside the 
subsequent “show trial” that sentenced him to execution demonstrated that the government had 
little interest in addressing the minority rights that Riel defended.10 French Canadians publicly 
decried the decision as racially and religiously motivated while the Opposition Liberals gladly 
attacked John A. Macdonald’s Conservative government on the issue. 
One of the largest gatherings held by French Canadian politicians took place in 
November at Montreal’s Champs-de-Mars. Future Liberal Party leader Wilfrid Laurier and 
future Quebec Premier Honoré Mercier took the stage and in the audience was a young Henri 
Bourassa. “Had I been born on the banks of the Saskatchewan,” Laurier famously declared to a 
captive audience, “I would myself have shouldered a musket to fight against the neglect of 
governments and the shameless greed of speculators.”11 For French Canadians and the young 
Bourassa, Laurier’s words cemented his place as a leader who would defend their rights in the 
Dominion of Canada. 
The speeches convinced Bourassa to enter politics. He was elected mayor of his 
childhood home of Montebello in January 1890 at the age of twenty-one. By 1896, he was the 
successful Liberal candidate for the riding of Labelle in the federal election that brought 
Wilfrid Laurier to power with significant French Canadian support. The impressive Bourassa 
was Laurier’s protégé and the Liberal leader made sure to offer guidance to the young new 
                                                 
have examined the international reaction to Riel, who drew comparisons to the Sudanese religious zealot, the 
Mahdi, see Geoff Read and Todd Webb, “‘The Catholic Mahdi of the North West’: Louis Riel and the Metis 
Resistance in Transatlantic and Imperial Context,” The Canadian Historical Review, no. 2 93 (June, 2012): 
171-195. 
10 A. I. Silver, The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation, 1864-1900, 2nd ed., (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1997) 156-159. 
11 Oscar Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1965) 88. 
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Member of Parliament.12 
Bourassa’s early political life as a Member of Parliament was difficult. He tried to 
reconcile the tumultuous world of politics and his deep-rooted religious faith. After the 
election, Laurier appointed him part of the delegation to resolve the crisis of Manitoba Schools, 
where in 1890 the provincial government restricted the rights of French Canadians to learn 
their native tongue. The resulting compromise between Laurier and Manitoba Premier Thomas 
Greenway, appropriately named the Laurier-Greenway Agreement, effectively enforced the 
status quo. It maintained a single public school system in Manitoba, but the agreement allowed 
for schools with enough French-speaking students to offer French language education. French 
Canadian Catholics appealed to the Vatican for an intervention as Laurier also sent a delegation 
to Rome. Eventually, the Catholic Church dispatched an apostolic delegate, Archbishop 
Raphael Merry del Val, to Canada. Del Val decided that as long as the Laurier government 
made some administrative changes, it was best for Canadian Catholics to side with Laurier.13 In 
December 1897, Pope Leo XIII affirmed that the Laurier-Greenway agreement was “defective, 
imperfect, insufficient,” but it was a worthwhile remedy and might eventually lead to better 
legislation. Leo warned that “nothing would be more detrimental than discord: union of minds 
and harmony of action is required.” This clearly rejected Quebec’s opposition to Laurier’s 
solution.14  
The papal position did not prevent Bourassa from feeling unsettled by Laurier’s refusal 
to defend the rights of the French Canadian Catholics that he had so eloquently championed at 
                                                 
12 Réal Bélanger, Henri Bourassa, 44. 
13 Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1974) 
14 Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Affari vos by Pope Leo XIII On the Manitoba School Question December 8, 1897, as 
reproduced in Claude Bélanger, “Documents in Quebec History,” Marianopolis College, accessed 30 
September, 2014, http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/docs/manitoba/1897-5.htm. 
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the Champs-de-Mars in 1885. Almost a decade later in the midst of another school crisis (this 
time in the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan), Bourassa reflected on his Manitoba 
experience and denounced “l’histoire du Manitoba et de ses déceptions, des abus de pouvoir, 
des faiblesses et des fourberies qu’elle a consignés dans nos annales.”15 In 1896, however, 
Bourassa was still willing to work with his Liberal leader. 
After a disappointing eight-day term as editor of the radical liberal paper La Patrie, 
where Liberal party members rejected Bourassa’s ultramontane perspective on moderate 
liberalism, Laurier hoped to expose his protégé to the world of international politics. The Prime 
Minister assigned the young man as secretary for the joint Anglo-American commission 
meeting in Quebec to settle a dispute over the Alaskan boundary between the United States and 
Canada.16 The talks collapsed within a year and Bourassa returned to Ottawa. Bourassa left the 
commission convinced that not only would Canadians would have to represent their own 
interests in Washington, but that they could not trust the British to do so.17 With the 1899 
British invasion of the Boer republics in present-day South Africa, Bourassa felt compelled to 
express openly his views that were increasingly diverging from the Liberal party and his 
mentor, Wilfrid Laurier. 
French and English Canadians fiercely contested their nation’s involvement in the 
British war with the Boer republics in present-day South Africa, and Bourassa was one of the 
loudest voices in the debate. Carman Miller has recently suggested that historians’ approach to 
                                                 
15 Henri Bourassa, Les Écoles du Nord-Ouest, discours prononcé le 17 avril 1905 dans la grand salle du 
Monument National, à Montréal, (Montreal: Nationaliste, 1905) 10-11. 
16 Réal Bélanger, Henri Bourassa, 56-57. For more on the Alaska Boundary dispute, see Allan Smith, “Alaska 
Boundary dispute,” Oxford Companion to Canadian History, Gerald Hallowell ed., (Don Mills, ON: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 30-31; and on Bourassa’s role in it, Norman Penlington, The Alaska Boundary 
Dispute: A Critical Reappraisal, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1972) 106-107. 
17 Henri Bourassa, “Speech of Henri Bourassa M.P. on the Alaskan Boundary Commission Ottawa, Friday, 
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French Canada and the Boer War might require a reassessment. The Boer War was not a 
prelude to the divisive issues and opposition experienced during the First World War. Attitudes 
among French Canadians shifted from opposition to cautious acceptance.18 While this may 
have been true for some French Canadians, it was not so for Henri Bourassa. After his three 
years as a Member of Parliament for the Liberal Party, the Canadian involvement in the British 
war against the Boer Republics not only irrevocably broke his loyalty to his party, but also 
served as the basis for his developing nationalist ideas. 
Months of increasing tensions between Britain and the Boer Republics preceded 
Britain’s 11 October 1899 declaration of war. Canadians had had a long time to develop their 
own views, and in some cases apathy, towards the conflict.19 While imperial-minded Canadians 
believed it was their duty to the Empire to fight, Bourassa and other Canadians believed that 
Canada had no reason to send troops to far away Africa for British colonial interests. Bourassa 
argued that any Canadian involvement in Empire affairs that were not its direct concern set a 
dangerous precedent. With his typical flair for sharp comment, Bourassa claimed that “M. 
Chamberlain [the colonial secretary] a voulu la guerre d’Afrique pour arracher des colonies, à 
l’heure où l’ivresse de l’orgueil et des passions sauvages fait taire la raison, ce premier tribut 
du sang qu’elles lui avaient refusé jusque-là.”20 Bourassa distinguished two key problems with 
Canadian participation: a question of fact and a question of law. Not only was the Britain’s 
justification for the war faulty, if not immoral and unjust, but Canada had no legal obligation to 
join it.21 In the age of Canadian political imperialism, Bourassa’s imposition of morality and 
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legality onto imperial responsibility was a significant intellectual intervention.  
His distinction between the act of committing Canadian troops and its legal obligations 
as a member of the British Empire revealed a critical aspect of his burgeoning sense of 
Canadian nationalism. Bourassa’s rejection of the Boer War was rooted in a position against 
Canadian Imperialism and in favour of Canadian Nationalism. He disagreed with the Liberal 
policy and with imperialists not simply as a matter of opinion; Bourassa advocated for a 
fundamentally different conception of the country and its place in the world. On the other end 
of the political spectrum, imperialists believed that Canada’s active participation in Empire 
were more valuable, but Bourassa could not accept such a worldview. He believed that Canada 
had its own interests and values entirely separate from that of Britain.  
The political ideology of Canadian imperialism against which Bourassa opposed had 
emerged in the late 19th century. It began as a Britain debate over the purpose and utility of its 
Empire and that eventually spread to Canada. “Constructive Imperialism,” a term coined by 
W.A.S. Hewins in 1899, described “the deliberate adoption of the Empire as distinguished 
from the United Kingdom as the basis of public policy.” Its adherents advocated “those 
principles of constructive policy on all constitutional, economic, defensive, and educational 
questions which will help towards the fulfilment of that ideal.”22 It is also termed 
“Conservative Imperialism,” though opponents and supporters did not always divide along 
party lines. This brand of imperialism that championed imperial unity emerged out of the 
changing international context of the late 19th century as rising states like Germany, France, 
Russia and the United States ballooned into global powers. Britain was no longer the sole 
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power spread across the world and imperialists argued that the centre and the periphery of 
Empire required each other for future prosperity.  
Constructive Imperialism reached the peak of its influence in Britain and abroad during 
the two decades before the First World War. Some aspects, like Imperial Preference regarding 
trade and tariffs, failed to gain traction among the Empire’s former colonies. Most of the 
Dominions considered any changes to tariffs conditional on other political concerns, not 
inherently appealing as a means of expressing imperial patriotism alone. Discussion of 
Imperial defence was more popular, as both Britain and its colonies sought solutions to 
growing defence costs while increasingly using military power as a means of achieving 
international and collective security.23 
This brand of imperialism was epitomized through Joseph Chamberlain’s time as 
Colonial Secretary from 1895 to 1903. Chamberlain advocated for an active British presence in 
imperial management, accelerating the process of adopting a Constructive Imperialism 
approach. Until the last quarter of the 19th century, imperial governance had often been left to 
private concerns.24 Under Chamberlain, the idea of an enlightened, united Empire was justified 
by the difficult British victory in the Boer War. Imperial unity offered a solution to the apparent 
weakness of an Empire that took three years to defeat the disparate Boer Republics. As well, 
the war proved that Empire could benefit from its former colonies, as demonstrated by the 
enthusiastic contribution of soldiers for the Boer War by the self-governing Dominions. It 
encouraged the view that there was popular support for stronger imperial relations among them 
and Chamberlain was eager to use that enthusiasm to strengthen imperial unity. He believed 
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that popular British support for the Boer War proved that there was the possibility of support 
for imperial unity at home as well.25 
Paradoxically, the success of the Boer’s guerrilla tactics and examples of British 
barbarism during the conflict also helped discredit Chamberlain’s particular vision of 
constructive imperialism. The British failure to defeat the Boers and Britain’s use of 
concentration camps proved to some that the Empire was not as glorious and civilized as it 
claimed.26 Perhaps as a result, enthusiasm for the constructive imperialists’ goals waned during 
peacetime, especially without the military necessity of defending Empire. In the end, the idea 
that “general support for the Empire could be translated into enthusiasm for a particular 
concept” proved false.27 
The Empire’s response to the Boer War and subsequently the First World War 
demonstrated the compelling nature of a call to arms over a call to political unity. Rallying 
political and popular support was often most successful in a military context. Appeals to the 
Empire’s role in defending its members from potential threats, such as Germany, or the 
military value of defending its prosperity as in South Africa, rallied far more citizens to the 
cause. In Canada, it was no different. The policies advocated by Canadian imperialists were 
most popular during situations like the Boer War, the Naval Crisis when Britain called on 
Canada to help in the naval race against Germany, or in August 1914 at the outbreak of the 
First World War.  
Canadian imperialism mirrored the larger British conception of imperialism, though 
obviously in a local context. As historian Carl Berger famously noted in his study of the period, 
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imperialism emerged as a set of cultural values and a political ideology that was a form of 
nationalism unto itself.28 Nationalism did not necessarily mean opposition to Empire. British 
writer Richard Jebb published Studies in Colonial Nationalism in 1905 after travelling through 
the British Dominions and witnessing the emergent nationalist sentiments of Britain’s former 
colonies. Colonial loyalty was giving away to national patriotism, and “the Empire [was] less 
valued for its own sake and more in proportion as it subserves the interests and ideals of 
separate nationalism.”29 For Canadian imperialists, imperial loyalty united their vision of the 
Canadian national community. Canadian imperialists were perfectly situated at the end of the 
19th century to envision a modern “nationally-imagined community” tied to the British Empire, 
though often at the expense of non-English speaking and non-British minorities.30 These ideas 
were encouraged by men like George Denison, G.M. Grant, G.R. Parkin, Stephen Leacock and 
Andrew MacPhail, who in the late 19th and early 20th century supported a Canada more closely 
connected to the Empire. Organizations like Canada First, founded in 1868 but dissolved in the 
late 1870s, pushed for the first organized creation of a national consciousness, again linked to 
the British Empire.31 Its successor, the Canadian chapter of the Imperial Federation League in 
the 1880s and subsequently the British Empire League in the 1890s, cemented the connections 
between Canadian imperialists and the larger British discussion regarding the future of the 
Empire. These “colonial nationalists” sought to enlarge Canada’s position in the Empire.  
Other historians have qualified Berger’s statement, arguing that imperialism was 
Britannic nationalism, not a Canadian one. Simon Potter argued that “few people used the 
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terms ‘nationalism’ and ‘imperialism’ with either precision or consistency,” and commentators 
used “nation” as a term with different meanings depending on constitutional or political 
contexts.32 Douglas Cole distinguishes between patriotism – loyalty to the state – and 
nationalism – loyalty to the national idea. It is important to distinguish the difference. While 
almost all Canadians were loyal to the state, “some were pan-Anglo-Saxon or Britannic 
nationalists while being imperialists, some were Britannic nationalists while being 
autonomnists, perhaps some were embryonic Canadian ... nationalists, and some were 
unconcerned with a nationalist identity.”33 In that respect, outside of the committed adherents 
that Berger outlines, most Canadians lay somewhere on a scale of imperialist and nationalist 
belief, regardless of their level of patriotism.  
In a political context, Canadian imperialism aligned with Constructive Imperialism’s 
goal of creating a unified Empire, though imbued with a Canadian perspective: a close-knit 
Empire assured the future prosperity of the Canadian nation-state, not the British one. Unlike 
in Britain, where debates over the Empire were focused on their implications for Britain’s 
global power and economic success, in Canada the simple, abstract objective of prosperity and 
future Canadian greatness had a broad appeal to many on Cole’s scale (and not just avowed 
imperialists). These were desirable goals for any patriotic Canadian.  
Thus, Bourassa’s devotion to a nationalism wedded to the Canadian nation led him 
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further away from his former Liberal compatriots but made him no less patriotic. That 
commitment was apparent in how strongly Bourassa opposed Laurier’s Boer War policy and 
led him to leave the Liberal Party and sit as an independent in the House of Commons. He 
continued to define his brand of Canadian nationalism through his commentaries on political 
issues. Réal Bélanger observes that, after the Boer War, Bourassa was determined to 
communicate to Canadians “une opinion publique éclairée en transmettant aux Canadiens une 
compréhension plus nette des relations du Canada avec l'Empire et de la nature des rapports 
entre la majorité canadienne-anglaise protestante et la minorité canadienne-française catholique 
du pays.”34 His role as a critic of all sides of the House of Commons was evident by the time 
the war ended in 1902. He turned to his native province to seek allies who agreed with his 
vision of Canada. 
In 1903, Bourassa founded the Ligue Nationaliste along with Oliver Asselin, Armand 
Lavergne, Jules Fournier, Omar Héroux. Although he would never officially join the league, he 
still served as its defacto leader. All of the men were rising young professionals, part of 
Quebec’s established intellectual class, and already involved in the province’s public life. 
Asselin, Fournier, and Héroux were journalists while Lavergne was a lawyer. Asselin and 
Fournier came from farm families. All were well educated and well trained in writing.35 At the 
helm of the group was the now well-known federal politician Henri Bourassa. The Ligue used 
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periodicals such as the aptly named weekly newspaper, Le Nationaliste,36 to express their ideas 
regarding provincial and national matters. Bourassa’s powerful rhetoric made him the most 
prominent of this band of French Canadian nationalists who argued for greater Canadian 
autonomy within the Empire in opposition to Canada’s imperialist movement.37  
Nationalisme, as distinguished from other forms of Canadian Nationalism, was a 
uniquely French Canadian ideology.38 Bourassa and the nationalistes did not support either of 
two dominant political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. Many of their ideas were 
deeply embedded in the intellectual currents of French Canada at the turn of the century, but 
their political ideology differed from their contemporaries -- though there was overlap between 
their social, economic and political beliefs. 
Generations of French Canadian intellectuals and politicians informed the views of the 
nationalistes, but two notable ones were politician Joseph-Israël Tarte and journalist Jules-Paul 
Tardivel who directly inspired Bourassa to turn away from established political groups. 
Joseph-Israël Tarte was a Quebec Conservative politician who served as their 
“conscience” during the 1870s and 1880s and kept the province loyal to John A. Macdonald’s 
Conservative Party. By the 1890s, Tarte left the Party after growing dissatisfaction with its 
anglophone wing that paid less and less attention to French Canadian problems. The Manitoba 
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Schools crisis in particular proved that the party was no longer the best option for French 
Canada, and when Wilfrid Laurier asked that Tarte to join the Liberal Cabinet, he agreed. Tarte 
briefly opposed the Boer War, though he eventually accepted Laurier’s argument that 
volunteers averted any future Canadian responsibility to a British war, but it was rumoured he 
might even lead an independent party in 1900.39 By 1903, however, he had returned to the 
Conservatives over the issue of protectionist tariffs, and remained there until he died in 1907. 
His biographers called Tarte a “francophone, Catholic, Canadian, and British subject,” never 
quite a Liberal or Conservative, and certainly not a nationaliste. 40 Henri Bourassa had helped 
Tarte win his first election as a Liberal in 1893 and Tarte inspired the young man, who 
described the senior politician as one of the most interesting men he had ever known.41 Tarte 
was one of the most prominent protectors of French Canadian identity within a united Canada 
in the years before the nationalistes coalesced.  
Jules-Paul Tardivel was a more extreme defender of French Canada than Tarte. Indeed, 
he was one of the first advocates for Quebec’s separation from Canada. An ultramontane, 
Tardivel linked together his French Canadian nationality and his Catholic religion, and 
believed that only an independent French Canada could protect them. From the time of the Riel 
affair, Tardivel developed a vision of French Canadian autonomy that advocated for a French 
Canadian nation distinct and separate from the English Canadian one. In his view, French 
Canadians had been chosen by God to christianize North America. Mathieu Girard summarized 
Tardivel’s views: “être séparatiste c’est pour Tardivel être catholique, c’est poser un acte de 
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foi.”42 Tardivel established an independent newspaper, La Verité, in 1881 to communicate his 
religious and political beliefs which he edited until his death in 1905. During his career as a 
journalist, even though Tardivel never formally entered politics, he was an influential force on 
French Canadian political thought.43 He worked closely with Bourassa and fellow nationaliste 
Omar Héroux (who married his daughter) before and after the establishment of the Ligue 
Nationaliste. It was Tardivel with whom Bourassa consulted during his opposition to the Boer 
War as he debated whether to start an independent third party or find another solution.44 He 
was a significant figure to the nationalistes even though they rejected his separatist 
perspective.45 
Instead the next generation of French Canadian nationalists combined the passions of 
Tarte and Tardivel, wishing neither to support an English-dominated government like Tarte or 
separation from Canada like Tardivel. Their ideology combined elements of British Liberalism, 
American Progressivism and a bilingual and bicultural Canadian nationalism. At their 
formation in 1903, they presented a comprehensive program of their vision of Canada’s future, 
which they continued to develop over the next decade through speeches and newspapers. 
The social concerns of the nationalistes were rooted in the tenets of social Catholicism, 
which deserves some explanation. Over the course of the 19th century, Catholicism modernized 
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its approach to the social dilemma of industrialization and the demand for democratic rights.46 
As a result, liberal Catholics began advocating for Church involvement in social programs and 
through organizations like the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul. In 1891, Pope Leo XIII issued 
the Rerum Novarum, a papal encyclical that addressed the growing influence of Marxism and 
individualism and served as a general Catholic reply to political liberalism. He defined for his 
flock “the boundaries of the rights and duties within which the rich and the proletariat ... ought 
to be restricted in relation to each other.”47 Rerum Novarum outlined a role for social 
Catholicism in the modern world. The Catholic Church and the state could, Leo wrote, address 
social ills without allowing private life to supersede public life or doing away with social 
hierarchies. It preserved the family and private property, as well as the separation between rich 
and poor, even as individual concerns gave way to collective ones.  
In Quebec, the Catholic Church underwent a similar transformation, though with great 
difficulty. Liberalism, which demanded a clear separation of Church and State, and 
Catholicism continued to clash in Canada throughout the 19th century. It reached its peak in the 
1870s, as the Guibord Affair over burial rights, and the Programme Catholique demanding 
clerical political influence, highlighted Quebec ultramontanes’ attempts to combat liberalism in 
the province. Only after 1877, when the young Liberal MP Wilfrid Laurier confirmed that “le 
libéralisme catholique n’est pas le libéralisme politique” and that Canadian Liberals had no 
interest in degrading the powers of the Catholic Church, did an uneasy truce emerge.48 
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Eventually, the Church in Quebec accepted that in a democracy it was one voluntary 
association among many, but it could still balance its social role in regards to education and 
public charity without contravening the role of the state to intervene in public life as liberalism 
demanded.49 By the turn of the century, the nationalistes could be strong advocates for social 
Catholicism in Quebec without contradicting conservative strains of Catholic thought. 
The nationaliste vision of society was a social Catholic one and drew much from Rerum 
Novarum.50 The Church should help create a stable and prosperous society so that Catholic 
values could be preserved within it rather than be at odds with it. This meant sometimes 
supporting unions, rejecting materialism, and improving the conditions of the poor. The 
nationalistes endorsed state action to fulfill the goals of social Catholicism, such as addressing 
social problems like poverty and class exploitation.51 Education also played a vital role in 
society. Schools, controlled by the Church, could impart moral and religious values to society 
and allow them to resist corruption and the temptation of materialism. By allowing the Catholic 
Church to continue directing the province’s education programs, a stronger society would be 
able to confront the moral dilemmas of the modern age.52 Like Pope Leo XIII’s missive, the 
nationalistes presented a view of society that preserved French Canada’s traditional societal 
values in the process of modernizing their state for the 20th century.53  
The nationalistes’ economic program reflected their social beliefs. They envisioned a 
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state that could intercede in the economy for the benefit of its people. Their position was rooted 
in the ideas of Quebec’s leading economist of the era, Errol Bouchette, who lamented Quebec 
traditionalism that shunned the study of economics and social sciences and its disastrous 
impact on French Canadian capital.54 Bouchette argued instead that French Canada had to use 
its own capital and people to exploit its natural resources, which depended on the ability of a 
French Canadian state to intervene economically.55 Only then could French Canadians control 
their economy rather than English Canada or the United States doing so. The nationalistes were 
willing to adapt to the economic realities of the industrial age so they succeed in this 
endeavour, even if it meant rejecting established elements of French Canada’s identity. They 
espoused an economic liberalism that did not want clerical interference in economic matters, 
but neither did they challenge the Church control in other areas.  
Politically, the nationalistes sought ways to ensure French Canadians’ survival in North 
America. They desired greater autonomy within a bicultural and binational Canadian federation 
as well as independence from the British Empire. Describing the nationaliste perspective, 
Bourassa noted that “la patrie, pour nous, c'est le Canada tout entier, c'est-à-dire une fédération 
de races distinctes et de provinces autonomes. La nation [...], c'est la nation canadienne, 
composée des Canadiens-français et des Canadiens-anglais.”56 In their 1903 program, they 
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demanded for the provinces “la plus large mesure d’autonomie compatible avec le maintien du 
lien fédérale” alongside Canada’s political, commercial and military independence from British 
policy.57 The constitutional promise of protection for minorities curtailed provincial power 
since French language schools had to be protected in provinces where English speaking 
Canadians had a majority, just as Quebec protected its English language schools. A bicultural 
nation allowed both of Canada’s races to prosper, and equally they argued that such a Canada 
could only be sustained in an autonomous Empire. As Bourassa wrote in 1901, “la première 
condition nécessaire à l’indépendance d’un peuple, c’est d’être assuré de la paix intérieure et 
extérieure.”58 The nationaliste Canada could only exist if it upheld its internal commitments to 
racial equality as well as chose the manner and content of its external commitments. 
The nationalistes and Bourassa sought to establish a new Canadian political ideology, 
though ultimately it remained limited to French Canada. Joseph Levitt argues the nationalistes 
ultimately failed to create a Canadian nationalism and could not convince English Canadians 
that their Canadian identity naturally ought to include both cultures. While the nationaliste 
program intended to broaden the case for a Canadian nationalism to include French and 
English, their chosen battleground of Quebec inherently limited their influence.59 As a result, 
their Canadian nationalism contrasted with Jules-Paul Tardivel’s French Canadian 
nationalism. Tardivel believed that French Canada could only survive alone, not cooperatively 
with English Canada. He warned them that “de même que M. Bourassa se méfie de ceux qui 
songent à fonder un grand empire britannique, ainsi nous sommes constamment en garde 
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contre ceux qui travaillent à créer un grand tout canadien.” 60 Tardivel distrusted any 
encompassing movement that might weaken French Canadian identity. Notwithstanding their 
hopes, the nationalistes remained a French Canadian movement and positioned themselves 
within provincial politics more than national ones. Bourassa transcended those boundaries 
more easily than his compatriots did. 
In a broader Canadian context, nationalistes might be considered liberals but not 
Liberals. A conservative set of French Canadian cultural values and, for some of them, Catholic 
ones, mitigated their liberal ideology. Still, historian Yvan Lamonde has termed their ideas as a 
“dérivatif nationaliste” of Laurier’s liberalism since they too supported collective national 
values of equality, democracy, and economic intervention.61 They were pro-clerical, rather than 
simply not being anti-clerical like Laurier, which reflected the values of French Canadian 
culture. Their liberal nationalism, Oliver Asselin explained in 1909, aligned with a wider 
American Progressive tradition as well. He explained that they “[were] Liberals in the matter 
of minority rights, and Progressists in economic and social matters.” He elaborated that “it is 
that opposition to both Imperialism and Annexation [from the United States], that Liberalism 
and that Progressism[sic], which makes up our brand of Nationalism.”62 The nationalistes 
existed in a national and continental context, as did their nominal leader, Bourassa. 
The nationalistes were representative of a particular French Canadian political thought, 
but also existed within an international reaction to liberal ideas. Historian Joseph Levitt 
specifically addressed the relation between the nationalistes, social Catholicism, and American 
Progressivism. Nationaliste ideology was different from both strains of thought due to their 
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French Canadian circumstances. The nationalistes dealt with the problem of foreign corporate 
control, which Pope Leo XIII never addressed, since they faced a lack of French Canadian 
capital investment. Nor were they entirely American Progressives, whose “frontier 
individualism” meant that all individuals were equal in modern society.63 Instead, the 
nationaliste ideology was a fusion of corporatism, liberalism, and social Catholicism. Levitt 
calls them “utopian corporatists” since their ideal society had ingrained economic inequality, 
state intervention, and no class distinction. The persuasive force of social elites informed by 
Catholic social philosophy, rather than by democratic voice or state power, guided their 
philosophy.64 Though inspired by social Catholicism and American Progressivism, they chose 
which ideas most suited their situation in Canada. 
Historians have also drawn parallels between the nationalistes and British liberalism. 
Bourassa was in some ways a classical liberal of the 19th century, echoing the political tradition 
of the Whigs that minimized the role of Empire and emphasized democracy, equality, and the 
rule of law.65 He publicly admired its well-known disciples, chiefly British politician William 
Gladstone, who served as Prime Minister four times between 1868 and 1894.66 James Kennedy 
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explored the link between the nationalistes and Gladstone comparing the French Canadians to 
the Young Scots, an early 20th century nationalist movement in the United Kingdom. Both 
groups attempted to reconcile nationalism and liberalism, and Kennedy argued that they 
revealed the contrasting faces of 19th century liberalism as they tried to resolve its emphasis on 
individuals rights against the national (or collective) rights that they championed. Both groups 
resolved that dilemma differently. The Young Scots were “Liberal nationalists” while the 
French Canadians were “liberal Nationalists.” Thus, the Scots nationalized classical liberalism, 
while the nationalistes liberalized their French Canadian nationalism.67 Both coopted classical 
British Liberalism according to their political and social context while nurturing the national 
community they sought to create. 
Bourassa was the leading nationaliste and was the best known on the national stage, 
before and after the creation of their league. At the heart of the nationaliste position lay the 
bicultural and autonomous Canada that Bourassa first articulated, where two peoples lived in 
equal partnership free of imperial responsibilities. In spite of parallels to American or British 
political traditions, Bourassa espoused a nationalist sentiment focused on Canada’s uniquely 
French and English Canadian character, rather than its colonial or New World heritage. His 
nationally-imagined community did not attach itself to the former motherlands of England or 
France. “Les Canadiens-français du peuple n’ont d’autre patrie que le Canada,” Bourassa wrote 
in 1903, “ils sont prêts à lui rendre tout ce qu’ils lui doivent; mais n’estimant rien devoir à 
l’Angleterre ni à aucun autre pays, ils n’en attendent rien.”68 Bourassa believed that Canada 
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possessed a political culture that was a combination of French and English heritage and 
deserved expression in its own right. In his mind, the long history of French Canadians in 
North America left them best equipped to define this political culture and defend it. Bourassa, 
unsurprisingly, often led the charge.  
Bourassa’s efforts took him from federal politics in Ottawa to the provincial arena in 
1907. Although he lost the first by-election he contested against the Minister of Lands and 
Forests, Adélard Turgeon, he beat Liberal Premier Lomer Gouin in the 1908 election. 
Bourassa’s provincial campaign against Gouin sought to reclaim from the provincial Liberals 
“le vieux drapeau qu’ils ont déchiré et souillé.”69 His time in the Assemblée Nationale found 
him concentrating on economic issues such as the colonization of Quebec’s northern frontier 
and the management of its natural resources. Levitt has depicted the social program of 
Bourassa and the nationalistes as one based on the belief that “industry and commerce were the 
keys to national power, that economic development was the weapons of this century and that 
only if it possessed economic strength would French Canada become an important 
nationality.”70 Strengthening Quebec, as distinct from French Canada, was an important step in 
towards righting the power imbalance in the Canadian federation. Equality was not simply a 
matter of the rights and privileges of a minority, but the equal ability to contribute to the 
Dominion’s progress. Bourassa failed in Quebec City to accomplish his goals and he left the 
Quebec capital frustrated in 1912. During his time there, however, he built the connections 
within provincial politics and with the Quebec wing of the Conservative party that he needed to 
found his influential newspaper, Le Devoir.  
Le Devoir began publishing in 1910 and quickly became Bourassa’s preferred vehicle 
                                                 
69 R. Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, la vie publique d’un grand Canadien, (Montreal: Editions de l’homme, 1953) 274. 
70 Joseph Levitt, Henri Bourassa and the Golden Calf, 35. 
56 
 
for developing ideas on national and provincial politics as well as international ones. As editor 
from its founding to his resignation in 1932, he offered his opinion to a numerically limited but 
important readership.71 The size of Bourassa’s audience understates his influence. Bélanger 
describes Bourassa as the mouthpiece of the “élite petite-bourgeoise” who spoke for a 
generation of French Canadians.72 Bourassa did not represent the view of all French Canadians, 
but he acted as a crucial spokesperson for many of the province’s élite, who debated French 
Canada’s place in confederation or Canada’s place in the world. His public speeches drew 
hundreds of interested spectators and he travelled extensively extolling his views. 
Nevertheless, it was always in the pages of Le Devoir where he began formulating the basis 
and details of his arguments. 
Le Devoir’s first target was Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s decision to create a Canadian navy in 
light of the ongoing naval crisis between Britain and Germany. In 1909, the British government 
realized that Germany had increased its ship production and might surpass British naval 
supremacy within several years. In theory, the German navy could eventually threaten the 
British control over the North Sea and the Atlantic, impose an embargo, and win a war against 
the British Empire. New Zealand immediately offered to build or at least fund the construction 
of powerful battleships, the Dreadnought-class, while it spurred debate over the matter in 
Australia and Canada. The Opposition Conservatives demanded that Canada immediately 
make a gift of ships or money to Britain, and Laurier refused it as an expensive “imperial 
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obligation.”73 After meeting with British authorities that summer, Laurier became convinced of 
the need for some form of Canadian contribution, but the British demanded that any ships 
Canada built be under imperial control.74 On 12 January 1910, he put forward the Naval 
Service Bill to the House of Commons in Ottawa that proposed a small fleet of ships to form a 
Canadian Navy that only the Canadian Parliament could commit to action. Laurier walked a 
tenuous line between the two opposing forces of English Canadian imperialism and French 
Canadian nationalism. He famously told the House that “when Britain is at war, Canada is at 
war; there is no distinction” -- although he carefully qualified his statement by noting that “if 
Great Britain, to which we are subject, is at war with any nation, Canada becomes liable to 
attack, and so Canada is at war.”75 
Laurier’s “tin-pot navy” of five cruisers and six destroyers satisfied neither imperialist 
nor nationaliste. Many Conservatives decried it as an insufficient contribution to the defence of 
the Empire. Opposition leader Robert Borden, seeing an opportunity to weaken the Liberals, 
demanded that Canada required a voice in imperial affairs alongside its new navy.76 Bourassa 
reiterated his fear from the Boer War that such a course would implicate Canada in future 
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imperial conflicts and he denounced Laurier as a traitor.77 This marked the journalist’s first 
foray into international affairs through Le Devoir, where he dissected British policy and 
Germany’s rising prominence. The resulting furor over the Naval Bill helped convince 
Bourassa and the Conservatives to work together to bring down Laurier despite their vastly 
different political perspectives. 
The Liberals’ shaky position in Quebec became clear with a by-election in the Prime 
Minister’s old riding of Drummond-Arthabaska. The Quebec wing of the Conservative party 
led by F.D. Monk had grown dissatisfied with Borden’s moderated support of the Naval Bill 
and found common cause with Bourassa and the nationalistes. In January 1910, the two 
corresponded over possible political cooperation in Quebec. By May, they agreed to an alliance 
between Quebec Conservatives and nationalistes to pursue the goal of creating a third party: 
conservative-nationalists independent of the Liberals and Conservatives.78 Bourassa desired a 
counterbalance to the English – and imperialist – dominated federal parties in the House of 
Commons, and believed that the Quebec Conservatives might provide it. When Laurier 
announced a by-election in Drummond-Arthabaska in August 1910, the new coalition was 
ready to present a candidate to challenge what was considered a safe Liberal riding. The 
Liberals nominated a little known Arthabaska lawyer, Joseph-Édouard Perrault, who faced a 
nationaliste local farmer, Arthur Gilbert. The campaign was bitterly contested. All knew that it 
represented Laurier and Bourassa competing for control of the province.79 Gilbert won the 
election by 200 votes, signalling to the nation that the Liberals no longer enjoyed unquestioned 
support in Quebec.  
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The Drummond-Arthabaska by-election set the scene for the 1911 federal election for 
French Canadians. For English Canada, the election focused on the issue of reciprocity, or free 
trade, with the United States. It was a shock to the ruling Liberals when American President 
William Howard Taft proposed an agreement to the Canadians in 1910. Previously, Canadians 
always had to persuade the Americans to enter into discussions. Laurier found it difficult to 
refuse and a trip to the Canadian West suggested strong support for lowering tariffs among 
Prairie farmers.80 In January 1911, the Americans and the Canadians signed a final agreement. 
All Laurier had to do was pass it through Parliament. The Conservatives made every effort to 
impede its passage, and the debate remained unresolved when Laurier left for an Imperial War 
Conference in May. Laurier was confident that the country stood behind him, but his departure 
gave his opponents time to organise. Conservatives criticized the reciprocity agreement across 
the country, Bourassa expounded the dangers of imperialism, and Toronto Liberals grew 
apprehensive about reciprocity’s effect on their business. All were ominous signs for the 
Liberals. The reciprocity debate stagnated after Laurier’s return in mid-July. By month’s end, 
the Government announced an election for 21 September with far less confidence about the 
results than it had two months earlier.81  
The election yielded a victory for Conservative Robert Borden. Historians have argued 
that reciprocity and imperialism turned Canadians away from supporting the Liberals, in 
English Canada and French Canada respectively, but more recent work suggests that the 
Liberal loss was razor-thin. Historians Patrice Dutil and David Mackenzie argue that the 
Liberals lost because the Conservatives convinced between a few dozens or hundreds voters in 
a riding to switch their allegiance. Seventy-one seats, a third of the 221 total, were decided by 
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less than 5% of the vote.82 The Conservative victory did not signify a sweeping change in the 
country’s attitudes away from the Liberals, but it did produce a change in government. 
This was especially true in Quebec. The Québec Conservatives supported Bourassa as 
he attempted to bring a caucus of conservative-nationaliste MPs to Parliament. Quebec’s 
election was a judgement on the naval issue and Laurier’s decision to cooperate with Great 
Britain’s naval expansion. Bourassa spoke fervently against Laurier alongside Conservative 
candidates, while at the same time insisting that Borden would not be much better as Prime 
Minister.83 His goal was not to bring Borden to power but to ensure the election of 
conservative-nationalistes. He believed they would be independent of the Conservative Party 
and would instead exist as a bloc of federal MPs who spoke for French Canada alone. In the 
end, however, most of the Québec MPs elected as conservative-nationalistes joined the new 
Conservative government and followed the party line. Bourassa had merely helped to place 
Robert Borden and his imperialist allies in power.84 The Conservative leader and his Cabinet 
led Canada even farther away from the nation envisioned by Bourassa and his nationaliste 
compatriots. 
After the loss in 1911, Bourassa refocused his energy on the issue of French language 
education. Ontario enacted Regulation 17 limiting Franco-Ontarians’ access to French 
instruction. The politician-cum-journalist remembered well the imperfect solution of the 
                                                 
82 Dutil and Mackenzie, Canada 1911, 252, 278-279. 
83 For example, Henri Bourassa, “La Vrai Terrain de la Lutte,” Le Devoir, 2 August 1911, 1. 
84 The extent to which Borden ignored Québec would not be fully realized until 1913 when the Conservatives 
introduced their own Naval Aid Bill, though it was defeated in the Liberal-dominated Senate. Patrice Dutil and 
David Mackenzie conclude that the Conservatives could easily afford to reject Quebec demands given the 
seats they had gained outside the province. They had enough seats in English Canada, that even if Quebec 
MPs voted against the government, they would still survive the vote, see 294. Bourassa realised it after no 
nationalistes MP were appointed to Cabinet in November, 1911, for his perspective, see Réal Bélanger, Henri 
Bourassa, 378-381. Another useful work is Réal Bélanger, Paul Émile-Lamarche: Le pays avant le parti 
(1904–1918), (Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 1984), and its exploration of Lamarche’s career as a 
“conservative-nationalist” MP. 
61 
 
Manitoba School Crisis through the Laurier-Greenway agreement. Keeping a tenuous balance 
between minority and majority rights had been a difficult task for Canadians since before 
Confederation and certainly afterwards. As early as 1871, New Brunswick’s banning of 
religious schools had violated the terms of section 93 of the British North America Act, which 
nominally recognized the educational rights and privileges of linguistic minorities but did not 
specifically mention French language rights outside the province. The failure of Manitoban 
French Canadians to protect their separate schools helped spur the Franco-Ontarian minority of 
the province’s eastern counties to protect their rights. “Their intention,” historian Marilyn 
Barber argues, “was not to defend their rights but to extend their rights, not only to protect 
existing rights but also to secure additional ones.”85 Increased agitation of these French-
speaking Catholics alarmed the Protestant Orange Order. The Orange Order, a fiercely 
Protestant and pro-British organization, held a significant presence in Ontario’s Conservative 
Party that had come to power in 1905. The growing hostility between Irish Catholics and 
Franco-Ontarians added to the tensions and culminated with Conservative Premier James 
Whitney passing Regulation 17 in 1912. The regulation severely restricted the use of French 
language in the schools of the province and had a devastating effect on French-English 
relations in Canada.86  
Ontario Anglophones believed they were protecting their cultural identity against a 
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restless and allegedly dangerous minority. In 1907, Robert Sellar published The Tragedy of 
Quebec, which claimed French Canadian Catholics were an insidious force bent on supplanting 
English Protestants in rural Quebec and eastern Ontario. “Nationalism,” Sellar warned, stood 
for nothing more than “French-Catholic supremacy in the Dominion.” The book went through 
four editions between 1907 and 1916.87 Meanwhile, French Canadians viewed Regulation 17 
as yet another English Canadian refusal to uphold the promises of Confederation. They 
perceived the Ontario government’s legislation as part of a sinister decades-long trend in 
Canada to limit French Canadians to Quebec alone. French Canadians, and certainly 
nationalistes, understood the compact formed in 1867 primarily as an agreement to safeguard 
their cultural and religious identity in the country. By the twentieth century, they believed that a 
guarantee of French rights outside the province should always inform government policy; 
particularly in light of how well Quebec’s English-speaking minority was treated.88 
On the eve of war in 1914, Bourassa’s political and journalistic career had shaped a set 
of ideas about the nature and purpose of a Canadian nationalism. Bourassa’s Canada was one 
where imperial affairs did not supersede Canadian ones, and a nation that respected and 
protected the pillars of French Canadian culture, its language and religion. Above all, his vision 
stressed equality between English and French Canadians. Canada as he saw it was neither 
English nor French, but a partnership of the two languages and cultures. He saw a grave threat 
in the dominating influence of imperialism that fundamentally placed the values and beliefs of 
the British (English Canadians) above those of other “races.” 
“Race” was conceived differently in the early twentieth century than later usage. Today, 
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we would consider “French Canadians” (or Québécois more likely) as a cultural identity rather 
than a distinct race. We understand that the biological or genetic differences that distinguish 
human beings from one another are superficial ones with no bearing on their history or culture. 
In the 19th century, the term race carried societal connotations. “Race” had been a concept in 
European thought for several centuries before Darwinian ideas of evolution were coopted into 
social constructs. Works like Robert Knox’s Races of Man in 1850 and Arthur de Gobineau’s 
Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races, though not based on Darwin’s writing on 
evolution, helped shape social Darwinian thought and separated “races” by their historical 
accomplishments and how “civilized” they were. That some races were superior to others was 
a vital aspect of understanding larger historical developments, such as European superiority. 
Equally, “nation” and “race” were used interchangeably to explain successful national 
accomplishments. For the British, race took on a cultural dimension as well. “Race” 
distinguished a set of national values and qualities.89 Emerging out of the context of its multi-
racial Empire, the “British race” was on a civilizing mission to its various colonies and 
Dominions, be it for Indians, Africans, or French Canadians.  
In Canada, the concept of “race” mirrored European developments. Unlike Britain, 
which approached race from a global perspective, Canadians were more likely to encounter it 
in a local context as a descriptor for its French and English peoples. The two dominant “races” 
of Canada had a long history of conflict. Since the Conquest in 1759, when the British 
conquered New France during the Seven Years War, Britain had tried to incorporate its new 
French-speaking subjects into a governmental system with varying success. The Quebec Act of 
1774 guaranteed the new population’s Catholicism, their use of civil law in private matters, 
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defined the structure of its colonial government and abandoned any structured attempt at 
“anglicization.”90 The establishment of a representative assembly with the Constitution Act of 
1791 did not completely assuage the concerns of a growing number of republicans in the 
colony and in 1837 the short-lived rebellion against the government erupted. Its failure led to 
an investigation by Governor General Lord Durham, who in his 1839 report wrote that “I 
found two nations warring within the bosom of a single state: I found a struggle, not of 
principles, but of races.”91 Of French Canada, he bluntly dismissed them as “a people with no 
history, and no literature.”92 Other sections of Durham’s famous report eventually led to the 
establishment of “Responsible Government” in the Canadian colonies of Lower and Upper 
Canada (Quebec and Ontario respectively), where the government was responsible to the 
electorate rather than the Governor General. It did not solve the “struggle of races” between 
Canada’s two emergent cultures.  
Instead, French Canadians proved Durham wrong by setting out to describe their 
unique North American history and writing their own literary works devoted to their “racial 
achievements.” François-Xavier Garneau’s three-volume Histoire du Canada published from 
1845-1852 focused on the accomplishments of French Canadians and their ability to survive 
while surrounded by Anglo-Saxon Protestants in North America. This early French Canadian 
historian emphasized the endurance of his people’s language, laws, and religion.93 Other 
French Canadian historians who echoed his theme of survival, though sometimes with a more 
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positive view of the clerical contribution to French Canadian history or the British one 
followed Garneau.94 This cultural renaissance proved that they were not simply a subjugated 
diaspora, but a vibrant and unique community. As discussed above, the idea of survivance was 
embedded in French Canada with aid from the Catholic Church. Cultural, religious and 
linguistic survival was paramount and implicit in that struggle was a dichotomy between 
Canada’s “English” and “French” races.  
By the beginning of the 20th century, most Canadians accepted a difference between 
“English Canadians” and “French Canadians” and used the term “race” as a descriptor for 
them. French sociologist André Siegfried toured Canada in 1904 and wrote The Race Question 
in Canada based on his experiences. Siegfried outlined a pessimistic view of Canada’s political 
and cultural tensions that hinged on the religious and racial differences between its French and 
English speaking peoples. “There is a pronounced feeling of jealousy between [Ontario and 
Quebec],” he reflected. “The dominant race suffers the presence of the French because it 
cannot do otherwise, but it sets up its own tongue and religion and form of civilisation against 
theirs. An open warfare is in progress, the bitterness of which it were useless to seek to 
disguise.”95 He dissected the forces shaping the two sides and their impact on Canadian 
politics, concluding that in “the absence of ideas and doctrines dividing electors into opposite 
camps, there remain only questions of collective or individual interests.”96 The cultural 
divisions outlined by Siegfried had a racial component and, linking together “race” and 
“progress,” he believed that without resolving the crisis of Canada’s two races, its political 
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development remained stunted. 
Bourassa disagreed with Siegfried’s conclusions but not his views. He too believed that 
French and English Canadians’ language and religion were inseparable racial characteristics. 
Bourassa reflected on their fusion during a famous speech at the 21st Eucharistic Congress in 
Montreal in September 1910 (an important Roman Catholic gathering of clergy and laity to 
collectively practise their faith and publicly reflect on Catholicism). Various speakers 
addressed the audience in Montreal. The Archbishop of Westminster Francis Bourne delivered 
a speech arguing that the English language was the future of Catholicism in North America.97 
In return, Bourassa offered an impassioned and eloquent defence of French-speaking Catholics 
in the New World. French speakers, he argued, were the true bastion of Catholicism in North 
America. Religion and language was engrained in French Canadians’ identity and Catholicism 
had to preserve the French language if it wanted to survive. Only then would a strong Catholic 
presence on the continent be assured forever.98 Bourassa foresaw no future where the religion 
and language of French Canadians would come undone. 
Despite Canada’s racial strife, Bourassa was not as convinced as Lord Durham or 
Siegfried about the impossibility of unity between Canada’s French and English peoples. An 
excellent example of his optimism is evident in an address to Montreal’s English-speaking 
population only a few months before the outbreak of the First World War. For years it had been 
the city’s custom to elect a French-speaking mayor followed by an English-speaking one, but 
Médéric Martin’s successful campaign in March 1914 broke this tradition. Bourassa wrote to 
Montreal’s English population during the election campaign in the pages of Le Devoir as well 
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as in a brief pamphlet. Bourassa counselled them in English that  
they ought to take the lead in the crusade for the triumph of equal justice to all 
minorities, and the maintenance of the principle of equality of rights, for both 
races, all over the land. Upon that principle Confederation was built, old feuds 
were pacified. Upon that principle alone Confederation shall stand, and peace and 
harmony prevail.99 
Despite two decades in politics and much experience with an intransigent and sometimes 
hostile English Canada, Bourassa still believed on the eve of the war that French and English 
could come together as Confederation had promised. There were differences, but they were 
reconcilable. In Montreal, perhaps the most bilingual and bicultural city in the country, 
Bourassa saw a place where French and English cultures could fulfil their separate destinies 
together. 
Bourassa’s career before the war was marked by his perceptive and vocal discussion 
about the problems of national unity, Catholicism and Quebec, and the growing danger of 
imperialism. Together with his fellow liberal nationalistes, he shaped a new political ideology 
that differed from other French Canadian nationalists, like Jules-Paul Tardivel, and from other 
liberals, like Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Accordingly, pre-war ideas and experiences led Bourassa to a 
different understanding of the First World War than that of many other Canadians. He was 
intimately involved in Canada’s political debates, either as an MP or as a journalist. Whether 
English and French Canadians accepted or understood what he was saying is less certain. His 
prominence on the national stage on the eve of war positioned him as a man who had a clear 
and well-developed set of ideas about Canada, Quebec, and the world, and he was willing to 
communicate them to his audience. Unfortunately, the war was unlike anything the world had 
ever seen. Like others, Bourassa was unprepared for its intensity or its brutality and the drastic 
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impact it would have on Canadians’ perspective. Bourassa’s war led him down a different path 
than most but it was not a path he wanted to tread. 
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Chapter 2: The Duty of Canada at the Present Hour (1914) 
 
Canadians filled the Russell Theatre at the corner of Queen and Elgin streets in Ottawa 
on 17 December 1914. Its architecture reflected the talents of its creator, J.B. McElfatrick, 
whose Beaux-Arts design echoed the Italian renaissance while incorporating new American 
techniques to perfect acoustics and seating arrangement. Like that night’s speaker, Henri 
Bourassa, it fused Old World style with New World pragmatism.1 The 1500-seat venue was 
packed full of journalists, citizens and soldiers who awaited the intellectual and sometime 
polemicist Bourassa. He was the heart and voice of the French Canadian nationalist movement 
and had made a career out of challenging members of Parliament, a stone’s throw away from 
where they gathered.  
Some in the audience arrived solely to disrupt the proceedings. For days, pamphlets had 
been circulating in Ottawa decrying the appearance of the “arch traitor” and “rebel” Bourassa. 
“The Skull of Rebellion must be crushed,” the pamphlets declared, urging “loyal citizens” to 
enter with or without paying the admission fee. The text promised its reader that the police and 
the militia were on their side against “the rebels” who had invited Bourassa to speak on “the 
duty of Canada at the present hour” in the midst of the Great War.2  
As Bourassa stepped onto the stage, the crowd erupted. Shouts and jeers drowned out 
the words of Dr. Anthony Freeland who tried to introduce the night’s speaker. Bourassa 
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ignored them and spoke directly and fluently in English to the journalists who had gathered. 
This enraged his opponents in the crowd even further. A sergeant in uniform leaped to the stage 
with a Union Jack and demanded that the French Canadian wave the flag. Bourassa turned 
from the journalists and took the flag in his hands. The tumultuous crowd quieted as they 
listened to his words. “I am ready to fly the British flag of freedom, but I will not do it under 
threat,” he affirmed, turning back to the journalists. When the sergeant repeated his demand, 
other soldiers rushed the stage, overwhelming the organizers and journalists who encircled 
Bourassa. Some French Canadians in the audience sang the Marseillaise. Amidst the chaotic 
chanting and threatening invectives of the crowd, Bourassa left to deliver his speech at Château 
Laurier down the street.3 Later he would write that “the only serious aspect of the situation is 
the marked growth of intolerant and arrogant jingoism. There is, for all true Canadians, a 
danger to be more dreaded than the expansion of German militarism in Europe: it is the moral 
conquest of Canada by Prussianism under false British colours.”4 
It was not the first time Bourassa had referred to his fellow Canadians as Prussians, nor 
would it be the last, but the Russell Theatre debacle revealed the divide between the dissenter 
and the majority. Over the previous five months, Bourassa’s editorials had repeatedly rejected 
the rhetoric that Canadians used to justify fighting for the British Empire in the First World 
War -- rhetoric that focused on British ideals, atrocities in Belgium, and upholding Canadian 
honour. Bourassa perceived this rhetoric as disguised imperialism and, as a veteran critic of 
imperialist arguments, countered that Canadian self-interest took precedence over jingoistic 
contributions of money, resources and soldiers. Both sides took deep offence at the other’s 
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position. Even before Canadian soldiers had reached the battlefield, the homefront was 
dividing into a contest between Bourassa and the rest of the country. 
Bourassa’s engagement with the Canadian domestic debate during the first months of 
war differed from critics in other belligerent nations. In France, opposition to the war was 
virtually non-existent in 1914. Germany’s seizure of French territory and their dangerously 
successful push towards Paris in August united France’s previously divided people and 
politicians. Even the fall-out from the assassination of Socialist leader Jean Jaurès on 31 July 
did not crack French unity. Both friends and enemies attended his funeral, though some argued 
that his death was the last chance for France (and Europe) to avoid the coming war.5 France’s 
Union Sacrée brought together the bickering Right and Left sides of the political spectrum, 
which had been rehashing the arguments of the Dreyfuss Affairs for fourteen years in different 
ways. The Union Sacrée symbolized a French determination to oppose the oncoming German 
menace that superseded normal political concerns.6 With little room for arguments against such 
a direct defence of the nation and with no central figure around whom to rally, French 
objections to the war were silenced or absent. France faced the first months of the war with 
common purpose as its traditional religion of Catholicism united with its civic religion of 
Republicanism.7 
Germans were also outwardly united. In Germany, the “spirit of 1914” took hold of its 
citizens, who entered the war believing their country was threatened by Russia and its western 
allies. Feinde Ringsum, “enemies surround us,” was the motto of the war. At the Royal Palace 
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in Berlin, the Kaiser proclaimed that he recognized “no parties, only Germans.” Discordant 
German politicians, as was the case in France, fell in line at the call to arms.8 German 
Socialists and pacifists, who were nominally against war, seemed to acquiesce to Germany’s 
right to self-defence in 1914. When they began to reject the war, they faced strong state 
suppression and their opposition floundered.9  
 Britain, where the motivation to fight a continental war was less clear than the nations 
directly involved, offered the possibility of more coherent opposition. In the early days of the 
July Crisis, elements within the British government had argued against intervention. By early 
August, almost all members of Cabinet who had opposed participation changed their positions 
after the German invasion of Belgium. On 4 August, British opinion supported intervention and 
cheered at news of British entry into the war. After news of the British retreat from Mons on 25 
August and newspapers published accounts of the German atrocities in occupied Belgium, 
particularly after the burning of Louvain on 29 August, British enlistment surged alongside 
support for the war. The war transformed from a necessary intervention to preserve France and 
the balance of power to a crusade to defend Britain from the morally corrupt German 
militarism now threatening the world.10 Several prominent British intellectuals and politicians 
created an anti-war group, the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), which began organizing 
resistance to the conflict almost as soon as it began. Its members believed that British foreign 
policy had to be answerable to the British people, and that political and economic reasons, not 
the interests of the British people, lay behind Britain’s involvement in the European war. They 
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believed that foreign policy ought to be under the control of voters and thus under “democratic 
control.” Only then could they restrain the “secret diplomacy” that had widened the conflict to 
include most European nations through treaty obligations. Though their political resistance 
grew in popularity over the course of the conflict, particularly amongst the British Left, the 
UDC’s influence remained minimal in 1914 as they were sidelined from the parliamentary 
discussion of the war and lacked widespread popular support.11  
Each belligerent country formed a dominant national narrative around their entry into 
the war which heralded and justified their participation. Each also had exceptions to the 
common portrayal of cheering crowds in Paris, Berlin and London welcoming the war. 
Historians agree there were different reactions between urban and rural, and between regions, 
classes and genders. Nevertheless, the popular enthusiasm that characterizes the memory of 
1914 was rooted in contemporary perceptions. As Europeans celebrated their nation’s wartime 
raison d’etre, those who mourned war’s outbreak refused to speak out against it (or, in the case 
of Britain’s Union of Democratic Control, were relatively muted). In the absence of a strong, 
vocal opposition to the war in Europe, the myth of all-encompassing support for it may as well 
have been true. 
Among the British Dominions, South Africa had similar circumstances to the French 
and English union found in Canada. Both experienced August 1914 as unifying moment for its 
divided political groups that had good reason to distrust the British war. South Africa, which 
had only been a Dominion since 1910, possessed a mixture of British, conquered Boer 
colonists, Asian immigrants from India, and black Africans. Initially, the war served as an 
opportunity to unite the deeply divided nation, though throughout the conflict South Africa 
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struggled with responses to imperial loyalty and colonial jingoism that varied between its 
diverse cultural groups.12 As in Canada, it began with unquestioned declaration of war and 
support for Great Britain, and “help knit together new levels of national consciousness and 
national integration.”13 For instance, a group of black loyalists urged their compatriots to 
mobilize for war as part of their support for Britain’s multicultural imperial identity in 1914. 
Blacks easily linked their support for the war to more equality for their people in South 
Africa.14 Contrarily, Boers and some labour and socialist organization reacted hostilely to the 
war effort. Though the popular response was largely positive, there was still no single voice in 
1914 that undermined the war effort like Henri Bourassa.15 
Was Canada different? Separated from the conflict by an ocean, Canadians were 
familiar with the political and cultural divisions over its submission to British policy. The 
French Canadian nationalist movement arose in the previous fifteen years to oppose the goals 
of Canadian imperialists. Language issues that had raised the ire of both sides and the 1911 
federal election confirmed French Canadians’ distrust of English Canada. Nationaliste 
candidates had campaigned alongside Quebec Conservatives to help Robert Borden defeat the 
Liberal incumbent, Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Of the few nationaliste candidates elected, many simply 
became part of the Conservative government that continued its imperialist policies without 
considering Quebec or its nationalistes. The following three years of Conservative government 
was lacklustre, and certainly did not achieve any of the goals the nationalists had envisioned 
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from their support. 
Canada, like South Africa, had developed political fault lines along which opposition to 
general European war could easily set off. Many Canadians may had vocalized their opposition 
to war in principle in the months before the July Crisis,16 but political leaders were unified in 
their support that August. “Ready, aye ready,” Laurier proclaimed at the onset of hostilities. “I 
have often declared that if the Mother Country were ever in danger, or if danger ever 
threatened, Canada would render assistance to the fullest extent of her power,” the Liberal 
leader reminded Canadians before announcing that “pending such great questions there should 
be a truce to party strife.”17 The party truce confirmed total parliamentary agreement on 
Canadian participation. Across the country, newspapers described spontaneous demonstrations 
of patriotism and support.  
Among the figures that rushed to provide their views on the European war, Henri 
Bourassa and the nationalistes were alone in expressing serious public dissent. Much like the 
UDC in Britain, Bourassa articulated a political objection to Canadian participation rather than 
a purely moral or religious one like that of J.S. Woodsworth.18 Bourassa had nurtured his 
French Canadian political movement for a decade, which ensured that war enthusiasm would 
not subsume it -- although it did influence it. His determination to adhere to and express his 
nationalist and anti-imperialist political views to Canadians remained intact. Committed to the 
tenets of Canadian nationalism that he had developed throughout his career, Bourassa had to 
twist his words to remain loyal to his ideas. Few European countries had a similar political 
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nexus for opposition to the war and none maintained their position after outbreak. Bourassa, 
drawing upon the ideas he had espoused since the Boer War, was ready and willing to offer 
detailed and rational criticism of Canadian involvement.19  
* * * 
Bourassa’s experience of the war began under more dangerous circumstances than most 
of his fellow Canadians. On 21 May 1914, he left on his regular summer trip to Europe. He 
went to learn of British opinion on Canadian affairs and to explore the plight of linguistic 
minorities, especially in light of the 1912 Ontario Schools Crisis, which led him to research the 
situation among similar Europeans communities.20 Bourassa’s intended destinations included 
Wales, Belgium, Switzerland and Alsace. On 30 July he arrived in the Alsatian village of 
Colmar to meet with Abbé Emile Wetterlé, a member of the Reichstag for Alsace-Lorraine 
since 1898, editor of the newspaper Le Nouvelliste d’Alsace-Lorraine, and a well-known 
opponent to Germany’s rule there.21 Bourassa planned to speak with the Abbé but quickly 
discovered that the prospect of war had forced many of Alsace’s most fervent voices against 
German rule to flee. Wetterlé, accused of high treason, had fled to Switzerland on the day that 
German authorities searched his home and office for evidence of treason.22 Bourassa 
discovered that others, such as Chanoine Collin of the Lorrain, also fled to safety. Some failed 
to escape, like Alexis Samain, president of the Souvenir Lorrain, who was shot in Metz on 3 
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August.23  
Unlike many Canadians who experienced news of the war as a distant event, Bourassa 
was close to its dangerous reality. On the night of 30 July, the secretary of Le Nouvelliste 
d’Alsace-Lorraine, a young Frenchman, invited Bourassa to his house. With war all but certain, 
Bourassa and his host fled the next morning. The secretary joined the French army, while 
Bourassa hoped to return safely home. He reached a deserted, soldier-filled Strasbourg the next 
day and prayed with Alsatians in the cathedral.24 On 2 August he arrived in Cologne and took 
the train as far as the German-Belgian border which was closed to railway traffic. Undaunted, 
Bourassa abandoned his luggage and crossed on foot, resigned to the “fortune de la guerre.” 
Reaching wartime Paris, which he found had “presque l’air d’une ville religieuse,”25 he 
witnessed firsthand the Union Sacrée of France’s bitterly divided politics. “Royalistes, 
impérialistes, républicains, socialistes, tous ne paraissent avoir qu’un coeur,” he wrote of his 
time in the capital.26  
Back in Canada a week later, he immediately described what he had seen to Omar 
Héroux for his first published response to the war in late August.  Bourassa told his readers of 
the ethereal, quiet French cities through which he had passed and reminded them that “ceux qui 
ont vécus ces heures-là en France peuvent dire qu’ils ont vu l’âme de la nation française.”27 
War, Bourassa noted solemnly, “n’est pas l’enfer … C’est le pire des châtiments sur la terre; 
c’est aussi la plus salutaire des expiations.”28 Bourassa echoed a generation of Christian 
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thinkers before him when he extolled this chance for Europe’s – and maybe Canada’s – 
regeneration.29 The sense of national purpose that bound the French together was palpable and 
something Bourassa wished to see in his native land. His return home to Montreal on 21 
August marked a moment where it seemed the war’s zeitgeist that subsumed many in 1914 
captured Bourassa’s spirit as well.  His first experience of the European war would be a stark 
contrast to the months that followed in Canada. 
The political landscape of nationalistes and imperialists that had dominated Canada 
during Bourassa’s career still defined his understanding of Canadian political discourse. At the 
onset of the war, English Canada seemed replete with enthusiasm for the “Great Adventure,” 
though this may have been the loudest urban voices crowding out the periphery.30 Bourassa 
prepared to counter that rhetoric with a different understanding of the war. In the coming 
months he would furnish a tempered response to the war’s supporters, detailing both Canada’s 
potential contribution to the war as well as its causes. In August, however, he offered cautious 
support and in September had cautious criticisms of Canadian involvement that revolved on the 
axis of his political life: Canadian nationalism.  
Bourassa understood that the war required a national unity that had been absent since 
Canada’s creation almost fifty years before. He believed it possible to put on hold political 
arguments in favour of a national war effort, as he observed in France, but it would require 
compromise from both sides. In his first editorial response to the war on 29 August, he offered 
                                                 
29 Ramsay Cook offers a more detail examination of the idea of “social regeneration” among Canadian Christian 
thinkers, see Ramsay Cook, The Regenerators: Social Criticism in Late Victorian English Canada, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1985). 
30 One excellent example of the ubiquity of war support in an urban centre like Toronto is Ian Miller, Our Glory 
and Grief : Torontonians and the Great War, (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 2002) 15. It is less clear 
without a more comprehensive study how much war enthusiasm extended into urban, less heavily populated 
areas, or what regional differences existed, though James M. Pitsula, For All We Have and Are : Regina and 
the Experience of the Great War, (Winnipeg : University of Manitoba Press, 2008) suggests similar urban 
reactions. 
79 
 
a truce to his opponents: make this truly a Canadian war, not an imperial one, and he would 
support it.31 Therefore, it had to be fought under the auspices of Canadian nationalism. If 
English Canadians sought to enter the Empire’s war alongside Bourassa and his fellow French 
Canadians, the first step had to be a show of good faith. Nationalistes would compromise if 
imperialists compromised as well. After all, French Canadians were disadvantaged, and what 
reason did they have to support a British war when they themselves faced persecution at home?  
Bourassa argued that the clearest peace offering by English Canada would be for 
Ontario Premier James Whitney to end his discriminatory Regulation 17 against Franco-
Ontarians.32 This legislation had eliminated French language schooling for thousands of 
Franco-Ontarians since 1912, opening a wound for French Canadians who had seen their 
linguistic and education rights outside of Quebec minimized since Confederation. If Whitney 
repealed Regulation 17, Bourassa insisted, “cet acte d’élémentaire justice et de politique 
intelligente fera plus pour assurer l’unité de l’Empire et de la nation canadienne que tous les 
dons de farine ou d’argent.”33 The contradiction in asking for national unity while demanding 
political concessions elicited sharp criticisms, but in Bourassa’s mind it represented a fair 
attempt at political negotiation and compromise. The Canadian union sacrée could only form if 
the Ontario bilingual schools question was resolved. 
The Premier ignored his request, indicating Bourassa’s excessive optimism about the 
war’s short-term, transformative potential. Imperialists had agitated for a larger Canadian role 
in the Empire for decades. They had fashioned a national consciousness intrinsically linked to 
imperial values in the years before the war, which historian Carl Berger identified as a form of 
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nationalism unto itself.34 For imperialists, Canadian domestic and international policy was best 
guided by an imperial connection that superseded national concerns.35 The outbreak of war 
opened an opportunity to realize these objectives.  
Consciously or not, Canadians seemingly fulfilled an imperialist vision of supporting 
the Empire. The impassioned speeches of Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden and Liberal leader 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier during the parliamentary session on the war on 19 August 1914, spoke of 
the need to both defend Britain and uphold Canadian honour, thus emphasizing Canada’s duty 
to join the war. Borden declared that the Dominion entered the war “for the cause of honour, to 
maintain solemn pledges, to uphold principles of liberty, to withstand forces that would convert 
the world into an armed camp.”36 In December, Borden more explicitly articulated to Canadian 
soldiers leaving for Europe his hopes for the war effort:  
There is only one respect in which we in Canada have not yet attained our full 
share of self-government in this Empire and that is with regard to foreign 
relations— the decision of those questions of alliances and understandings which 
in the end must determine the issues of peace and war.... I may see the day, and 
you young men will certainly see it, when the men of Canada, Australia, South 
Africa and the other Dominions will have the same just voice in these questions 
as those who live within the British Isles.37 
English Canadian Conservatives, Liberals, and newspapers across the country rallied around 
the cause of defending European nations (particularly Britain and Belgium), in defence of 
British ideals against German ones.  For most of Canada’s press, there was no question about 
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Canadian involvement.38 The invasion of Belgium and atrocities there, alleged and real, 
significantly influenced Canadian public opinion in the first months of the war. Newspapers 
were replete with accounts of Belgium and the plight of its people.39 In the light of Germany’s 
aggression, imperialist ideas about Canada’s role in the world and its relationship within the 
Empire seemed justified, if not triumphant.40 
A public reaction that was largely unquestioning towards the war’s purpose resembled 
the national unity that Bourassa had found so appealing in France. Unfortunately, that was not 
the transformation Bourassa wished to see. With the outpouring of support for the war, he 
perceived that more Canadians than ever publicly believed in the supremacy of an imperial 
connection -- not the national one that Bourassa espoused. To him, any support for Canadian 
involvement in the European war was invalid if it failed to consider and integrate Quebec’s 
nationaliste view. If Borden or any Canadian subsumed in war enthusiasm could not 
distinguish between national interests and imperial interests, then they inherently omitted the 
nationalistes and omitted what Bourassa considered true national unity.  
Bourassa rejected an imperialist context to Canada’s involvement in the war. As a 
result, his position was unacceptable to the war narrative developing throughout the rest of the 
country, effectively making the French Canadian journalist the largest obstacle to unity in 
1914. Bourassa did not want to be a hindrance to the war effort, but he could not avoid this role 
without voluntarily censoring his opinions from the pages of his newspaper, a nearly 
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unimaginable step to the journalist. War supporters dismissed Canadians, like Bourassa, who 
did not accept the legitimacy of imperialist positions as, at best, unpatriotic and, at worst, 
traitors. 
In early September, the fate of the Allied powers in Europe remained undecided. The 
German offensive in August had steadily pushed back the French army and its government had 
fled from Paris to Bordeaux in an ominous echo of the German victory in 1870. The British 
Expeditionary Force, outnumbered and defeated at Mons in Belgium, had withdrawn to the 
Marne River where the Allied forces made their final attempt to resist the advancing German 
armies. The “Miracle of the Marne” that saved Paris and the western Allies in September 1914 
was not certain as Bourassa wrote to his fellow Canadians of their imminent role in the war. 
Like many Canadians in the early months of the war, he was idealistic about what Canada’s 
role could mean. 
Bourassa turned his critical gaze to the events at home through Le Devoir. “Après la 
Guerre, la Famine,” he warned on 2 September.41 Quoting the imperialist Lord Milner, who 
was in charge of organising coal and food production in Britain,42 Bourassa warned of an 
impending food crisis and its implication for Canada. Since many farmers had joined the 
armies of Europe and almost half of the world’s wheat grew in nations now at war, Bourassa 
expected a worldwide famine in 1915. Lord Milner called for a mobilization of agriculture 
alongside the mobilization of soldiers, and Bourassa used this declaration as a platform to 
question Canadians devoted to the war effort. Echoing the advice of English Canadian 
millionaire Herbert Samuel Holt, Bourassa wondered “s’il est nécessaire pour l’Angleterre, 
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engagée directement dans le conflit européen, de tripler ses effectifs agricoles au risque de 
n’envoyer sur les champs de bataille qu’un armée à peine supérieure en nombre aux vaillantes 
phalanges belges, le Canada n’a-t-il pas là un exemple à suivre?”43 Bourassa translated 
Milner’s unease about food production into fear over the potential for Canada to succumb to a 
reckless war effort. Canada should look out for its own interests, just as Britain did. Why 
devote manpower on a large army when those men could be plowing fields?  
Bourassa repeated this argument more forcibly later, but in early September he used it 
to introduce an intellectual manifesto laying out his position on the war. Although alarmed by 
the potentially devastating consequences of the world war, he took heed of Borden and 
Laurier’s inspiring speeches in Parliament that August. Bourassa presented himself as ready to 
support the war effort as they had, and he proclaimed that “l’heure n’est pas aux polémiques” 
as he outlined the intellectual foundation that guided his writing about the war. 
Dans mon humble sphère d’action je me propose de rechercher 
consciencieusement, en toute loyauté, et de dire en toute franchise tous ce qu’il 
me semblerait urgent de prévoir et de faire, se l’on veut éviter au Canada et, par 
répercussion, à l’Empire, des désastres dont beaucoup de gens parlent dans 
l’obscurité, mais sur lesquels très peu semblent avoir le courage d’appeler 
l’attention des gouvernants et la coopération de toutes les bonnes volontés. 
Dans cette recherche et dans les conclusions qu’elle m’inspirera, je suis 
fermement résolu à ne pas me départ du ton que les circonstances devraient 
imposer à tous. Aucune provocation, aucune injure, aucune calomnie, aucune 
goujaterie ne m’entraîneront au dehors de cette voie. Je ne rechercherai pas même 
les motifs des attaques brutales ou grotesques dont je pourrai être l’objet.  
Les spectacles grandioses et touchants dont j’ai été témoin en Europe m’ont mis 
à même de faire la comparaison entre le patriotisme désintéressé, le dévouement 
vrai à la chose publique, et l’exploitation sordide des choses les plus sacrées.44 
This manifesto, which guided Bourassa’s commentary over the next four years, pledged to 
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explore the unreported, the ignored and the unpopular. In so doing, he aligned himself against 
the triumphant and positive rhetoric surrounding the conflict. In making the extraordinary 
promise that he would discuss issues that others were afraid to address, regardless of the 
consequences, Bourassa revealed the essence of his wartime writing. Bourassa did not explain 
whether he was for or against the war, instead he committed to uncovering the dangers that the 
war presented to Canada -- and the Empire, he made sure to include. According to this 
rationale, his wartime opposition was not an expression of disloyalty, as his detractors were 
quick to claim. Instead, the French Canadian intellectual vowed to help Canadians better 
understand the war. If that meant examining the negative impact of the war, so be it. It was his 
loyalty to the nation of Canada that compelled him to dissect the conflict. 
On 8 September Bourassa examined Canada’s potential duty to the war effort and the 
legitimacy of its growing contribution. The first, aptly titled “Le Devoir National,” criticized 
Canada’s war effort for overestimating the country’s importance and ability. He lamented 
“l’absence à peu près complète du sentiment des responsabilités réelles du Canada comme 
nation – responsabilités extérieures et plus encore responsabilités intérieures.” Canada could 
not, he argued, remain indifferent to the war raging in France: a “nation anglo-française, liée à 
l’Angleterre et à la France par mille attaches … a un intérêt vital au maintien de la France et de 
l’Angleterre.”45 Bourassa again qualified his support for the war with the caveat that Canadians 
remain realistic and quantify exactly what the country could or could not provide. After all, he 
reminded Canadians, Britain demanded no less of its own policy. 
Bourassa replied to his supporters who asked if he approved today of Canadian 
participation in British wars or wars foreign to Canada as he had in 1899. He outlined the case 
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for nationaliste support for the war, arguing that the Canadian nation had an interest in the 
success of Britain and France in Europe based on historic and cultural connections. Though he 
did not consider the Canadian character intrinsically tied to Britain, as it could never fully 
accept Canada’s French speaking Catholic peoples, there were connections that obliged 
Canadian participation in the war. He emphasized that Canada had no moral, constitutional or 
immediate interest in the conflict, but Canadians seemed utterly unaware of any sort of national 
responsibility. He wrote of “l’absence à peu près complète du sentiment des responsabilités 
réelles du Canada comme nation – responsabilités extérieures et plus encore responsabilités 
intérieures.” 46 His nationaliste argument for the war reminded them of that fact, making it 
worthwhile even if it meant aligning too closely with imperialism. 
Next, Bourassa dissected Britain’s entry into the war and justifications of their actions 
in a five-part series. Called “Une Page d’Histoire,” each editorial examined the British White 
Papers containing Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey’s communications with the great powers 
of Europe in the final weeks before the war. Bourassa traced the British refusal to go to war for 
Serbia in July and their attempts to persuade Germany that Britain would stay out of an eastern 
European war. As late as 2 August, he noted, the English were committed to defending their 
coasts from the German Navy, but not the protection of France or Russia. The English did not 
want to commit to a war if peace was still viable. Only the 3 August invasion of Belgium and 
King Albert I’s request for British intervention secured English entry into the war. By 4 
August, Bourassa concluded that war with Germany was unavoidable given British public 
sentiment and the threat that Germany posed to the English Channel. His outline of the English 
efforts to sidestep the conflict exudes admiration for Sir Edward Grey, whose diplomatic 
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machinations revealed a statesman who was “courageux, inlassable, dont toute l’action n’est 
inspirée que par ce seul mobile: l’intérêt de son pays.”47 In Bourassa’s view, the Foreign 
Secretary’s goal was the preservation of peace for Britain’s benefit, and it was only after all 
hope had been extinguished that Grey used the Belgian invasion to rally public opinion for the 
war to unite the nation and enter the war under the most favourable circumstances.48  
Though he endorsed Grey as a statesman, Bourassa’s expressions of high regard for the 
English diplomat were not couched in terms that endeared him to English Canadian 
imperialists. Bourassa evoked Grey’s actions not as examples of English suavity in handling 
the crisis, but rather as a blunt refusal to compromise on issues of national self-interest. This 
was not the esteem that English Canadian imperialists expected. Grey was “fidèle à la grande 
tradition britannique, il a été avant et par-dessus tout l’homme de son pays,” Bourassa wrote. 
“Il me parait que le Canada ne saurait mieux démontrer son «loyalisme» qu’en s’inspirant des 
exemples de la grande nation à qui il a emprunté ses institutions politiques.”49 Bourassa’s 
articles portray the British as “perfidious seekers of peace,” willing to play all sides against 
each other in the name of ever-important national self-interest. British entry into the war did 
not stem from a moral obligation to defend Belgium, as most other Canadians believed in 
1914, as much as its failure to secure England’s interests through refusing to participate in the 
continental conflict. Only once it was clear that participation was necessary for British interests 
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did they enter the war. Bourassa used the articles to repeat his support for the war, and he did 
so in such a way that stripped away the moral ambiguity (or perhaps moral certainty) imbued 
upon it by English Canada’s call to defend the Empire. British entry into the war was an act of 
self-interest for Great Britain – a national policy that Bourassa wished to see at home as well.  
Bourassa noted that the value placed on Britain’s self-interest by Edward Grey 
contrasted with many of the proffered justifications of the war, as it did not explicitly demand 
the defence of France or a resolve to contain German militarism. Canada as a nation, he 
argued, should equally have no interest in those European concerns. It should only wage war 
for the potential benefits to Canada itself. Implicitly, a war that was an ocean away in defence 
of an ally did not deserve a total Canadian war effort. Thus the events of August 1914 did not 
lead Bourassa to reject the validity of the war entirely. He believed that they denoted the need 
for Canada to mirror British policy and adjust its involvement according to its national 
interests. He argued that, like their British counterparts, Canadians should have a clear vision 
of those interests and what actions they prescribed. 
Bourassa’s position garnered many critics. A few months later in November, he 
categorized the various forms of opposition he received for his views over the last several 
months. One, that they were “insultes à la mère-patrie;” two, that “ce n’est pas le temps de 
parles de ces choses-là;” and three, “vos conclusions ne répondent pas à votre prologue et à 
votre démonstration.”50 He encountered each from different directions. The first largely from 
the fervent English Canadian war supporters, the second from moderates in French and English 
Canada alike, and the third from former allies or what he might term “reasonable” people who 
disagreed with the result of his argument, but not the act of submitting them to the public. They 
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appeared in different forms, but at their root most opposition fell into one of these three 
categories. 
The majority of the Canadian press portrayed Bourassa’s articles of late August and 
early September as a nationaliste polemic that once again denounced the dangers of Canada’s 
imperial ties. Bourassa had not been so prominent on the national stage since the Boer War. 
Across the country, newspapers responded to his arguments with scorn and sometimes derision. 
None addressed Bourassa’s promise of September 2 to “rechercher consciencieusement, en 
toute loyauté” the issues of the war or the details of his argument, but rather attacked its 
implication: that a true Canadian was a nationalist and must reject Canada’s total support for 
an imperial war. Though the Quebec journalist lamented his opponents mischaracterizing his 
arguments, in truth most popular responses rejected his position regardless of its rationale. 
Bourassa’s past political actions, such as his opposition to the Boer War and especially his 
support of the Conservatives in the 1911 election, suggested to many that he had always been 
self-serving and not above furthering his own political interests rather than Canada’s interests, 
as he claimed in 1914. During wartime, his nationaliste critique (or any critique) was deemed 
unpatriotic. To his critics, Canada’s interests lay in the historic and cultural obligations to 
England and perhaps France, which superseded national ones, rather than accented them as 
Bourassa believed. Canadians had a duty to fight which, according to the war’s supporters 
inside and outside of Quebec in 1914, surpassed the petty political issues that Bourassa raised. 
French and English Canadians had many of the same reasons for disregarding Bourassa 
in the early months of the war. The most common rejection of Bourassa centred on his 
assertion that the war effort did not serve Canada’s national interests. Outside of Le Devoir, the 
French language press of Quebec had been in favour of the war in August. Accordingly, many 
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commentators attacked his evolving views in September.51 La Patrie, the second largest French 
language newspaper in Montreal,52 first responded to Le Devoir on 31 August and through the 
ensuing month. Its editors dismissed the idea that England was acting in its self-interest in July 
and August, as Bourassa alleged, and instead argued that England was saving the countries of 
France and Belgium from the German menace. La Patrie also denied that the war required 
compromise between nationalism and imperialism.53 Those ideologies represented positions 
that were no longer relevant during the war. Instead, in the name of patriotism, those divisions 
should be put aside for the sake of political unity and Bourassa should abandon his partisan 
positions. 
Editorials in smaller papers soon followed, such as Le Pays, Le Clairon, Le Soleil, and 
others. To these French Canadian editors, Bourassa seemed naively unaware of the seriousness 
of the European war and the consequences of defeat – he was a political agitator to be pitied.54 
Quebec’s English language papers, like Montreal’s Daily Mail and the Montreal Star, also 
added their voices, though in far stronger terms than their French Canadian counterparts did. In 
the pages of L’Action Sociale, the Church hierarchy’s organ, Mgr. Paul-Eugène Roy spoke in 
place of Cardinal Bégin who was attending the Papal Conclave, and wrote that French 
Canadian Catholics had a duty to the mother country and owed her cooperation.55  
A few presses would temper their criticism of Bourassa later in September. Le Canada 
responded reasonably by undertaking another interpretation of Grey’s diplomacy that rejected 
Bourassa’s arguments, while Le Pays defended the nationaliste chief’s right to offer his 
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opinion.56 Yet these exceptions were few compared to most newspapers that continued their 
unequivocal support for the war and their attacks against its only vocal critic. 
French Canadian commentators delivered an emphatic appeal to English Canada that 
Bourassa did not represent them. The reminder that French Canada supported the war usually 
accompanied articles attacking the nationaliste leader. Thomas Chase-Casgrain, a French 
Canadian lawyer, Conservative politician, and imperialist, offered his interpretation of the 
French Canadian reaction to Bourassa’s argument in a letter to La Patrie on 14 September. 
Casgrain asked how Bourassa could demand that Canada pursue its national interest when the 
war represented its most important interest: the defence of the two Canadian motherlands, 
France and England. “French Canadians,” he wrote, “do not wish ... to stand aloof. .... Duty, 
gratitude and self-interest unite them to the other members of the great family in this fight for 
justice and right.” Casgrain supported the idea that Canada could not commit everything to the 
war, asking “somme nous des parasites et nous contenterions de nous abreuver et de nous 
nourrir à sa table, sans faire de nos poitrines un rampart contre ceux qui veulent l’assassiner?” 
The majority of French Canadians did not support Bourassa, according to Casgrain. Instead, 
they remembered the French Canadians of 1775 and 1812 who fought for England.57 The 
editorials of Quebec newspapers suggest that many French Canadians likely agreed with 
Casgrain in the first months of the Great War. 
Outside Quebec, most major newspapers echoed these disputes. The Winnipeg Free 
Press wrote that Canadian and British interests in the war were the same.58 Toronto’s Globe 
and the Toronto Star barely mentioned the French Canadian iconoclast, perhaps an equally 
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damning condemnation of his seeming irrelevance to many Canadians outside la belle 
province.59 While some papers such as the Kingston Standard went so far as to demand that the 
arrest of the “traitor,” most were content with demanding his silence.60 A cursory examination 
of the other news that garnered headlines, since many did not mention Bourassa, reveals that 
the Canadian press did not understand the war through the lens adopted by the journalist. For 
most Canadian newspapers, there was no question that Canada had to enter the war and fully 
fight it. Any discussion over the nature of Canada’s entry or the scale of its participation was 
no longer worth debating during the struggle for Europe across the Atlantic.  
One of the most common rejections of Bourassa in newspapers portrayed his editorials 
as a craven effort to draw attention and support to his own ideological beliefs. The editor of La 
Patrie denounced the man who “nous dise maintenant ce que nous devons penser du 
programme politique qu’il a formulé, et que le premier coup de canon allemand a réduit en 
poussière.”61 For the Daily Mail in Montreal, Bourassa was not a man but a “troubled spirit… 
formed of suspicion, distrust, envy, malice, ingratitude and prejudice.”62 The Winnipeg Free 
Press, one of most widely circulated papers in the country, debated with its local Catholic 
press, La Liberté, over its unquestioned support of Bourassa’s desire for limited participation. 
As “ultramontane organs,” the Free Press lumped Le Devoir and La Liberté together in blindly 
rejecting England and France’s call to arms to further their own political objectives.63 The Free 
Press hoped that Bourassa could “keep his nationalist theories to himself,” as they had little to 
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do with Canada’s present circumstance.64 These criticisms were not altogether unwarranted: 
Bourassa was as committed to his ideological positions as they suspected.  
Bourassa’s grounding in the political views that he had nurtured for more than a decade 
was a weakness to his critics rather than as a testament to his sincerity. They perceived the 
Great War as unlike any other situation Canada had experienced. To debate political issues 
from before the conflict in the fall of 1914 seemed intrinsically faulty. Bourassa’s arrogance in 
demanding concessions from English Canada, the repeal of Regulation 17, seemed like an 
obvious attempt to use the war to push his own political agenda and gained him few friends. 
The worst of the English Canadian press believed him a traitor to Canada and the Empire while 
French Canadian papers thought his belligerence undermined the unity he professed to desire. 
Regardless, none believed that wartime was an appropriate moment to divide the nation over 
such concerns. 
For French or English Canadians critical of Bourassa’s views, national unity demanded 
that all political considerations be put aside immediately. Unity meant total, unquestioning 
support for Canada’s war, not a discussion over concessions. Bourassa’s intransigence seemed 
only further proof that he was an impediment to national unity rather than an advocate. 
Commentators across the country presented his refusal to compromise in the face of the new 
wartime circumstances as ignorant and delusional. They did not accept that Bourassa’s 
nationalist position demanded critical examination of Canada’s involvement in the war to 
discern the best possible course of action for the country. For a Canadian nationalist like 
Bourassa, unity meant debating the best course of action and agreeing together on it. 
While the articles that denounced Bourassa proffered an honest opinion of his 
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criticisms, they did not shy away from dishonest or dismissive portrayals. Most newspapers 
quoted his words in the worst possible light. They told their readers that Bourassa believed 
Canada had no obligation to fight in English wars, while omitting his defence of Canadian 
participation to the extent that it could afford to offer.65 Other banal renunciations included the 
Canadian Club expelling him from its membership even though, Bourassa noted dryly, he was 
not actually a member.66 Though his critics accused him of blind adherence to his own 
ideology and of ignoring the moral and political urgency of the war, he could easily accuse 
them of the same narrow-minded focus. 
The words of retired Major General Sir William Dillon Otter, who returned to active 
service for the war and was the first Canadian-born Chief of Staff for Canada’s army, 
exemplified the attitude of his critics. In an interview with the Canadian Courier, he explained 
that “the public mind should not be allowed to dwell too much upon what is going on in 
Europe. That can be safely left to the military leaders of Europe.”67 Most Canadians probably 
did not care about Bourassa’s Le Devoir articles other than noting the brief mentions in small 
columns of their local English language papers. Apathy silenced Bourassa as effectively as any 
censor. 
Bourassa’s position did not align with some of his nationalistes allies as the war 
revealed divisions within their political group. Armand Lavergne and Omar Héroux agreed 
with Bourassa and asked that Ontario repeal Regulation 17 in exchange for supporting the war. 
Jules Fournier did not accept Bourassa’s distinction that Canada could join the war on Britain’s 
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side as a nation without the strings of imperialism attached. He openly condemned his leader’s 
equivocation.68 Olivar Asselin split away from his compatriots entirely. He was convinced by 
the argument that Quebec’s “mère-patrie” of France ought to be defended, though at the same 
time attacked the Catholic Church’s abuse of power in the province.69 The war separated their 
nationalist views, as Asselin and Fournier turned towards a Quebec-focused perspective like 
that of Tardivel, while Bourassa, Lavergne and Héroux still believed in a pan-Canadian 
combination.70 
A few English Canadians, even though they did not support Bourassa’s perspective, 
believed he should have the opportunity to express his views. One of his most fervent 
defenders was prominent Montreal lawyer Charles Hazlitt Cahan, who first encountered the 
French Canadian journalist in the naval debate. They exchanged correspondence and remained 
friends in the years leading up to the war. Cahan vehemently disagreed with Bourassa’s 
arguments, but wrote letters to editors of newspapers across the country (such as the Gazette, 
the Halifax Herald, and the Toronto Star) protesting their misrepresentation of Bourassa’s 
argument. Cahan argued that the French Canadian was neither unpatriotic nor against the war.71 
His defence of Bourassa was founded in the same British ideals that war supporters used to 
justify British superiority over German militarism. As Bourassa noted in a letter to Cahan, “the 
best feature of English civilisation is individual liberty,” which always allowed for the 
presentation of opposing perspectives.72  
Cahan was an exception among Bourassa’s opponents. The widespread condemnation 
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of Bourassa’s views in newspapers across the country in September led him to denounce the 
war’s supporters as hypocrites, a message he continued to communicate as 1914 drew to a 
close. Accordingly, finding common ground with his opposition proved to be a difficult task. 
Although Bourassa tried to respond to his critics by citing other writers who agreed with his 
arguments, it was not a conversation. Bourassa simply accepted those who agreed with him and 
summarily rejected those who did not. Just as his detractors had little influence on him, 
Bourassa’s complete adherence to his own beliefs minimized his potential influence on his 
critics. For many of the newspapers in Quebec and throughout Canada, he was the primary (if 
not the only) voice criticizing the war effort -- but an unconvincing one. Critical comments 
only solidified Bourassa’s belief about the pervasiveness of imperialist ideas across Canada, 
while his own commentaries confirmed his opponents’ view of him as a dangerous iconoclast. 
This mutual affirmation of the worst of both sides narrowed the Canadian understanding of the 
war.  
Despite Bourassa’s growing dissent, French Canadian expressions of support for the 
war presented an illusion of wartime unity. In September, Montreal doctor Arthur Mignault 
offered the government $50,000 to form a French Canadian battalion. A recruiting rally, held at 
Parc Sohmer in Montreal on 22 October, featured speeches from Quebec Premier Lomer 
Gouin, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Conservative MP Thomas Chase-Casgrain, and Liberal MP 
Rodolphe Lemieux. “I have come here to tell you, above all that our hearts will follow you to 
the field of duty and honour,” Premier Gouin told his fellow Quebecois, “when you return, 
covered with the glory of victory, you will not only have told, but have proven to the Empire 
and to the Province of Quebec, what you have done for them.”73 French Canadians appeared as 
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committed to the war effort as English Canada in public expressions from urban newspapers 
and public meetings. However, despite its organizers’ claims of success, by 5 November only 
thirty-two officers and 891 other ranks had enlisted in the 22nd Battalion, Canada’s sole fully 
French-speaking battalion.74 Lower recruitment numbers throughout the province of Quebec 
belied popular manifestations of support for the war in public and in the press.75 
In the fall of 1914, Bourassa was more preoccupied with the Quebec’s Catholic Church 
public stance on the war. Historian René Durocher convincingly argues that Bourassa’s early 
support for the war was purposefully ambivalent and reflected his desire not to contradict the 
position of the Church, which favoured Canadian participation. Durocher suggests that many 
members of the clergy privately supported the journalist’s views but the devout Bourassa 
anguished over any perceived conflict with Quebec bishops.76 Consequently, Bourassa 
carefully worded his editorials of 1914 to ground his support in an appropriate nationaliste 
critique. His dissection of British policy in September is also cautious -- especially when 
compared to his later wartime articles. By crafting an argument that emphasized Canada’s 
political autonomy, Bourassa could straddle a position between supporting the war and the 
nationaliste opposition to any imperial involvement, without setting himself up to potentially 
contradict the Church. According to Durocher, Bourassa’s Catholicism forced him to moderate 
his reaction to the war, despite the fact it went against his equally fervent political beliefs. This 
stance, which awkwardly placed Bourassa between favouring intervention and criticizing it, 
helps explain some of the incoherence of his views in 1914. He supported the war, but was 
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critical of many aspects of Canada’s involvement, much to his critics’ displeasure.77 
When the Quebec Catholic Bishops clarified their position in September, it was more 
approving than Bourassa’s views. L’Action Social, Quebec’s official Catholic newspaper, 
published a detailed refutation of Bourassa’s analysis on 16 September, grounding its stance in 
a moral obligation to fight in the conflict.78 The bishops of Quebec released a pastoral letter on 
23 September that made an emotional and moral appeal for prayers and contributions to the 
Patriotic Fund to supplement the money and men that Catholics had already “generously” 
offered. The bishops described the terrible situation in Europe for their followers and wrote 
that “il fera tourner cette guerre au profit de la justice et du droit. ... Ce sera l’honneur et la 
gloire du Canada ... d’avoir concouru, par ses pieuses supplications, à restaurer la paix dans le 
monde, et à soulager, par ses généreuses contributions, les maux dont aura souffert 
l’humanité.”79 A month later, they confirmed that “Britain is engaged in this war, and who does 
not see that the destiny of every part of the Empire is bound up with the fate of her armies? She 
counts very rightly on our cooperation, and this co-operation, we are happy to say, is being 
generously offered to her both in men and in money.”80 
Bourassa’s cautious support did not entirely align with the Church position of total 
support. Bourassa explained the difficulty of his position two years later in a letter to Bishop 
Georges Gauthier. He knew beforehand that the Catholic Church in Quebec would publish their 
pastoral letter and did not want to be in the position of publicly contradicting the episcopacy. 
Instead, Bourassa claimed that he offered a conciliatory view -- though measured and limited -- 
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that endorsed participation in the war. In retrospect, he told Gauthier that he should have 
opposed any military intervention and stayed true to the principles that he had held for fifteen 
years, but “j’osais encore croire que les évêques parleraient en évêques nationaux: je voulais 
me tenir aussi près que possible de leur attitude probable.”81 Durocher’s review of Bourassa’s 
relationship with Catholic bishops during the war concludes that Bourassa was convinced that 
“un lien essentiel entre le catholicisme et la survivance canadienne-française” demanded that 
the bishops be nationaliste in their position, so as to defend the “les justes droits de la 
minorité.”82 The ultramontane Bourassa turned away from the province’s bishops and found 
solace in the position of the newly elected Pope Benedict XV, who condemned the war. While 
the Catholic Church in Quebec carefully avoided disagreeing with Pope Benedict XV’s 
neutrality, they still reminded their flock of Canada’s obligations in Europe to its former 
motherlands of Britain and France. Thus as the war continued, Bourassa increasingly turned to 
Rome, not the cathedrals of his native province, for guidance. 
 An unexpected but obviously profound influence on Bourassa during the fall of 1914 
was the British radical Henry Noel Brailsford. A noted left-wing British intellectual, 
Brailsford’s career as a British political commentator stretched from the Boer War in 1899 to 
the Suez Crisis in 1956. He believed “that the citizens of a democratic society would respond 
in enlightened fashion if political issues were properly explained,” his biographer observes.83 
Brailsford visited and wrote about the tumultuous situation in Macedonia, caught between 
various Balkan powers in the early 20th century, and subsequently co-authored the Report of the 
International Commission to Inquire into the Cause and the Conduct of the Balkan Wars 
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published by the Carnegie Foundation in 1914.84 He later used that experience to apply J.A. 
Hobson’s view of British imperialism to other European powers in his own study of the “armed 
peace” of Europe, The War of Steel and Gold, published in May 1914. Brailsford condemned 
the British “balance of power” policy in Europe as intrinsically faulty. Its preservation, he 
argued, was not “self-sufficing” but represented a means to an end: the preservation of British 
national liberties.85 According to Brailsford, Europe’s problems in 1914 sprang from the 
corruption of that principle, wherein the balance of power became an end unto itself.86 By 
1914, he had made a name for himself as a left-wing commentator dissecting British 
imperialism and the complex Balkan crises. He joined the Union of Democratic Control 
alongside other well-known British leftists, and became influential enough to be included in 
A.J.P. Taylor’s history of British “trouble-makers” -- a group of political dissenters with whom 
Bourassa might have found common purpose, though not common ideology.87 
 In his editorials, Bourassa does not refer to Brailsford as an outsider or radical but 
merely introduces him as a British writer. Building upon Brailsford’s recent article in the 
Contemporary Review,88 which was unlike anything Bourassa might have read in the pages of 
Canadian newspapers, the French Canadian recited Brailsford’s argument that Germany’s 
invasion of Belgium did not cause the war. Instead, the Serbian alliance with Russia was a 
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thorn in Austria’s side that precipitated the July Crisis. Germany, in turn, responded to Russian 
aggression and launched a defensive war.89 According to Brailsford, and consequently 
Bourassa, Russia was the isolated Entente Power and agitator that pitted Serbia against Austria, 
drawing the other Great Powers into a European-wide conflict for its own political 
machinations and economic benefit.90 Ironically, Brailsford wrote, if the Entente won and 
Germany, Austria and Turkey were crushed, Russia would control the Balkans, the Dardanelles 
and Turkey and would sit on top of Britain’s road to India. In this case, imperialists would 
argue that only a strong Germany could balance the threat of Russia.91 In focusing his attack on 
the German aggression thesis to explain the war in western Europe for a British audience, 
Brailford’s emphasis resembled Bourassa’s challenge to the dominant Canadian narrative of 
the war’s origins. 
Reviewing Brailsford’s account fulfilled Bourassa’s promise to interrogate issues that 
others ignored so Canadians might better understand the European war. Neither Brailsford nor 
Bourassa simply sought to alleviate Germany’s blame for attacking Belgium; they discerned 
complexity in the political issues underlying its outbreak rather than the monocausal emphasis 
presented in patriotic rhetoric. Bourassa had agreed with Brailsford as early as 29 August, 
when he wrote that “les responsabilités sont multiplies”92 and that it could not simply be a war 
in defence of Belgium. Bourassa believed that Canadians deserved to know as much as 
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possible so they could make an informed decision about the scale and nature of Canada’s 
contribution to the war.  
One of the Canadians to share Bourassa’s beliefs was J.S. Ewart, a well-known English 
Canadian lawyer and an influential liberal nationalist. Ewart had defended the rights of Franco-
Manitobans before the Privy Council in the 1890s and wrote the Kingdom Papers in the years 
before and during the First World War, a voluminous examination of Canada’s legal 
obligations to Britain that envisioned a future distinct from the Empire.93 Many of the 
prominent liberal politicians and academics of the day, including Bourassa, read Ewart’s work 
on Canadian nationalism.94 Like Bourassa, Ewart sought an independent and equal Canada that 
could nurture Canadian nationalism and remove it from European affairs and British wars. The 
only way to unify Canada’s disparate peoples, Ewart argued, was to “make her a nation in 
name as well as in fact. Let her throw off her mean colonial wrappings and let her assume her 
rightful place among the nation of the world.”95 Ewart’s “romantic” notions of nationalism 
presented it as a unifying and inevitable force of Canadian history.96 
Unlike Bourassa however, Ewart voluntarily removed himself from the debate over the 
war. In its early months, Ewart supported the war hoping that it would reveal the power 
imbalance of Canada’s relationship to Britain.97 One of the few instances that Ewart did 
venture into the public realm during the war years was 26 October 1914, when he published an 
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article in the Ottawa Citizen. In it, Ewart summarized the reasons behind the war’s outbreak 
and offered the same far ranging causes that Bourassa had -- though without the French 
Canadian’s inflammatory invectives.98 Bourassa translated large sections of Ewart’s piece for a 
French-speaking audience and noted their agreement that Russian mobilization had pushed 
Europe into war, not the invasion of Belgium. Both distinguished between “predisposed” 
causes of the war, such as imperialism and national ambition, and “precipitating” ones, such as 
the invasion of Belgium or Russian mobilization.99  
Ewart wrote little after the October article and his silence strained the relationship 
between the two nationalists. Two years later, Ewart wrote to Bourassa explaining his silence: 
“I should not think it at all right at the present time to say anything that would tend to distract 
our people during the stress of war.” “After the war is over,” he further explained, “all those 
interested ... will have much to engage their attention and quite possibly I shall not be amongst 
the silent when the right time arrives.”100 While Bourassa and Ewart publicly and privately 
acknowledged the similarities in their views on the Empire, aside from a handful of articles, 
Ewart refused to threaten Canadian unity with his public commentary. In his mind, the time 
was not right. 
Bourassa continued to espouse his views despite accusations of “disloyalism.” What in 
a wartime context was chastised as “déloyalisme” or “trahison,” Bourassa reminded his 
readers, was once called “patriotisme.” It would be one day again, he reassured his readers, 
“quand les Canadiens sont guéris, qui de l’anémie coloniale, qui de la fièvre chaude de 
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l’impérialisme.”101  
 By December 1914, Bourassa stood alone as the most public voice of dissent against 
the Canadian war effort. The month before, a People’s Forum in Ottawa invited him to speak, 
but opposition forced the organizers to rescind the invitation. A group of Ottawa citizens 
organized a second potential appearance at the Russell Theatre on 17 December. In the interim, 
Bourassa toured New England speaking to Franco-Americans,102 although he looked forward 
to the opportunity to explain himself directly to English Canadians in their own tongue. The 
Ottawa event nearly devolved into a riot after his opponents aggressively campaign against his 
presence, labelling him the arch-traitor of Canada. Bourassa was prepared to face 
disagreement, as he had many times before, but the violent disruption of public disorder in 
response to his words testified to the wartime transformation of Canada. Afterwards, he offered 
brave words: “[I] can well afford to laugh at the easy game played against [me] by all dealers 
in ‘cheap loyalty’.... [I] survived it [during the South African War], and will pass through this 
one, in the minds at least of those people whose opinions and sympathy [I care] for.”103 At 
year’s end, he stood more isolated than ever on the public stage. French and English, Catholic 
and Protestant, even other nationalistes, all rejected his equivocating position on the war. No 
one realized how long the war would last, nor the extent of its transformation effect on Canada 
and the world. However, the coming months underlined its transformative nature for all 
Canadians, especially as it wrought a transformation on Bourassa’s cautious position in favour 
of Canadian intervention. 
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Chapter 3: What do we owe England? (1915) 
 
The year had begun in the shadow of his appearance at Russell Theatre where he had 
reached out to explain his position on the war. By the end of 1915, Bourassa was convinced 
that compromise was nearly impossible. Like all involved, the first full year of the war had 
attuned Bourassa to its horrific cost. Unlike most though, it led him to a far different 
conclusion and he championed anyone who echoed his position. Over the course of the year, he 
examined the words of the Papacy, the Union of Democratic Control, and others, as he 
conveyed to his readers any voice that saw the conflict as he did. Despite the return of tension 
over French language schooling, Bourassa knew that the war had become more than a political 
debate over Canada's imperial ties or the relationship of its linguistic neighbours. Less certain 
of where it would lead and its consequences than he had been at the close of 1914, the year had 
reaffirmed to Bourassa that if there was one certainty in wartime it was his faith. He believed 
that God did indeed have a plan for the world that included such atrocity, but it was human 
failings that twisted the path towards salvation. He strove to convince others to join him on the 
right path.  
The year began with Canadians still enthused by the war, but having not yet realised its 
consequences. Throughout the year, Bourassa looked for other voices that asked for 
moderation and found some in the person of Pope Benedict XV and the Union of Democratic 
Control. He praised their wisdom while criticizing the seemingly blind adherence of war 
supporters to their imperial cause. Alongside him, many French Canadians who had eagerly 
supported the war in August 1914 had begun to question a prolonged Canadian war effort as 
the year progressed. Tension between French and English Canadians only worsened as poor 
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recruitment in Quebec and the debate over language equality in Ontario revealed that the two 
sides disagreed on the nature of the war effort. English Canadian recruitment was higher due to 
the rate of British-born Canadians, as opposed to Canadians actually born in the country, but 
Henri Bourassa’s dissident tone accented the low numbers for French Canada. English Canada 
placed blame for it on Bourassa’s shoulders as well as the “bilingual issue.”1 Ontario’s 
Regulation 17, the legislation banning French education in the province, was scheduled to 
appear before the Ontario Supreme Court to judge its legality in 1915. The campaign to 
overturn or at least mediate the law was well supported by the nationalistes and more and more 
French Canadians were convinced that Ontario’s actions were unjust.  
* * * 
French Canadians contrasted the government’s request to wage a war for liberty when 
they did not even possess liberty at home in Ontario. They gained a powerful ally in the fight 
when, on 9 January, Quebec Cardinal Louis-Nazaire Bégin published a letter he sent to 
Archbishop Bruchési on the validity of Ontario's Regulation 17. The Cardinal wrote that, “if, 
which God forbid, the trial ... be prolonged, it will be the noble duty of the French and Catholic 
province of Quebec to assist with all its influence and all its resources.”2 The Quebec 
legislature followed Bégin’s lead and unanimously passed a resolution condemning the Ontario 
government’s refusal to protect Franco-Ontarian right to French education.3 Bourassa’s fellow 
nationaliste Armand Lavergne was more strenuous in his rejection, proclaiming in a letter to 
the Kingston Standard that “this country was born Bi-lingual[sic] and it will remain Bi-lingual, 
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or it shall end. ... We will have [the official language of this country], just as English, taught in 
our schools or there will be no schools at all.”4 Despite disagreement between the nationalistes 
and other French Canadians over the war effort, they were united in defending their linguistic 
rights against English Canadian discrimination. As historian Mason Wade noted, a “passionate 
emotional reaction … always developed [in Quebec] whenever one of the essentials of national 
survival [was] endangered.”5 That protective instinct sharpened over the course of the year as 
the date for a ruling by the Ontario Court of Ontario on Regulation 17 approached that fall. 
The nationalistes had always been one of the leading defenders of French language 
schooling in Ontario, and Bourassa did not hesitate to join the Church in continuing the years-
long campaign for Ontario's French minority. He had the opportunity to express his support a 
few days later on 14 January 1915, when he and his supporters celebrated the fifth anniversary 
of the founding of Bourassa’s paper, Le Devoir, and gathered at the Monument National for the 
occasion.  
The night began with J.-N. Cabana, President of the Friends of Le Devoir, G.N. 
Ducharme, President of the Board of Administration, and Armand Lavergne giving speeches to 
warm up the crowd for the main event. Eventually Lavergne introduced Bourassa to the 
audience, saying that, “au début, nous pensions la race condamnée à mourir, et nous n’avions 
plus qu’un espoir, celui de la voir mourir proprement. Mais les temps sont changés. Il n’est 
plus question de mourir, car la race vivra. Un homme l’a sauvée ...” The crowd drowned out 
Lavergne’s words with cheers of “Bourassa.”6 My critics in English Canada want to hang me 
for my words, Bourassa said at one point during his speech, and a voice from the crowd 
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replied: “Et on veut être pendu avec vous!”7 It was a stark contrast to the hostile crowd 
Bourassa had faced the previous month in Ottawa. The audience adored him in Montreal that 
night as he used the history of Le Devoir to defend his vision of Canada, its importance for 
Quebec, and the continued relevance of his arguments. 
Bourassa's anniversary speech touched on many of the criticisms directed at him over 
the last five months. In turn, he affirmed the value of his newspaper to Canada’s public 
discourse. He believed that the issues confronting French Canadians in 1915 were much the 
same as the ones he had debated since the paper's founding. The continuing struggle of Franco-
Ontarians that Cardinal Bégin had highlighted proved the necessity of shaping of public 
opinion, boasting to his audience that Le Devoir had swayed Quebec in favour of their plight.8  
Some doubted the paper’s purpose during the war, but Bourassa assured his audience 
that his newspaper continued its mission. It was a crucial organ of nationaliste beliefs about 
Canada and moreover, a Catholic journal, though he noted that it was not a voice of the 
Catholic hierarchy.9 This misconception had caused tension the year before, and the 
ultramontane Bourassa made sure to distinguish that Le Devoir was independent even though it 
upheld the authority and unity of the Church. He wanted to demonstrate that he could disagree 
with the episcopacy without ceasing to be Catholic.10 He promised Le Devoir would continue 
to be non-partisan and try to force political parties to work for the “bien de la nation au lieu 
d'en corrompre l'esprit.”11  
After reviewing the mission of Le Devoir, Bourassa examined the paper's previous 
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campaigns, such as those against imperialism, defending French Canadian’s religious and 
linguistic rights, and support for Catholic unions and temperance. He ended his listing with an 
appraisal of the greatest obstacle facing Canadians: unity between its French and English-
speaking peoples. “Ce fait primordial de notre situation nationale passée, présente, et future,” 
he said, “nous n’avons pas plus le droit de vouloir faire du Canada un pays exclusivement 
français que les Anglo-Canadiens n’ont le droit d’en faire un pays anglais.”12 Thus, 
nationalistes should be opposed to the exclusion of French or English as both were integral to 
Canadian identity, and they must put Canadian interests before those of Britain, France or any 
country. Le Devoir, Bourassa proclaimed, would continue to search for a “idéal commun, fait 
des traditions canadiennes, enraciné dans le sol canadien et n’ayant d’autre object que la 
grandeur morale et matérielle de la patrie canadienne.”13 He ended his speech with an 
impassioned plea for donations, promising that: 
En retour de tout ce que vous pourrez faire pour le Devoir et ses oeuvres, je ne 
vous fais qu'une promesse, c'est que, moi vivant, il ne déchera pas. Avant qu'il ne 
défaille ou trahisse la mission que je lui ai tracée, dussé-je y voir la fin de toutes 
mes ambitions, de toutes mes espérances, je le tuerai de ma main!14 
In expressing Le Devoir's continuing mission, Bourassa set out his own path for the coming 
year. The war had not changed the political issues of the day, though they were dimmed in its 
long shadow.  
The next week, he returned to sharp critiques of Robert Borden's wartime government, 
which had to represent Canada more strongly in the Empire for the sake of the Canadian war 
effort. In 1910, Bourassa reminded his readers that Borden had promised that if Canada were to 
fight an Imperial war, it would be accompanied by participation in Imperial government. The 
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journalist saw no evidence of it in 1915, as British Cabinet Ministers continued to meet on 
issues of imperial defence without Canadian input.15 Even as Minister of Justice Charles 
Doherty claimed that Canada's entry into the war was spontaneous and voluntary, meaning 
Canada had exercised its right to choose whether to participate in the British conflict, Bourassa 
saw little proof of Canadian autonomy.16 Borden wanted to secure imperial reform, but now 
that he had the opportunity, Bourassa observed little action. “Le vin est tiré, messieurs les 
sauveurs d'Empire,” Bourassa wrote, “vous ne le ferez pas boire qu'aux autres.”17 As 
Canadians waited for Borden, the British government led the war without any concern for 
Canadian interests. 
Bourassa was not alone in his demands for a Canadian voice in imperial affairs, though 
he couched them differently than others. When asked about the planned Imperial Conference 
for 1915, Ontario Liberal Party leader N.W. Rowell told journalists on 27 January that “to have 
representatives from the Empire meet and take counsel together” would “give to Europe a ... 
splendid manifestation of the unity of the Empire and of the determination of all parts to see 
this fight through.”18 Though the Conference was cancelled for that year, many raised the idea 
of imperial reform in the coming months. Author and imperialist Castell Hopkins mused in 
Hamilton that February about the possibility of an Imperial Council that included the 
Dominions.19 As Bourassa had suspected, the war could fulfil the Canadian imperialist dream 
of an inclusive Empire that was not solely ruled from Westminster, but brought together its 
Dominion Ministers to keep each informed and advised about vital questions. When Borden 
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eventually did meet with the British Cabinet during his trip to England in July, advocates of 
imperialism were understandably pleased, and the press was effusive in its praise of the 
important precedent.20 
Bourassa met these developments with suspicion as his stance against the Empire 
reflected much of what he had argued for the previous decade and a half. Thus, the cancellation 
of the Imperial Conference became a sign that Britain had no desire to inform its colonial 
subjects about the war. Such hubris, as Bourassa saw it, could not sustain the imperial 
relationship. Bourassa predicted that eventually Canada and the other Dominions would realise 
that the faulty premise of their involvement in the war and the ensuing anti-imperialist reaction 
would pose a greater threat than the “barbarie Allemand.”21 Great Britain always acted in its 
own global interests and the war proved more than ever that they had long ago become “une 
puissance mondiale plutôt qu'européene.”22 Bourassa repeated his position of moderate 
Canadian participation without obligation. Critics wrote to him either privately or in the pages 
of Le Devoir to refute his arguments.23 Yet for all those who championed the Empire's defense 
of small nations like Belgium and the principle of nationalism, Bourassa raised the spectre of 
Canada's nationalities, like the Franco-Ontarians who still faced the “tyrannie assimilatrice des 
Prussiens d'Ontario.”24 When his opponents talked of “reform” and “British liberties,” he saw 
little more than hypocrisy and self-delusion. To the nationaliste, the absence of representation 
in the Empire and the costs of the Empire for ordinary Canadians were even more important 
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now that millions of lives hung in the balance.  
The release of the Canadian budget further frustrated Bourassa. On 11 February, federal 
Finance Minister W.T. White revealed that Canadian debt had spiralled out of control since the 
beginning of the conflict. The country had spent $190,000,000 against a revenue of only 
$130,000,000. White estimated the war would cost Canada a further $100,000,000 by the end 
of the fiscal year and that its debt would increase to $110,000,000.25 “Les 'sauveurs de 
l'Empire' pourraient bien être les destructeurs de leur propre pays,” Bourassa remarked, as it 
became all too evident that Canada could not in fact afford the price of “le poids de la gloire.”26 
As Canadians paid more taxes to save the Empire, Bourassa wondered how long it would be 
until they realized the farce of a poorer nation supporting a stronger one.27 Bourassa saw little 
difference in Canadian policy despite the changed circumstances of the war. The cost of 
Canada's imperial obligations grew greater while their rewards dwindled -- if they had existed 
at all.  
The House of Commons at least, should be asking questions of Canada’s growing 
commitments to the war. Yet Bourassa observed only uncritical acceptance of the war policy in 
the Canadian Parliament. The “party truce” that Laurier declared in August 1914 was still in 
effect and the House passed legislation that, in Bourassa's eyes, the Liberals should have 
opposed. The Finance Minister's budget focused Parliamentary discussion on increased taxes 
and tariffs, which the Liberals only opposed half-heartedly. In 1910, the Liberals had 
campaigned against protectionist policies, yet Laurier now accepted them “due to the 
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exigencies of the present situation.”28 Bourassa considered this policy of “tout pour l'empire, 
rien pour le Canada” a foolish result of the Opposition Liberals placing war patriotism over 
Canadian interests.29 These taxes and tariffs weakened Canada's economy and the budget 
seemed further proof that Canada's parliament operated firmly within a colonial mindset. The 
only worthwhile criticism in Laurier's speech on the budget, according to Bourassa, was 
demanding that tariffs vary based on merchandise and the needs of the poor, echoing his own 
position.30  
These concessions had grave consequences, Bourassa foretold: “un peuple ne joue pas 
impunément à la guerre.”31 He agreed with his critics that war was not a time to make quick 
decisions on national matters, but the war enthusiasm pervading every level of Canadian 
government had serious consequences. War supporters, Bourassa emphasized, freely used 
loyalty and patriotism to justify their actions without a thought to long-term effects. As he had 
written in 1914, participation was necessary because of Canadian political and historical 
obligation, but that did not entail forsaking critical discussion about the budget or other 
political issues. All of the sacrifices the country had made for the war effort and the ones it had 
yet to make would only be prolonged or increased if Canada gave up on protecting its 
interests.32 Instead, a Canadian nationalism that demanded careful decisions, balanced and 
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informed by what was best for Canada, was the ideal course of action.33 Bourassa saw no 
worthwhile perspective other than his own in the “patriotic” theatre of the House of Commons 
that guided the nation at war. 
There was no problem with patriotism, he told his readers. It was a natural instinct, 
born of an attachment to a homeland; half egotism and half noble sentiment. Unfortunately, the 
wartime Canadian patriotism was hollow. It was “atrophié par le servilisme colonial, [était] 
moins fort, moins agissant, que la patriotisme d'un peuple libre, maître de son action 
mondiale.”34 “True patriotism” was not being expressed in Canada during the war. As a result, 
Bourassa argued, recruitment was low among the French and English-speaking native-born 
Canadians because of the lack of true patriotism to the Canadian nation. War supporters used 
appeals to loyalty to encourage enlistment, but loyalism was not patriotism. Loyalism was “une 
sentiment – et souvent une hypocrite profession de foi – qui dépendent de circonstances 
extérieures et lointaines.”35 Laurier might stand before a crowd in Quebec, as he did that 
August, and say “We have an interest to take part in this War. We are fighting for liberty and 
we are combating absolutism ... I claim for my country the supreme honour of bearing arms in 
this holy cause, and if I support the Government it is because I have the heart to do my duty.”36 
To Bourassa these were empty words. Canadians loyal to Britain joined the army, but that did 
not mean that all patriotic Canadians shared their conviction.  
On 3 March, Bourassa returned to his analysis of foreign affairs and offered a more 
detailed examination of Russia's interest in Constantinople and its impact on the political and 
economic aspects of the war. Bourassa's article examined the Russian statement in February 
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1915 that it would permanently occupy the Turkish capital of Constantinople and gain access 
to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. Foreign Secretary Edward Grey supported this stance 
in the House of Commons on 25 February,37 but if the Russian declaration was true, 
governments had misled the public over the nature of the war. “Dans toute guerre, le gros 
public n'aperçoit que l'aspect dramatique et sanglant,” Bourassa wrote, “C'est la force de 
résistance économique qui donnera la victoire finale aux Alliés, plus que tous leurs faits 
d'armes; c'est l'influence politique la plus forte qui règlera les conditions de la paix et 
détournera ou activera les causes de conflits futur.”38 While other newspapers looked to the 
Canadian soldiers recently sent to the trenches of the Western Front, Bourassa asked why 
Canadians risked their lives in Europe for Russian claims to territory a thousand kilometres 
away. 
Unbeknownst to anyone at the time, Britain and Russia signed a secret agreement 
formalizing Russia's annexation of the straits and Constantinople just weeks after Grey's 
comment.39 At the time, Bourassa took Grey at his word. In the House of Commons, Grey 
responded to Russia's claim saying, “that is an aspiration with which we are in entire sympathy. 
The precise form in which it will be realised will no doubt be settled in the terms of peace.”40 
Leaving such determinations to the terms of peace was a reasonable position, though again 
Bourassa asked what sort of world might emerge from an Allied victory. Allowing Russia to 
extend its empire so far south was as dangerous as Germany's expansion against which the 
Allies now fought. Quoting Noel Brailsford, he reminded his readers that “our imperialists will 
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be calling out for a strong Germany to balance a threatening Russia” by the end of the war if 
Russia controlled the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.41 Bourassa intimated that this “peace” 
led only to future war. The insatiable thirst of empires for conquest, domination and wealth had 
led the world to war, he warned, and only when they were extinguished would they know 
peace.  
In the spring of 1915, Canadians confronted the brutal reality of the conflict that they 
had joined eight months prior. They experienced their first major casualties when the Germans 
launched devastating gas attacks against the Canadians at the Ypres salient in April 1915. Few 
Canadians were ready for the extent of the losses. Less than a month later, German U-Boats 
torpedoed the RMS Lusitania off the coast of Ireland as part of their campaign to restrict cross-
Atlantic shipping. The Germans alleged that the civilian liner was carrying weapons, but few 
among the Allied countries believed them. Historian Ian Miller wrote in his study on Toronto 
during the Great War, that the events of April and May 1915 changed the war from a “Great 
Adventure” to a “Great Crusade,” imbued with a moral necessity to stop Germany.42 
For Henri Bourassa, the sinking of the Lusitania was significant as a commentary on 
British policy and the American response to it. The Lusitania tragedy mocked the supposed 
British dominance of the sea with its Dreadnought fleet that it had so urgently required in 1909 
and 1910. Despite its power, it could not actually protect shipping from German U-boats. Two 
British admirals, Lord Charles Beresford and Sir Percy Scott, had already warned of British 
vulnerability against submarines. To Bourassa, bellicose patriotism had trumped common 
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sense. If there were not enough destroyers to escort ships, it was because they had spent the last 
ten years building dreadnoughts.43 Bourassa also worried that the incident would push one 
more nation into the worldwide conflict. The United States was still neutral in the war and U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson tried to keep the American nation removed from European affairs. 
Wilson, Bourassa believed, was aware of “les conséquences effroyables qui découleraient d'une 
décision hâtive.”44 The hope of Allied war supporters that the United States would enter the 
conflict over the loss of Americans lives on the Lusitania, who had willingly travelled the seas 
under threat, was farfetched to the French Canadian journalist. 
Bourassa was far less sure of the possibility or justness of American intervention after 
the sinking of the Lusitania than other Canadians.45 On 13 May, the American Secretary of 
State, William Jennings Bryan, warned Germany that the Americans would not hesitate to 
perform “[their] sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens.”46 
Bourassa agreed with the Montreal Herald, which termed the American position as “boiling 
neutrality.”47 If the Germans did not temper their actions, then the United States would have no 
choice but to enter the war in defence of its own interests. In that context, Bourassa wondered 
what effect Japan's entry into the war on the side of the Allies had on American opinion, as 
they had their own interests in the Pacific that might oppose American interests there.48 The 
French Canadian did not believe that American entry into the war hinged on the single moral 
issue of civilian deaths. Rather, he perceived the complex political and moral facets to it that 
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had no easy resolution. 
By 8 June 1915, Bryan had resigned his post in protest of President Wilson asking him 
to send another more aggressive response to the German government. The implication that the 
United States could respond to any “infringement of [American] rights, intentional or 
incidental” was unsettling to Bryan, who believed that Wilson was effectively opening the door 
to an American declaration of war against Germany.49 Bryan believed in American neutrality, 
and he saw Wilson’s warning as an ultimatum on the path to war. Bourassa agreed with Bryan's 
principled position. Both were against the suggestion that the United States could choose sides 
in the conflict so blithely. Neutrality, even in the face of losses, was the only way to keep the 
United States out of the European war. For Bourassa, to decide between “brutalité allemande” 
or the “morgue britannique” was a poor set of options.50 Although the United States did not 
join the war until 1917, Bryan's resignation was an important reminder that the world was not 
completely subsumed in a binary between the Allies and the Central Powers. The sinking of the 
Lusitania indicated to Bourassa that few rational voices prevailed on the international stage. 
Those that did, like William Jennings Bryan, were forced out by the harsh demands of political 
brinkmanship.  
Months later, Bourassa returned to the correspondence between the United States and 
Germany that continued after Robert Lansing replaced Bryan as Secretary of State. Bourassa 
analyzed the German note of 8 July, calling it “un singulier mélange d'impudence, d'habile 
dialectique et de franche sincérité.”51 Germany protested that the British had instructed its 
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merchant vessels to seek protection behind neutral flags while increasing the arms of its 
shipping fleet. They argued that the attack on the Lusitania and other neutral ships was for the 
defence of Germany.52 In Bourassa's view, the English had a real interest in focusing American 
attention on the deaths of civilians, rather than the German naval threat German to British 
security and commercial shipping. In fact, he wrote, it had relatively minor impact on the 
Americans themselves.53 Bourassa considered the German reply of 7 June, where they 
promised to no longer attack passenger liners,54 a polite one that considered President Wilson's 
desire to avoid any future incidents like the Lusitania. The Americans could easily 
“[préservent] leur pays des horreurs et des crimes de la guerre” by not using British ships to 
transport goods. Contrary to the protestations of the British press, the Americans were better 
off acceding to German demands and staying out of the war altogether. 
In May, Bourassa returned to the plight of Franco-Ontarians. He delivered a speech to 
the Association catholique de la jeunesse canadienne at a benefit for the Franco-Ontarian 
struggle. Over the course of two hours, he defended “la langue française au Canada, ses droits, 
sa nécessité, [et] ses avantages.”55 He argued that French was an integral aspect of French 
Canadian identity, and its protection was entirely legitimate in view of its legal and cultural 
history in North America under British rule. He affirmed that “la Confédération canadienne est 
née d'une pensée d'alliance féconde des deux races; elle ne vivra que par le respect réciproque 
de leurs droits,” and to their opponents’ claim “qu'un peuple bi-ethnique et bilingue ne peut 
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former une nation homogène et que la minorité doit parler la langue de la majorité” was one of 
the most ridiculous denials in all of history.56 Bourassa reiterated the nationalistes’ arguments 
since Regulation 17’s enactment: the French language was an irrevocable facet of Canadian 
identity. The right to pass it onto to the next generation was unalterable. 
Bourassa also reflected on the Franco-Ontarians’ persecution in light of the ongoing 
war. The supporters of Regulation 17 claimed that linguistic unity and national unity were the 
same, especially during wartime, but “ce n'est qu'au français qu'on fait la guerre,” he reminded 
his audience.57 The journalist evoked the rhetoric of war supporters to convince his listeners to 
donate to the cause. “Les meilleures traditions britanniques et la conservation même du 
patrimoine canadien” demanded a fair and intelligent solution. Surely, the Ontario schools 
merited as much support as the French Canadian war effort. “Dans un magnifique élan de 
générosité,” Quebec had donated men and money to a British war, and Franco-Ontarians now 
deserved the same. They fought for a cause as just and sacred as the one in Europe, Bourassa 
declared, “[une] cause qui n'a d'autre défaut que d'être la nôtre et de ne pouvoir attendre d'appui 
des nations étrangères à qui nous prodiguons notre or et notre sang.”58 His juxtaposition of the 
war’s purpose and the treatment of French Canadian underlined the contradiction of 
recruitment campaigns in the province. Why fight for Britain, France, or Belgium, when they 
had not yet won the fight for Franco-Ontarians at home. At the end of the gathering, the 
assembled audience unanimously passed a motion supporting French language rights and “les 
préceptes et la pratique de l’entente cordiale qui unit l’Angleterre et la France sur les champs 
de bataille de l’Europe.”59 If equality and liberty were worth dying for in the trenches of 
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Europe, surely they were worth defending in Canada as well. 
The journalist continued to search for fellow advocates of peace and reason. He found 
them across the Atlantic where British anti-war commentators earned his approval. Bourassa 
published a letter from Lord Leonard Courtney, a former Cabinet Minister under Prime Minster 
William Gladstone who had advocated with his wife against the Boer War fifteen years earlier. 
Courtney affirmed that he stood on common ground with Bourassa.60 The British politician 
was also a member of the Union of Democratic Control and Bourassa republished sections 
from their first pamphlet in a June editorial.61 A group of British politicians and intellectuals 
formed the UDC in August of 1914 as a rejection of the British Liberal Party's decision to 
support the war. They criticized the British war effort and, like Bourassa, did not question the 
legitimacy of defending Belgium, but rather offered a more nuanced perspective about the 
war's reason and purpose. They asked Britons what obligations would Britain have had if its 
foreign policy been open to democratic approval instead of solely in the hands of government 
Ministers?62 Their first pamphlet outlined four points to inspire the “conditions of the peace”: 
one, that no province be transferred without plebiscite; two, that Great Britain sign no treaty 
without Parliamentary approval; three, that Britain should not form an alliance for the purpose 
of maintaining the “Balance of Power” and instead a public international council should settle 
disputes; and four, that Great Britain propose a drastic reduction in armaments among all 
belligerent nations.63 Bourassa had been impressed with UDC member Noel Brailsford and 
continued to praise their program for the peace and their active resistance against the British 
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war effort. 
It is little wonder that Bourassa found solidarity with the men and women of the UDC 
during the war years. He admired these “hommes de haute valeur, prêts à risquer leur 
popularité et leurs chance de succès personnel, à rompre leurs attaches de parti et leurs 
associations d'intérêts, pour défendre une liberté légitime et soutenir un principe ou une 
idée.”64 Their radical advocacy for peace and demands for “democratic control” struck a chord 
with the French Canadian nationalist. Bourassa also wanted Canadians to have control over 
their own foreign policy. Further, the UDC demands proved that British liberty allowed 
dissidents to express themselves. If it was indeed “not time to talk of such things,” as his critics 
claimed, then why were prominent British intellectuals free to express similar thoughts?65 To 
him, the UDC seemed relatively well received in Britain, free of the criticism and threats that 
he received in Canada. This was not in fact the case, especially after they began expanding and 
holding public meetings in 1915, but it never reached the same level of vitriol that he 
confronted in Canada.66 Despite the glorious claims of the Empire's Canadian supporters, 
Bourassa saw no evidence that “la véritable liberté brittanique” had made it across the Atlantic. 
The UDC argument against the war's justifications closely mirrored his own. In both 
Canada and Britain war supporters claimed that the war would not end until Germany’s 
destruction and that eliminating Prussian militarism would bring peace in Europe. Both the 
UDC and Bourassa had declared the goal an impossibly idealistic view of continental Europe. 
Germany would never be destroyed, unless the Allied nations -- “les champions de la 
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civilisation supérieure” -- decided to kill every man, woman and child in Germany. Even if 
they somehow accomplished that brutal task, militarism still thrived among the Allies states. 
These contradictions seemed especially relevant before a Canadian audience. The refusal to 
acknowledge the impossibility of the supposed purpose of the war was the crux of Bourassa's 
opposition. Until Canadians woke up to the “ignorance” and “invincible torpeur” of 
colonialism, they would never truly understand the virtues of British civilization embodied by 
the UDC and to which the war supporters claimed loyalty.67 
The disconnect between the purpose of the war and the means by which it could be 
achieved was increasingly worrisome. Where was British liberty and freedom in wartime 
Canada? A protest against conscription reinforced Bourassa’s doubt. On 23 July, a group of 
about 1,000 anti-conscription protestors broke up a recruitment meeting at Montreal's Parc La 
Fontaine.68 Montreal's Gazette declared in response that conscription may be a possibility, but 
it would come at too great a cost for the nation and could never happen. The law, the Gazette 
explained, did not allow for conscription for foreign wars. While a few voices advocated for 
conscription in 1915,69 the government reacted to the disturbance by categorically denying the 
possibility of conscription in Canada. One of its Quebec ministers, Postmaster General Thomas 
Chase-Casgrain, issued a statement on 28 July in reply to the incident: “You can state, in the 
most positive manner, that the question has never come up, directly or indirectly. ... We are 
happy to see that in all parts of the country Canadian patriotism is manifested so eloquently ... I 
am pretty accurate in my political predictions, and I can say that there will be no 
Conscription.”70 The government assured the people that forced military service was not 
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necessary to win the war. 
Bourassa doubted the Gazette's confidence that conscription would not happen. He 
would have scoffed at Chase-Casgrain's words had they not been given after the publication of 
his editorial, since only those who had opposed the alleged legal and moral obligation of 
Canada to fight for Great Britain had the right to logically argue against conscription. Anything 
else was idealistic, if not delusional, given how the war had proceeded in Canada to that time.71 
He reminded his audience that Prime Minister Borden continued to increase the size of the 
Canadian Army through 1915, requiring even more recruits.72 Furthermore, the interpretation 
of the law was in the hands of politicians who were not “canadiens avant d'être 
impérialistes.”73 Bourassa believed that they would interpret or change the law any way they 
desired in order to fulfil their commitment to the war with little opposition. In the Canadian 
press, he declared, only Le Devoir had thoroughly contested the claim that Canadian liberty 
and security was threatened by Germany. “Nous avons paru prêcher dans le désert,” he wrote.74 
Bourassa condemned the Gazette's naivety in hoping that conscription would not happen as a 
matter of law. 
In August, the war was a year old. Canadian soldiers had experienced long months of 
trench warfare and had fought brutal battles at places such as Ypres in April and Festubert in 
May. Neither were defeats, but nor were they victories. The war had reached a stalemate. 
Sanitized newspaper reports from the front arrived while letters going home often downplayed 
                                                 
71 Henri Bourassa, “La Conscription,” Le Devoir, 26 July, 1915, 1. 
72 By June, the Canadian Army had expanded to 100,000, and recruitment grew difficult, as one recruiter noted: 
“The first 100,000 came easily. We found that other men were not coming,” J.L. Granatstein and J.M. 
Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977) 
34-35. For information on 1915 recruitment, see Castell Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1915, 216-218. 
73 Henri Bourassa, “La Conscription,” Le Devoir, 26 July, 1915, 1. 
74 Henri Bourassa, “La Conscription,” Le Devoir, 26 July, 1915, 1. 
124 
 
the terrible conditions of trench life.75 In appearance, Canadians continued to offer stalwart 
support for the war, though they may have been less certain of Borden's stewardship of it. 
There were rumours of an election that year as reports of government corruption involving 
numerous war contracts appeared in newspapers.76 Liberal papers such as the Winnipeg Free 
Press were particularly vocal in their denunciations, but even its editor J.W. Dafoe believed it 
best to extend the government's mandate until the war was over.77 Some Liberals urged their 
party to put the government performance before a vote though Laurier unequivocally stated 
that his party would not seek an election that year.78 No one expected the war to conclude in 
1915 and the warring nations prepared for a much longer conflict than they had foreseen a year 
earlier. 
The Great War's first anniversary was lamented in the Vatican, where Pope Benedict 
XV grieved the war that marked his ascendance to the Papacy in 1914. On 28 July, exactly a 
year after Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, Benedict released an “Aspotolic 
Exhortation” to the belligerent nations. The Pope was saddened that his advice to end the 
conflict had gone unheeded. “May this cry,” he hoped, “prevailing over the dreadful clash of 
arms, reach unto the peoples who are now at war.”79 The Pope's appeal, addressed to all those 
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involved, was not solely couched in Christian morality. He reminded them of their 
“tremendous responsibility of peace and war.” It echoed the Pope’s letter to Cardinal Vannutelli 
in May after the sinking of the Lusitania and the introduction of gas warfare, when he noted 
that “the war continues to ensanguine Europe, and not even do men recoil from means of 
attack, on land and on sea, contrary to the laws of humanity and to international law.”80 Pope 
Benedict XV reflected on the value of international law, and above all, moderation and 
compromise, as a means of ending the terrible war that beset the people of the world. 
Bourassa took heed of the Pope's message. After first thanking the Sovereign Pontiff for 
having given to humanity “cette parole lumineuse et consolante,” he quoted the papal 
statement directly and thrice noted the phrase, “Why not from this moment weigh with serene 
mind the rights and lawful aspirations of [all] peoples?”81 Hear this, Bourassa called out to the 
“conquérants de l'Alsace et du Transvaal, tyrans de la Belgique, de la Pologne et de l'Irlande, 
persécuteurs de Schleswig, de l'Ukraine, et de l'Ontario français!”82 Bourassa knew, however, 
that they would not listen to the Pope, who alone had a practical plan to resolve the conflict – 
practical, at least, to Bourassa's Catholic ultramontane thinking. Pope Benedict asked only that 
the nations at war work for peace rather than war; Bourassa elevated the Roman Pontiff to the 
position of international arbitrator. 
Bourassa was not surprised to the muted response to the Pope in most quarters. The 
worst transgressors against peace and moderation were the nations that had turned away from 
the Papacy. The liberty and democracy that the belligerent nations claimed to protect had only 
led to “affaiblissement de tout principe d'autorité, à la laxité du lien familial, à la négation du 
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devoir social, à l'égoïsme individuel, à la haine des classes, au culte effréné du bien-être 
physique, à la soif des richesses – au paganisme.”83 Bourassa looked to the world that ignored 
the Pope’s message and saw “une humanité sans âme.”84 The passion and drastic tone of his 
words emphasized the seriousness of his discussion of Papal missives. For Bourassa, Pope 
Benedict XV was not simply another contributor to the array of opinions on the war. Here was 
the word of God given to his people. Often the most excessive and evocative of Bourassa’s war 
editorials dealt with the Vatican and even in 1915, long before the war intensified to more 
frightening levels, the Pope's words moved the devout Bourassa to dismal depths. Seeing so 
many Catholics ignore Benedict's words was outrageous.  
He saw some hopeful signs of a “rénovation du sens chrétien des peuples” in France 
and England. In a three-part series, “Guerre à la Guerre,” Bourassa first introduced a French 
publication, the Semaine Catholique from Saint-Flour, which called the war a chance for 
penitence and atonement as Bourassa had in August 1914.85 “Nous n'avons pas besoins de nous 
d'examiner la conscience de nos ennemis,” the Semaine Catholique wrote, “mais seulement 
notre propre conscience.”86 The periodical believed that it was a Christian duty to hold fast to 
religious values, especially as they fought against the “anti-christian” and militaristic Kultur of 
Germany. They claimed to speak for French bishops and Bourassa called on French Canadian 
bishops to issue a similar decree against Canadian jingoism.87  
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An article by John Keating also suggested changing attitudes about the war in Britain. 
Keating, the editor of the Jesuit periodical Month, attacked the rise of “British Bernhardi-
ism.”88 He warned of the Allies failing to examine their own actions in the war. Friedrich von 
Bernhardi was one of the most famous German authors in the years before 1914. A military 
historian and Prussian general, he advocated an aggressive, unrestrained foreign policy based 
on war to achieve German dominance. His best known book, Germany and the Next War, had 
been published in 1912 and “Bernhardi-ism” meant unrelenting militarism.89 Alongside the 
works of Treitschke and Neitzche, Bernhardi symbolized the alleged German barbarity that led 
many among the Allies to believe Germany had planned the war.90  
Keating was among them when he wrote that Britain must remember that war was 
never desirable. As the British people embraced total war against militarism, they could not fall 
victim to the same “Prussian ideals.”91 Keating made the same distinction as Bourassa, that war 
for the sake of war was a faulty and hypocritical doctrine. If British values were lost in the 
process of defending them, then victory over Germany mattered little. Bourassa and Keating 
both asserted that Britain hardly had a moral high ground upon which to stand given its record 
of ignoring international law. It could not ignore its national conscience. In Britain, Bourassa 
remarked, writers were asking important questions of their country’s actions. In Canada, 
Bourassa saw few public figures doing the same. Canadians were quick to ask what was wrong 
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with Germany, but Bourassa asked what was wrong with England?92  
In the second and third parts of the series, Bourassa elaborated on its title, “La Guerre à 
la Guerre.” He returned to the work of the Union of Democratic Control in Britain and a recent 
article by its founder E.D. Morel.93 Bourassa briefly reviewed their accomplishments for his 
readers and their key points. By mid-1915, the group had solidified but faced increasingly 
oppressive and sometimes violent reactions to their anti-war movement.94 The UDC worked 
for the same goal as Pope Benedict: to eliminate war. They waged war on war -- not actual war 
as the “hommes de lucre et de sang” proclaimed -- but a true movement to abolish war as an 
international practice.95 Bourassa repeated the four points that guided the UDC, emphasizing 
the third point that asked for an international organization to settle international disputes. The 
French Canadian was particularly interested in Morel's references to Canada and the British 
Dominions. Bourassa cited sections of Morel's work where he explained that it was now the 
second time the former colonies contributed money, soldiers, and lives to policies which they 
had no part in forming (the first being the Boer War of 1899-1901). Morel saw little chance of 
it continuing. If the British Empire was to be preserved, the British author wrote, the 
Dominions would no doubt be a part of the peace settlement.96  
The British anti-war group and Bourassa both desired an equitable peace and both 
believed that that peace was possible in spite of the war's dominating influence. Bourassa 
accepted its view of the world, though the UDC couched it in modern terms that seemingly 
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rejected the traditional leaning of the Catholic Church. Morel spoke of “great forces, some 
measurable, some intangible ... [drawing] civilised people closer to one another, to accentuate 
the mutuality of human needs. .... The whole tendency of modern development emphasises the 
interdependence of civilised peoples.”97 Bourassa would have read much the same message in 
the Pope's words: “the equilibrium of the world, and the prosperity and assured tranquillity of 
nations rest upon mutual benevolence and respect for the rights and dignity of others ... may 
they resolve from now henceforth to entrust the settlement of their differences, not to the 
sword's edge, but to reasons of equity and justice.”98 The progress that compelled the UDC's 
vision of British foreign policy and European relations mirrored the worldly Catholic position 
espoused by Pope Benedict XV. The two desired to see an end to the “domination diabolique 
des capitalistes” who profited from a prolonged war; Morel as a left-wing radical, Bourassa as 
what Joseph Levitt called a “utopian corporatist.”99 More than ever Bourassa personified the 
name given to him by his former mentor, Wilfrid Laurier: castor-rouge, denoting his fusion of 
conservative and liberal beliefs.100 The UDC’s vision of the world inspired him and he took 
heed of Morel's rallying call, “Organise, still Organise, again Organise!”101 He promised once 
again that, although they were isolated, the nationalistes would do their best. 
With that in mind, Bourassa continued his work in the autumn of 1915. At the end of 
August, Britain and Germany lobbed accusations of war guilt back and forth. Russian defeats 
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in the east allowed Germany to occupy and re-form the state of Poland. German Chancellor 
Theobald von Bethman-Hollweg used it as an opportunity to decry the Russian behaviour in 
the region while maintaining Germany was “a shield of peace, and of the freedom of great and 
small nations.”102 In reply, British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey restated Germany's guilt 
for invading Belgium, reiterating the Allied war aim for “freedom and safety” from Germany's 
desire “to control the destiny of all other nations.”103 Bourassa ridiculed the British minister's 
claims. Even as Grey spoke of Germany controlling other nations, Britain continued to demand 
naval supremacy across the globe.104 Bourassa had once appreciated Grey's suavity in dealing 
with the July Crisis. A year later, he believed British claims of a just war to be a lie. Neither 
British nor German reply spoke to the cause of peace as the Pope or E.D. Morel had done a few 
weeks earlier.  
In September, Bourassa left for a tour of New England and presented lectures to 
Franco-Americans. They received him as a “champion de la race.”105 The small North 
American francophone communities huddled in the American northeast greeted Bourassa with 
fanfare, decorating automobiles and proclaiming him as the great defender of French 
minorities. Bourassa and other nationalistes had fought hard to protect French Canadians 
within the Dominion, but on 18 November the Supreme Court of Ontario upheld Regulation 17 
against the arguments of Napoléon-Antoine Belcourt.106 
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Belcourt was a former Liberal Member of Parliament and appointed to the Senate by 
Prime Minister Laurier in 1907. He was deeply aware of the division between French and 
English Canadians. As a young lawyer, he had established his office across the Ottawa River in 
Ontario at a time when there were no French speaking lawyers practising there. He married an 
Irish Catholic and, after her death, married a Protestant. Belcourt worked hard to raise his 
family to be as bilingual as he was.107 As tensions over the issue of French language school 
rose in Ontario, Belcourt became more involved in advocating for Franco-Ontarians, as he had 
often discussed the need for unity between Canada’s two peoples.108 He was the first President 
of the Association Canadienne-française d’éducation de l’Ontario, which was founded in 1910 
after it became clear that Ontario had concerns about the quality of French-language education 
in the province. When Regulation 17 passed in 1912 to resolve the problem by abolishing 
bilingual schools, Belcourt was one of the most prominent advocates against this heavy-handed 
solution.109 He presented cases before the Ontario Appellate Court and Ontario Supreme Court 
defending various actions aimed at delaying or overturning Regulation 17. In November 1915, 
he lost the final appeal to Ontario’s court and decided to appeal to Britain’s Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council -- what was then the highest court in the land.110 The following year 
promised to have a final decision on the matter and the delays continued to spark French 
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Canadian dissent. 
A single article detailed Bourassa’s response to the ruling. In it, he reprinted section 
133 of the British North America Act, which detailed the bilingual nature of Parliament and the 
Quebec legislature.  To Bourassa, this proved that Canada recognized two official languages, 
and thus the right to French education in every province.111 Unsurprisingly, Bourassa fully 
agreed with Belcourt’s arguments. The nationaliste admired Belcourt’s ardent defense of 
Franco-Ontarians and claimed him as one of their own, despite his Liberal allegiance. During 
and after the war, French Canadians praised Belcourt’s actions before the court. Recent 
scholarship has placed Belcourt in a middle ground between Liberal and nationaliste. 
Geneviève Richer argues that Belcourt’s fight against Regulation 17 was driven by his belief in 
“l’ancienneté des Canadiens français en Ontario et au Canada, le catholicisme et l’unité 
nationale.”112 They were similar, certainly, but Belcourt’s vision of the Canadian nation was 
not the one that Bourassa proposed. Still, they remained friends until Belcourt’s death in 1932. 
Bourassa returned home from his visit to the United States invigorated and that October 
he finished his major publication of the year, Que Devons Nous à l'Angleterre?, and prepared 
for its December release. The year ended on the successful note of Bourassa's publication. He 
delivered speeches repeating his argument to crowds of Quebecois and, at a dollar a book, it 
sold quickly.113 
The 420-page book was a history tracing the origins of the “profonde [et] radicale” 
revolution that had transformed the British Empire's constitution and government.114 His title 
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echoed the celebrated slogan of Quebec Premier Honoré Mercier more than two decades 
earlier, who had proclaimed that “nous ne devons rien à l'Angleterre.”115 Using government 
documents and parliamentary excerpts, Bourassa argued that there was a “contrat solennel” 
defining Britain's relationship with Canada. Britain alone had the power and responsibility to 
defend its colonies against foreign powers, while the colonies were only obliged to defend 
themselves.116 He cited several moments from 1854 to 1865 that set this precedent. He began 
with a dispatch from Governor General Lord Elgin to Sir George Grey, the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, during the Crimean War where Elgin stated that imperial authorities were 
tasked with protecting the colonies from hostilities “in which they had no share in 
provoking.”117 That policy was renewed through other treaties and agreements over the next 
decade, and once more again during the Confederation negotiations. Only in the last decades of 
Canadian political life, Bourassa argued, had that relationship radically diverged from the 
national traditions and principles of the past.118  
In Bourassa's view, the expansion of the British Empire in the last quarter of the 19th 
century matched the emergence of the imperialist ideology that advocated reforming their 
traditional relationship. In this new Empire, colonies helped Britain maintain their newly 
enlarged territory while imperialism expressed a “moral obligation” to fight in its wars.119 
Thus, when Prime Minister Laurier stated in 1910 that “when Britain is at war, Canada is at 
war,”120 it revealed how the “imperialist revolution” had transformed a benevolent Britain 
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overseeing an Empire into one collective imperial unit. The Great War, Bourassa believed, had 
completed the revolutionary trend as Canadians eagerly offered sacrifice after sacrifice without 
compensation. 
In the final pages of his analysis, Bourassa returned to the war itself. He reaffirmed that 
while Canada had no moral or legal obligation to the British Empire to fight in the war, he 
stood by his statement of 8 September 1914, that “lié à l'Angleterre et à la France par mille 
attaches ethniques, sociales, intellectuelles, économiques, le Canada a un intérêt vital à la 
conservation de l'Angleterre et de la France, au maintien de leur prestige, de leur puissance, de 
leur action mondiale.”121 This time he added an important caveat. He gave his support only if 
he believed that “la puissance et l'action mondiale de la France et de l'Angleterre restent 
contenues dans de justes bornes et ne deviennent pas, à leur tour, une menace pour la paix et 
l'équilibre du monde.”122 Of the two, he believed Britain was most likely to cross that line. 
Everything he had witnessed in Canada since the beginning of the war proved the danger of a 
British victory. The “arrogante brutalité des anglicisateurs canadiens” against French Canadian 
Catholics, particularly in Ontario, hinted at the dangerous extreme of a British apogee. Still, the 
French Canadian did not yet fully reject Canadian participation in the war in his December 
publication. He only outlined the reason he might do so. 
The reaction among supporters of the war was understandably negative. The editor of 
Le Canada, Fernard Rinfret, called the book “propagande antipatriotique et pro-allemande” 
and entirely rejected Bourassa's arguments. Canada, Rinfret argued, entered the war voluntarily 
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to defend the world, not just in defence of its own territorial borders.123 Many other newspapers 
echoed Rinfret's denunciation. English Canadian papers scoffed at his claims. The papers of 
English Canada allowed for few dissenting voices. Those they did include seemed so ludicrous 
that one historian has suggested it seemed as if newspapers made deliberate attempts to 
provoke a patriotic response for its readers.124 Among the responses to Bourassa, The Globe 
wrote in a 23 December editorial that Bourassa was playing the hero and the martyr, and his 
nationalism “repudiated all the vital claims of the Internationalism of the world. ... It is not a 
principle, it is a pose.”125 Meanwhile, the Kingston Standard again called Bourassa a traitor, 
while others simply decried his “criminal” activities during wartime.126 Most of his critics’ 
initial reaction focused on his conclusions rather than the evidence he provided.  
The Chief Censor E.J. Chambers, appointed in June 1915, was flooded with letters 
demanding that he silence Bourassa, but he was reluctant. Minister of Justice Charles 
Dougherty told him that the government was hesitant to censor Le Devoir since the Order-in-
Council that had formed the Censor Office was “intended to prohibit publication of facts in the 
nature of news or information concerning the movement and preparation of the forces, rather 
than criticism of the policy or administration of His Majesty's Government.”127 Bourassa 
would be able to continue publishing his work despite opposition.  
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Que devons-nous was undoubtedly a historically-minded work. To the ultramontane 
journalist, history had a divine character. Since God was the ultimate power, what had 
happened in the past must be the fulfilment of God's will. Sylvia Lacombe argues that 
Bourassa saw the study of history as paramount to a coherent understanding of present day 
affairs. Bourassa believed that by studying history, “les hommes peuvent dégager la mission 
providentielle qui singularise leur existence collective, et la justifie par le fait même.”128 When 
Bourassa referred to past events, it was imbued with a divine purpose that gave the facts he 
presented far more importance than simply reminding his readers that they had once occurred. 
History was how God's plan for humanity unfolded. Thus those who ignored history ignored 
Divine Providence itself. As a result, Bourassa often offered historical knowledge without 
context since that something had occurred proof of its import. Two hundred pages of his book 
consisted of reprinted excerpts from his sources with select phrases bolded for the reader's 
attention. His actual analysis draws quotes from these documents but does not situate them 
within history. The journalist focused entirely on explaining the present, not the past.  
From Bourassa's perspective, the events of the present were more important than the 
past. Only humanity could fulfil God's purpose in the future. God had willed historical events, 
but contemporary ones still allowed for the possibility of conforming to God’s desires. This 
religious urgency lingers throughout his work, helping to explain the tenaciousness of his 
appeals and his incomplete historical presentation. Not until 1918 would one of his critics, 
Louis Georges Desjardins, respond to Bourassa’s treatment of history in Que devons-nous. 
Desjardins criticized Bourassa the historian, writing that no historian would read the sources he 
provided and come to the same conclusions. Britain's military did not form with the purpose of 
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world domination, nor had imperialism coalesced around the aim to suppress the Empire's 
colonies.129 Yet Bourassa’s goal was not the same as a historian. He was an ultramontane 
Catholic and a journalist, not an academic. 
On New Year's Eve 1915, Bourassa's attitude was pessimistic but hopeful. The war was 
almost a year and a half old with no end in sight. He reflected that “le soleil de 1915 s'est levé 
dans un nuage de feu. Il se couche dans une mer de sang.”130 Bourassa affirmed that only one 
voice in the world continued to rise above all others: Pope Benedict XV. In his mind, few had 
been anywhere near as devoted to the cause of peace as the Vicar of Christ in Rome. The folly 
of the war was wholly apparent to the French Canadian. Millions of dead and wounded from 
the conflict convinced Bourassa that any victory would not be worth the cost. Those who 
perceived the conflict the same way were rare. Few had pierced “le voile de mensonges” that 
stymied the free expression and exchange of ideas.131 
Bourassa examined some of those who advocated for peace in light of the war's terrible 
consequences. He reproduced the Christmas message of the British socialist newspaper, the 
Labour Leader, noting that it was the most similar to the message of Pope Benedict XV. It 
demanded that the people of Europe unite against the suffering of all common people. So too 
did the 9-point “minimum program” of the Hague's Peace Conference of Neutral Nations from 
April 1915 reflect the same position of the Sovereign Pontiff, or even took directly from the 
program of Britain's Union of Democratic Control.132 He made note of their demands for 
annexed people to have the right to freely exercise their own language, one he hoped to see 
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given to the French-speaking “free subjects” of the Empire in Ontario as well as to Alsatians, 
Flemings, Walloons, Poles and Ukrainians. Like the words of the Labour Leader, they came 
from an unlikely grouping of Protestants or nonreligious nations (save Catholic Spain) that 
agreed with the position of the Vatican. Regardless of their source, Bourassa heralded them as 
the most reasonable opinions on a war.  
He welcomed them after what had been a bloody year. While Europe had yet to witness 
the slaughter of the Somme or Verdun, the first major Canadian action at Ypres in Belgium that 
April. German use of poison gas had shocked Allied soldiers and homefront alike.133 A 
committee headed by Viscount James Bryce released its report on “alleged German outrages” 
in May, publicizing German atrocities in Belgium on the frontlines a few short weeks after 
their U-boats sunk the RMS Lusitania.134 Letters from the front were published in newspapers 
across Canada detailing supposed German crimes against POWs and civilians, as were stories 
on the execution of British nurse Edith Cavell for supposedly spying on German authorities 
and aiding Allied soldiers.135 More Canadians were committed than ever to dismantling the 
“evil” German empire. 
 The path that God had laid out for the world seemed hazardous, but Bourassa believed 
it was worth the cost if the voices that desired peace could overcome those that desired war. He 
did not see many of them in Canada. A few weeks before Bourassa's New Year message, the 
opposition Liberal Party affirmed that as long as the war continued, the Liberal Party would 
“give loyal support to all necessary war measures,” though “whilst exercising a vigilant 
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supervision of the conduct of the Government in military and civil matters.”136 Bourassa could 
not accept such moderation and compromise with the imperialist war. To him, the war “[a 
marqué] l'effondrement du système politique élevé par la fausse sagesse des hommes, par la 
diplomatie orgueilleuse, par la soif des conquêtes et le culte païen de l'or et de la force 
brutale.”137 The only feasible solution was the destruction of those systems, and perhaps re-
establishing the moral authority of the Pope in world affairs. The Pope was far better than the 
other forces shaping the world in December 1915, which he listed as German scientific 
militarism, English mercantile imperialism, the debilitating democracy of the French 
Revolution, savage mysticism, or the perfidy of panslavism.138 
So as Bourassa reflected on the past year he lauded the rational voices among the 
cacophony of the “apôtres de la haine” and the “agents complaisants de l'impérialisme.”139 He 
hoped that the Pope's moral authority would continue to draw together those striving for peace. 
He found that he could no longer abide by the war supporters’ incessant demands and he found 
it more and more difficult to support the war in any form. In the coming year, the war 
intensified for Canadians once more as the Battles of the Somme raged across the Western 
Front. The war's savagery seemingly surpassed that of 1915 and in turn, Canadians began to 
wonder what price would be worth the cost of winning the war. Their answer would not satisfy 
the nationaliste. 
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Chapter 4: The Soul of Canada (January – September 1916) 
 
It was a long and brutal summer for Canadian soldiers on the frontlines in 1916. The 
Somme Offensive begun on 1 July, as hundreds of thousands of British soldiers surged across 
no man’s land, yet most failed to meet their objectives. A generation of Newfoundlanders had 
one of the worst experiences when their regiment was devastated at Beaumont-Hamel on the 
opening day. In the midst of the Somme offensive, Henri Bourassa was briefly in the 
international spotlight for his truculent views on the war. Sharing the limelight with him was 
his cousin, an army officer serving on the frontlines, Talbot Mercer Papineau.1 
Papineau had written privately to his cousin demanding that if Bourassa “was truly a 
nationalist” he would “recognise this moment as [Canada’s] moment of travail and tribulation” 
and urge support for the war. He repeated many of the same arguments Bourassa had already 
encountered, and like the imperialists, Papineau spoke of a Canada that thrived within the 
Empire, not in spite of it. He expressed a Canadian nationalism born on the battlefield. “If 
Canada has become a nation respected and self-respecting,” Papineau warned, “she owes it to 
her citizens who have fought and died in this distant land and not to those self-styled 
Nationalists who have remained at home.” In his reply, Bourassa reminded his cousin that the 
federal government, the press, and politicians of both parties had “applied themselves 
systematically to obliterate the free character of Canada’s intervention.” Bourassa dismissed 
Papineau as “most part American” who possessed only “the most denationalised instincts of 
his French origin.” Papineau was removed from the reality of true Canadian nationalism, 
Bourassa reasoned, so he had little insight to offer on his country’s place in the conflict. The 
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nationaliste journalist ignored Papineau as his appeal offered little to Bourassa, only a new 
version of the imperialist plea to a non-existent British connection long ago rejected.2 Though 
both spoke of Canadian nationalism, they had entirely different understandings of it. 
The months preceding Papineau’s plaintive letter had not oriented Bourassa towards 
accepting his cousin’s views. Bourassa announced in January 1916 that he had officially 
returned to his nationaliste roots, despite the movement’s growing fracture over the war. He 
grew further disillusioned with Canada’s political leaders, and with Wilfrid Laurier in 
particular, as no one in Ottawa seemed willing to admit that Canadian participation demanded 
too much of the nation and its people. The publication of another book, Hier, Aujourd’hui, 
Demain, expanded Bourassa’s views on the problems of the war and grouped Quebec bishops 
alongside imperialists in leading Canadians astray. Continuing tensions over the issue of 
Canadian bilingualism and Ontario’s Regulation 17 further antagonized French Canadians. So 
when Papineau’s letter arrived, filled with assumptions and misconceptions about the 
nationaliste and completely ignorant of what Bourassa had experienced, the journalist was well 
prepared for a rebuttal.  
* * * 
A month after Bourassa asked in his provocative book what Canada owed England, he 
formally renounced any support for the war. At the sixth anniversary of Le Devoir’s founding 
on 12 January 1916, before an audience of devoted nationalistes, Bourassa delivered an 
impassioned speech clarifying his position on the war.3 Once, he told them, he had tried to 
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achieve reconciliation and reach a compromise by offering conditional support for the war. 
Rather than discuss the concerns of nationalistes, however, the war supporters had denounced 
them. They had ignored Canada’s legal and constitutional tradition and used the war as an 
opportunity to impose their vision of Canada upon the country. Now, Bourassa promised his 
followers “un aveu complet et sincère,” and a repudiation of the position he had outlined in his 
“si malmené” article of 8 September 1914.4 It was now time to “retrancher dans les solides 
positions du nationalisme intégral. ... C’est sur ce terrain solide que nous avons livré nos 
premiers combats contre l’impérialisme britannique. C’est sur le même terrain que nous 
résistons à l’affolement du jour.”5 The nationaliste leader was no longer concerned with 
convincing Canadians of the sincerity of his position. The threat to Canada was not Germany, 
as his critics claimed, but the militaristic imperialism that he saw guiding Canada’s war 
rhetoric. 
The complete rejection of imperialism and foreign conflicts marked Bourassa’s return 
to his traditional nationaliste perspective, but by early 1916, the movement had splintered 
considerably. Minister of Militia Sam Hughes directly asked Armand Lavergne and Olivar 
Asselin to enlist -- Lavergne had publicly refused, but Asselin had accepted it. In a letter to the 
Montreal Gazette, Lavergne explained that he expected compulsory service within six months 
and refused to ask his people to fight for England in a war that he did not support.6 Lavergne 
stood firmly on side with Bourassa. Asselin on the other hand had grown distant from his de 
facto leader’s position. Asselin had spent the last two years heavily criticizing the Church’s 
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support for the war, which Bourassa could not support.7 Before joining the army with the rank 
of Major and placed in charge of the 163rd Battalion, Asselin wrote to Lavergne explaining his 
loyalty to France and a sense of adventure had led him to accept Hughes’ offer. Bourassa felt 
betrayed: after Asselin joined the army in December 1915, Asselin’s name was never to be 
mentioned in the offices of Le Devoir while its editor was present.8 
Bourassa also faced criticism from within the nationaliste movement itself. Jules 
Fournier had disagreed with Bourassa’s choice to support the war in 1914, and after Bourassa 
formally rejected it in January 1916, Fournier prepared a response to the nationaliste leader in 
the summer of 1916 that was unpublished during his lifetime. His wife eventually published 
the unfinished article, “The Bankruptcy of Nationalism,” in 1922 as part of a collection of 
Fournier’s writings, four years after he had died from influenza.9 It was a harsh and critical 
dissection of Bourassa’s failure as a nationaliste. Fournier wrote that Bourassa’s “impérieux 
besoin d’étaler son érudition[,] ... son inaptitude foncière à l’action [et] son inexpérience et son 
dédain des hommes” explained his failure to achieve his goals after twenty years.10 “Deux 
choses,” Fournier concluded, “auront toujours manqué au chef nationaliste dans son action 
politique: un peu d’indulgence humaine et d’humaine sympathie. Il lui aura manqué de 
connaître les hommes, et de les aimer.”11  
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Fournier did not accept that Bourassa could support the war while staying true to his 
nationalist principles. Instead, Fournier argued that in the first sixteen months of the war 
Bourassa had nominally accepted the principle of Canadian participation, before changing his 
mind suddenly without prior notice in January 1916. Fournier examined Bourassa’s articles 
from 1914 in detail, and condemned the “culture intensive du seulement” that he found within 
them.12 That is, Bourassa always qualified his reasons for supporting the war by other 
statements. While he continually declared himself in support of Canadian participation, he also 
continually found reasons that it was unjust or illogical. “Autrement dit,” Fournier wrote, 
“l’intervention, à l’entendre, lui paraissait bien l’indiscutable « devoir de l’heure », – 
seulement il ne pouvait s’empêcher de reconnaître, par contre, que cette entreprise au fond 
n’avait pas le sens commun, et que nous avions toutes les raisons du monde de nous en 
abstenir.”13 Fournier condemned Bourassa’s inconsistency, offering tacit approval of the war 
while detailing its problems, and Fournier believed, as the title of his article suggests, that 
Bourassa had failed the nationaliste movement. 
Bourassa’s return to “les solides positions du nationalisme intégral” of 12 January was 
equally problematic. Fournier saw Bourassa’s speech as intellectually dishonest given the 
reality of his position in 1914. According to him, Bourassa depicted his change in position as 
occurring after the publication of his 8 September article, so sometime in October 1914, 
despite never having publicly repudiated the war until January 1916. It also made it seem as if 
Bourassa had never opposed intervention, but only its imperialist character, and that there were 
two distinct periods where Bourassa was for the war, and then against it.14 None of this was 
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true, Fournier argued. Instead, Bourassa had vacillated between being for and against the war, 
never clearly explaining the contradictions of his position. What Bourassa’s inability to 
communicate clearly meant to Fournier is unknown -- the unfinished article ends there.  
A few days after Le Devoir’s anniversary, Bourassa’s new spirit of opposition emerged 
in earnest as he reflected on the first British conscription legislation in living memory. Amidst 
fierce Cabinet debate, the “Bachelor Bill” legislated compulsory service for unmarried men. 
British Prime Minister Asquith met resistance over the extent and effectiveness of the bill and 
the final compromised product did not resolve the dispute between advocates and adversaries 
of conscription. Sir John Simon, the only Cabinet Minister to resign over conscription, 
prophetically asked in parliament on 5 January, “Does anyone really suppose that once the 
principle compulsion has been conceded that you are going to stop here?”15 Both Simon and 
the pro-conscriptionists believed its passing was a partial measure since it included many 
exemptions, such as for Ireland, married men, and employment of national importance.16 
Britain would indeed require more men and revisit the acrimonious battle over British 
conscription. 
In response, Bourassa compared the British debate over conscription to Prime Minister 
Robert Borden’s Throne Speech of 13 January. Borden addressed the “unabated vigour and 
varying fortunes” of the war and, what Bourassa found most damning, heralded the “spirit of 
splendid loyalty and unfaltering devotion, India and the Overseas Dominions have vied with 
each other in co-operating with the Mother Country.”17 The “pantomime des marionettes 
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politiques” of Canadian Parliament, Bourassa responded, had deceived Canadians about the 
disastrous consequences of the war for too long and Borden’s empty words only further 
highlighted their self-serving falsehoods.18 Canada gave much but received little in return for 
its service. He was tired of watching the poor political theatre play out in Ottawa compared to 
the vigorous debates and measured compromises occurring in the British Isles. Why, Bourassa 
asked, could Canada not follow Ireland’s example? In return for delaying the “Home Rule” 
Bill for Irish autonomy until after the war allowed the Irish nationalist politician John 
Redmond to ask that Irish volunteers only defend Ireland and free British soldiers to fight on 
the continent. His influence helped secure Ireland’s exemption from British conscription.19 
Bourassa noted that Ireland’s autonomy had given them a valuable distance from the imperial 
war effort. If Ireland had such pressing concerns that it could reject the false principle of 
“imperial solidarity,” so too could Canada.20 Bourassa disputed Borden’s claim that the 
Dominions and colonies were vying over who could contribute the most. Ireland stood apart in 
its contribution to the war, and so could Canada. Instead, Canada had sacrificed far more than 
other parts of the Empire, none of which had resulted in any sort of allowances like the kind 
Ireland had received.  
Bourassa praised moderation in British policy where he saw none in Canada. Canada’s 
contribution, justified as necessary to secure a definitive victory, continued to grow in scale. 
On 1 January 1916, Prime Minister Borden had unexpectedly announced that the Canadian 
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forces were to double in size from 250,000 to 500,000 men.21 Meanwhile, the British offered 
reasoned policies such as the exemption of “employees of national importance” from British 
conscription, like munition factory workers. According to Bourassa, the British refusal to 
conscript from the munitions industry was a clear-headed policy meant to assure the continued 
production of armaments for Britain and its allies. “Il n’est guère croyable,” Bourassa 
remarked, “que le gouvernement britannique enverra au feu plus de soldats qu’il n’en peut 
convenablement armer – sauf les coloniaux, évidemment, ces bonnes bêtes.”22 In the same 
editorial, he reminded his readers of Britain’s reluctance to commit to a full blockade of 
Germany as further proof of his argument. The British acted only to preserve present and future 
economic prosperity.23 Destroying the German economy would add little value to British 
interests after the war.  
The French Canadian’s disdain for Parliament in Ottawa and its members grew as 
Bourassa urged Canadians to stop praising the heroic determination of the British people to 
sacrifice for Canadian liberty. Even if there was glory in serving as cannon fodder for the 
Empire, Bourassa saw none in “jouer les Orgons et les Dandins de la comédie impériale.”24 
Bourassa was certain that before the war’s end Canada would know “la dure et stérile 
amertume” from its leaderless government.25 The “tragic comedy of Ottawa” played out to the 
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detriment of the nationalistes where Laurier offered a long refutation of their position. 
Parliament was in the midst of debating an extension of the Borden government’s term past the 
five-year limit coming up in 1916. For Bourassa, the discussion surrounding its justification 
was more damning than the motion itself. Laurier addressed the motion with an avowal of the 
Liberal Opposition’s responsibility to “criticise fairly under all circumstances,”26 a curious 
echo of Bourassa’s own promise from September 1914, before blaming Bourassa’s 
nationalistes for any cracks in national unity. 
To Bourassa, Laurier’s renewed attack on his position against the war amounted to the 
“rancune sénile de l’idole déchue.”27 The truth, Bourassa rejoined, was that the he and his 
nationalistes had offered to support the war on the “seul terrain où l’union des coeurs et des 
esprits pouvait s’opérer: celui d’une intervention raisonnable et efficace, proportionnée aux 
ressources du pays.”28 Though other Members of Parliament spoke at length along similar 
lines, Bourassa reserved special vitriol for Laurier. He listed many times when the Liberal 
leader had opposed militarism and imperial involvement as Prime Minister. If French 
Canadians were not eager to spill their blood for Britain, Bourassa concluded dryly, then 
Laurier could say: “Voilà la génération que j’ai élevée et instruite!”29 The hypocrisy of the 
Liberal leader, who once ardently defended Canadian autonomy at least in part if not in full, 
riled his former follower. Convinced that compromise and conciliation with imperialists was 
futile, Bourassa attacked those who still pursued it with new vigour. 
The final decision to prolong the Parliament to avoid a wartime election in 1916 passed 
on 8 February, with both Borden and Laurier offering eloquent approval of the extension. “It is 
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sought of us,” Laurier declared, “not to do away with the control of the Canadian people over 
this Parliament, but simply to suspend for a short twelve months the verdict of the Canadian 
people upon Administration, upon its policy, and upon the general questions arising out of the 
war.”30 Bourassa denounced the decision of Canada’s political leadership. Laurier’s 
justification that it was only a suspension not a modification of the constitution did not 
convince Bourassa. Much like Laurier’s previous “[capitulations] aux exigences de 
l’impérialisme” during the Boer War and Naval Crisis, the latest surrender once more ignored 
“les doctrines libérales, le respect des lois et des libertés populaires.”31 Here was the crux of 
Bourassa’s condemnation of his former leader. In his mind Laurier’s support for the imperialist 
war was not so much a rejection of Bourassa’s nationaliste views as it was a rejection of 
liberalism. No true liberal, Bourassa believed, would compromise the country’s or the 
individual’s legal and constitutional rights for the sake of war. 
Laurier’s ability to compromise had always been a source of his political strength – and 
his weakness. Balancing the concerns of English and French Canadians while navigating the 
crises of the Boer War, the Alaskan Boundary dispute, and French language school issues had 
allowed him to stay Prime Minister for fifteen years. Yet it had been his downfall in 1911, 
when Bourassa accused him of being too British, while his Conservative opponents claimed he 
was not being British enough.32 His opponents did not understand historian Blair Neatby’s 
point that, for Laurier, “compromise was a means to an end, not a principle.”33 He sought to 
achieve Canadian autonomy from Britain in steps, fearing the consequences from the sudden 
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break that Bourassa’s nationalistes advocated. Laurier’s moderation led him to support the war 
in August 1914. By 1916, the Liberal leader still believed that the wartime conditions required 
flexible liberal principles, especially if the Liberals wanted to win a wartime election while 
maintaining their control over the province of Quebec.34 At the same time, he grew wary of 
Bourassa’s increasingly belligerent provocations. Bourassa rejected Laurier’s compromise as 
tantamount to betrayal and Laurier saw in his former student a dangerous narrow-mindedness 
that focused on the nationaliste’s personal goals above all else. “Bourassa is playing with fire,” 
Laurier warned Liberal Senator Raoul Dandurand in January 1915, and “if he thinks that he 
will be able to extinguish it he may have a rude awakening.”35 Liberal principles meant little if 
French and English animosity tore the Dominion asunder. Laurier’s liberalism, notwithstanding 
Bourassa’s criticism, continued to lead his party down a middle path between the extremes of 
nationaliste and imperialist. 
As a critic, Bourassa had little consideration for Laurier’s concerns as leader of a 
national party. To Bourassa, extending the parliamentary term was proof that the pressures of 
wartime were drastically transforming Canadian governance for the worse. “Depuis cinq ans, 
nous avons plus rétrogradé dans la voie de l’indépendance nationale que nous n’avions avancé 
en un siècle. La nouvelle démarche du parlement est un pas de plus dans cette marche en 
arrière,” Bourassa concluded.36 For a castor-rouge like Bourassa, any depreciation of law and 
rights in order to serve the war effort was a grievous mistake. How much further would the 
Parliament go to win the war? “Le Canada devra se nationaliser de nouveau, et réchapper sa 
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vie,” Bourassa warned in January 1916, “ou s’impérialiser à demeure, et se suicider.”37 The 
more the nation bound itself to an imperial future, to imperial conflict, and to the needs of 
Empire over the needs of Canada, the weaker that nation would become. Bourassa believed 
that the laws that safeguarded society could not be casually amended for the sake of 
convenience. During wartime, when the threat of militarism was even greater, these laws were 
vital protection for society. 
Bourassa saw little evidence that the nation’s protectors, its parliamentarians, shared his 
fears. Every policy of the sitting government (and usually the Opposition as well), he asserted, 
was seemingly proof of their failure to consider the interests of Canadians. Bourassa 
highlighted Minister of Finance Sir Thomas White’s budget on 15 February 1916.38 White did 
not seem to weigh the economic impact of new taxation, increasing debt and short-sighted 
economic planning. The Taxations of Profits Bill imposed new taxes on Canadian profits, 
retroactive to the beginning of the war. To White, the government was merely taxing those 
businesses that had profited primarily from the war itself.39 Bourassa saw it as little more than 
a state-sanctioned confiscation of funds. Mirroring his comments about the 1915 budget, he 
wrote that “après avoir ébranlé l’équilibre économique de l’État,” the government “jette la 
perturbation dans l’économie privée du pays. Nous aurons pourtant besoin de toutes nos forces 
de récupération pour réparer les désastres accumulés par nos folies.”40 Ottawa’s new laws 
might be necessary for the war effort, but they also had far-reaching effects beyond the limits 
of the war. To Bourassa, the nation’s leaders ought to consider their consequences on 
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Canadians and gauge their value appropriately. 
Both the war supporters and Bourassa were ensnared in the war’s growing intensity, 
and each side repeated their arguments ad nauseum as the gravity of the war drove each side to 
extremes. When Australian Prime Minister William Hughes passed through Canada towards 
the “Mecca of the Empire,” London, Bourassa mocked Hughes’ empty speeches about the fight 
for freedom and liberty on European battlefields. Bourassa remarked that “cette banale 
ritournelle prend un goût d’amère ironie,” given that French Canadians were deprived of their 
rights in Ontario.41 Bourassa chose a suitable turn of phrase. The ritournelle is a fast-paced 
dance from the 17th century set to repetitive musical phrases, as its introductory musical theme 
reappears throughout the piece. So too were speeches urging support for the war peppered with 
repetitive phrases and rhetoric -- though Bourassa himself was not innocent of playing his own 
ritournelle. In each editorial, he returned to the same themes of government mismanagement, 
unseeing devotion to the Imperial cause, and the long-term consequences of Canada’s place in 
the conflict. Often he used the same descriptive phrases. There was little debate and neither 
cared about the absurd repetitiveness of their rallying cries. 
Bourassa held a series of six public lectures from 2 March to 6 April for the “Friends of 
Le Devoir.” The series was published as Hier, Aujourd’hui, Demain, a nominal sequel to the 
book he had published the four months earlier. He published the lectures first as Le Devoir 
editorials, but the most complete account of Bourassa’s writing was within the book itself. In 
six sections, Bourassa outlined the new developments in his thoughts on the war He reviewed 
his history of Canada’s colonial autonomy, this time highlighting the role of French Canadians 
and their clergy throughout the process. Then he summarized the alleged “Imperialist 
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Revolution” of England and its transatlantic transfer to Canadian shores. He examined the 
justifications for Canadian intervention in the European conflict, particularly the reasons raised 
by the war’s supporters and Quebec Bishops. He then details the disastrous consequences of 
the war before introducing the “solutions of tomorrow.” He concluded with a section on 
Canadian foreign policy and asked if “le Canada travaillera-t-il pour la paix ou pour la guerre?” 
Much of the content had appeared in various forms in the pages of Le Devoir over the 
preceding year and a half, but he expanded some arguments and made them more forcefully. 
In Hier, Aujourd’hui, Demain Bourassa further elaborated on his argument that the war 
was a revolutionary moment for Canada. He added to his history of Canadian autonomy a 
damning indictment against the Quebec Catholic hierarchy. After assessing historical examples 
of Canadian Bishops protecting Canadian autonomy from the control of the British 
government, such as during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and throughout the 19th 
century, Bourassa contrasted the bishops of yesterday with those of 1916. There was no 
“tradition épiscopale,” he wrote, that demanded support for the war or surrendering the right of 
Canada to be at peace when Britain was at war. Bourassa repeated his conclusion that “la 
participation du Canada à la guerre actuelle, comme colonie britannique, constitue donc une 
révolution, une révolution profonde, radicale, dans la charte nationale du Canada ... Tous ceux 
qui ont encouragé cette participation ... ont fait oeuvre de révolutionnaires.”42  
The accusation is remarkable since Bourassa’s encompassing view of the war’s impact 
now included the Quebec Bishops alongside Borden’s government as supporting imperialism 
and the war. Once Britain may have formed a liberal imperial association for its North 
                                                 
42 Henri Bourassa, Hier, aujourd’hui,demain, (Montreal: 1916) 39-40. Durocher also reviews these points and 
explains the reaction of Quebec Bishops and priests to his writing, see Durocher, “Henri Bourassa, les évêques 
et la guerre,” 261-263. 
154 
 
American Dominion, but wartime militarism had turned British and Canadian imperialists 
away from that possibility while drawing other elements in society to their cause. Any 
collusion with imperialists was a dangerous precedent. Bourassa reminded his readers that “la 
Grande-Bretagne veut maintenir sa suprématie maritime, garder pour elle toute seule les 
immense contrées qu’elle a conquises depuis un demi-siècle, et dite au monde entier: ‘What we 
have, we hold.’”43 The Empire he portrayed in his book did not exist for its subjects’ sake, but 
for the interests of Great Britain and its grip on the world. Bourassa could not accept the 
cooperation of Quebec Bishops in expanding that domination.  
The “imperialist revolution” was the culmination of more than a century of “good” and 
“bad” events. Bourassa readily acknowledged the positive benefit of British liberalism and its 
protection of individual freedom but contrasted it against a history of growing colonial 
domination that continued even after the nominal independence of Canada in 1867. To him, 
French Canadian nationalistes were defending “ces droits, ces traditions, ces libertés, ces 
devoirs” of British liberalism and “c’est à l’école de l’Angleterre que nous avons appris à les 
respecter, à les apprécier, à les aimer: elle ne peut trouver mauvais ni déloyal que nous les 
défendions jalousement.”44 In time, Bourassa believed that the wedding of the imperialist 
vision of Canada to an increasingly militaristic Canadian society would prove disastrous. The 
supposed subservience of all aspects of Canada’s economic, political and social structures to 
the needs of the military was both “antisocial et antinational ... le résultat que poursuivent les 
révolutionnaires impérialistes.” He warned that “il est rare que les révolutions ne soient pas 
dirigées également contre l’ordre social et le patriotisme national.”45 The drastic changes 
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Bourassa observed taking place were proof enough of the transformation of Canadian society 
by the conflict in ways that seemed increasingly permanent and far reaching. Most of the topics 
he had covered in his editorials, such as the introduction of new taxation, the threat of 
conscription, and the efforts to quell public dissent, all suggested a turn towards militarism. 
The militaristic project would not disappear after the war finished, Bourassa predicted, as it 
deformed social structures and national identity. Here was the basis of an important aspect of 
Bourassa’s war resistance. Canada at war seemingly had no place for the British liberal tenets 
(or for that matter, his Catholic values) that guided his views. His greatest fear was that this 
militaristic and imperialist “revolution” would lead to a lasting transformation of Canadian 
society, one that had no space for the French Canadian “race” to survive.  
There were three potential outcomes to the “problem” of rampant militaristic 
imperialism. “Les solutions de demain” were independence, imperial association, or 
annexation.46 Canadian independence from the British Crown was Bourassa’s preferred 
solution – albeit with dangers. He feared the threat of war without British protection, but 
Canadian involvement in imperial wars was just as dangerous – as the current conflict 
demonstrated.47 Independence might, he mused, also further antagonize Canada’s internal 
conflict, such as the rivalry between French and English Canadians, between immigrants and 
Canadians, and between eastern and western Canada. Yet, imperialism surely did not prevent 
these internal fractures. If anything, its “politique d’anglicisation” further deepened the 
separation between Canadians. The best solution to the “problem” of imperialism was 
independence. While some believed that “c’est quelque chose de faire partie d’un grand 
empire,” Bourassa told his readers that “il y a, pour soi et pour les autres, pour la paix, la 
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liberté, le progrès et le bon équilibre du monde, ‘quelque chose’ de mieux que de ‘faire partie 
d’un grand empire’: c’est d’être une nation, même modeste.”48 Bourassa thought independence 
was an unlikely outcome since only a minority of Canadians supported the idea and most of 
those were probably French Canadians. 
Instead, Bourassa wrote that it was far more likely Canada would form some sort of 
imperial association, “la plus logique dans l’ordre des faits anormaux crées par la révolution 
impérialiste.”49 At least imperial representation would help correct the excesses of the militant 
imperialism that currently reigned in Britain, Canada, and its other colonies. Since his 
opposition to the Boer War in 1899, Bourassa had long maintained that participation in 
imperial conflicts deserved Canadian representation in imperial governance, so his cautious 
endorsement in 1916 was understandable.50 Its most appealing aspect was the possibility of 
eventually dissolving the Empire. Imperial association would be an invaluable “école de 
reforme coloniale” that exposed the “colonial” Canadians to the larger issues of modern global 
politics. Perhaps after ten, fifteen or twenty years, the governments and people of the colonies 
would be “préparés à jouer leur rôle de nations avec infiniment plus de sobriété, de sagesse et 
de dignité qu’ils ne le sont aujourd’hui.”51 Though it preserved a connection to Britain and its 
foreign conflicts, at least imperial association held the promise of further separation. It was a 
solution that Bourassa could accept, though not one he embraced. 
The third option was the least desirable result of Canada’s national dilemma and not a 
real solution at all in Bourassa’s eyes. Annexation through a political union with the United 
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States was, according to Bourassa, the natural outcome of “des causes et des faits accumulés 
par nos extravagances, et surtout par la suprême folie de notre participation dévergondée à la 
guerre actuelle.”52 Those who championed the Empire and Canada’s limitless participation in 
the European conflict led Canada down a road of false hope and economic ruin. When Britain 
emerged from the war weaker and unstable, Bourassa feared that Canadians would “naturally” 
turn from an imperial identity to an American one. Increased American immigration and 
economic integration would begin when the war ended regardless of historic and cultural 
connections to Europe. The devastated European states would not have the economic power 
they once had. Bourassa believed American supremacy would mean the extinguishment of an 
English Canadian identity, which for the Canadian nationalist destroyed the possibility of a 
Canada that fused French and English together. It was only the French Canadians, Bourassa 
claimed, who would resist American influence with their strong linguistic and religious 
identity. Though the United States would treat French Canada far better than they currently 
were in the Canadian Dominion, Canada as a whole would be weaker.53 While French 
Canadians would survive in a North American union, Canada would not. 
In the final section of the booklet, Bourassa examined the future of Canadian foreign 
relations after the war. Regardless of which of his solutions occurred, he anticipated a shifting 
international landscape that required an independent Canadian foreign policy removed from its 
“puérile et désastreuse mentalité coloniale, anglaise ou française.”54 He believed Canada would 
be more autonomous and choose its own allies. France and England would still naturally be 
Canada’s greatest supporters, but the country could also form relationships with a wide variety 
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of other European nations. The United States and Canada would defend North America 
together and prosper through economic and political agreements. A North American 
partnership rather than a union would be even better than an “imperial association,” Bourassa 
argued, since the United Sates would keep Canada out of wars and had no interest in any sort 
of imperial relationship with its neighbour.55 To Bourassa in 1916, the Americans who still 
refused to enter the war were the ideal partners for post-war Canada. 
The United States was committed to peace and it would be the greatest ally in 
reforming the international system. A new system of arbitration should be introduced, one 
which counteracted all the failures of the current system. Bourassa outlined the causes behind 
the outbreak of the war as well as those behind its frightening intensity. “L’effroyable 
banqueroute du vieux système des alliances, de l’équilibre des forces brutales, de la diplomatie 
secrète, et des armements à outrance” had all been justified to “assurer la paix du monde,” 
Bourassa wrote, but in fact had only caused the present war to erupt.56 A new international 
system focused on disarmament, the neutrality of all maritime shipping, the publication of all 
international treaties, the suppression of secret treaties, and the nullification of any agreements 
made without the assent of a nation’s representatives.57 Each suggestion addressed the causes 
of the Great War and echoed the demands of Britain’s Union of Democratic Control’s first 
pamphlet. 
The book ended on this optimistic tone for the future, neatly presenting the underlying 
hope that continually pushed the journalist to confront the issues raised by the war. After the 
war, Bourassa hoped Canada would add its voice to the “concert des nations qui [vont décider] 
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du sort de l’humanité au de cette guerre.”58 If Canada supported a post-war system, and 
reaffirmed its right to neutrality in any war that did not menace its territory, then perhaps they 
could repair the damage that they had caused by listening to the “apôtres de haine” that had led 
them into the conflict. The Canada he envisioned would finally be “libre de poursuivre un idéal 
de paix, de justice, d’ordre et de vraie liberté.”59 The only way to achieve that future was if 
Bourassa continued his education of the public. 
Bourassa’s condemnation of the “revolutionary” nature of Canada’s war experience 
alongside his vision of the future marked a new perspective on the war. “Revolution” was not 
an idea that Bourassa raised lightly. For the ultramontane Catholic and a French Canadian, 
social order was intrinsically linked to a stable and modern society. Revolution was a violent 
process, even if it did not appear as physical violence, and by its nature caused social turmoil. 
Previous certainties, such as a political balance between Liberals and Conservatives or 
Canada’s distance from foreign conflicts, were no longer assured. The sudden reactionary 
change wrought by the war threw Canada’s future into question. Bourassa argued then that the 
war was beginning to induce revolutionary transformations. They were encompassing changes 
that Bourassa feared might be irreversible.  
Bourassa’s solutions all pointed to the unsustainability of the war experience. The 
“imperialist revolution” bound Canada to an ephemeral identity and the temporary cause of 
victory in a war that was not its own. He feared the long-term consequences of that binding. In 
Bourassa’s ideal world, the same principles and values from before the war would continue to 
guide Canada. Yet the “imperialist revolution” nurtured new principles, such as unthinking 
service to Empire, glorifying soldiers, and the oppression of dissent. If Britain won the war, 
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Bourassa claimed, the values that guided the nation during wartime would become permanent. 
Then, the imperialists’ militarism would be the same as the Prussian iteration against which 
they now fought. The “revolutionaries” would continue to “utiliser les ressources du Canada, 
en hommes et en argent, pour la gloire et le profit de l’Angleterre.”60 He feared that this 
Canada could not survive. French Canadians would not submit to imperialism’s militarism and 
Anglicization, worsening the divide between French and English Canadians.61 Canada would 
emerge from the war politically, economically and spiritually weakened, and unless Canadians 
adopted one of his solutions, its national life was at risk. 
Strangely, Bourassa’s arguments were not that different in tone from ones presented in 
the pages of English Canadian newspapers. There, editorials and columns all acknowledged the 
war’s revolutionary impact on the Canadian people. English Canadian papers hailed the war’s 
“purging of materialism and selfishness” and the “virtuous nature of the fight and its salutary 
influence on Canada.”62 While Bourassa viewed the war’s militarism as a corrupting 
revolutionary influence, English Canada perceived the war as a crucible for positive change. 
German militarism was a dangerous threat, but it was not the same sort of militarism appearing 
in Canada. As one anonymous writer in the Montreal Star noted in September 1916, “a patriot 
... is one whose bosom swells with pride of his country ... while in a jingo the swelling appears 
in his head.”63 English Canadian public commentary justified the growing influence of 
militarism as necessary to defeat Germany, or at least as having potentially positive effects, but 
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Bourassa made no distinction between them. To him, any ideology or circumstance that 
unevenly valued military endeavours and soldiers was detrimental to Canada’s liberal 
democracy. 
In his next series of articles, Bourassa turned to the international situation in the spring 
of 1916. There too state leaders and diplomats envisioned the resolution of the war and the 
future that would come of it. To Bourassa, peace was the only true solution. On 4 March 1916, 
Benedict XV wrote to Cardinal Pompilj, the General Vicar of Rome, asking the faithful to pray 
for peace during Lent. The letter added to the wealth of public statements from Rome on the 
necessity of peace and asked that the belligerent nations declare their “aims and objects” of the 
war.64 On the heels of his appeal to Canadians to envision a future after the war, the Papal 
request led Bourassa to ask of the warring nations, “qui veut la paix?” 
It was not, Bourassa concluded, Germany or Britain.65 A speech by German Chancellor 
Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg in April 1916 revealed the German position. Germany put 
out peace feelers towards Britain, but Germany was not willing to accept a return to the status 
quo to end the war.66 After all, the Germans were winning. They occupied Belgium, parts of 
France and Russia, as well as Montenegro and Albania. Serbia offered token resistance, Italy 
had little chance of a breakthrough and the Russian offensive into the Ottoman Empire had 
stalled. Famine, Bourassa reasoned, was the biggest worry for the blockaded nations of the 
Central Powers. Germany was open to peace offers and Bethmann-Hollweg envisioned 
German support for the “oppressed” nationalities previously under Russian rule.67  
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Understandably, Bourassa found the German Chancellor’s words on those people who 
were not part of the Great Powers of Europe the most intriguing. Bourassa believed that 
Germany did not want to see Belgium vassalized. It supported an independent Belgium and 
more autonomy for their Flemish minority. Of course, Bourassa noted, Germany’s proposed 
treatment of these “petits peuples” were hypocritical given its position on Alsace, Posen and 
Schleswig where French, Polish and Danish people lived under German rule.68 Equally, the 
Allies who defended the small nations of Europe against German aggression ignored their own 
minority populations. The necessity of liberating such peoples seemed entirely contingent on 
one’s point of view. At least Bethmann-Hollweg had offered a reasonable beginning for peace 
negotiations to begin, even if it was a problematic one. 
In contrast, Great Britain was recalcitrant towards the possibility of peace, undoubtedly 
for the same reasons that Germany was supportive: Germany had the upper hand in the war. 
Bourassa’s editorial on 12 April turned to examine the British reaction. The British government 
maintained “une apparence de suprême mépris” towards the German suggestion of 
negotiation.69 Dissecting speeches from Minister of War Trade Robert Cecil and the Prime 
Minister Herbert Asquith, Bourassa dismissed their continued efforts to portray the war as a 
just one against Germany. German militarism, he wrote, was just the “expression la plus 
intense, la plus efficace, d’un système qui est commun à toutes les nations européennes.”70 If 
German land armies were a threat to European stability, so too was British naval supremacy. 
The French Canadian argued that the true goal of Britain’s war was securing dominance over 
the seas, not the defence of nations like Belgium or France.  Again, Bourassa’s own bias 
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swayed his arguments.  Britain did want dominance over the seas -- but surely it was for the 
purpose of assuring trade across them, rather than Germany’s goal of controlling them entirely. 
The war could not balance on such a simple issue. Yet, Bourassa alleged that if the British 
government could guarantee that Germany would no longer be a threat to their naval 
supremacy, then they would be the first to talk of peace.71 Either way, the Allies and the Central 
Powers had such different positions and purposes for fighting the war that peace before a 
complete military defeat seemed an unlikely prospect. 
The final article provided Bourassa’s answer to the question of who wanted peace. “Le 
Pape seul veut la paix,” Bourassa declared praising the Sovereign Pontiff’s efforts to mediate 
the conflict from Rome. As the only figure who had “aucun intérêt à fomenter la haine des 
peuples,” Pope Benedict XV alone could outline the conditions “d’une paix véritable, d’une 
paix juste, chrétienne et durable.”72 Though Bourassa treated politicians with cynicism, he 
always welcomed the words from the Vatican. For the Ultramontane Catholic, the best force of 
moderation in Europe was the Pope as “higher concerns” rather than the foolish compulsions 
of humanity guided Vatican diplomacy. He translated large parts of the Pope’s message from 4 
March and it is clear that they drove his own beliefs. One reproduction of the papal missive is 
telling: 
Throwing Ourself as it were among the belligerents, as a father might do between 
sons at strife, We have entreated them, in the name of that God Who is Himself 
Love Infinite, to renounce the purpose of mutual destruction, to declare clearly 
once for all, whether directly or indirectly, what are the aims and objects of each 
nation, bearing in mind, as far as is just and practicable, the several national 
aspirations, but accepting, where need is, for the sake of equal good in the general 
commonwealth of nations, whatever sacrifice of self-love or selfish interest may 
be demanded. That was, that is, the only way to calm this monstrous conflict 
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according to the dictates of justice, and to reach a peace profitable not to one 
alone of the contending parties, but to all, and thus a peace equitable and lasting.73 
Bourassa’s feelings are evident. “Quelle force! quelle[sic] vérité! quelle[sic] justice!,” he 
wrote, “quelle profonde connaissance de la vraie politique humaine, fondée sur la loi divine!”74 
Pope Benedict XV was a unique figure on the world stage. Bourassa saw in him the authority 
and influence to bring both sides to the negotiating table and he gladly embraced the neutrality 
of the papal position. Since the victory that the war supporters’ demanded would not fulfill 
Benedict’s vision, it further underlined Bourassa’s opposition to them. 
After his comments on international affairs, Bourassa discussed one of the most 
important international events for many Canadians in the spring of 1916. On 24 April 1916, 
posters around Dublin proclaimed a provisional government for the Irish Republic. “We 
declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland,” it said, “standing on that 
fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim 
the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State.” They claimed the allegiance of all Irish 
and guaranteed their “religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its 
citizens” and “its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all 
its parts.”75 With that high purpose, the Irish Republic fought for its national life and the 
“Easter Rising” had begun.  
The actual fighting of the Easter Uprising was short-lived but the British reaction was 
swift and brutal. The rebels took control of Dublin, though they failed to seize the city’s key 
points. Officers and students at the Officer Training Corps defended Trinity College Dublin 
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against the rebels, while other forces successfully held the centre of British rule in Ireland, 
Dublin Castle. Nor could the rebels take Dublin’s train stations, so the British were able to 
funnel in troops and easily outnumbered the rebels within a few days. With machine guns and 
artillery, they slowly pinned down the rebels. Soon artillery shelled the Irish Republic 
headquarters at the General Post Office, underling their total defeat. On 29 April, after realising 
that further resistance would only waste civilian lives, the rebels surrendered to the British 
authorities. By its end, the British arrested 3,430 men and 79 women. In May, British 
authorities executed those who had signed the Proclamation announcing the short-lived 
Republic. Some of those the British arrested were freed, but 1,480 men were imprisoned for 
longer terms.76 
Bourassa offered qualified sympathy to both sides of the nationalist movement in 
Ireland, empathising with the politician John Redmond who had worked within the 
parliamentary system, as well as understanding the Irish Volunteers who had resorted to 
violence. Bourassa reminded his readers of the cause of the suspended national aspirations 
throughout Europe and within Canada itself. Though he never condoned violence, if French 
Canadians wanted to understand better what compelled the Irish to extreme action, they only 
had to reflect on their own history.77 Redmond could easily be Louis-Hippolyte Lafontaine, the 
cautious political reformer of the 1830s and 40s, while the Irish Volunteers would be the party 
of Bourassa’s grandfather, Louis-Joseph Papineau, who had led the Lower Canadian rebellions 
of 1837-38 and wanted political and educational reform. Surely, Bourassa asked, the Irish were 
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only standing up for the principles and rights of its Irish peoples?78 Bourassa was fully aware 
of the limited rights of traitors who rose up against the government during wartime, but he 
rarely missed an opportunity to underline the implicit falsehoods of war rhetoric. The Irish 
were only seeking the freedom for which the Allies fought in France and Belgium. 
As the Irish rose up in rebellion for the cause of freedom, Canada’s French minority 
continued their own struggle against perceived English Canadian persecution. Liberal Senator 
P.A. Choquette addressed an audience on 2 March, warning of Regulation 17’s impact on 
Quebec sentiments: “These young-blooded fellows may start an agitation to abolish the use of 
English in the Quebec schools, despite the calmer councils of older men like myself.”79 
Meanwhile, Robert Sellar’s The Tragedy of Quebec continued to sell well, and he updated the 
1916 edition to address Regulation 17. “The issue,” he wrote dismissively, “is simply whether 
this Canada of ours is to be British ... or whether it is to be a mongrel land, with two official 
languages and rules by a divided authority.”80 Both sides waited on the decision of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in London, but until then, they were uncompromising in their 
stance against the other side. On 9 May, the issue was put to debate before the House of 
Commons. Liberal MP Erneste Lapointe submitted a resolution to the House asking that during 
“this time of universal sacrifice and anxiety, when all energies should be concentrated on 
winning of the War ... [make] it clear [to Ontario] that the privilege of the children of French 
parentage of being taught in their mother tongue be not interfered with.”81  
Lapointe made his motion with the support of Laurier, who had grown increasingly 
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interested in the plight of Franco-Ontarians. He had personally offered pragmatic compromises 
over the issue of French language education during his tenure as prime minister and remained 
aloof from the Ontario situation until the First World War. On 18 April 1916, however, he 
wrote to Ontario Liberal leader Newton Rowell, remarking that “If the party cannot stand up to 
the principles [of provincial rights and defending minorities that were] advocated, maintained 
and fought for by Mowat and Blake, I can only repeat to you that it is more than time for me to 
step down and out.”82 His principled position aside, Laurier believed the Lapointe motion 
would help him maintain leadership over Quebec in light of Bourassa and the nationalistes’ 
growing influence. Only Laurier and the Liberals could preserve the nation’s fragile unity.83 
Consequently, Lapointe’s resolution did not (and could not) compel the Ontario government to 
action, but rather officially stated the Liberal position and forced the federal legislature to 
debate the motion. Laurier threatened to resign if English Canadian Liberals who opposed the 
motion did not follow the party line. They voted in favour of it, but they resented “the bilingual 
episode” and would remember it a year later when Laurier again evoked the spectre of 
preserving national unity over the issue of conscription.84  
Bourassa welcomed the Liberal motion, but believed it was too moderate. Debates in 
parliament underlined how the ongoing dilemma weakened the Canadian war effort. Bourassa 
would have preferred going in the other direction. He noted two faults with Lapointe’s 
resolution: “l’absence de sanction pratique et l’intempestif accouplement de la question 
ontarienne à la participation du Canada à la guerre.”85 Bourassa believed that the Liberals 
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should have raised the illegitimacy of fighting for British civilization without finding it at 
home. He agreed that Regulation 17 negatively affected the war effort, but not solely because it 
threatened national unity -- it undermined the justification of the war itself. The federal 
government had to intervene if they wanted French Canadian support for the war. Their refusal 
to do as Laurier had done for Manitoba in 1896 proved their disdain for French Canada. 
Bourassa concluded, 
La motion du député de Kamouraska apportait un appui moral, un témoignage 
public et solennel de sympathie des représentants de la nation aux Canadiens-
français de l’Ontario aux vaillantes mères de famille, aux héroïques petites 
maîtresses d’école qui défendent la civilisation française contre la haine stupide 
et cauteleuse des ‘Huns’ de Toronto. ... La grande lutte continuera jusqu’au 
triomphe finale.86 
The debate solved little as all parties continued their wait for the decision of the Judicial 
Committee in London entirely convinced that they were in the right. 
In June, weeks before receiving the letter from Talbot Papineau asking him to support 
the war, Bourassa highlighted two important obstacles he had encountered during his growing 
and vocal opposition to the war effort. First, the press consistently muted the voices of those 
opposed to the war. The “partisans de la guerre à outrance” interpreted any suggestion of peace 
in their favour. If a German spoke of peace, it meant that Germany was weakening. If an 
Englishman raised the subject of negotiations before Germany was defeated, he was a traitor. 
Nuanced discussions of the war were unpopular as they asked ques+tions whose answers 
defied the rhetoric of the war. Second, the rallying patriotic call to support the war was 
misleading and dangerous. It was not patriotism expressed by the war supporters but loyalism, 
Bourassa repeated. They asked for absolute loyalty to the British crown and its endeavours – 
indeed, Canadian patriotism had often emerged in conflict with British loyalism. “C’est en 
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luttant contre l’autorité impériale et ses tenants au Canada,” he claimed, “que les Canadiens 
des deux races s’étaient rapprochés peu à peu et avaient commencé à se lier par un commun 
attachement à la patrie canadienne.”87 Patriotism had once unified the Canadian nation, but 
now loyalism divided its French and English peoples. The suppression of dissent inhibited 
Bourassa’s efforts to voice his opinion as his critics poisoned the audience of English 
Canadians who may have otherwise listened to his call for moderation and peace. 
In these turbulent times, after months of repeating his position and exploring its historic 
and contemporary relevance, Bourassa received a letter from a cousin he barely knew. Talbot 
Mercer Papineau was born into privilege at his family’s estate at Montebello. He spent his 
early years travelling between it and Philadelphia, where his mother belonged to a prominent 
American family. His father, the grandson of his famous forebear, was an alcoholic and 
estranged from his mother when Papineau was young, so his American mother near 
Philadelphia raised him.88 Despite his English Presbyterian upbringing, however, he called the 
French and Catholic province of Quebec his home. He cherished the summer memories of his 
childhood at Montebello, where he and his three brothers spent many summer days exploring 
their expansive 2800-acre property together and playing games as Indians or as King Arthur.89 
His family’s social and economic status created few worries and many opportunities as he 
matured. The early years of Papineau’s life reflected a curious mix of English Canadian, 
French Canadian and American cultures. Though he primarily referred to himself as a French 
Canadian, he sometimes was simply Canadian - and once he noted that he was in fact “three 
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quarters American.”90 He moved easily between cultures and nationalities. Still, his paternal 
ancestry forever marked Papineau as a great-grandson of Louis-Joseph Papineau. Immediately 
identifiable with the prominent French Canadian name, he could not help but be intimately 
connected to his heritage. 
Papineau was wealthy, well connected, and unsure of what to do with his life when 
Britain declared war in 1914. That August, he found himself on the far side of the country, 
speaking to the Canadian Club in Vancouver on the subject of nationalism in Quebec.91 He 
spoke with authority and publicly assured his listeners that “as many French Canadians as 
English Canadians [would] take up arms in defence of the Empire.”92 With that heartfelt hope, 
he rushed eastward to fulfil his words and volunteer for the newly formed Princess Patricia’s 
Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). Joining as a Lieutenant, Papineau hoped to be among the 
first Canadian soldiers to land in Europe to make a name for himself while furthering his career 
and public life.93 The officer cadre in the Patricias was mainly of the same social class as 
Papineau -- wealthy enough to buy their supplies and assume positions of command in the new 
but rapidly expanding Canadian Expeditionary Force. 
After surviving a year on the front lines and winning a Military Cross, in October 1915 
he met with Sir Max Aitken while visiting London. Though not their first encounter, they were 
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impressed with one another and the connection was a fruitful one. Aitken, the future Lord 
Beaverbrook, was an influential figure within British and Canadian political circles.94 He had 
made millions before moving to England and obtaining a Parliamentary seat and knighthood. 
After the war broke out, Robert Borden appointed him the “Canadian Eye Witness” to the war 
in May 1915, effectively becoming Canada’s official record officer.95  
In February 1916, Papineau was promoted to Captain and became the Aide-de-Camp to 
the Canadian Corps commander, General Sir Edwin Alderson. In June 1916, Papineau joined 
Aitken’s War Records Office as an official “Eye Witness.” This put him in a unique position, 
amassing information on the activities of the Canadian units and writing communiqués 
released to newspapers around the world. As a result, he travelled extensively across the front 
lines, visiting with Generals and Privates and collecting information on every branch of the 
service. Papineau’s roving daily activity allowed him the chance to see the breadth of the 
Canadian experience of the First World War.96 
In the months before that formative experience, Papineau’s vision of Canada at war 
took shape as he confronted the mounting casualties among the Canadians from his perspective 
on the front lines. In light of Quebec’s estrangement from those who supported the war, he 
wanted to explain his actions to his fellow citizens and elicit their support. As well, he felt 
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obligated to counter the influence of his cousin, Henri Bourassa. To that end, Papineau drafted 
a letter to Bourassa in March 1916 arguing for greater French Canadian participation in the war 
effort. The letter is a glimpse not merely into Papineau’s political beliefs, but into the life of a 
soldier on the front and a man torn between two cultures. 
The great distance between Papineau and Canada elongated the process of finalising the 
public letter. Papineau first wrote a draft in March and sent it to his friend and law partner 
Andrew McMaster in Montreal, requesting that he release it to the newspapers as well. 
McMaster, when he replied in late April, doubted the value in releasing the letter. He 
questioned Papineau’s intent and noted that the young officer did not realise how much Canada 
had changed during the war. “You speak of an imperial war,” McMaster wrote to Papineau, 
“that is not the keynote of all the appeals made for patriotic purposes here – very often it is the 
Canadian note that is sounded & that the war is a war for civilization and liberty.”97 On 15 July, 
McMaster sent a revised letter written in English to Bourassa. Not knowing that Bourassa was 
travelling and had not received it, McMaster assumed he had no reply and released it to papers 
across Canada on 28 July. Within a week, the London Times published it and Papineau’s name 
became known throughout the Dominion and the Empire. Bourassa issued a reply on 2 August 
in Le Devoir, to much less domestic and international publicity. The sparring between the two 
revealed the vast difference between their visions of Quebec and their conceptions of the war. 
At best, Papineau’s letter was a fervent plea for Canadian unity to the man who was at 
the heart of its discord; but, according to Bourassa, it was a misplaced cri de coeur that 
revealed the depth of Papineau’s estrangement from the state of affairs in his province. Despite 
his sincerity as an honest attempt to improve the situation, Bourassa saw an irrelevancy and 
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distance to Papineau’s arguments. Papineau was not describing the Quebec experience of the 
war that Bourassa had known; instead, he was speaking from the battlefields of Europe. He 
began with the faulty accusation that Bourassa had opposed the war from August 1914 
onwards. This was an inauspicious start to a letter meant to rouse an enemy to your side. 
Papineau then faltered again, stating: “I shall not consider the grounds upon which you base 
your opposition to Canadian participation … rather I wish to begin by pointing out some 
reasons why on the contrary your whole-hearted support might have been expected.” Papineau 
refused to meet his opponent head on, dismissing not only Bourassa’s long-held beliefs 
spanning 15 years of careful thought and reasoning, but also the vast majority of his editorials 
published in the previous twenty-four months. It became evident that though Papineau 
ostensibly wrote to Bourassa, he had not followed his cousin’s evolving commentary closely. 
There is no mention of the Pope, or of the British radicals the Union of Democratic Control, or 
of numerous other inspirations and guiding forces that Bourassa publicly and repeatedly 
addressed.  
What followed was a list of reasons why the nationaliste was wrong, and why Bourassa 
had betrayed his compatriots and the civilized world. Papineau’s argumentation was 
straightforward. First, he contended that Canada became a belligerent the moment Germany 
declared war upon Great Britain when it became “subject to invasion and conquest.” It was not 
a war for Great Britain, but a defensive act to protect its territory. He wrote, “proof may no 
doubt be made that one of the very purposes of Germany’s aggression … was the ambition to 
secure a part if not the whole of the English possessions in North America.” This was a bold 
claim for 1916, but not entirely unlikely. The Americans had vigorously defended their 
Manifest Destiny over the western hemisphere for almost a century; so the idea that Germany’s 
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military might could extend across the ocean was implausible.98 On the other hand, stories of 
German agitation in the United States led some to believe an invasion from the south was 
possible. Several plots had been widely publicized, including a group of Germans in the United 
States who had been planning to blow up the Welland Canal.99  
It would have been even worse, said Papineau, if the Allies had won and Canada had 
not fought at all. He spoke directly to French Canadians’ self-respect, hoping to shame them 
into the war, asking, “What [then] of the Soul of Canada?” How could a nation assured of its 
“national life” by the actions of English soldiers refuse to make sacrifices for them in their time 
of need? That would be a nation without pride. If Bourassa “was truly a nationalist” he would 
“recognise this moment as [Canada’s] moment of travail and tribulation.” A loyal Canadian 
would fight for his country in this moment of national birth. In Papineau’s view, Bourassa’s 
support should stem from this patriotic impulse to defend “Canadian territory and Canadian 
liberties.” 
Bourassa’s reply repeated his familiar argument that the federal government, the press, 
and politicians of both parties “applied themselves systematically to obliterate the free 
character of Canada’s intervention.” He became opposed to the war when supporting it no 
longer became a matter of choice, but a matter of “blackmail, intimidation and threats.” Surely, 
the high ideals of British civilization had been eroded as foreign “aliens” were imprisoned, 
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citizens harassed on the streets, and war supporters silenced dissent. Censorship and oppression 
pervaded Canada’s public life. Bourassa did not support the war, not because he was a traitor 
as Papineau implied, but because he was standing by the principles he had repeatedly 
expressed before and during the conflict. Canada’s involvement in British wars, Bourassa had 
once predicted during the Boer War fifteen years earlier, resigned it to future participation in 
what Laurier had called the “vortex of European militarism.”100 Inevitably, Bourassa had 
stated, the Old World would dissolve into conflict and this would lead to Canada’s ruin. “All 
the nations of Europe are the victims of their own mistakes, of the complacent servility with 
which they submitted to the dominance of all Imperialists and traders in human flesh,” 
Bourassa insisted in his response. He raised a sort of twisted neutrality. There was no side 
Canada should defend, as there was no side worth defending. 
Papineau argued that a “spiritual union” existed between Great Britain and Canada, one 
that demanded national responsibility. These bonds “unite [Canadians] for certain great 
purpose and which have proved so powerful.” To fight the war is “to preserve and perpetuate 
that invaluable spirit which alone makes our union possible.” In addition to this connection 
between English and Canadian, Papineau stated, there existed the racial strength of French 
Canadians that superseded the century and a half old conquest. A race that survived -- and even 
thrived -- under British rule deserved defence. Concessions were inevitable, individuality 
sacrificed, all so that “the greatest opportunity … to show unity of purpose” could be fulfilled. 
This would finally prove that French Canadians loved their country too. The low recruitment 
numbers from Quebec, Papineau believed, reflected Bourassa’s negative influence. Bourassa 
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built his politics upon “strife and enmity” and brought “disfavour and dishonour upon [his] 
race,” while the “honour of French Canada” and “the unity of [the] country” was at stake. At 
the very least, French Canada’s “bond of blood relationship between the Old France and the 
New” demanded that they fight.101 
Bourassa scoffed at the younger man’s claims. “His long and diffuse piece of 
eloquence,” he replied, “proves that the excitement of warfare and the distance from home 
have obliterated in his mind the fundamental realities of his native country.” Papineau’s words, 
as grandiose as they may have sounded, reflected a view of Canada and Quebec from an ocean 
away. Bourassa argued that French Canadian recruitment, rather than being unusually low, was 
merely representative of the higher number of native-born Canadians among them.102 Those 
who lived on their land for centuries were less likely to leave to fight a European war. English 
Canadians who volunteered were largely recent immigrants from the United Kingdom, 
Bourassa maintained, and thus retained more affinity to Scotland or England. He alleged that 
low recruitment in Quebec did not stem from one man or even one movement, but from 
“hereditary instincts, social and economic conditions and a national tradition of three 
centuries.”103 Papineau’s inability to comprehend the Quebec that Bourassa knew and nurtured 
is evident. Papineau represented a French Canadian of a very different sort from his cousin. 
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Not only had he joined the army, but he also defended it. He wrote in English to French 
Canada. Bourassa’s hereditary instincts, social and economic conditions and a national 
tradition may be vague categories, but surely Papineau did not fill them. 
Papineau closed his letter ominously, and his final flourish revealed a stark difference 
between him and French Canadians at home. He became the soldier: the one who had seen 
artillery shells explode friend and enemy alike, the one who had edged his way across no 
man’s land under machine gun fire, the one who fought for the sole reason because not to fight 
was to die. Papineau wrote: 
for those who grew fat with the wealth dishonourably gained by political graft 
and by dishonest business methods at our expense – we shall demand a heavy day 
of reckoning. We shall inflict upon them the punishment they deserve – not by … 
violence … but by the invincible power of our moral influence. 
With these threatening words, Papineau delivered his coup de grace: Beware the soldiers, for 
they were the “Soul of Canada” and when they returned, they would control the country. The 
war had changed the young Canadian lawyer who had left for Europe in 1914. Its outcome had 
gained a deadly significance to him, as did the support of his fellow French Canadians in order 
to secure victory for the Allies and for the soldiers on the frontlines. The men in the trenches 
were going to fight for the Canada they wanted, not the one envisioned by those living safely 
on the homefront. 
Papineau’s dire warnings did not faze Bourassa as he saw little truth in his future 
predictions. His reply to Papineau ended with a similar retort: 
Those [who have grown fat with the wealth dishonourably gained in war 
contracts] are not to be found in nationalist ranks: they are all recruited among 
the noisiest preachers of the holy War waged for ‘civilization’ against ‘barbarity,’ 
for the ‘protection of small nations,’ for the honour of England and the ‘salvation’ 
of France. 
Bourassa did not worship soldiers simply because of their service or their courage. He did not 
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see the soul of Canada within those who fought in a British war. Canada had its own interests 
and values that ought to be defended. Who was taking advantage of the war – of the death of 
hundreds of thousands – to improve their circumstances? Papineau believed it to be the 
nationalistes and Bourassa, using it for their own political machinations. Bourassa believed it 
was the imperialists using it for profit and a means to impart their ideology to Canadians. 
These viewpoints were not mutually exclusive. Both were rooted in their own experiences of 
the war and Bourassa’s supported by years of editorial comment. 
Papineau’s failure to clearly engage Bourassa’s position on the war helps explain the 
latter’s aggressive condemnation. Many of the points that Papineau raised, such as the nature 
of the war’s purpose, Canada’s future after the conflict, and the role of supporters and 
dissenters, had all been addressed by Bourassa in detail. In some ways, their positions 
overlapped. Contrasting Papineau’s letter to Bourassa’s booklet, Hier, Aujourd’hui, Demain, is 
revealing. Both believed that the war was transformative: Papineau believed it was creating a 
stronger Canadian national identity, while Bourassa believed it was fundamentally weakening 
it in favour of an imperialist one. Both foresaw a new role for Canada after the war linked to 
the Empire, though Bourassa preferred other possible outcomes. The key difference between 
their positions was that Papineau believed the war was an integral part of Canadian progress 
towards a more autonomous nation. Bourassa had argued since 1899 that Canada could do so 
alone, without British help, spearheaded by its own citizens. The Canada that Bourassa 
envisioned was as united in its national purpose as Papineau’s, but the war had interrupted that 
process rather than initiating or intensifying it. At the war’s beginning perhaps the cousins 
would have had more common ground to discuss their ideas, but by the summer of 1916 the 
chasm between them was insurmountable. Papineau’s appeal no longer even dealt with the 
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same basic facts as Bourassa’s view of the war. Two entirely different understandings of the 
war had developed. Bourassa was more committed than ever to his ideas by the fall. If 
anything, Papineau had only succeeded in convincing his cousin that his oppositional voice 
was more necessary than ever. 
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Chapter 5: The Possibility of Peace (September – Spring 1917) 
 
After rejecting the impassioned plea of his cousin Talbot Papineau to support the war in 
August, Bourassa spent the fall and winter of 1916 examining the possibility of peace. His 
work was in the shadow of the Somme Offensive, which had begun with a slaughter on 1 July 
1916 and finished on an equally bloody but thankfully triumphant note. Canada’s sole French 
Canadian combat unit, the 22nd battalion, endured three days of German counterattacks as they 
successfully held the village of Courcelette in September.1 In the weeks ahead, Canadian 
soldiers took more German lines, a series of entrenchments they called the Regina Trench, at 
high cost. The last months of autumn resulted in thousands of Canadian casualties. By the end 
of the Somme Offensive, 24,029 Canadians were killed or wounded -- nearly a quarter of the 
Canadian Corps’ original strength.2 The Allies’ failure to achieve any sort of movement 
towards victory, and German successes against Romania and Russia, led individuals within the 
belligerent nations to discuss seriously the possibility of peace for the first time. 
In December 1916, Germany offered its terms for negotiations, which the Allies 
rejected in turn. President Wilson then released a peace note asking for a clear statement of war 
aims so that, at the very least, the world could see what might end the war. Bourassa praised the 
American President as a voice of reason amidst the cacophony of militarism and false 
patriotism. The New Year quickly changed the international situation, however, as Wilson 
                                                 
1 Geoff Keelan, “‘Il a bien merité de la Patrie’: The 22nd Battalion and the Memory of Courcelette,” Canadian 
Military History, no.3, 19 (Summer 2010): 28-40. For a more in-depth study of the 22nd Battalion, see Jean-
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2 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918, (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1992) 81. 
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delivered his famous speech “peace without victory” speech that reflected his new policy of 
establishing a liberal post-war international system. Germany resumed unrestricted submarine 
warfare in January (which they had suspended in 1915 after sinking of the Lusitania) meaning 
they were targeting neutral -- and thus American -- shipping. The public release of the 
Zimmerman Telegram in late February 1917 turned the American people against the Central 
Powers, and the United States entered the war shortly thereafter.  
In May 1917, Bourassa devoted ten editorials to explaining American intervention. He 
had spent much time in the United States in the fall and winter of 1916-17. His wife 
Joséphine’s health was failing and the Bourassas travelled south of the border in hope that the 
better climate would help.3 Bourassa’s direct exposure to American politics allowed him to 
follow them much more closely than he had back home in Montreal. During his travels, he read 
newspapers and discussed the state of the country with Americans. He paid more attention than 
he otherwise might have to the American election in the fall of 1916, to the peace offers of 
December, and the subsequent slide from the United States as “champion de la paix” to “le 
héraut de la guerre.” After months of watching the “jingo press” insult and dismiss Wilson-the-
advocate-of-peace, Bourassa saw the same newspapers herald Wilson-the-declarer-of-war as 
the one the greatest statesman of the age. “Dans tous les pays,” he counselled his readers in 
May, “les mobiles de l’opinion publique sont multiples.”4 With that in mind, Bourassa began a 
dissection of the complex chronology behind the American republic’s entry into the First 
                                                 
3 Andre Bergevin, Cameron Nish, and Anne Bourassa, Henri Bourassa: biographie, index des écrit, index de la 
correspondence, 1895-1924, (Montreal: Les Éditions de l’Action Nationale, 1966) XLIX. 
4 Henri Bourassa, “L’intervention Americaine I: M. Wilson: son succès, sa valeur, sa sincérité – Force de l’opinion 
pacifiste,” Le Devoir, 7 May, 1917, 1. 
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World War. Like much of his work, it was incisive and informative, but it was also tinged with 
a lamenting tone that reflected the long months Bourassa had hoped to see the supporters of 
peace not only have their voices heard, but understood. Their failure and the American 
intervention seemed to extinguish the best hope for negotiating a peaceful end to the Great 
War. 
* * * 
In August 1916, following his verbal sparring with Papineau, Bourassa reviewed those 
who were pursuing peaceful solutions to the conflict. The list remained much the same as the 
one he had outlined eight months prior in December of 1915.5 The most prominent group was 
again the British Union of Democratic Control, which, Bourassa observed, every other 
Canadian press virtually ignored.6 The UDC, and other groups like the Quaker Society of 
Friends and The Hague’s gathering of neutral nations, were concerned with more than just 
calling for peace. They outlined the necessary policies that might end the current war as well as 
avoid future ones. Their directions were straightforward: no annexations of independent states 
such as Belgium; reasonable attention given to “oppressed” nationalities like Poland, Alsace-
Lorraine, or Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire; establishing international guarantees 
against war on land and sea; and the creation of an organization that could mediate 
international disputes. All of which aligned with the position of Pope Benedict XV, and 
affirmed the wisdom of both positions in Bourassa’s eyes. The Pope, as the greatest advocate 
for peace, called for an “equitable peace” that avoided laying down the foundations of another 
                                                 
5 Henri Bourassa, “Le Pape et la Guerre,” Le Devoir, 31 December, 1915, 1. 
6 Henri Bourassa, “L’Effort pour la Paix,” Le Devoir, 12 August, 1916, 1.  For instance, the author only found 7 
references to the UDC in the Globe and the Star for the entirety of the war.  
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war.7   
The failure of so many to support the cause of peace seemed to Bourassa a rejection of 
the Papacy. Instead, the faithful prayed for peace while working for war, which to Bourassa 
was “pure hypocrisie ou puérile inconséquence.”8 He found this especially true in Canada. 
Even in Germany, where voices in favour of peace were persecuted (as the imprisonment of 
socialist Karl Liebknecht indicated), they still seemed more prominent than those in Canada 
did. Bourassa noted that the Archbishop of Treves could echo the Pope’s views and condemn 
the jingo press in the Petrus-Blätter, but without the allegations of treason that the French 
Canadian faced in Canada. After two years of brutal warfare, Canadian voices calling for peace 
seemed muted except for Henri Bourassa and his supporters. 
In September, the Minister of the Colonies Andrew Bonar Law raised the issue of the 
Empire’s future after the war, and Bourassa offered a series of articles communicating his 
response. The series was titled “La Reorganisation de l’Empire”9 and he began by quoting 
Bonar Law’s 14 September speech to the West India Club in London: 
This War, so far as our Dominions are concerned, is being carried on under 
conditions which never existed in the world before. It required ... an arrangement 
to work by which one set of men should contribute lives and treasure and have no 
voice as to the way in which those lives and that treasure are expended. That 
cannot continue. There must be change.10 
This seemed to send a clear message that despite Bourassa’s critics, who always told him that 
                                                 
7 “LETTER Al Tremendo Conflitto TO CARDINAL POMPILI, VICAR OF ROME,” as printed in Principles for 
Peace Selections From Papal Documents Leo XIII to Pius XII, Reverend Harry C. Koenig, ed., (Washington: 
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9 Henri Bourassa, “La Reorganisation de l’Empire,” Le Devoir, 16 September, 1916, 1. 
10 J. Castell Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review, War Series, 1916, (Toronto: The Canadian Annual Review 
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184 
 
 
 
“now was not the time to speak of such things,” the future of Canadian imperial participation 
was open to debate. Bourassa added that even in the recent book championing Canadian 
accomplishments during the war, Max Aitken’s Canada in Flanders, Bonar Law had 
recognized the right of the colonies to some form of independence. “We had no power to 
compel any one of them to contribute a single penny, or to send a single man,” Bourassa 
quoted from Bonar Law’s preface to the book, “after this war the relations between the great 
Dominions and the Mother Country can never be the same again.”11 How could Bonar Law’s 
position, Bourassa wondered, be reconciled with that of the British Prime Minister Herbert 
Asquith who at the 1911 Imperial Conference had proclaimed “that [imperial] authority cannot 
be shared.”12 Bourassa decided to explore what the future might hold for Canada and the 
Empire, and eventually collected his series of commentaries as a booklet under the title Le 
Problème de l’Empire, with an added subtitle: “Indépendance ou Association Impériale? Étude 
critique du livre de M. Lionel Curtis: The Problem of the Commonwealth.”13 
Lionel Curtis was a prominent imperialist intellectual whose book represented a 
culmination of fifteen years working towards closer imperial ties across the Empire. Curtis had 
begun his political journey in the midst of the Boer War where he was an Army messenger. 
After the conflict, he served as Sir Alfred Milner’s assistant imperial secretary in South Africa. 
Milner famously gathered a group of young imperialists known as “Milner’s Kindergarden” 
who worked to unite the fractured South African colonies. Over the next decade, they helped 
                                                 
11 Max Aitken, Canada in Flanders: The Official Story of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Volume I, (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1916) vii-viii. 
12 As quoted in Lionel Curtis, The Problem of the Commonwealth, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1915) 101. 
13 Henri Bourassa, Le Problème de l’Empire: Indépendance ou Association Impériale? Étude critique du livre de 
M. Lionel Curtis: The Problem of the Commonwealth, (Montreal: Éditions du Devoir, 1916). 
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fashion a single state from the disparate groups, which came to fruition in 1910. Curtis 
believed that South Africa was a microcosm of the Empire and their methods could achieve a 
worldwide imperial union.14 The resulting organization, the Round Table movement, was 
established in 1909 and its members were tasked with setting up local groups throughout the 
Empire and establishing a periodical for the group, aptly titled The Round Table.15 The Great 
War increased the popularity of the movement, but it was quickly evident that wartime 
circumstances were changing the relationship between Britain and its Dominions faster than 
the Round Table had foreseen.  
In 1915, Curtis published The Problem of the Commonwealth to spur debate about the 
future of the Empire. He consciously advocated views that were extreme to provoke debate and 
analysis.16 In it, he argued that the Dominions had to take control of their defence and foreign 
policy through an Imperial Parliament -- the final step of their journey towards self-
government.17 Much like Bourassa’s work, it was rooted in historical research and opinionated 
pronouncements about the shape of the future Empire. Some of Curtis’ vision was not well 
received, like granting Britain the right to tax its Dominion subjects, even among imperialists, 
but it did incite debate.18 Among its opponents was Henri Bourassa, who nonetheless held a 
grudging respect for Curtis’ clear and comprehensive arguments. 
                                                 
14 Deborah Lavin, “Lionel Curtis and the Idea of the Commonwealth,” in Madden et al, eds., Oxford and the Idea 
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Curtis was the sort of opponent that Bourassa wished to see in Canada. His praise for 
The Problem of the Commonwealth was effusive: “c’est l’exposé de la thèse impérialiste la 
plus lucide, le plus complet, le plus tassé et aussi le plus loyal et le plus pratique que j’aie 
encore lu.”19 The first 34 pages of Bourassa’s book broke down Curtis’ thoughts on the future 
of the Empire for his French-speaking readers with Bourassa’s comments included. His 
thorough exposition of Curtis’ work proved that the nationalist and imperialist agreed on the 
basic facts about Canada’s relationship to the Empire. Both writers acknowledged that the 
national status of Canada was a matter of law. For instance, Britain could not order Canada into 
a war without the consent of Canadian ministers. Self-government was an integral 
characteristic of British government, and thus Canada could declare its neutrality in the case of 
British wars. Nor could Britain demand more support than the colonies were willing to offer in 
wars the colonies voluntarily entered. Both affirmed that the current war was, in Bourassa’s 
words, “une révolution radicale dans l’ordre établi par les constitutions coloniales.”  In 1914, 
the former colonies had entered the war with Britain’s declaration, and subsequently their 
national forces were under British command.  These circumstances necessitated systematic 
change where there were only two feasible options: absolute independence or imperial 
association with the United Kingdom. Clearly, Bourassa differed from Curtis on which choice 
was better but ultimately, Bourassa wrote, they agreed with the “status national des colonies 
autonomes” in fact and in law, as outlined historically and recently by the statesmen of Britain 
and Canada who shaped the Canadian constitution.20  
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Bourassa also recognized that Canadian imperialists had a significantly different 
perspective of Canada’s imperial relationship. He underlined that, even as a French Canadian 
nationaliste, he was not opposed to Britain’s political values. Like Curtis, he wanted to see 
those values entrenched in all interactions between Canada and Britain. So while Curtis and 
Bourassa believed in concrete principles of British constitutionalism and democracy that 
clearly outlined the relationship between its people and government, Canada’s “nouvelle école 
de théologiens ultra-impérialistes” envisioned these principles as abstract guidelines for it.21 
Instead, Bourassa claimed, Canada’s imperialists opposed democracy and parliamentarianism 
since they did not support Canada’s democratic right to govern itself. The present war had only 
exacerbated the problem because the British government made life and death decisions for 
Canadian soldiers while only answerable to the British electorate, not the Canadian one. It was 
one democracy’s oppression by another, Bourassa declared. Canadians had no way to express 
disfavour with their foreign policy or the conduct of the war, an action that was essential to 
Canada’s British-based political system. The “faux, révolutionnaire, [et] anarchique” 
relationship between Canada and Britain during the war and endorsed by the imperialists was 
unsustainable. Bourassa warned that, if the colonies did not proclaim their independence soon 
they would adopt the same negative sentiments of the Americans towards their former 
motherland.22 According to the nationaliste’s logic, the imperialists ought to adopt Curtis’ 
views if they actually wanted to improve Canada’s place in the Empire. 
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At the crux of Bourassa’s opposition to imperialism was his desire to see Canadians 
controlling the decisions that affected their nation. His criticism, especially in the midst of a 
war that Canada could not leave of its own free will, was concerned with the imperial political 
system, not the British Empire itself. Britain was a champion of many of the democratic and 
liberal rights that Bourassa supported. However, he did not see those political values reflected 
in the system that governed the Empire and its Dominions. He saw the illusion of political 
freedom hiding Canada’s ineffectual control over its own affairs. The freedom of Canada was 
really just “servitude volontaire,” a state even worse than slavery imposed by force. 
Nationalistes demanded change. He wrote, 
nous préférions l’indépendance nationale, la neutralité et la paix. Mais s’il faut 
porter l’uniforme de guerre et aider l’Angleterre à faire la police du monde, nous 
préférons que ce soit à d’associés responsables, plutôt que sous la livrée 
domestique, dût-il nous en coûter plus pour coopérer que pour servir.23 
Bourassa did not think it was likely that the Empire could ever transform itself into a just, 
equitable system of governance, so he supported its dissolution. If he had to live under its 
constraints, Canada should be included as an equal partner at the very least. Then the Empire 
would truly represent the political values of Britain and Canada. Bourassa’s problem with the 
imperial system was that in its current form he saw it only as “an agent of conquest, moral 
domination, and stifling mercantilism” rather than the form he believed it should take: a force 
for peace, progress, order and a place for the national aspiration of its Dominions to prosper.24 
Bourassa’s great fear was that the war seemed to solidify the former system and discourage the 
growth of the latter. 
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That autumn, the question of Canadian bilingualism was finally resolved as both the 
Papacy and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council pronounced their judgements on the 
case of French language education in Ontario. Napoléon Belcourt had presented his arguments 
before the Judicial Committee that summer. He argued that there was a constitutional right to 
French education and that Regulation 17 caused serious harm to Franco-Ontarians’ religious 
freedom. The Judicial Committee rejected his position and ruled in favour of the Ontario 
government. While Regulation 17 was upheld in the October 1916 decision, they did disallow 
the takeover of the Ottawa Separate School Board by the province, meaning that French 
education could continue in some form.25 It was a meagre victory for French Canadians.  
A worse moral defeat had occurred a few weeks earlier when Pope Benedict XV sent a 
letter to Quebec’s Cardinal Bégin requesting that French Canadian Catholics moderate their 
views and accept the decision of the Ontario government. The Pope based his comments from a 
report by the Apostolic Delegate to Canada, Archbishop Pellegrino Stagni, who had submitted 
a report to Vatican authorities that concisely reviewed the situation in Canada to date. He 
concluded that the bilingual schools question was “not essentially a religious matter” and 
specifically criticized the Quebec episcopate for interfering in the affairs of Ontario 
Catholics.26 Intervention from Catholic clergy on both sides had fuelled the flames of the 
dispute, and Stagni concluded that “if priests kept themselves completely outside this and 
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similar matters of race the occasions for disagreement among the laity would be much rarer.”27 
This report shaped the Papal letter, which ultimately asked all Catholics involved to end the 
conflict and seek compromise because the issue was not a religious one.28  
Bourassa offered no public reply to the Papal decision, but he was disappointed. 
Privately, he admitted that on reading it he had felt “une impression pénible et même un 
sentiment d’irritation.” He blamed the insidious influence of the imperialists over the Catholic 
episcopacy, which he believed influenced the Pope as well. His opponents had won the day.  
The solution, Bourassa explained in a letter to F. Hébert, was to keep trying to convince the 
Pope of the justness of their cause.29 
Instead of publicly deliberating on the Papal decision, Bourassa looked to the United 
States for encouraging signs about the state of the world and the future possibility of peace. 
The re-election of Woodrow Wilson in November affirmed the importance of the Democrat’s 
election slogan, “he kept us out of the war.” Bourassa dismissed American concerns during the 
campaign about the electoral influence of “hyphenated Americans” like German-Americans or 
Italian-Americans as ridiculous. One might better talk about the influence of hyphenated pro-
Allies and pro-Germany, he wrote, welcoming Wilson’s return to the White House.30 Backed 
by popular support, the U.S. President was now in a position to nurture a peaceful resolution to 
the European war. Bourassa reasoned that if Wilson “offrait aux peuples ravagés par la guerre 
sa médiation et son appui afin de les aider à rentrer en possession des bienfaits inappréciables 
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dont le peuple américain, avec raison, n’a pas voulu se départir, le mouvement en faveur de la 
paix ne tarderait pas à devenir irrésistible.”31 Bourassa hoped that Wilson could make some 
progress on the issue of peace since no one else seemed willing. Bourassa was partially right. 
In December 1916, Wilson became actively involved in defining the terms of a peace treaty, 
but not before Germany made their own offer.  
After two years of warfare, the belligerent nations seriously considered the possibility 
of peace for the first time in the winter of 1916. Especially after the Somme Offensive and the 
Battle of Verdun, European statesmen were at least willing to contemplate an end to the war to 
avoid more disastrous stalemates. Germany, as leader of the Central Powers, was the first to 
publicly issue a formal proposal to the Allies in December 1916, stating that they were spurred 
“by the desire to stem the flood of blood and to bring the horrors of war to an end” to enter 
peace negotiations.32 They offered to discuss the terms of the peace, though they did not quite 
outline the terms that might satisfy them.  
Bourassa approached the prospect of peace with typical reason and intellect. Two days 
after the announcement he commented on the timing of Germany’s peace offer and the hidden 
motivation behind it in an article in Le Devoir titled “La Démarche de L’Allemagne: Espoirs 
de paix – Obstacles probables.”33 His careful deconstruction reminded his readers of the recent 
German victory in Romania and the acquisition of the oil fields there, which put them in a 
stronger position than the beleaguered Allies. The peace proposal did not reflect a new desire to 
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end the war, he noted, but only a new belief that a negotiated peace would be beneficial at that 
time. It made sense that Germany would offer peace when they had the most to gain from it. It 
was clear to Bourassa that they sought to appear “devant l’opinion mondiale comme les 
protagonistes de la paix et à rejeter sur leurs ennemis la responsabilité d’une guerre à 
outrance.”34  
All of this could be a reason to reject the German proposal, but for Bourassa it 
represented a crucial opportunity. Here lay the possibility for an honourable and immediate 
peace. The Allies could take Germany at its word and consider the terms, and if they were not 
acceptable, reject them. In response, the Allies could offer their own terms, and the neutral 
countries and the opinion of the world could form a reasonable middle ground between the 
two. Then an agreeable and equitable peace could be fashioned.  Only through that process 
could the “droits de la conscience, de la justice et de la raison” prevail against the “passions 
sauvages.”35 In short, Bourassa did not simply react to the German offer and accept it as a 
means to end Canada’s involvement in a war he did not support. He honestly examined the 
proposal, and accepted it as a possible means to end the war’s suffering. The German terms 
should be at least met openly, he argued, as any chance at peace was worth pursuing.  
Bourassa’s reaction stands as an honest intellectual inquiry about the German peace 
offer and the best response to it. He was not writing as a journalist agitating for a sensationalist 
headline to sell papers or a political figure seeking to weaken an opponent. Bourassa cut 
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through the façade of the German peace offer as a means to end the war in their favour within 
the first few paragraphs of his article. Rather than condemning their deceit, he accepted it as 
inevitable and proposed a course of action that allowed for progress. He realized that, 
realistically, each side would only offer peace to serve their best interest. Accepting this truth 
was crucial in moving towards an end to the war.  
The patriotic press of English Canada did not easily recognize this important fact. 
Consider the headline from the Globe on 13 December 1916: “Foe Peace Proposals 
Accompanied by Threats: Allies will continue to fight for human liberty,” or its editorial, which 
declared that accepting the peace was “tantamount to an admission of defeat by the Allied 
nations […] The Allies cannot sheathe the sword until their ends are accomplished.”36 This 
perspective reflected English Canadians’ belief that the war had become a patriotic conflict 
requiring a “total Canadian war effort.”37 The majority of English Canadian newspapers 
emphasized that Canadian triumph would be found in commitment to the war and the 
justifications for it. While the Canadian press was not monolithic in its coverage, it still clashed 
greatly with Bourassa, who articulated a very different understanding of the war. 
Bourassa continued his analysis by outlining what he saw as the most significant 
obstacles to peace. He named the “partisans de la guerre à outrance”38 as one of the greatest 
barriers, though they took different forms among the belligerent nations. First, he commented 
briefly on the aristocratic Junkers in Germany and their dwindling influence. As aristocratic 
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power weakened, he argued, German socialists gained prominence. The German peace offer 
was, then, a consequence of the rising calls of German socialists for the end of the war.39 
Bourassa’s appraisal of the German situation spoke to the variety, and weakness, of his 
sources. Still, they led him to the reasonable belief that diminishing support for total war in 
Germany had opened a new window of opportunity for peace. 
Bourassa concluded his analysis with what he believed to be the final, and most serious, 
obstacle to peace: Russia. As he had since 1914, he claimed that history would come to see this 
as a Russian war over Turkish succession, the final struggle between “des Slaves et des Teutons 
pour recueillir les dépouilles du cadavre ottoman.”40 The driving force behind the prolongation 
of the conflict was, in his view, the Russian determination to claim Constantinople and to 
achieve Balkan supremacy, which closely paralleled traditional Papal fears regarding the 
Orthodox Church creating an “Orthodox St. Peter’s.”41  
Bourassa’s claims may seem exaggerated given what historians now know about the 
fate of Russia’s imperial ambitions but explaining the war as a titanic struggle between 
German and Slavic peoples must be understood in the context of the previous decades of 
European history. Since the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the Balkans had been the centre 
of conflict between Russia, Austria, the Ottomans, and the smaller Balkan nations. Indeed, the 
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First and Second Balkan Wars had been fought in 1912 and 1913. To a contemporary and 
informed observer of European affairs, such as Bourassa, solving the “Balkans problem” would 
have to be one of the final results of the bloodshed on European battlefields. The entire conflict 
had begun there and Bourassa argued that it would end there as well. He wrote, 
Si la guerre se prolonge, si toute chance de paix est écartée, si des millions 
d’Anglais, de Français, de Canadiens continuent à périr dans les tranchées ou 
survivent mutilés, ce sera principalement parce que la Russie n’a pas encore 
atteint son objectif suprême: la prise de Constantinople.42 
The seizure of Constantinople would finish the war in the East and bring about a Russian 
victory, an outcome Bourassa found problematic. In his assessment, Russia was by far the least 
democratic of the Great Powers (though their autocratic ruler would be gone a few short 
months later), but it was also the lynchpin of Allied victory. As long as Russia was in the war, 
Germany was locked into a two-front battle. Still, he mocked Britain and France for supporting 
an ally so obviously not interested in liberty, civilization or progress. To him, the alliance with 
Czarist Russia was difficult to reconcile with Allied claims of fighting for democracy against 
the German Kaiser. As long as Russian success remained an important part of Allied 
objectives, their war effort would be tainted and peace would depend on victory in the East as 
much as the West. For Canadians, such a victory had little value. 
Above all, Bourassa noted, the inability of the belligerent nations to end the war would 
have a terrible cost for Canada. Fighting in Europe meant the death of tens of thousands 
Canadians; ending the war would mean tens of thousands saved. His simplest observation was 
perhaps the most valid. If the war was solely about saving lives, then it would be over within a 
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day. Clearly, this was not the case. He wrote in his final line that “les peuples sanglants, 
mutilés, épuisés, finiront par l’entendre.”43 His words were an ominous prediction reminding 
readers that the obstacles to peace were too great for the moment. That might change in the 
future, albeit with disastrous results. Bourassa believed the prolongation of the conflict 
promised far more catastrophic consequences than a compromised peace. He worried that 
Canadians, and all the people of the belligerent nations, would be too slow in recognizing that 
fact. 
The article struck at the centre of the myth of the Allied war effort and at the hearts of 
many patriotic Canadians. Portraying the war as a political and economic manoeuvre was 
especially challenging to zealous patriots who claimed moral superiority over their enemies. If 
Britain fought for wealth and power, and not for civilization and liberty, then it was perhaps not 
worth the increasing cost. This view of the international system differed from that portrayed in 
the rest of the Canadian press. Drawing on earlier articles he had written,44 Bourassa depicted 
the war for a scrap of paper and Belgian security as a means to an end, a solution to the 
problem of rising German dominance that had threatened the British Empire for the last two 
decades. Belgium, Poland, Serbia, Romania and Greece were all victims of “l’ambition et [les] 
infâmes calculs de leurs grands voisins, manipulateurs sans scrupules de ‘l’équilibre 
européen.’”45 The primary tenet of the international system that had maintained relative peace 
across the continent since the Vienna Congress of 1815 had been the preservation of this 
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“balance of power.” The corruption of that balance by the great powers in the twentieth century 
resulted in more than just the outbreak of the First World War. Bourassa inferred that the 
system, which had once assured the continuance of European peace, now assured the 
continuance of war. The Germans were intent on influencing the small powers of Europe and 
were intent on seeing the scales tip in their favour, while the British and the French were 
determined to see the opposite. Neither of the Great Power alliances wanted to see the other 
benefit from the war’s end. Germany’s proposal, a gauntlet thrown when the balance was so 
tenuously in its favour, could not and would not be accepted. 
Closely following the German peace proposal was a “peace note” released by President 
Wilson on 18 December 1916. Wilson’s refusal to enter the war hinged on a continuing belief 
that he could mediate a peace between the belligerents, as well as having a “manifest duty” to 
maintain a detachment from European affairs.46 Wilson, who ran as the man who had “kept 
America out of the war,” wanted nothing more than to mediate the conflict but had to be 
circumspect before the election so as to not alienate voters. Pacifist organizations within the 
United States had been asking Wilson to mediate since the war’s beginning, and after defeating 
Hughes in November 1916, he was finally ready to launch his initiative.47 His “peace note” 
was not a peace proposal. It suggested that the powers involved in the conflict declare their war 
aims. He proposed that this would allow neutral nations to understand better when and how the 
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war would end.48 Arriving on the heels of the German offer, Wilson made it clear that his note 
neither was a response to it nor connected to it in any way.49 It represented the call of a neutral 
nation to the warring ones: a call not for peace, but for clarity. 
Bourassa deconstructed Wilson’s note in the same manner as the German proposal. In 
an article titled “Espoirs de Paix” in the 27 December 1916 issue of Le Devoir, he discussed 
the significance of the note while echoing many similar themes from the previous weeks.50 He 
outlined three important facts: “la valeur intrinsèque de la note du président; l’accueil favorable 
qu’elle reçoit dans les milieux favorables à la paix, neutres ou belligérants [et] l’opposition 
violente que lui suscitent les démagogues, les jingos, et les profiteurs du massacre.”51 Each of 
these points explored the reaction to Wilson’s peace note and reinforced Bourassa’s personal 
appraisal of the situation. The American President did not compromise his neutrality.  Instead, 
he asked both the Allied and Central powers to present their goals for the war and let the world 
judge them impartially. Wilson was “la voix du chef de la plus grande des nations neutres” who 
among them had “la plus haute autorité morale du monde.”52  
Bourassa argued that the best possibility for peace lay not with the belligerent nations, 
but with neutral intermediaries, such as Switzerland, Holland and the Scandinavian countries -- 
those best positioned to understand the horrors of war inflicted upon their neighbours. He 
believed that this granted them the moral influence and opportunity to mediate the conflict. 
Bourassa assumed that Wilson’s call for a statement of war aims meant the mobilization of 
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these neutral powers and the prospect of ending the war. Bourassa had previously set out the 
logic behind the self-interest of governments and their reasons for wanting the war to continue. 
Now he argued that it was in the best interests of the neutral nations that it ended. It was up to 
them to represent the “intérêt général de l’humanité.”53 Bourassa split the political scene into 
its logical power blocs; separating the interests of the Allies, the Central Powers and the rest of 
the world. While those at war sought an end through victory, the neutral powers alone sought 
an end through negotiation.  
In Bourassa’s eyes, the attack by ardent supporters of the war against those who wished 
for peace exposed their duplicity as they further abandoned the pretence of a just war. 
Bourassa’s arguments spiral close to the ridiculous as he accused the “vampires” of each nation 
of paying others to support it and terrorizing any who did not agree.54 After first insisting that 
the American government give a material advantage to the Allies in the name of democracy 
and liberty, “les vampires d’outre-mer lui font maintenant un crime de vouloir mettre fin au 
conflit, source de profits inouïs pour son propre pays.”55 Bourassa argued again that the war 
was about profit and that peace was unattainable as long as corporate and political interests 
suffered little but gained much. Peace offered justice and alone offered “aux nations en guerre 
une chance de sortir honorablement du conflit avant leur total épuisement.”56 He reiterated the 
notion that the war would destroy its participants if not stopped immediately. With so much at 
stake, Bourassa wondered how the Allies could think of continuing to fight; even a major 
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defeat was better than total annihilation. Quoting at length from the liberal Manchester 
Guardian, he stated that many Britons were against the war, but their opinion was 
“malheureusement peu exprimée” and when it was expressed, “ses interprètes sont isolés, 
impuissants, traqués et dénoncés comme traîtres.”57 As a result, the dominant view became the 
only view.  
Bourassa’s religiosity infused his international political analysis with a moral attitude 
and supreme confidence.58 For example, the conclusion to his article on the peace invoked the 
moral superiority of Pope Benedict XV. The war would not conclude until the aggressors 
accepted “les obligatoires et nécessaires sacrifices d’amour-propre et d’intérêts particuliers” 
and that the peace must not benefit “à une seule des parties, mais à toutes.” “Plus que jamais,” 
he continued, “[nous avons] le devoir de prier pour que la paix rétablisse.”59 Bourassa’s 
assurance that he spoke of higher truths translated into a ferocious writing style and evocative 
imagery that emerged, particularly when discussing Pope Benedict XV’s comments on 
international affairs. 
Yet at times Bourassa’s prose appeared out of touch with the reality of a nation at war. 
His deeply held beliefs left little room for compromise; just as with the “jingoists,” his was a 
world of black and white. You agreed with Bourassa or you were his enemy. It is little wonder 
that English Canada vilified him. After all, he called the most devoted of war supporters hate-
mongers possessing short-sighted minds who, if they could, would have God himself in their 
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armies.60 These were the men and women of Toronto, or Winnipeg, or Victoria. These were his 
fellow Canadians. Bourassa’s anger may have been justified to him, so fiercely did he hold his 
own opinions, but he did not earn himself many friends with it. Neither side was willing to 
admit the other could be correct. The legitimacy of his analyses of these peace proposals, as 
insightful as they may have been, often suffered from the anger they revealed. For a man 
supposedly trying to encourage peace, his tone was decidedly belligerent. 
Despite the lack of response among Canada’s political leaders to his arguments and 
perhaps because of the failure of a possible peace to emerge from the December discussions, 
Bourassa continued vigorously dissecting the Canadian and international war effort. In 1917, as 
Germany restarted unrestricted submarine warfare and the United States swung towards the 
side of the Allies, Bourassa once again chose to discuss the world could secure a lasting peace. 
From 17 to 24 February, he wrote a series of articles to Prime Minister Robert Borden, who 
had left for London on 12 February to attend the Imperial War Cabinet.61 In his Speech from 
the Throne, Borden had declared that the British War Cabinet would consider “urgent questions 
affecting the prosecution of the war, the possible conditions on which the Allies Nations could 
assent to its termination, and the problems which would them immediately arise.”62 While 
Borden was travelling (he only arrived on the 23rd), Bourassa thought it was important to 
suggest how the Prime Minister should deal with these questions since the members of 
Parliament had forgone offering any critical perspective. Instead, Parliament had resorted to 
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“les phrases creuses et stéréotypées qui trainent partout depuis deux ans et demi.”63 Bourassa 
advised that Borden should remember all those affected by the conditions of peace discussed 
among the Empire’s representatives, which included the belligerent nations, the nations of the 
British Empire, and the people of the world. 
What followed echoed much of Bourassa’s previous writings, though this time his tone 
was demure. His vision of the peace was guided by the war supporters themselves, implying 
that the peace must be based on the same ideals as the war. If Canadians were fighting and 
dying in a war to free oppressed peoples, to make the world more peaceful, and to safeguard 
democracy while erasing militarism, then the peace forged by it should take a similar shape.  
Bourassa wrote that the Allies should avoid demanding territorial and monetary 
compensation from the Central Powers as terms of peace. Canada and most of the Allied 
nations had not yet taken any enemy soil, so demands that adjusted European borders should 
be raised cautiously. As well, the current war was bankrupting all of the participants -- what 
money was there left to demand?64 It was unlikely that Canada would receive any money, so 
Borden should not press for financial compensation from the peace. Demanding German 
colonies was an equally foolhardy endeavour. Again, Bourassa highlighted the absence of any 
benefit for Canada. Annexed territory would belong to the Empire, certainly not to any of its 
Dominions. Besides, he added, German colonists would only represent yet another group of 
British subjects that would require assimilation. If Germany lost their colonies, he reasoned, its 
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emigrants would travel to foreign countries seeking better conditions. Would they come to 
Canada or the United States seeking better lives, as so many already had? That had not worked 
out in their favour Bourassa asserted. German-Americans had demonstrated their influence on 
American affairs in the election when Wilson feared offending them, but in Canada “les camps 
de concentrations, les émeutes de Berlin-Kitchener témoignent que, chez ces ‘excellents 
Canadiens’, la voix du sang n’est pas éteinte.”65 If Borden truly wanted to see a lasting peace, 
he would temper the “ambition impériale du junkerism prussien,” but not the “expansion 
coloniale du peuple allemand.”66 Only then would the peace be beneficial to Canada and avoid 
another war. Any end to the war, Bourassa implied, could not be simply a matter of 
compensating the damage done to the victorious coalition. It had to consider the long term and 
future international disputes that might again cause a European war or turmoil.  
The principle of free national expression, which demanded the defence of Belgium in 
August 1914, was worth defending in the war’s aftermath. There were two ways of envisioning 
European nationalism. The first stemmed from the natural rights and history of a people. Each 
group of people could possess the “éléments essentiels” of nationalism: territory, government, 
laws, and social organisation. With them they should be given the right to independence.67 The 
second, “le vrai principe des nationalités” according to Bourassa, was the application of God’s 
eternal moral principle to international affairs: “Ne faites pas à autrui ce que vous ne voulez 
                                                 
65 Henri Bourassa, “Sir Robert Borden et les Conditions de Paix: Indemnités de guerre – Colonies allemandes,” Le 
Devoir, 17 February 1917, 1. 
66 Henri Bourassa, “Sir Robert Borden et les Conditions de Paix: Indemnités de guerre – Colonies allemandes,” Le 
Devoir, 17 February 1917, 1. 
67 Henri Bourassa, “Sir Robert Borden et les Conditions de Paix II: L’affranchissement des peuples,” Le Devoir, 
19 February, 1917, 1. 
204 
 
 
 
pas qui vois soit fait à vous-mêmes.”68 Bourassa explained to his readers that the Sovereign 
Pontiff had already outlined how to consider freedom and nationalities. He quoted Pope 
Benedict XV’s letter of 28 July 1915, on the first anniversary of the outbreak of war, which 
clearly outlined the proper behaviour between nations, when the Pope had asked: “Why not 
from this moment weigh with serene mind the rights and lawful aspirations of the peoples? ... 
The equilibrium of the world, and the prosperity and assured tranquillity of nations rest upon 
mutual benevolence and respect for the rights and the dignity of others.”69 This affirmed that 
national aspirations were a worthwhile cause for Bourassa and Borden alike, and reasserted the 
authority of Rome and the word of God to guide human affairs. Bourassa was quick to point 
out who ignored this wise council: the supporters of total war against Germany were more 
interested in imposing their social ideas, their government and their “superior civilization” on 
others. There was no guarantee that triumphant Anglo-French democracies, which Bourassa 
saw as a mixture of egalitarianism and plutocratic mercantilism, would be better than Prussian 
militarism.70 The only peace worth pursuing had to follow the true principles of national 
expression. That meant freedom not only for the peoples of the Central Powers, like Belgium, 
Serbia or Montenegro, but also for those of the Allies, like Ireland, Poland, and Finland. The 
peace had to be all or nothing, Bourassa told Borden, or it would not be worth the lives 
sacrificed for it. 
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Bourassa then highlighted his fears for the future of the international system, using the 
familiar example of Russia’s desire to control Constantinople to explain the war’s 
prolongation. He repeated the claim to Borden in his next article, reminding the Canadian 
leader that the conflict meant to secure Russian control of the Dardanelles. “En vertu de quel 
principe de droit ou de morale internationale,” Bourassa asked, “faut-il que les Canadiens 
versent leur sang et leur argent, afin de permettre à la Russie de s’installer à Constantinople?”71 
None, he answered. Instead, the decision to support Russian expansion maintained the Entente 
alliance’s cohesion against the Central Powers. A fairer plan would impose “absolute 
neutrality” on the Bosporus straits and grant control to Greece, which had a better historical 
basis for ownership than Russia. Such a plan was impossible Bourassa wrote, quoting 17th 
century French poet Lafontaine to underscore his point: “que de tout temps / Les petits ont pâti 
des sottises des grands.”72 In a line, Bourassa revealed his inquietude about the war’s impact on 
the international system: the weak always suffered at the hands of the powerful. 
The Allies had no moral high ground, or at least could not claim they were building a 
better world than the one wrought by German victory. Imperial ambitions would not disappear 
at war’s end, and Russia was as likely to compete against Britain and France for control of the 
world as Germany had before 1914. Japan also had a precarious position in the alliance. Japan 
and Russia both had interests in Asian expansion and after the war, Bourassa believed, they 
would come into conflict again as they had in 1905. Prime Minister Borden, if he truly 
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represented Canadian interests, should enquire as to the British position on the future of Asia 
and the Pacific.73 If Canada was inexorably linked to British interests, it at least deserved to be 
informed about those interests. Of course, Bourassa chided, such questions might be 
considered too close to the “hérésie u-ti-li-ta-ris-te[sic],” an approach Canadian policy had 
studiously avoided.74 
Borden’s dominant argument raised to justify the Canadian war effort, and perhaps the 
most compelling, was to champion British democracy against Prussian militarism. Bourassa 
urged Borden to consider fully the validity of such justifications, translating a quote from Sir 
Edward Grey. In October 1916, Grey’s speech on “Why Britain is in the War” stated that “we 
shall fight until we have established [for all States]... free development under equal conditions, 
and each in accordance with its own genius.”75 Grey, along with many of the war’s supporters, 
repeatedly argued that they were fighting to preserve some sort of independent democratic 
character for the nations of Europe. Who was to say that democracy was so much better than 
anything else? Democracy, Bourassa emphasized, had initiated invaluable economic and social 
reforms while stopping the inherent abuse of monarchies, but it had also “engendré des maux 
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et des abus” of its own.76 Further, Bourassa asked, what sort of democracy should the victors 
impose upon the defeated nations? Should it be the democracy of France? England? Italy? Or 
the democracy forming in Russia after the Tsar devolved power to the Duma (parliament)? 
Besides he added, democracy was subverted the moment some of the Allied nations had 
entered the war, because their parliaments or people had not approved their foreign policy.77 If 
they were fighting to preserve democracy and replace “autocratic” Europe, they should take a 
closer look at their own understanding of it. 
If Borden did manage to secure the peace that Bourassa envisaged, it would be 
meaningless if another war broke out in the future. The Allies’ goal must not be only to end the 
current war, but to create an international system that avoided future wars. Even if Europe 
liberated oppressed nations, resisted imperialist pressure, rejected the alliance system and 
preserved the freedom of the seas, the continent could still retread the road to war if militarism 
remained a viable ideology. Bourassa ridiculed the Roman axiom, si vis pacem para bellum; if 
you want peace, prepare for war. Of all maxims, he wrote, none were “plus mensongère que 
celle-là, de si contraire à la raison, au simple bon sens, à la réalité des faits.” “Les préparatifs 
de guerre mènent la guerre,” he continued and advised Borden that “si l’on veut établir la paix, 
il faut travailler pour la paix.”78 It was the work of all nations of the world. Surely, not just 
Prussian militarism had caused the crises of Tunisia and Morocco, or wars in Afghanistan and 
the Sudan, or the conflict between Russia and Japan.  
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Militarism was not just about the number of guns or dreadnoughts or soldiers. To 
Bourassa the greatest threat of militarism was the mindset that led nations to believe they 
required larger and larger armies. Armies were necessary – if only to defend against other 
nations – but their continual expansion was not. According to Bourassa, the “war-mongers” 
sought to exclusively focus on Prussian militarism, for if all militarism was rejected they would 
lose the source of their “odieux profits.”79 The only way Borden could truly establish a lasting 
peace was to advocate for the real solution to war: abolishing militarism. 
Accordingly, Bourassa insisted that the peace must address pervasive militarism. The 
journalist raised the arguments from an American publication, Basis for a Durable Peace, 
written by future Nobel laureate and President of Columbia University Nicholas Murray Butler 
(under the pseudonym “Cosmos”).80 Butler wrote that “one way in which Prussian militarism 
might emerge victorious ... [was] if the spirit and policies of Prussian militarism should 
conquer the mind of Great Britain or that of any other allied Power.”81 Bourassa returned to the 
argument he had made almost a year prior in Aujourd’hui, Hier, Demain, highlighting the 
potential for Canada to be “conquered” as Butler feared. It seemed to Bourassa that soldiers 
had already become a separate caste of Canadian society who were treated differently by its 
citizens and its laws. He perceived this as a sure sign of the rising influence of militarism over 
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the last two years of war. Prime Minister Borden should “promettre de défaire à peu près tout 
ce que [militarisme a] fait ici” and denounce British “navalism” if he truly sought an end to the 
brand of militarism in Germany and which, in theory, was one of the primary justifications for 
the war effort.82 The victorious Allies ought to impose the same principles of peace, which 
demanded the fight against militarism, not just in a defeated Germany, but also in Russia, 
France, Britain or Canada.  
In this somewhat cynical mood, Bourassa witnessed the progression towards the 
American entry into the war. The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in January 
1917 made American intervention increasingly likely, while the publication of the 
Zimmermann telegram in the US press on 1 March shocked the American public. Named after 
the German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Arthur Zimmermann, Germany sent the 
telegram to the German Ambassador in Mexico promising that if Mexico allied with Germany, 
Germany would transfer American territory to them if the United States entered the war. As 
Justus Doenecke argues, previous concerns over the nation’s dignity and rights were abstract 
concepts to the American Republic - but Germany promising entire states to Mexico (a foreign 
power invaded by the Americans year before) suddenly gave the Great War new relevance.83 
Nonetheless, President Wilson’s 5 March inauguration speech revealed his continued 
commitment to the “principles of a liberated mankind” that the United States stood for 
“whether in war or in peace.” Wilson listed the positions that defined America’s view of the 
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world, including the equality of nations; that no peace could rest upon an “armed balance of 
power;” that government power derived from those they governed; the freedom of the seas; 
and the limitation of armaments.84  
On 6 April 1917, the United States entered the war on the side of the Allied Powers. It 
was an extraordinary turn for a country that had been trying to act as mediator a mere four 
months earlier. Though Bourassa did not want to see the United States go to war, he argued that 
at least they fought the war on a solid moral foundation. Canada could claim no such 
justification for its role in the conflict. “C’est tellement plus facile et plus profitable,” Bourassa 
wrote of his own nation, “de suivre à l’aveugle et de hurler avec les loups.”85 In his view, the 
Americans went to war for rational reasons. The Germans left them no other choice. Secretary 
of State Robert Lansing had pointed out the tenuous nature of the American position in 
December 1916 after Wilson’s peace note.  He announced that “the sending of this Note will 
indicate the possibility of our being forced into the War. That possibility ought to serve as a 
restraining and sobering force safe-guarding American rights.” The Americans were well aware 
of the probability of renewed German submarine attacks and had offered mediation alongside 
the ultimatum that, if mediation failed, the United States would go to war.86 In turn, the 
Germans had threatened American territory in their message to Mexico. Canada, Bourassa 
lamented, did not share the same clarity in their war effort. 
A month after the American declaration of war, Bourassa returned to the subject of the 
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American intervention. From 7 May to 19 May he outlined his view of the “extraordinaire 
évolution” of American sentiments and international policy.87 Bourassa described the difficulty 
of the United States choosing one European coalition over another and painted a picture of the 
American sentiment towards the conflict. As President Wilson had noted in his second 
inaugural address, “We are of the blood of all the nations that are at war.”88 In July and August 
1914, the United States was as close to Germany as it was to the Allied nations. American 
suspicion of Britain still lingered while autocratic Russia remained an unlikely partner. France, 
according to Bourassa, was in the middle. The Franco-Americans of New England and 
Louisiana supported it, but its Catholics did not trust the republican anticlerical state.89 
Neutrality was the natural result of preferring neither side in a conflict.  
Bourassa outlined his timeline of the American transition from neutrality to war, tracing 
the tide of American public opinion turned against the Germans as the war intensified. The 
violation of Belgian neutrality and France’s heroic defence endeared the Allies to the American 
people. The British blockade pushed Germany towards submarine warfare, which devastated 
shipping and emphasized German brutality to the public. At the same time, Bourassa claimed, 
newspaper barons like J.P. Morgan organised press campaigns that pushed the American people 
further into the Allied camp.90 After the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915, American 
attitudes went against the Central Powers. When the champion of American neutrality, 
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Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, resigned a month later, war seemed a likely 
prospect. Then German renunciation of unrestricted submarine warfare allayed American fears 
and helped prevent their intervention that summer.91 The next year, the presidential election of 
1916 seemed to indicate the desire of the American people to avoid war as they re-elected 
Woodrow Wilson, who had “kept them out of the war.” 
In that moment, Bourassa claimed, the possibility of American intervention was 
uncertain. A “groupe de financiers anglo-américains” required an American declaration of war 
and began actively influencing American policy. They had lent hundreds of millions of dollars 
to the Entente powers that were in danger of defaulting. Only by lifting the embargo against the 
Allied nations and allowing the financiers to use foreign goods as guarantees could their dire 
situation be resolved. In November 1916, when the United States seemed firmly opposed to 
intervention, the financiers began a campaign in the newspapers that they controlled, appealing 
to American sentimentality on the necessity of joining the war against Germany -- all designed, 
Bourassa alleged, to preserve their fortunes and the British economy.92 Wilson’s appeal for the 
conditions of a peace and his own attempts to outline an American vision of “peace without 
victory” were part of the process of clarifying the terms and objectives of an American war 
effort. Wilson had honestly tried to avoid war, but Bourassa believed he had no other option. 
“Rarement,” he wrote, “un chef d’État a montré un tel souci de ses responsabilités, une 
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prévision si grande des conséquences de ses actes.”93 The final push occurred in early 1917, 
when the February Russian revolution tempered the Tsar’s powers and introduced democratic 
government, an important step for the fiercely republican Americans. Now the Allies could 
present a united front against the autocracies of the German, Austrian and Ottoman Empires.94 
Next Bourassa examined the motive and mode of American intervention in the war. 
There was a variety of public opinion shaping discourse in the American nation, and Bourassa 
chose to look at President Wilson alone rather than the diverse collection of sentiments 
expressed by the American people. Bourassa saw much to admire in Wilson’s “peace 
program,” but was unsure about its translation into a “war program.”95 The journalist wondered 
if Wilson could still achieve “peace without victory” now that the United States had entered the 
war. Wilson distinguished his position as a peacetime observer by his ability to separate the 
required conditions and desirable conditions of peace. He recognized the required conditions 
for a lasting peace, such as freedom of the seas and the democratization of governments, while 
other national concerns, like settling territorial disputes in Alsace Lorraine, were simply 
desirable conditions for it. Wilson’s goals had changed after the American intervention as he 
was constrained by the conditions of peace that he could expect his new allies and the Central 
Powers to accept, and not those conditions he hoped to see.96 The President, Bourassa noted, 
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desired to address the underlying causes of the war, rather than right specifics wrongs for one 
side or another. It remained to be seen if Wilson could achieve his goals while also fulfilling 
his new allies’ war aims. 
As to the mode of American intervention, Bourassa saw the war effort he had 
demanded for Canada since the war’s beginning. He hoped that the Americans would learn 
harsh lessons from the previous two and a half years of Allied blunders. Already Congress had 
begun passing legislation to better organize national resources for the war effort, while 
Bourassa observed his own country bankrupt itself “pour aider la mère-patrie.”97 American 
conscription was reasonable and restrained, befitting a nation that had to “catch-up.” In 
Canada, Bourassa wrote, “c’est le triomphe du militarisme sous sa forme la plus dangereuse et 
la plus bête.” In the United States, “c’est l’assujettissement de l’organisation militaire aux 
intérêts suprêmes de la nation”98  
Bourassa was unfair to Canada, which had entered the war at least as unprepared as the 
Americans in 1917 (if not more so). His ongoing critique of Canadian militarism had focused 
on legislation and measures intended to secure an adequate Canadian war effort under the 
pressures of time and manpower. Yet Bourassa’s preliminary comparison between two similar 
circumstances found Canada wanting. 
One worrisome aspect of the American war effort was the speed at which it aligned 
itself with the Allied Powers. Bourassa noted that its government and financial elite were 
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firmly on side with Britain and France as soon as war was declared. Of the two, France might 
be more popular Bourassa wrote, but Britain shaped the American war effort.99 From a 
nationaliste perspective, he knew the dangers of Britain’s friendship. He quoted Lafontaine’s 
translation of the Aesop fable, the Lion’s Share. In it, the powerful lion was hunting with the 
fox, the jackal and a wolf. They kill a stag and argue about how to split the spoils of their hunt, 
but the lion decides as the most powerful that all of it would be his. “Ce droit,” Bourassa 
quoted, “c’est le droit du plus fort.”100 The United States ought to be careful of its new ally and 
its interests that might conflict with their own. The cultural and economic ties between 
American and Britain were nothing new, but their partnership now shaped the future of the 
Allied war effort and the world. Their decisions affected everyone, including Canada -- for 
better or for worse. 
Finally, Bourassa theorized about the potential result of American intervention in the 
war. He reminded his readers that he now entered into the realm of conjecture. American 
soldiers could help shorten or prolong the war, depending on the evolving situation in Russia, 
the army strength and domestic situation of Germany, and the performance of the global 
economy. A German victory on the eastern front would prolong the war while a defeat there 
would shorten it considerably. Otherwise, it might push Germany and Austria towards their 
own revolutions, in which case President Wilson might demand that these new democracies be 
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recognized as new nations. Then Wilson would achieve his vaunted “peace without victory.” 
Regardless of the war’s outcome, the global economic upheaval as nations’ economies shifted 
to war production and accrued billions of dollars of debt and their subsequent shift back to 
peacetime might make any benefit to the American entry pointless. The war had impoverished 
the warring nations, and now the United States, the last unaffected bastion of the global 
economy, had joined their ranks.101  
The clearest consequence of American entry was that yet another nation had fallen 
victim to militarism. It was probable that the American intervention was beneficial, but war 
was a dangerous affair. Bourassa pointed to the Russian Revolution in February as 
demonstrative of how completely social order could dissolve under the pressures of wartime, 
and warned that any nation at war could suffer the same fate. “Revolution,” Bourassa wrote, 
“c’est tout; c’est tout l’ordre social menacé, c’est le chancre qui dévore l’Europe et le 
monde.”102 
Bourassa was referencing the work of Donoso Cortés, a Spanish-born Catholic 
diplomat and philosopher who had written Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism in 
the shadow of the 1848 revolutions. Once a liberal, Cortés had renounced his views and 
published a long series of devotional tracts praising the Catholic Church. He was an anti-liberal 
Catholic, who posited that when religion was subordinated to the political realm, society and 
governance inevitably slid towards revolution, atheism, and chaos.103   
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As a friend of another of Bourassa’s intellectual inspirations, the ultramontane writer 
Louis Veuillot, it is no surprise that Bourassa had read Cortés works.104 Historian Brian Fox 
summarized Cortés’s view of mid-19th century European politics and reveals why Bourassa 
would have found his writing compelling: “Authority was the moral voice of society and its 
amalgam of localized points of liberty embedded in various corporate institutions – the primary 
authority was the Catholic Church.”105  Cortés understood the world much like Bourassa did, 
though the French Canadian imagined the fusion of British liberalism and Catholicism worked 
so long as the Catholic Church could control the expression of that liberalism. Ultimately, 
Cortés’ 19th century thought encapsulated Bourassa’s own fears of revolution. Cortés 
counselled that “there [was] no revolution which [did] not involve for society a danger of 
death,” or his warning that 
to such a degree is it necessary that all things be in perfect order, that man, though 
turning everything into disorder, cannot conceive disorder; every revolution, 
when destroying ancient institutions, rejects them as absurd and injurious; and 
when substituting others of individual invention, says they constitute excellent 
order.106 
In his final analysis of the American intervention in the European war, Bourassa saw 
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much of the same dangers that Cortés had discussed in the aftermath of 1848. Societies were 
not so easily made and remade to the beholder’s vision.  Social authority depended upon 
society’s belief in it. If the United States wanted to remake the society of nations, they would 
have to imbue that new system with authority to prevent future wars. It was a dangerous 
gamble.  For an ultramontane Catholic, any refashioning of social order was hazardous. 
Bourassa only hoped that the new international society be baptized in “les eaux de l’éternelle 
vérité et de l’inaltérable justice [et] les accords internationaux.”107  As Bourassa had argued 
through the winter of 1916-17, Papal authority could provide the necessary bulwark for a new 
international system devoted to peace.   
With those hopes and fears in mind, Bourassa turned his critical eye back to Canada. 
The government introduced conscription legislation that May and the coming months would 
throw Bourassa once more back into fierce debates over the meaning of patriotism, nationalism 
and Canada. 
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Chapter 6: La Muraille de Duperie (Spring-July 1917) 
 
In late July 1917, the House of Commons was finishing its debate over conscription 
legislation. It was the epitome of Bourassa’s fears about the war. He saw little of value in 
Canadian politicians’ long debate: even the words of Liberal leader Wilfrid Laurier who 
opposed it seemed empty. Laurier’s final words before the Military Service Act passed on 24 
July 1917, called for moderation: 
I oppose this Bill because it has in it the seeds of discord and disunion; because 
it is an obstacle and a bar to that union of heart and soul without which it is 
impossible to hope that this Confederation will attain the aims and ends that were 
had in view when Confederation was effected. Sir, all my life I have fought 
coercion; all my life I have promoted union; and the inspiration that led me to that 
course shall be my guide at all times so long as there is a breath left in my body.1 
When it did pass 119 to 55, the vote split between French and English speaking Members of 
Parliament. Only five French speakers voted for the bill: two Cabinet ministers, one MP from 
Saskatchewan, one from New Brunswick, and the former Speaker of the House.2 Laurier had 
made his stand alongside the other French Canadians against the imposition of conscription by 
an English Canadian majority. For the first time in many years Laurier and Bourassa shared a 
position, though for different reasons. Laurier believed that conscription was unpopular among 
Canadians and was concerned for the future political fortunes of his party, while Bourassa 
rejected any military service in a war fought for Empire and not Canada. Both believed that the 
passing of the bill had divided Canada for the worse. 
Protestors held anti-conscription meetings across the province in late July and August 
and some spilled over into violent riots. The atmosphere in Quebec was tense. Early in the 
                                                 
1 Wilfrid Laurier, House of Commons Debates, 12th Parliament, 7th Session, vol. 4, 24 July, 1917, 3729. 
2 J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada, (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1977) 69. 
220 
 
morning of 9 August, an explosion rocked the Montreal suburb of Cartierville. The summer 
residence of the newly minted Baron Atholstan, Hugh Graham, had been dynamited. Graham 
was the owner of Montreal’s largest English language newspaper, the Montreal Star, and an 
outspoken and prominent advocate of imperialism, the Canadian war effort and conscription. In 
May 1917, he received a peerage for his “extraordinary initiative and zeal in promoting and 
supporting measures for safeguarding Imperial interests.”3 After an investigation, authorities 
discovered that masked men had stolen dynamite from a local quarry. Eventually the police 
arrested a group of men who and tried them for the crime. All were associated with anti-
conscription agitation. Their trial revealed their motivation as, in the words of Castell Hopkins, 
“partly fanaticism evoked by superheated politics, partly the real criminality of desperate 
characters.”4 Bourassa, no friend of Hugh Graham or his newspaper, was appalled. 
In an 11 August article, he condemned the culprits and denounced violent action in 
reaction to conscription. Violence only weakened the legitimacy of conscription’s opponents. 
Those who used conscription as a pretense for extremism were no better than those who sought 
to impose conscription on Quebec. The only successful way to oppose this “mesure 
tyrannique,” Bourassa advised, was if all of its opponents were able to meet on a common 
ground. Violent action excluded anyone who believed in law and order.5 He scolded the most 
virulent leaders of the meetings, noting that conscription was not solely a measure aimed at 
French Canadians. There were two enemies of French Canada, those who “se sont appliqués 
systématiquement à boucher les yeux et oreilles du peuple” while preaching “servilisme abject 
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et un loyalisme outrancier,” and those who sought to avoid the consequence of the first groups’ 
faulty doctrine by “l’émeute, le meurtre et les déprédations.”6 Servility led to revolt, but only 
by opposing the first could they denounce the second. The symptoms should not be confused 
with the disease.  
Bourassa concluded with a discussion about the value of passive resistance. Was the 
law terrible enough to justify defying it? Many laws were odious or unpopular, but that alone 
did not mean they ought to be disobeyed. “Pour ma part,” he told his readers, “je ne prendrai 
jamais la responsabilité de conseiller la résistance passive à la loi de conscription: et ceux qui 
n’ont pas ce scrupule ont le strict devoir d’en faire envisager toutes les conséquences.”7 
Conscripts were soldiers and, if they disobeyed their orders, they could face the death penalty. 
The only legitimate resistance to militarism and military service was the rejection of the amoral 
means to achieve their goals: violence. French Canadians, Bourassa proclaimed, would not be 
complicit with the agents who sought to deceive them, nor the demagogues who sought to 
incite them.8  
The long debate over conscription revealed to Bourassa how pervasive militarism had 
become in Canada. It affected even those opposed to it, as violence begot violence. Throughout 
the months-long public deliberation, Bourassa remained convinced that it would have greater 
repercussions beyond forced military service.  The pressure of the war was drastically changing 
Canada and its people. 
* * * 
There had been calls for conscription in Canada throughout the war, but they reached a 
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fever pitch after Prime Minister Borden doubled the size of the Canadian army in January 1916 
from 250,000 to 500,000 soldiers. Faced with faltering enlistments, the Borden government 
established the National Service League to bolster recruitment in April 1916. Those in favour 
of registration often suggested conscription as another form of increasing enlistment, but 
Borden and his Ministers repeatedly stated that conscription would never come to pass in 
Canada.9 By the end of 1916, the National Service League sent out cards to Canadians eligible 
for service asking them to register. 10 The government hoped that this would encourage 
enlistment, but in December Borden refused to rule it out and privately had doubts about 
sustaining the Canadian forces at its current strength with diminishing recruits.11 By March, the 
government proposed an alternative to conscription and Minister of Militia Edward Kemp 
(who had replaced Sam Hughes in November 1916) launched a campaign to raise 50,000 men 
for Home Defence. These soldiers were stationed home in Canada as a means of encouraging 
enlistment without the threat of seeing battle. The government hoped that these men could 
eventually be convinced to go overseas.12 
Prime Minister Borden was not in Canada in the months before he introduced 
conscription. He had left to meet with British officials in February 1917. On 26 December 
1916, Borden had received an invitation to join the Imperial War Cabinet made up of the 
British War Cabinet and representatives of the Dominions. Its goal was to allow the former 
colonies of the Empire to discuss the conduct of the war with Britain, ostensibly as equals, and 
                                                 
9 Castell Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1916, 320-324. Laurier was also vocally opposed to conscription, 
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12 Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 48-49. 
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it fulfilled the long held dream of Canadian imperialists to have an active voice in the Empire’s 
affairs. David Lloyd George replaced Herbert Asquith as Prime Minister of Great Britain in 
early December 1916, and he and Lord Milner -- the old imperialist from South Africa -- had 
decided to call together the Dominion Prime Ministers.13 Borden used the Imperial War 
Cabinet meetings from March to May 1917 to raise the issue of Dominion autonomy and, 
alongside South African General Jan Smuts, helped write Resolution IX. The now famous 
resolution asked to hold an Imperial Conference after hostilities to recognize the Dominions as 
fully “autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth” which had “an adequate voice in 
foreign policy and in foreign relations.” It guaranteed that Canada would gain its autonomy 
after the war and Borden’s biographer hails it as one of the Prime Minister’s proudest 
accomplishments.14 Borden returned home in May enthusiastic about Canada’s contributions to 
the war and its new role within the Empire.  
With Borden away meeting Britain’s highest officials and before the announcement of 
conscription, Bourassa anticipated its consequences for Canadians. Bourassa had warned of the 
perils of conscription throughout the war, and in March 1917 he considered whether National 
Registration and Home Defence recruitment would lead to conscription. “Aurons-nous la 
conscription?” he asked in Le Devoir on 26 March. Bourassa was uncertain, but he argued it 
did not matter. “La conscription ... ce n’est que le moyen extrême ... de racheter l’engagement 
                                                 
13 John Kendle assesses the influence of the Round Table movement in forming an Imperial War Cabinet, but 
concludes that the movement in fact desired to disseminate their ideas after the war and had not planned for 
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George, however, was that an executive body had emerged, amenable to his strategies, possessed of the 
authority to force them on recalcitrant British military establishment and which served, further, to drive a 
wedge between the generals and the leadership of the Unionist Party.” See Brock Millman, Pessimism and 
British War Policy, 1916-1918, (London: Frank Cass, 2001) 141.  
14 Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden: A Biography, Volume II: 1914-1937, (Toronto: MacMillan, 1980) 
80-81. 
224 
 
pris par le parlement tout entier de consacrer toutes les ressources du Canada au ‘salut’ de 
l’Empire.”15 Since the war’s beginning, he argued that Canada had effectively “conscripted” its 
resources to fight a war for Britain. The enormity of the war effort extended to all elements of 
Canadian society and conscription of manpower logically followed after committing every 
other national resources to the war. Both the Liberal and Conservative parties supported 
Canada’s contribution “sans limites et sans réserves,” perhaps epitomized in Arthur Meighen’s 
1914 proclamation that Canada would bankrupt itself for the Empire.16 The size and 
recruitment of the Canadian force had passed through Parliament without comment or debate, 
he reminded his readers. Borden had expanded the army to some 500,000 soldiers without 
resistance. Bourassa argued that since Borden had not consulted the Canadian people before 
committing more men, for all intent and purposes, an “impôt du sang” already levied on the 
Canadian people.17 No one mentioned conscription over the winter of 1916-17, but it seemed 
as if the proposed options could not meet the obligations proposed by Canada’s leaders, or 
fulfil the contribution their rhetoric demanded. 
Nor were political leaders alone in preparing the way for conscription, at least as far as 
Bourassa was concerned. The Quebec episcopate directed the province’s Catholics to support 
the war. For the first time in the country’s history, Bourassa noted, the Quebec bishops advised 
Canada to fight in a European war, but not for the defence of Canada. Its press organ, L’Action 
Catholique (renamed from L’Action Sociale in 1915), championed the war with extraordinary 
zeal, going so far as to argue that Canada had a legal and moral obligation to come to Britain’s 
                                                 
15 Henri Bourassa, “Aurons-nous la Conscription?,” Le Devoir, 26 March, 1917, 1. 
16 Bourassa first mentions this quote in Henri Bourassa, “Conscription et Banqueroute,” Le Devoir, 9 December, 
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17 Henri Bourassa, “Aurons-nous la Conscription?,” Le Devoir, 26 March, 1917, 1. 
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aid.18 The Bishops gave tacit acceptance of the imperialist justification for the war. It followed 
that if the religious authorities accepted the necessity of fighting the war, they would also 
accept any measure that achieved victory. Bourassa rebuked the episcopate’s decision and 
argued that Canada had reached the point where conscription was possible by virtue of their 
complicity. Conscription would come, he underlined again, because no one had opposed the 
ideas of militarism that made it acceptable to society.19 
Bourassa also disagreed with the tepid position of the Liberal Party against conscription 
but in favour of the war. They nominally opposed conscription, but if Canada did possess a 
moral or legal obligation to participate in the war, Bourassa continued, conscription was a 
legitimate policy. As long as the Canadian government sought and received the approval of 
Parliament, it had every right to compel military service as much as it had asked for voluntary 
service. In Bourassa’s mind, there was no way to argue against conscription without arguing 
against the basis of the war itself – if the war was legitimate, so was conscription. His critics 
had spent the last three years proving that “par le Droit Naturel, ... le Canada a l’obligation 
morale et même légale de combattre pour l’Angleterre, même contre le gré de ses citoyens,” 
yet now the Liberals were arguing that “les Canadiens, pris individuellement, ont le droit de se 
soustraire à cette obligation.”20 “C’est de la démagogie toute pure, c’est la révolte et 
l’anarchie,” Bourassa stated. Neither the Liberals nor Canadians could pick and choose the 
scope and manner of their government’s war effort. They had endorsed a total war effort and 
conscription was the consequence.  
                                                 
18 Henri Bourassa, “Aurons-nous la Conscription?,” Le Devoir, 26 March, 1917, 1. Bourassa’s expressed his ire 
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Bourassa believed that the only way to combat conscription with logic and sincerity 
was to recognize that the nation of Canada had as much right to decide on its participation as 
the individual. Only then could a real debate begin over the advantages and disadvantages of 
national and individual participation. Without admitting one or the other, critics of conscription 
were accepting the validity of “demagogues” and “politiciens en quête de popularité.”21  
That March Bourassa predicted that, within three months, Canadians would see 
conscription introduced in the House of Commons in one form or another.22 The government 
could act to avoid conscription, but Bourassa saw little hope of such an effort. He offered an 
alternative policy where, instead of enlarging the army, the government would use more 
manpower to continue making the vital war material and supplies that fuelled the Allied forces. 
It would satisfy Canadian commitments as well as enrich the nation and its people, a goal that 
both imperialist and nationalist could support. Bourassa was pessimistic about the likelihood of 
Canada adopting it. He was resigned to conscription’s eventual appearance on the Canadian 
homefront. There were too few voices of dissent to prevent it. “Nous n’aurons que ce que nous 
aurons voulu et mérité,” Bourassa lamented.23 This was the total war against which Bourassa 
had spent the entire war detailing, disputing and rejecting. Without an organized and logical 
resistance from the people or their governments, it would continue transforming Canada and all 
of the belligerent nations.  
Only a week after Bourassa’s lament, Canadian soldiers engaged in battle on the slopes 
of Vimy Ridge from 9-12 April 1917. Their success justified to many Canadians all of the 
sacrifices that Bourassa decried. Though later the battle would take on heroic proportions to 
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Canadians as the birthplace of the Canadian nation, when it occurred in early April 1917 it was 
a much needed and hard-fought victory.24 As part of the greater Arras offensive launched by the 
British Army, the Canadian success at Vimy Ridge was one victory during an operation filled 
with defeats. The rest of the Allied lines advanced slightly on the first day of the assault on 9 
April, but stalled after their initial success.25 Only the Canadian soldiers significantly expanded 
their front lines and held onto their gains against heavy German counterattack, but at the cost 
of more than 10,000 casualties. French newspapers heralded Canada’s “Easter Gift to France” 
and King George V heartily congratulated his Canadian subjects.26 Prime Minister Robert 
Borden visited the divisions preparing to launch the attack and the wounded afterwards, calling 
it a “splendid victory.”27 Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour arrived in Canada on his way to the 
United States and told Canadians on 21 April that their sacrifice at Ypres and Vimy 
demonstrated that “you have combined to the utmost of your powers, energy and mercy in your 
prosecution of the war.”28 This validation of the Canadian war effort did little to convince 
Henri Bourassa, whose criticisms had little relation to the definitions of success held by the 
war’s supporters. 
If the battle had any impact on Bourassa at all, he did not write about it in his column. 
Soon after the Canadian seizure of Vimy Ridge, his arguments warning of the war’s 
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militarizing effect on Canadian society turned again to foreboding predictions. “Après la 
guerre, la révolution,” was the headline of a vitriolic editorial on 23 April. He repeated his 
views on the “revolutionary character” of the Canadian intervention. The two major parties 
colluded as “les instruments de l’impérialisme britannique et de la haute finance anglaise.”29 
He now alleged that Laurier had betrayed his followers and merely pretended to oppose 
imperialism during his decade and a half as prime minister. Further, the war had thus 
formalized the alliance between Liberals and Conservatives that had been ongoing at least 
since 1899, as the party truce in 1914 demonstrated. Enticed by wealth and power, the 
journalist maintained, Canada’s politicians had endorsed in all but name the imperialist 
revolution.30 From Bourassa’s perspective, the victory at Vimy was little more than a step 
towards a future he did not want.  
Bourassa refused to let this “revolution” continue unimpeded. He denounced the great 
illusion of the imperialist revolutionaries and their mistaken belief that “ils peuvent à leur gré 
aveugler le bon sens populaire et déguise toujours la vérité sous la duperie des formules 
creuses et des arguments à côté.”31 Bourassa believed that he saw through their falsehoods. His 
critics’ attack on his commentary supposedly revealed the terrible truth of Canada at war. In a 
revolutionary society, the revolution was indistinguishable from the state itself. Thus, any 
attack on the revolutionary transformation was an attack on the state itself. Denunciations that 
Bourassa was a traitor only further proved to him that the state and the revolution were the 
same. To him, he was clearly criticizing changes in Canadian society but not the state or nation 
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of Canada itself. Bourassa evoked the turbulent pendulum of the French Revolution, and its 
excesses between autocracy and democracy, as an example of what lay ahead for Canada. The 
only way to avoid it was to continue his campaign against the extremes of the Canadian war 
effort and reveal the truth of its consequences. 
For Bourassa, the worst aspect of the war narrative was that it had seemingly convinced 
Canadians of its benefits without reflecting on its detriments. Canadians accepted without 
question the necessity of a war economy, of conscription, and of winning the war at any cost. 
Bourassa argued that in accepting these war policies, the people of the Allied nations 
threatened to overturn the peaceful progressive societies of Europe and North America. In the 
Canadian context, they endangered the partnership of French and English Canadians crafted at 
Confederation. These fears had formed the basis of Bourassa’s rejection of expansive and 
possessive British imperialism since the Boer War, but by 1917 he believed that the war had 
shifted the balance much farther than any other point in the young nation’s history. It might 
soon be too late to reverse the corrupting influence of unquestioned imperialist and militarist 
ideologies. Bourassa began to suspect that the changes wrought by the Great War would be too 
great to reverse and he saw a new Canada was emerging, one defined by the brutal conditions 
of warfare, not by the compromise of Confederation.32 
Bourassa’s distress was so great that he veered into the world of outrageous conspiracy. 
The Allies aided the Russian revolution, he told his readers, as they were eager to bring the 
United States into the war and remove the troublesome autocracy.33 Here, he seemingly offered 
a new version of the war’s causes, as he implicitly rejected earlier pronouncements that the war 
was for Russian claims on Constantinople. Instead, all monarchies, including that of the Allies, 
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were targets of the wave of militarized “democracy” that swept the world. “Les protagonistes 
de la révolution sont les dénonciateurs les plus ardente de toute tentative de paix,” he wrote, 
“ils comptent sur les souffrances et l’exaspération des masses populaires, énervées et aigries 
par la guerre à outrance, pour faire triompher leur projets.”34 All autocratic nations would 
eventually succumb to the pressures of wartime and revolutions that followed their inevitable 
collapse. Bourassa argued that “war democracy” was no better than imperialism; both sought 
the expansion of European empires, their wealth, and power.35 The formation of an Imperial 
Republic had been the goal of imperialists for decades, and Bourassa alleged, the war 
overcame the opposition that once prevented it.36 As with all conspiracies, a kernel of truth was 
present. Imperialists had indeed hoped the war could change Canada’s relationship with 
Britain, though of course nowhere near the scale of the “revolution” that Bourassa claimed. He 
offered little proof of these opinions he presented as facts other than his own interpretation of 
actual events.  
He outlined his logic about the danger of an imperial republic. The Empire included 
hundreds of millions of people, stretching from Britain, to Canada, to Australia, to India, to 
South Africa. If bound together economically and politically, these peoples would represent the 
most powerful military and far-reaching economy in the world. Two obstacles, according to 
Bourassa, had previously stopped this imperial association: one being Canadian autonomy, the 
other being Britain’s traditional monarchy.37 Politicians forgot the goal of Canadian autonomy 
in August 1914, while the British, Bourassa wrote, would overturn the British Crown by war’s 
end. Bourassa declared that the imperialists would not hesitate to dethrone the King if it was 
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necessary “pour assurer le triomphe de la plouto-démocratie armée dont ils se sont constitués 
les cornacs.”38 He provided British Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s support for the new 
Russian government as proof that the monarchy was no longer sacrosanct. The figures behind 
the push for an Imperial Republic were the true benefactors of the war: the plutocrats, wealthy 
financiers who produced war armaments and bought political influence from politicians 
needing votes. As in all revolutions, it would be the masses who were hurt the most and 
exploited for their manpower and wealth. No one was safe, since the war demonstrated that 
even the highest political and Church offices were not beyond becoming “les instruments et les 
complices de la révolution.”39  
Amidst this horrific future, Bourassa saw Pope Benedict XV as a beacon of hope. Only 
Rome understood the dire situation of the world. Bourassa continued to put his faith in Rome 
and that one day those who refused to endorse the war would be acknowledged as “patriotes 
aussi clairvoyants” who had remained loyal to the British King.40 In the meantime, Rome’s 
message of peace was the only voice that could be trusted. The Allies and Central Powers had 
too much at stake, as the sole goal of militarized societies was to win the “total war” in which 
they fought.  
His late April series “Après la Guerre, la Révolution” was more condemnatory and 
alarmist than his previous writing. Bourassa was always evocative to the point of hyperbole 
and offered passionate fiery arguments meant to stir opinions in his reader. Here he took his 
basic set of assumptions about the war and its impact and pushed it further than a rejection of 
the war. Over three days, he outlined a global conspiracy, costing millions of lives and dollars, 
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all to increase the wealth of an elite class. The Imperialists were no longer political opponents, 
but extremists looking to overturn the international system in favour of the Empire. His tone 
took on a radical edge, one that fit better with far-left liberals or even socialists than a moderate 
liberal nationalist, let alone an ultramontane Catholic. The American entry into the war and 
Russia’s February Revolution drove him to new heights of suspicions and extreme conclusions. 
Bourassa’s political and religious beliefs repeatedly led him to question the dominant narrative 
put forward by the war supporters, but here his skepticism reached a fanatical level. Bourassa 
questioned even the basic diplomatic maneuvers of the Great Powers as part of a larger and 
nefarious scheme.  
Three days after his return from Europe, Prime Minister Robert Borden announced in 
Parliament on 17 May that the government was enacting conscription legislation. It is unclear 
exactly what caused Borden to change his mind. J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, in addition 
to detailing the failure of National Registration and Home Defence to supplement recruitment, 
note a letter from Borden to Archbishop Bruchési in Montreal. Borden reflected on his recent 
European trip, writing that “What I saw and learned ... made me realize how much more 
critical is the situation of the Allies and much more uncertain is the ultimate result of the great 
struggle.”41 John English emphasizes Cabinet’s agreement that conscription was necessary due 
to lower enlistment, despite the knowledge that it would “kill [the Conservative Party] 
politically ... for 25 years.”42 Others historians such as Ramsay Cook and Robert Craig Brown 
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frame the decision to enact compulsory military service around Borden’s recognition that a 
coalition government, between the Liberals and Conservatives, was the best resource for 
uniting the national war effort. Conscription was introduced as a “radical change in enlistment 
policy [that had] a catalytic effect on domestic politics by forcing a coalition of those groups 
who genuinely placed winning the war above every other consideration.”43 Regardless, 
faltering enlistments, increasing casualties (Canadians suffered more than 10,000 casualties at 
Vimy Ridge), and pressure for the Allies to fight the war without Russia at their side are the 
most quantifiable explanations of the government reneging on its previous promises. By April 
1917, the Chief of Staff Willoughby Gwatkins warned Borden that by summer the Canadian 
forces would require 10,000 additional men that it did not have.44 Conscription was a solution 
to a problem at a time when few others presented themselves. 
Bourassa addressed conscription in late May when he published a series of articles that 
he eventually released as a pamphlet, La Conscription, in June. The pamphlet included his 
writing on conscription in Le Devoir from 28 May to 6 June as well as an appendix citing other 
nationaliste statements about conscription and quoting Robert Borden and Wilfrid Laurier’s 
rejection of conscription from January 1916. Bourassa modified it slightly to consider the issue 
of coalition government raised after he had originally written the articles.  
Bourassa hoped the pamphlet would continue to encourage resistance to conscription 
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and “les emprises de l’impérialisme” that drove it, since the only way to defeat conscription 
was by organizing opposition against it.45 Petitions, his writing and the work of others were 
“infiniment plus efficace que les manifestations dans la rue” he reminded the reader. French 
Canadians could not afford to forget that, at as all turning points in their history, they were “les 
défenseurs de l’ordre et de la constitution, les gardiens de la tradition nationale et des légitimes 
libertés populaires.”46 It would do no good to save Canada at the cost of social order. 
Opposition to conscription had to be “reasonable” and “reasoned.”47 
Bourassa had a straightforward argument. Conscription, he wrote, was not merely 
unjust; it led Canada closer toward bankruptcy and financial ruin. He believed that conscription 
was an inefficient policy that permanently damaged the Canadian nation and Canada had 
already contributed more than enough to the war effort. According to Bourassa’s calculations, 
Canada’s per capita contribution by men was at least equivalent to that of France and Britain. It 
was more when he compared the per capita cost to field each army since Canada paid its 
soldiers better daily wages.48 As well, Canada had already spent more than a billion dollars on 
the war, and took on debt at a rate that Bourassa believed made it nearly impossible to pay 
back.  
He speculated that conscription of the remaining able-bodied men would cause more 
economic hardships. Agricultural production would drop as farmers left their fields. Britain did 
not need Canadian soldiers as much as it needed the bread, meat and potatoes of Canada.49 If 
food production dropped, famine alone might end the war. He stressed that industrial 
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manpower was as important as army manpower. Munitions, agriculture, lumber, mines, and 
nearly every Canadian industry helped the Allied war effort in ways far more important than 
using Canada’s manpower to raise a rifle. At least, he pointed out, industrial work was more 
effective than the cost of equipping and sending them to die on European battlefields. 50 
Even if Canada conscripted men to serve in industry rather than the army, there was no 
proper way to assess the value of every individual to the war effort. The government should 
focus on the conscription of wealth through war taxes, he argued, but only if they were 
imposed in proportion to citizens’ capacity to pay. Anyone making profit from the war 
deserved to pay a respectively higher tax, as anything else was “injuste, immoral, contraire à 
l’ordre social et à l’équilibre économique.”51 There must be equal sacrifice of wealth before 
human life; otherwise, conscription would lead to social unrest and economic ruin. 
Bourassa noted that some supporters of conscription argued the continuing tension 
between English and French Canadians was a threat to national unity and the reason why 
conscription was necessary. French Canadians, they alleged, contributed less to the war effort. 
Bourassa understandably dismissed such arguments, especially since he was one of the primary 
instigators of French Canadian apathy (or perhaps rationality, depending on one’s perspective) 
towards the war. Instead, he offered examples of compromise and cooperation between French 
and English. There had always been a divergence of opinions, sentiments and aspirations 
between them, but there should be no expectation that they always had to agree. If anything 
their differing culture and history had led to inevitable disagreement; however, that difference 
was reconcilable. After all, he explained, the two peoples had agreed to a constitutional 
arrangement that satisfied both in forming Canada in 1867. Bourassa emphasized the compact 
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between the races of Confederation and its role in shaping the Canadian nation. It outlined the 
relationship between French and English as well the nature of the relationship between Canada 
and Britain. There were no obligations to defend British land, or to fight British wars, only to 
defend Canada when it was threatened. Implicitly, the French Canadian minority did not share 
an obligation undertaken by English Canada.52 When that compact had been upheld, national 
unity flourished. When it was broken, fractures in unity appeared. Conscription, Bourassa 
argued, broke the compact and further deepened the cracks in Canadian consensus. 
Part of the problem derived from the lingering connection between English Canada and 
their former motherland. French Canadians had had only one patrie since they had separated 
from France centuries ago, while English Canadians still clearly identified with their British 
forebears. Bourassa’s study of Canadian history argued that their circumstances especially 
changed as British immigrants had shifted the character of English Canada over the last two 
decades. So while French Canadians “sont restés, en masse, exclusivement canadiens,” English 
Canadian interests divided between that of their patrie and mère-patrie.53  
National disunity and lack of French Canadian support was not a result of the 
differences between the two races, Bourassa clarified, but derived from a systematic deception 
of Canadians. He wrote that two errors explained the lack of support for the war in French 
Canada. First, French Canadian leaders convinced their people to support Canadian entry into 
the First World War using appeals of loyalty to Britain and France. Those appeals were doomed 
to fail as they could not transform the French Canadian mentality or temperament, particularly 
since French Canada had opposed the doctrine of international obligations for more than 
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century.54 French Canada could not sustain long-term interest in a British or European war that 
did not threaten their homes or their people. The second misstep was the English Canadian 
attack against French Canadians for not contributing enough to the war effort and not enrolling 
with the same enthusiasm. He warned that this action “[entraîne] d’acrimonieuses explications, 
d’amères désillusions et surtout de fort périlleuses réactions.”55 Conscription was one more 
brick in “la muraille de duperie qui [les] sépare.”56  The construction of this “muraille de 
duperie” had begun long before 1917, but the previous three years of war alongside the 
acrimonious debate over bilingual schools, had expanded it greatly.  
According to Bourassa, Canadians across the country opposed conscription. Two 
million French Canadians certainly rejected it, but he remarked on growing opposition in 
English-speaking provinces. Bourassa shared conversations he had with English Canadians, 
who told him that Canada had done more than enough for the war effort. Even if they were not 
vocal, the “silent vote” in English Canada was opposed to conscription. Thus, he reasoned, 
foreign powers in Europe drove the political support for the policy, not the will of the Canadian 
people. This would become clear if Ottawa let Canadians vote on the issue. Only a referendum 
on the issue could avoid “une dangereuse explosion.”57 Bourassa wrote that if a majority of the 
electorate unreservedly accepted conscription, then French Canada might submit to it. A 
majority of French and English Canadians could send a clear democratic message. On the other 
hand, if all of Quebec rejected the proposal and a parliamentary majority from English-
speaking provinces enacted forced military service, it might result in violence or other extreme 
reactions. One way or another, a referendum would clearly distinguish the possibilities and the 
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limitations of conscription. 
Bourassa returned to his conclusions about foreign influence as he pondered what had 
caused Borden to renege on his promise not to impose conscription. He proffered three major 
events from 1917 that might have influenced him: submarine warfare, the Russian Revolution, 
and American intervention. Each of these changed the nature of the war for the Prime Minister, 
but Bourassa disagreed that it was enough to justify conscription. The threat of submarine 
warfare and blockade meant that Canada had to commit more industrial and agricultural 
production. The revolution in Russia weakened the Allies, but did not require Canada to 
contribute lives to their cause. After all, the American intervention promised thousands more 
troops and resources than Canada could ever provide, and thousands of them had already 
joined the Canadian forces.58 Yet the American intervention and enactment of their own 
conscription policy meant that if Canada did not do the same, “slackers” would have a refuge 
from the United States to avoid conscription. Bourassa proposed that the real reason Borden 
abruptly introduced conscription in Canada was to be consistent with their American 
neighbours. The declaration of war by President Wilson and the Congress vote on conscription 
forced Borden to accede to British demands for more troops. There was no worthwhile reason 
other than Borden’s continual subservience to foreign powers.  
The final part of Bourassa’s analysis reflected on the proposal of coalition government. 
First, Canada required an election before Borden formed a coalition government. Bourassa 
rejected the legitimacy of the sitting Parliament that had extended its term, in violation of the 
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constitution, to avoid an election in 1916. An election, with or without a coalition government, 
also could not be a substitute for a plebiscite on conscription. It was impossible in Bourassa’s 
mind to vote legitimately without a separate referendum.59 What if a riding had no candidates 
that supported conscription, or vice versa? How could a voter express their democratic voice in 
favour of or against the proposition? Coalition government restricted the choice of the voter, he 
proclaimed, and subverted the basic tenets of democracy. Bourassa cautioned that if Canadians 
could not cast their vote against conscription in an election (since both Liberals and 
Conservatives candidates might be a part of the coalition in favour of it) it was undemocratic. 
Further, taking away democratic rights was an open invitation to insurrection. Without a voice 
in deciding the future government, he warned, Canadians might resort to violent means to 
achieve their goals. Bourassa declared that “toute coalition des partis, à l’heure actuelle, serait 
inutile, dangereuse et immorale. ... Le parlement actuel ou future ne doit pas voter la 
conscription ... l’opinion du peuple ne peut s’exprimer librement que par un plébiscite.”60 
Anything else denied the people’s rights to express themselves. 
Wilfrid Laurier had already fashioned his own position on conscription and believed 
that a referendum was the best compromise between wartime necessity and national unity, but 
he faced some dissent within his party.  There was growing pressure for coalition government 
throughout the early months of 1917 and demands that Laurier align himself with the 
government position. Newspapers and some Liberal politicians demanded a coalition even as 
Conservatives were suspicious of any question about their party’s wartime leadership.61 After 
the announcement of conscription, Robert Borden approached Laurier on 25 May about joining 
                                                 
59 Henri Bourassa, La Conscription, (Montreal: Éditions du Devoir, 1917) 38-39. 
60 Henri Bourassa, La Conscription, (Montreal: Éditions du Devoir, 1917) 40-41. 
61 Castell Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1917, 553-560. 
240 
 
a coalition government. Laurier gave no immediate answer and instead took stock of his 
support among Liberals and the reactions against conscription. Quebec Liberals would not 
support conscription and Laurier returned to Borden on 6 June to reject his offer while 
advocating for a referendum on the issue of forced military service. The delay allowed Laurier 
to see which Liberals supported conscription, and in turn, his referendum proposal forced pro-
conscription Liberals to support conscription via plebiscite or to leave the party.62  
Laurier’s desire for a referendum and fears about the consequence of imposing 
conscription shifted him closer to the position of Bourassa. Though Laurier was concerned 
with the legitimacy of Canadian democracy and its impact on national unity like his former 
MP, he was afraid of Bourassa’s growing influence. Writing to Quebec Liberal Premier Lomer 
Gouin, Laurier explained that “as to conscription, there can equally be no hesitation. After the 
agitation which has been carried on upon this subject, if we were to hesitate at this moment, we 
would hand over the province to the extremists; in place of promoting national unity, it would 
open up a breach, perhaps fatal.”63 By raising the Liberal banner in Quebec against the 
imposition of conscription, Laurier provided a nexus for French Canadians to funnel their 
dissatisfaction. Laurier believed that he could guide the province on a more balanced path than 
Bourassa. The result was that, for the first time in nearly a decade and a half, Laurier and 
Bourassa stood in partial public agreement. 
On 11 June, Borden introduced the conscription bill in Parliament, noting that “it was 
my strong desire to bring about a union of all parties for the purpose of preventing any such 
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disunion.” The bill would not come into effect until after a general election so “that there might 
be a united effort to fulfill the great national purpose of winning this war ... [and] to throw the 
full power and effort of Canada into the scale of right, liberty, and justice.”64 Despite Laurier’s 
refusal, Borden still hoped to form a coalition to lead the country and he appealed to prominent 
English Canadian Liberals to join him. Throughout June and July, Parliament debated forced 
military service under the cloud of political division and conflicted loyalties. Former Laurier 
Cabinet Minister Clifford Sifton, who had left the Laurier government on bad terms a decade 
earlier, began organizing pro-conscription Liberals to join Borden’s coalition government.65  
Laurier responded with a demonstration of the leadership that had protected his place as 
Liberal leader for almost three decades. Even as Liberals left to join the pro-conscriptionists, 
he counselled a loyal English Canadian Liberal: “Do not, however, think hard of them, for I do 
not. They have behaved all through most honourably, and there is not and there will not be any 
loss of friendship between us. The pain is not less acute on their side than on mine, and I know 
only too well the difficulties which faced them.”66 Despite the divisive national debate over 
conscription, Laurier tried to preserve a moderate and understanding tone towards his former 
members. Bourassa, whose fear of conscription was quite different from Laurier’s political 
concerns, offered no such restraint. 
On the fiftieth anniversary of Confederation Bourassa believed the war had corrupted 
the Dominion. The Canada that had been created half a century earlier seemed far away from 
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that which fought the Great War, when its leaders spent the day in the “exaltation du 
dévouement à une cause étranger.”67 While Prime Minister Borden spoke of how proud the 
Fathers of Confederation would be to see their country, Bourassa saw little reason to be proud 
of “une nation plongée dans une guerre dont les causes, la direction et le règlement échappent 
totalement à l’action immédiate de son gouvernement.”68 It was time to have the courage, 
Bourassa urged, to admit that for twenty years Canada had had no true moral or intellectual 
progress. Its public and private morality was debased, its patriotism false, its vision obscured, 
its sense of order diminished, and the nation and “le goût des choses de l’esprit” were buried 
under vulgar ambition and vanity.69 The pressures of wartime had deformed the nation that had 
entered the war in 1914.  
On the anniversary, Bourassa painted a picture of an inchoate and aggressive English 
Canada against the calm and collected French Canada. He argued that in much of the effusive 
praise for Canada’s Confederation and its fifty years of “accomplishments,” French Canada’s 
true voice was absent from the boastful claims of government leaders. “La langue française,” 
he reminded his readers, “c’est la langue de la vérité, de la justice, du courage, de la probité, de 
la logique. .... Ne pas l’inviter [de] lui rendre hommage [à les dupeurs et de dupes].”70 
Bourassa reiterated the cultural divisions between Canadians over the issues of the war. He saw 
a divide between French and English that was greater than any previous debate within the 
Canadian Federation. 
For the battle over conscription, Bourassa had more allies. Alongside Laurier and the 
Liberal party, the Quebec Bishops also renounced conscription. Though they had supported the 
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rallying call to support the war, it had all been on the premise that they could avoid 
conscription. Archbishop Bruchési felt betrayed by Ottawa’s change in policy. He had 
supported voluntary enlistment and Borden had promised him that there would never be 
conscription.71 The archbishop let the public know of his anger in L’Action Catholique, where 
he rallied journalists to defend the liberties of the Church and its Catholics.72 Bruchési wrote 
privately to Bourassa admitting that “sur la conscription je pense absolument comme vous. Et 
je ne crois pas manquer de logique parce que j’ai admis la participation du Canada à la guerre 
actuelle.”73 Bourassa replied that he was ready to work with the Archbishop against the 
measure. The French language press in Quebec almost unanimously opposed the measure, 
except for Le Patrie, which attempted to explain the logic of Borden’s position.74 French 
Canadian opposition to conscription even extended to Borden’s Cabinet. Minister of State and 
Minister of Mines Esioff-Léon Patenaude resigned on 5 June, citing his inability to support 
conscription since “the proposed law threatens to destroy unity and to give rise throughout the 
country to deep internal divisions, of long duration, and even detrimental to the needs of the 
present moment.”75 General French Canadian outrage over the imposition of conscription 
marked the summer of 1917. 
A few voices among French speaking Canadians did stand out in support of 
conscription. The most prominent political voice in this vein was that of Conservative Member 
of Parliament Albert Sévigny. The French Canadian MP, first elected in 1911 as part of 
Bourassa’s “Conservative-nationalistes,” subsequently served as Deputy Speaker and Speaker 
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of the House. In 1917, Sévigny became the Minister of Inland Revenue and, as the laws 
dictated at the time, had to run in a by-election in January for the riding of Dorchester. The 
bitterly contested election was between Sévigny and a vocal opponent of the war under the 
Liberal banner, Lucien Cannon. Sévigny barely won the riding by 257 votes.76 Sévigny was 
one of the few French Canadian Conservatives to actively campaign in favour of conscription 
alongside the Postmaster General, Pierre Blondin. Sévigny accepted Borden’s argument that 
conscription was necessary and was prepared, in the words of his biographer, to commit 
political suicide.77 Admittedly, he had reservations about Borden’s approach to the issue 
conscription in regards to Quebec. Borden’s announcement of conscription without talking to 
Laurier or prominent Quebec politicians first proved that the Prime Minister did not understand 
the French Canadian mentality.78 Still, Sévigny stood by his leader and gave speeches in favour 
of conscription throughout 1917. 
Another voice was that of Ferdinand Roy, a Quebec City lawyer, who published a 
pamphlet in favour of conscription in July 1917. It was a moderate, reasoned response to the 
anti-conscription arguments titled, L’appel aux armes et la Réponse canadienne-française, and 
a direct response to Henri Bourassa.79 Roy agreed with many of Bourassa’s arguments. He 
acknowledged the insidious influence of imperialism on French Canadian society and the 
failure of Canada’s political leaders to stem it.80 However, Roy laid some of the blame for the 
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state of affairs in 1917 at Bourassa’s feet. Bourassa was wrong to only speak of the war as 
Britain’s war and disassociate French Canada from the conflict.81 Roy questioned the 
willingness of French Canadians and their clergy to accept Bourassa’s portrayal of the 
Canadian home front: 
cette foi en un prophète qui n’a pas la fatuité de réclamer l’infaillibilité n’est pas 
une foi aveugle, et la raison maintient son droit d’examiner avec soin sa thèse, 
qui n’est pas un dogme, et de juger si sa doctrine, toute logique qu’elle soit, 
captivante et dangereuse à la fois par l’appel qu’elle fait à nos haines de races, 
n’a pas pour base une erreur.82 
Instead, Roy believed that French Canada was indeed fighting for themselves, for their French 
heritage, and all that made them unique. By resorting to violence or resistance, French Canada 
only tarnished their reputation and left a poor legacy for their children. Would French Canada 
be content with the shame of refusing to fight and “ne plus lever les yeux, à courber le front?”83 
Roy argued that though French Canadians might resist conscription, their duty and honour 
required them to enlist and fight regardless of the outcome. If they did not, they risked 
indictment in the court of public opinion and domination from the English Canadian majority 
that controlled Parliament.84 Any other reaction to the imposition of conscription led to ruin.  
Like Bourassa, Roy asked for a reasonable debate on the issues of the war. He saw in 
the French Canadian reaction to conscription an unquestioning acceptance of Bourassa’s 
views. He warned of the dangerous path upon which his countrymen trod, asking “veut-on que 
vraiment nos lignes de défense, au lieu d’être dans les Flandres, se creusent dans notre 
province?” “Il nous faut,” he continued, “par des actes, par un changement d’attitude 
manifeste, sortir du remous d’incohérence où l’on nous a poussés, prendre pied sur le fond 
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solide qui est là, plus nous laisser aller, éperdus, indécis et inertes, à la dérive.”85 Roy discussed 
anti-militarism, the bastion of Bourassa’s own position against the war, but apparently 
misunderstood Bourassa’s arguments. Roy believed any anti-militarist sentiments were 
pacifism and “pacifists” condemned violence, thus refused to fight for the defense of Canada.86 
Bourassa was more concerned with the pervasiveness of militarism rather than a moral 
judgement of war itself.  
Roy’s foray into public commentary is a fascinating glimpse into the mind of a French 
Canadian opposed to the growing dominant narrative fashioned by Bourassa and his 
supporters. Much of Roy’s tone mirrors that of Bourassa. Both believe in the validity of critical 
thought, in the problem of mass acceptance of a single set of beliefs, and the dangerous 
outcome of violent resistance to conscription. Ultimately, Roy concluded however that French 
Canada must join the fight on the assumption that for Canada to function in the future there 
must be respect between its French and English peoples. Quebec ought to fight for its own 
honour and salvation as much as it did for Britain or France.  
Bourassa also highlighted the inherent division between Canada’s peoples in his book 
on conscription. He also argued that cooperation between Canada’s founding peoples was only 
possible if both sides respected the other as equals. Yet in his view, English Canada had to 
respect that French Canada had no stake in the European war, rather than Roy’s interpretation 
that French Canada had to respect that English Canada’s absolute investment in the war. Both 
wanted to avoid violence, French Canadian subservience, and the rule of incoherent thought, 
but offered different means to do so. 
It is difficult to gauge the impact of Roy’s work, though it was likely minimal. 
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Bourassa never refers to it in his public commentary while Castell Hopkins of the Canadian 
Annual Review bemoaned its meagre reception compared to anti-conscription writing.87 
Neither of these are definitive proofs of its impact, but it is fair to conclude that French 
Canadians attitudes did not change in the way Roy demanded, nor was there ever widespread 
support for conscription among them. In that respect, we can assume that Roy’s ideas had 
minimal impact since anti-conscription sentiment only grew in the final year of the war. Still, it 
stands as a clear voice proposing an acceptance of conscription not based on English Canadian 
or imperialist rhetoric. Roy did not demand that his fellow French Canadians accept the 
legitimacy of an English Canadian war effort, but rather argued that both English Canada and 
Bourassa had misrepresented the war. Consequently, French Canadians could fashion their own 
meaning to the war. Roy’s work was not an ideological polemic as much as it was an 
argumentative essay.  
Without reference to Roy, Bourassa rejected the premise of his arguments when he 
succinctly summarized why Canadians opposed conscription in mid-July for the New York 
Evening Post. Americans saw the situation in Quebec as a curious phenomenon and the New 
York paper asked Bourassa to submit a piece on conscription, which was followed by similar 
articles from Édouard Montpetit, a professor of Political Economy at Laval University, and 
Paul-Émile Lamarche, a former Conservative MP who had resigned over the issue of bilingual 
schools in 1916.88  
Canada’s French-speaking peoples, Bourassa wrote, could never accommodate 
conscription. He listed the reasons why Canada should not adopt conscription: Canada had 
already contributed an impressive amount to the war; any further contribution risked 
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weakening Canada’s agricultural production and industry; Canada could not shoulder any 
greater economic cost; it threatened Canada’s political independence; and finally, it would 
create disunion and strife for the country and the continent.89 Conscription, Bourassa argued, 
was not in Canada’s national interest, but rather continued to serve the imperial interests of the 
British Empire and its European war. If Canada had an international obligation, it was to strive 
for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and preserve the international system, not witness its 
systematic degradation. Conscription he warned could create “a second Mexico north of the 
45th and 49th parallels,” a relevant if somewhat exaggerated warning for American readers.90 
He saw no value in the cooperation for which Roy advocated as conscription meant 
domination, oppression, and violent reaction. 
As the Military Service Bill finally worked its way through Parliament and the Senate 
that July, Bourassa followed the debates closely. In his view, none of Canada’s 
parliamentarians raised the question of how conscription would affect national interest or its 
citizens. It is likely that Bourassa’s narrow vision of national interest did not include those 
raised by the House of Commons debate. For instance, there was a long discussion over the 
specific phrasing of how exemptions would be granted on the basis of “national interest.” The 
Solicitor General, Arthur Meighen, explained that they were basing it off the British legislation 
that stated that, “‘National interests,’ has to be construed broadly. It covers not only services 
which minister directly to the prosecution of the war, but also services which are essential to 
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the country at the present time.”91 Liberals pressed the Government over its somewhat 
ambiguous definition of national interest and its fair application. Members of Parliament 
mentioned national unity often. Both sides of the House raised the spectre of national unity in 
light of conscription many times over the course of the debate’s final month. Laurier argued 
that the government’s introduction of conscription had committed the “greatest possible injury” 
to the possibility of coalition government and national unity. “There is something more 
important even than the [coalition government] which [Borden] has sought,” he told the House, 
“that is to maintain the unity of the nation, and the unity of the nation is seriously compromised 
today.”92 Similarly, Meighen concluded the debate over the The Military Service Act’s third 
reading with a damning rejection of Laurier’s appeal: 
We either have national aims, a national will and a sense of national honour, or 
we have not. ... Let the right hon. leader of the Opposition say now whether the 
time has not come for him to take his place beside those who sustain the national 
will and the national honour of Canada. ... Then there will not be found the 
disunion which he predicts this afternoon; nor will there be encountered a 
disunion infinitely worse than that which he describes – a disunion between the 
nation at home and its defenders overseas.93 
If Bourassa had followed the debates, and perhaps he did not closely follow the long discussion 
of national interests, he certainly rejected Parliament’s understanding of it. Certainly 
Meighen’s words were distant from anything Bourassa would have believed, and even Laurier 
and other Liberals couched the issue in careful phrases that the nationaliste found wanting. “La 
politique du ministère,” he declared in late July, “menace directement la sécurité nationale et la 
liberté des citoyens.”94 Where were the defenders of the Canadian nation? Bourassa saw only 
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the rejection of wartime policies as a cause of disunity, rather than the war itself. He 
sarcastically noted that Canada might as well be Senegal fighting for France for all the 
influence it had on the war effort. Bourassa pointed out that the Bill’s passage without going 
before the electorate revealed a failing democracy. Canada was now sending its citizens to fight 
and die for a foreign power without acknowledging their dissent. To him, the lacklustre 
conscription debate pointed to the continued failure of Canadian democracy and the triumph of 
militarism. 
For the French Canadian journalist, the government had unavoidably changed the 
nature of the coming election by its meagre debate over the bill in Parliament. Bourassa 
compared the process unfavourably to Britain’s vote on conscription, where their MPs had 
examined its impact on Britain’s domestic and international situation, or Australia where there 
was sufficient opposition to keep it from passing at all. Since Parliament had not consulted the 
people directly, Bourassa drew comparisons to the situations of Ireland or Russia, where the 
involuntary nature of a war effort had contributed to revolution.95 Bourassa termed the passage 
of conscription as “la conscription électorale.”96 By hinging the upcoming election on the issue 
of conscription, Borden had turned it into a campaign on the value of Canada’s contribution to 
the war. The election would be over conscription, Bourassa predicted, not the ability of either 
party to lead the country during wartime.97  
The disturbances that followed the passing of the conscription bill and the explosion at 
Lord Atholstan’s house in August underlined the dangerous game that Canada’s government 
was playing. Bourassa believed that such outbursts were an inevitable result of subverting 
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97 Henri Bourassa, “La fin du Débat,” Le Devoir, 26 July 1917, 1. 
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democratic rights.98 For years, he had described the transformation of Canadian society 
because of the war, and in the summer of 1917 it seemed as if his worst fears had come to pass. 
He suspected it would get worse before it got better. A federal election was scheduled before 
the year was out and the war still seemingly had no end in sight. Bourassa’s warning in August 
that physical violence was not the answer was worthwhile, but one that ignored his own role in 
it. While he never asked for popular manifestations on the street, neither were his words ever 
conciliatory. He had spent years of writing about the “boches of Ontario” and their 
discriminatory policies and the incapability of war supporters to consider anything less than 
total support. The final year of the war revealed how dangerous the situation had become 
alongside the growing disunity of the Canadian nation.  
                                                 
98 Henri Bourassa, “Steriles Violences,” Le Devoir, 11 August, 1917, 1. 
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Chapter 7: Silenced (August 1917 – April 1918) 
 
The months following the enactment of conscription were arduous ones for Henri 
Bourassa. He advocated for the Liberal Party as Union Government coalesced and announced 
an election for December. He had reservations about Laurier and his party, but saw no better 
option for Canadians opposed to the militaristic governance promised by a Borden victory. His 
view of international affairs took on an anxious tone. New possibilities for peace emerged as 
the former British Cabinet Minister Lord Lansdowne publicly warned the British public that no 
victory was worth the war’s continuation. The Unionist victory in December demonstrated to 
Bourassa that militarism would continue to rule in Canada, and across the world, so long as the 
war continued. He was hopeful when British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and 
President Woodrow Wilson offered their visions of the world after the war in January 1918, 
though Bourassa saw Pope Benedict XV as their true source of inspiration and guidance. If 
only the world listened to the Pope’s rational voice, the war might end. 
The dire impact of the war on Canada was clear in the midst of the 1918 German 
Spring offensive, when German armies pushed to the Marne River, within 100 kilometres of 
Paris. In late March and early April, the government enforced conscription against a sometime 
unwilling populace. Riots broke out in Quebec City after imprisonment of two men for not 
providing their exemption papers on 28 March 1918. The police eventually released them, but 
a crowd of about 2,000 gathered and stormed the police station. The next evening a crowd of 
8,000 civilians looted the offices of two pro-conscription newspapers, the Quebec Chronicle 
and L’Évenement, and burned down the offices of the Military Service Act Registrar. These 
large mobs completely overwhelmed municipal police forces and the local armoury dispatched 
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300 soldiers before the crowd dispersed. On 30 March, Prime Minister Borden declared that 
the federal government was now taking charge of peace and order in Quebec City. Ottawa 
immediately deployed a force of 780 soldiers, and supplemented it by 1,000 more from Ontario 
to reinforce the Quebec garrison.1 Rioting continued through to 1 April as clashes broke out 
each night between rioters and soldiers. Over the entire Easter weekend, official reports state 
that the unrest injured four civilians, wounded an unknown amount, and injured 62 soldiers.2 
At its peak, the government feared revolution and widespread disorder across the province of 
Quebec. They reacted quickly to stem further riots and deployed thousands of soldiers to 
Quebec City and Montreal. Bourassa, disgusted with the outbreak of violence and facing 
stricter censorship laws, wrote a single editorial in response on 5 April declaring that “l’ordre 
public doit être maintenu.”3 He was clearly dismayed with what the war had wrought. 
* * * 
The riots were a confirmation of what English Canada had implied – or explicitly 
condemned – throughout the war: the French Canadian character was not suited for war.  
Whether it was a result of nationalist propaganda, or some intrinsic element such as their 
Catholicism, English Canada had lingering suspicions over French Canada’s failure to support 
the war.4 As they suspected, Bourassa was influential in shaping French Canada’s views on the 
                                                 
1 Martin F. Auger, “On the Brink of Civil War: The Canadian Government and the Suppression of the 1918 
Quebec Easter Riots,” The Canadian Historical Review, no.4, 89 (December 2008): 508-512. 
2 Martin F. Auger, “On the Brink of Civil War,” 519-520. 
3 Henri Bourassa, “L’ordre public doit être Maintenu,” Le Devoir, 5 April, 1918, 1. 
4 Castell Hopkins lay blame firmly on the nationalists and “a continuous stream of vituperative argument 
presented to men who knew nothing of Europe and little of the Empire and little of the War,” J. Castell 
Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review, War Series, 1918, (Toronto: The Canadian Annual Review Limited, 
1918) 640, see also a discussion on 462-464. Robert Sellar, writer of the vehemently anti-French Canadian and 
anti-Catholic book, The Tragedy of Quebec, continued to sell well throughout 1917-1918, and Kevin P. 
Anderson argues that Sellar’s 1917 publication George Brown: The Globe, Confederation continued this trend, 
noting that “For Sellar the sinister influence of the Church had manifested itself most clearly in the cowardly 
refusal of French Catholics to go to war at the behest of their priests, allowing good English Protestants to die 
in a just cause.” See Kevin P. Anderson, “‘This typical old Canadian form of racial and religious hate’: Anti-
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war throughout the election and in the months up to April 1918. 
After the violent response to the passing of conscription in late July and August 1917, 
Bourassa turned his gaze outside of Canada’s borders to the international stage. He looked to 
the chief advocate for a peaceful resolution to the ruinous conflict: Pope Benedict XV. The 
failed peace negotiations of 1916 and the American entry into the war compelled Pope 
Benedict to release his most strongly worded peace note yet. The Pope wrote to the belligerent 
peoples and their leaders on the third anniversary of the war’s outbreak, promising  
to maintain an absolute impartiality towards all belligerents, ... to endeavor 
continually to do the utmost good to all without distinction of persons, nationality 
or religion, [and] to contribute to hasten the end of this calamity by trying to bring 
the peoples and their leaders to more moderate resolutions in the discussion of 
means that will secure a “just and lasting peace.”5 
Benedict outlined a clear international position as the head of the Catholic Church that did not 
favour any side, since Catholics were amongst both the Allied and Central Powers. It was the 
sort of diplomatic balancing act that Pope Benedict was well experienced at performing. 
Pope Benedict XV was born Giacomo Giambattista Della Chiesa and replaced Pope 
Pius X, who died on 24 August 1914 – apocryphally from a broken heart over the outbreak of a 
general European war. Della Chiesa had only been a Cardinal for six months before he became 
Pope, though he had had a long career of diplomatic posts within the Vatican. He worked 
closely with Cardinal Mariano Rampolla, Pope Leo XIII’s (1878-1903) Secretary of State, and 
performed admirably. Contemporaries heralded him as the “new Consalvi,” referring to the 
worldly Cardinal who after the Vienna Congress of 1815 had positioned the Papacy as a neutral 
                                                 
Catholicism and English Canadian Nationalism, 1905-1965,” PhD Diss. McMaster University, 2013, 71, and 
113, fn 98. 
5 Exhortation Dès les Début to the Belligerent Peoples and to their Leaders, as printed in Principles for Peace 
Selections From Papal Documents Leo XIII to Pius XII, Reverend Harry C. Koenig, ed., (Washington: 
National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1943) 229. Originally written in French. 
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power, restored the Papal States and preserved its international relevance.6 Despite Della 
Chiesa’s commendable credentials, his election to the Papacy came as a surprise to 
contemporary observers. Few people outside of Rome had heard of him but, as his biographer 
writes, of all the papal candidates in the 1914 Conclave, Della Chiesa was the most papabile. 
He fulfilled the description of the ‘ideal’ Pope who possessed “superior intelligence, holiness 
of life, and Christian charity.”7  
As Sovereign Pontiff, Benedict XV immediately set out to resolve the terrible conflict 
that split his flock -- or at least to mediate its horrific consequences as much as he could. From 
September 1914 onwards, the Vatican commented on and engaged with each of the belligerent 
powers in its efforts to stop the war. Although he ultimately failed, his long years of diplomatic 
intervention earned him the name the “Pope of Peace.” Often unjustly characterized by 
contemporaries as having done nothing during the Great War besides meddle in diplomatic 
affairs, recent historians have demonstrated the immense commitment Benedict made towards 
ending the war and aiding its victims.8 Both the Allies and the Central Powers were suspicious 
of the Pope’s actions during the war. The Treaty of London that brought Italy into the war 
specifically forbade any Papal presence at future peace negotiations. Some members of the 
Roman Curia hoped for a Central Powers victory precisely because it could resolve the “Rome 
Question” and perhaps restore the Papal States, only annexed sixty years earlier in 1860.9 
                                                 
6 Henry E. G. Rope, Benedict XV The Pope of Peace, (London: The Catholic Book Club, 1940) 33. 
7 John F. Pollard, The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914-1922) and the Pursuit of Peace, (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1999) 64. 
8 This is concisely reviewed in Charles R. Gallagher, “The perils of perception: British Catholics and papal 
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ongoing Armenian genocide in Turkey, see Pollard, The Unknown Pope, 112-39. 
9 The publication of the Treaty of London by the Russians after the fall of the Czar in 1917 certainly encouraged 
this view, see Oliver P. Rafferty, “The Catholic Church, Ireland and the British Empire, 1800-1921,” 
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Though some members of the Curia may have been sympathetic to the German and Austrian 
war effort,10 Pope Benedict XV was committed to his policy of strict neutrality. His Papal notes 
throughout the conflict all sought to bring about an end to the war without favouring one side 
over another. The most famous was that of 1 August 1917, declaring the Pontificate’s 
impartiality and commitment to ending the conflict.  
Bourassa found Pope Benedict XV’s argument that the war would only end when just 
and fair arbitration took precedence over the force of arms compelling. The French Canadian 
agreed with the underlying philosophy that participation or support for the war was a sin for 
Catholics (or believers in any moral code). For years he had attempted to persuade his 
countrymen of the validity of the Pope’s words, confronting those who claimed moral 
superiority without the papacy’s moral authority. Accordingly, Bourassa unconditionally 
affirmed the Pope’s message and his impartiality– largely because of his religious beliefs, but 
also because the Pope called for a peace for the sake of peace without caring who won or lost. 
Whether the war ended in victory or defeat, the cost of thousands of lives every day affronted 
Bourassa.  
In his editorial reply to the Pope’s note on 18 August, Bourassa responded to the 
accusation that the Pope was a German sympathizer. The claim stemmed from detractors in 
Canada and Great Britain who attacked Benedict XV after he appealed for peace early on in the 
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10 One such example is Rudolph Gerlach, the papal secret chamberlain, who was accused of being the lead spy in 
an Italian espionage ring and allegedly linked to German and Austrian intelligence. He was discovered 
following an investigation into the destruction of the Italian battleship, the Leonardo Da Vinci, in August 
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war. Again, after this latest proposal, the “presse vampire” painted the Pope as a “docile et 
hypocrite instrument du Kaiser.”11 Bourassa reiterated in detail the Pope’s plan and denied 
what he described as falsehoods in other newspapers. Outlining each point, he defended the 
spiritual leader against those who tried to make his ideas seem both “trop absolues et trop 
favorables à l’Allemagne” and “trop vagues et insuffisantes.”12 Bourassa remained optimistic 
that a true peace was possible by paying heed the reasoned and moral voice of the Pope. He 
hoped the Pope’s words could convince others to reject “les hideux vampires qui se gorgent du 
sang des nations,”13 so that then the people of the world forced their leaders to action. 
Bourassa’s position on the war has been termed “Christian Pacifism,”14 but a more 
proper description may have been “Catholic Neutrality.” As a devout Catholic, his faith played 
an integral role in shaping his wartime views. As an ultramontane, however, his devotion 
influenced him in different ways than other wartime Catholics. His ultramontane belief in the 
supremacy of the Pope over civil authorities or national church hierarchies created a definitive 
understanding of the war’s events through that lens. While Bourassa may have not been 
absolutely certain of the Pope’s judgment in temporal affairs, he was certain that the Pope was 
the least fallible voice in the world.15 Bourassa’s thoughts on the war were undoubtedly 
Catholic in nature; however, they significantly diverged from the positions taken by other 
Catholics in the belligerent nations, including Canada. For instance, English-speaking 
Catholics used the war as a tool to emphasize further the differences from French Canadian 
                                                 
11 Henri Bourassa, “L’Appel du Pape,” Le Devoir, August 18, 1917, 1. Bourassa’s first footnote also remarks on 
some of the offending papers, which included Montreal’s La Patrie and New York’s Evening Post. 
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Catholics, seeking to balance their loyalty to Britain and maintaining sympathy with their 
fellow Catholics.16  
Just as important to understanding Bourassa’s position is the concept of “Neutrality.” 
Bourassa did not espouse a “pacifist” view (a moral opposition to any violence). He contested 
the justification and consequences of the First World War itself. This departed slightly from 
Pope Benedict XV’s official position of “absolute impartiality,” which denoted a subtle but 
often misunderstood difference from neutrality. “Absolute impartiality was more than simply a 
tightened concept of neutrality,” Charles R. Gallagher clarifies, since “absolute impartiality 
distinctly forbade public moral determinations by non-belligerent states.”17 The Holy See 
refused to draw moral judgments on warring states, with Benedict XV trying to position the 
Vatican as both politically and morally neutral in the conflict.  
Bourassa’s sententious writing did not follow this dictate closely. Rather, he argued for 
a peaceful resolution to the European war while denouncing those who refused to consider 
peace as a viable option. He effectively situated himself as “neutral” within an older context of 
neutrality. During the 19th century, neutrality was a key element in maintaining the European 
balance of power and restraining larger nations’ aggressive tendencies. M. M. Abbenhuis 
observes that this was a “legitimate foreign policy option” and a nation’s intent against war 
was just as valid as those who threatened to wage it.18 Thus, Bourassa did not oppose the war 
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for the sake of opposing it. He expressed, through a definitively religious lens, his belief that 
moderation, restraint and limited war (not total war) were the only ways to assure European 
stability and maintain the virtues of civilization for which both sides claimed to fight.  
Bourassa’s neutrality was not a passive abdication of war for religious reasons, as the 
term “Christian Pacifist” might suggest. It was a resolute stance against war’s excessive 
incarnation, rooted in Benedict XV’s wartime policy of impartial moderation. Above all, the 
French Canadian Catholic commentator trusted the righteousness of the Sovereign Pontiff to 
guide humanity. It was in this frame of mind that Bourassa returned to the political events 
developing in Ottawa.  
Throughout August 1917, Prime Minister Borden’s efforts to forge a coalition of 
Liberals and Conservatives continued without the support of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Borden 
believed that he could entice a group of pro-conscription Liberals to join the government and 
break away from Laurier’s party. Borden pursued prominent Liberals from across the country, 
like the Premier of Alberta, Albert Sifton (brother of Laurier’s former Cabinet Minister, 
Clifford Sifton), Saskatchewan MP James Calder, progressive Manitoban Liberal Thomas 
Crerar, Ontario Liberal leader Newton Rowell, and New Brunswick MP Frank Carvell. 
Conscriptionist Liberals tried to wean the party away from Laurier’s influence without 
success.19 At a Liberal meeting on 7 August, much of the rank and file enthusiastically 
supported Laurier, whose decision to support a referendum left the Liberals who wanted 
conscription unilaterally imposed with no place in the party. Consequently, the pro-
conscription Liberals reluctantly agreed to enter a coalition with Conservatives as part of the 
new Unionist Party. Believing that the Laurier Liberals faced annihilation in the coming 
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election, the Liberal-Unionists saw themselves as preserving the Liberal party outside of 
Quebec and ensuring its future longevity.20  
Bourassa approved of Laurier’s refusal to support forced military service and even his 
policy of a referendum, recognizing that Laurier was in a complicated and difficult situation. 
Bourassa believed the Liberal leader was trying to avoid conscription in any form, but could 
not outright declare his change in position and thus had supported a referendum. Bourassa told 
his readers that Laurier was personally and sincerely opposed to conscription, but the 
circumstances of the war and the chains that Laurier himself had forged entrapped the Liberal 
leader. The Liberal’s complicity during the Boer War and subsequent Imperial ventures -- 
including the last three years of the war -- had plunged Canada into its current position. Now 
Laurier was trying to correct his party’s past mistakes. “M. Laurier,” Bourassa declared, “se 
doit à lui-même, il doit à partisans fidèles, il doit à ses compatriotes, il doit au pays tout entier, 
de sortir de la brousse et de se placer sur un terrain solide pour livrer à découvert la bataille 
électorale.”21 A Liberal election victory was dependent on not alienating the party from the pro-
conscription vote. Bourassa believed that Laurier offered support for conscription as a means 
of ensuring electoral success for the Liberal party. During the debate over the legislation, 
Bourassa had been lukewarm towards Laurier’s efforts to oppose the bill, but now Bourassa 
accepted that a Liberal victory was the only way to correct the country’s wayward direction. 
The election preoccupied Canada’s political leaders in the fall of 1917, while Canadian 
soldiers fought costly engagements in the mud of Passchendaele. Prime Minister Borden, 
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fearing an election loss even with some Liberals on his side, passed two crucial pieces of 
election legislation in August and September: the Military Voters Act and the War Time 
Elections Act. The Military Voters Act gave the vote to all soldiers, and those who did not name 
a constituency were able to cast a “floating vote” that was assigned to any constituency the 
government wanted. In mid-September, the War Time Elections Act gave the vote to the wives, 
widows, mothers and sisters of soldiers and simultaneously disenfranchised “enemy alien” 
citizens naturalized after 1902, unless they had relatives serving in the armed forces. Borden’s 
legislation aimed to assure a victory for his coalition government, regardless of any lingering 
disputes over conscription.22 Two Liberal victories in the provincial elections of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan earlier that year were allegedly attributable to the “foreign vote” and the 
Conservatives were wary of their influence.23  
The Liberals stood firmly against the bill and spoke out vehemently against it in the 
House of Commons. They did not accept the government’s claims that the legislation would 
reveal “the real views of the Canadian people,”24 insisting that the legislation was intended 
only to bolster the government’s electoral results. J.H. Sinclair, the Liberal MP for 
Guysborough in Nova Scotia, asked on 10 September, “Let me suggest to the Secretary of 
State that he change the name, and call it ‘The War-Times Prussian Junker Act.’” “The idea 
behind this measure is military autocracy,” he continued, reminding his fellow parliamentarians 
that “we, on this side of the House, I am proud to say, stand for democracy.”25 The Liberals 
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condemned the establishment of what they saw effectively as a separate social caste for the 
military, calling it the founding of a Prussian Junker aristocracy and “oligarchic Kaiserism.”26 
None accepted that expanding the electoral franchise was bettering Canadian democracy. 
Bourassa understood the government’s intention as well, baptizing it the “Mad-Time 
Elections Act.”27 Bourassa also perceived the legislation as the creation of “une caste militaire 
privilégiée,” where women related to soldiers earned suffrage solely because of their relation 
“les héros.” Even giving women the vote seemed an extraordinary act, adding yet another 
revolutionary facet to his critique of the war.28 Equally unsettling was the government 
disenfranchising foreign-born Canadians. To Bourassa, disavowing the Canadians already 
acknowledged as citizens was outrageous. “Voilà la confiance,” he wrote, “que les sauveurs des 
‘petits nationalités’ accordent à leurs protégés.”29 They were already British subjects, they had 
paid taxes, they had set down roots and became Canadian, yet now they were to live as pariahs 
in their new home. In the conclusion to his thoughts on the Wartime Elections Act, Bourassa 
ranked it even worse than conscription. He told his readers that, “par son inspiration, ses 
motifs, ses conséquences immédiates, sa portée lointaine, cette législation est infiniment plus 
criminelle et dangereuse que la loi de conscription. Elle suinte par tous les pores l’iniquité, le 
mensonge, la fourberie, le despotisme lâche.”30 At least, Bourassa concluded, the Liberals 
opposed the motion. For the first time in several years, Bourassa readily admitted that the 
Opposition was doing its job to resist unjust government action.  
The debates over conscription and Borden’s election legislation finally rehabilitated 
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Laurier in Bourassa’s eyes. “Au noms de tous les vrais et sincères nationalistes,” Bourassa 
wrote that summer, “j’accepte le remède proposé par M. Laurier.”31 Robert Rumilly recounts 
the story of their first meeting after several years in the fall of 1917. Louis-Athanase David, a 
Quebec Liberal MLA, wrote to both Bourassa and Laurier telling them that they wished to see 
one another. Bourassa travelled to Ottawa to see his former chief, and Laurier opened his arms, 
saying, “ce qui m’arrive aujourd'hui, vous me l’avez prédit il y a onze ans. Je sais maintenant 
où trouver les vrais amis.”32 The two had reconciled their differences and could work together 
against a common foe. 
When Prime Minister Borden formally announced the formation of Union Government 
on 12 October and presented its program and Cabinet on the 18th,33 Bourassa affirmed that 
Laurier and his partisans had to have “la clairvoyance et l’énergie de comprendre la 
situation.”34 The only hope for the future of Laurier and his Liberal party was to understand the 
depth of Canada’s “complaisance envers les faux dieux.” Real and honest Canadians were tired 
of the government’s lies, Bourassa predicted, and were waiting for a party to lead them. 
Laurier’s Liberals had become that party.  
In late October, just days before Borden called the 17 December election, Bourassa 
outlined the international situation enmeshing Canada. He attached none of the high meaning 
to the cause of victory repeated in newspapers, posters, and speeches across the country. 
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Bourassa saw little proof that the war was anything more than for the profit of “financiers.”35 
He drew new inspiration on the topic from an article by American writer Frederic C. Howe 
entitled “Financial Imperialism.”36  
Howe was the President of the League for Small and Subject Nationalities, a New York 
based organization that aimed to ensure that all the nationalities of the world had representation 
on the international stage as well as at the peace conference that would one day decide the 
terms of the war’s end.37 Like Bourassa, Howe agreed with the work of British radicals such as 
Noel Brailsford and J.A. Hobson, and pointed to “financial imperialism” as one of the leading 
causes of modern war.38 Howe considered imperialism, or “dollar diplomacy” in an American 
context, as the fusion of financial development with foreign policy. It was an action of finance 
rather than trade and included “(1) the lending of money, often to weak or dependant countries 
or to rulers of doubtful legitimacy, (2) the building of railroads, canals, and the public utility 
enterprises; and (3) the development of mines, plantations, and other resources.”39 He explored 
the history of these practises in recent memory, touching on the British and French intervention 
in Egypt and the 1911 Moroccan Crisis, while connecting each international incident to 
financial investment from Great Powers. He considered these investments as dishonest or 
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exploitive, benefitting the wealthy and powerful nations of the world at the expense of poor or 
less developed peoples. Thus, the global economic conflict between Great Powers was a cause 
of the current war, Howe argued, and only democratic freedom and economic peace could 
correct these “monopolistic conditions” and avoid future conflict.40  
Finance was the arbiter of international politics, Bourassa declared, and he repeated 
Howe’s narrative of events and his argument. Britain would emerge from the war as a financier 
and creditor regardless of Germany’s victory or defeat. The only desire of the “ploutocratie 
anglaise” was to entrap every nation of the world in their financial clutches. Just as they had 
ensnared France and Russia, so too did “le démon de l’or s’est emparé des chefs de la société 
américaine.” 41 Amazingly, Bourassa alleged that Britain had been one of the firmest opponents 
to the American entry before the collapse of Russia in 1917 because the United States had little 
value to British plutocrats. The end of the war might see democracy in Germany, but it would 
come after British (and now American) financiers had total economic control.42 Behind all of 
the justifications for the war, he wrote, “se dresse partout le spectre hideux de la cupidité 
mercantile, l’horrible et insatiable démon de l’or.”43 If that was the war for which Canadians 
died and campaigned, Bourassa saw no hope of redemption for the “les fauteurs de la 
révolution.”44  
In his final article on the subject, Bourassa investigated the “deteriorating moral 
character” of the Canadian nation in light of the upcoming election. On 31 October, the day 
Borden announced the election, Bourassa wondered what future lay with the “ministère de la 
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trahison nationale.”45 Canada had everything to lose and nothing to gain. The nation ruined 
itself for the profit of Great Britain today and for the United States tomorrow. There was little 
chance of economic recovery after the war, Bourassa predicted, thus it would look to the 
United States: “la seule nation capable de nous remettre sur pied est, en même temps, notre 
unique créancière.”46 Ottawa took orders from London and New York, claimed Bourassa. How 
else to explain the alliance between the “ultra-jingos de Toronto” with “les annexionnistes 
anciens et modernes de l’Ouest et de la Nouvelle-Écosse” (the pro-conscription Liberals)?47 He 
believed the newly formed Unionist Party had committed national treason as they sold out 
Canada to foreign powers, which made the choice between Borden and Laurier clear. Laurier 
was “intègre, honorable, [et] notoirement supérieur à tout ce qui se meut dans les bas-fonds,” 
Bourassa wrote. Despite his writing from earlier in 1917, he now declared that Laurier “au 
moins, ne s’est jamais vendu.” Borden was “obéissant au mot d’ordre de l’étranger,” so Laurier 
had to rally all those of “convictions sincères pour défendre ce qui reste du patrimoine 
national.”48 Canada under Union Government was on a dangerous path, and only a Laurier 
victory could prevent further degradation. 
Despite his impassioned pleas, Bourassa held little hope for a Liberal victory, but he 
remained optimistic about the party’s future. The war had corrupted and broken the spirit of the 
Liberal party as some of its members left to join Union Government. Neither it nor the 
Conservative party, he wrote, would ever be the same party they had been before the Great 
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War. “Les noms subsisteront peut-être,” he foresaw, “mais les groupes ne seront plus les 
mêmes, ni les hommes, ni l’esprit.”49 Instead, Canada’s political parties would emerge as new 
entities. “Les partis – comme le peuple lui-même,” he wrote, “vont se refaire dans la norme des 
courants nouveaux, des idées de demain, selon l’antagonisme des principes qui correspondent à 
la dure réalité des choses nées de la guerre et de l’après-guerre.”50 He hoped then that Laurier 
could help one day repair the damage that had been done. The Liberal leader had the solemn 
responsibility of making the “suprême effort pour rendre à la nation canadienne conscience 
d’elle-même, de ses devoirs réels, de ses droits positifs pour l’arracher aux faux dieux de 
l’impérialisme, pour l’arrêter dans sa course au suicide, pour fermer ses plaies béantes et lui 
préparer une nouvelle vitalité.”51  
During the election campaign, Bourassa maintained a pessimistic tone throughout his 
editorials. For years he had extolled in the pages of his newspaper how and why the war should 
end, yet in the final months 1917 he had less confidence in the immediacy of that change. 
Instead, he hoped that one day in the future Canada could become the country he envisioned, 
as it was obvious that it would not happen under Union Government.  
The federal election campaign of November and December 1917 was, as historian 
Michael Bliss described, “the most bitter in Canadian history, viciously fought on both sides. 
Virtually everyone’s loyalty and morality were called into question.”52 Though the Unionists 
and the Liberals had comprehensive electoral platforms, the election was ultimately about the 
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future conduct of the war effort. The Unionist platform promised conscription and civil service 
reforms such as abolishing patronage and providing oversight for government purchasing.53 
The Laurier Liberals vowed to reduce wartime taxes and tariffs, better provide for soldier’s 
families, and eliminate the corruption that had plagued Borden’s government.54 These 
platforms were superfluous. The Unionists would impose a unified war effort through 
conscription while the Liberals appealed for a referendum for the sake of a unified war effort. 
The Unionists had to focus on conscription and the war, given that pro-conscription Liberals 
did not trust the Conservative-led coalition, while some Conservatives did not accept the 
Liberal presence in the new party. The war and conscription were the only issue on which they 
could all agree. Laurier, on the other hand, embraced the conscription as an electoral issue. He 
returned to familiar territory to defend traditional liberal values of individual freedom, liberty 
and resistance to oppression.55 Both sides argued that only they could successfully navigate the 
turbulent waters of wartime unity by virtue of their positions on conscription.  
In an election campaign focused solely on the war, there was little room for 
compromise or moderation. As Unionist and former Liberal Newton Rowell remarked on 21 
November, “What is the alternative to this Union Government? ... If you think of quitting the 
War, you have an alternative, but if you are in favour of ... a victorious conclusion [to the war], 
then I say in all sincerity you have no alternative to Union Government.”56 Both Unionists and 
Liberals presented voters with a stark choice: choose us or face ruin. In Quebec, the decision 
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was clear.57 Few wanted conscription and fewer trusted Union Government, which had a 
definitively anti-Catholic and anti-French Canadian tone.58 Unionist candidates in the province 
faced unruly mobs, interrupted speeches, few press organs that would express their views, and 
even death threats.59  
Bourassa was arguably at the height of his fame and notoriety. The election helped 
cement his position as leader of the Quebec resistance to the war in both English and French 
speaking Canada, with varying degrees of animosity and praise for it. “Le programme 
unioniste,” he told French Canadians, “c’est antithèse de tout ce que nous aimons, de tout ce 
que nous croyons, de tout ce que nous voulons. C’est la synthèse de tout ce que nous détestons, 
de tout ce que nous avons conspué – hommes, idées et tendances – dans les deux partis.”60 
Nationalistes, he advised, should vote for Laurier. As in 1911, it was in their best interest to 
support one party over the other rather than abstain or vote for independent candidates.61 The 
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chance of a Unionist winning Quebec seats was too dangerous to risk. Bourassa’s appeals and 
Laurier’s careful positioning of the Liberal Party as nominally against conscription virtually 
assured a Liberal victory in the province. As one historian noted, Québécois would have voted 
for a telephone pole so long as it was not in favour of conscription.62 
The united Canada that Bourassa had one hoped for was little more than a dream in the 
final months of 1917. English Canadian Unionists painted French Canadians as “shirkers” who 
did not want to do their duty, or worse, as traitors to Canada and the British Empire. They did 
their best to associate Bourassa with Laurier as much as possible to tarnish the Liberal leader’s 
reputation. They called Bourassa the “King of Quebec” and suggested that a Laurier victory 
meant Bourassa ruling Canada.63 Unionist propaganda pamphlets, such as Plain Facts for 
English-Speaking Electors, linked Bourassa and Laurier together while quoting from Le Devoir 
and other French Canadian newspapers as proof that French speaking Canadians sought the 
dissolution of Confederation and took orders from the Pope in Rome.64 Laurier did his best to 
disassociate his party from the nationalistes, at least outside of the borders of Quebec, 
emphasizing that he was not against the war effort, only the government’s conduct of the war.65 
Despite his efforts, many English Canadian papers condemned the Liberal leader, some more 
virulently than others. The Toronto News called Laurier “a demagogue, a charlatan and a 
mountebank,” while in Montreal an English-speaking Canadian wrote that “if Laurier were to 
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win he would win leading the cockroaches of the kitchen of Canada to victory.”66 Both sides 
used vitriol and hyperbole to convince voters that only they could lead the nation. 
In the last two months of 1917, Bourassa wrote only one article that did not discuss the 
election. It examined a new public advocate for peace in Britain, Lord Lansdowne. Almost a 
year after the German peace proposal and President Wilson’s note, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 
5th Marquess of Lansdowne, released a letter to the press in late November. Lansdowne, former 
Governor General of Canada as well as the former leader of the Conservative party in the 
House of Lords, had an illustrious career in service of Britain.67 The “Lansdowne Letter” was 
an edited version of a memorandum originally circulated to the British Cabinet after Prime 
Minister Herbert Asquith asked for their views on potential peace terms in early November 
1916.68 Though its context was the aftermath of the Somme campaign, not the fall of 1917, 
Lansdowne specifically chose to respect Cabinet tradition and never disclosed to the public that 
the upper echelons of British government had already discussed it in 1916. In it, he called for a 
negotiated peace that preserved Germany as a Great Power while ensuring economic trade and 
European stability. He eventually published it in the London Daily Telegraph on 29 November, 
1917, to “set out aims that are moderate and will appeal to moderate minds in all countries.”69 
A long history of diplomatic and government service had convinced Lansdowne of the 
                                                 
66 O.D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier: volume II, 537. Skelton includes other examples of the 
scorn directed at Laurier. 
67 P. B. Waite, “PETTY-FITZMAURICE, HENRY CHARLES KEITH, 5th Marquess of LANSDOWNE,” 
Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 15, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed October 
26, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/petty_fitzmaurice_henry_charles_keith_15E.html.  
68 Lansdowne’s biographer, Lord Newton, suggests that Lansdowne’s memorandum split the Cabinet and helped 
break up Britain’s Coalition Government, allowing David Lloyd George to come to power in December, 
though more recent studies have questioned its influence, see Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton, Lord 
Lansdowne, A Biography, (London: Macmillan and co., 1929), 449-50. One of the most recent works on 
Lansdowne rejects Newton’s conclusion, see Frank Winters, “Exaggerating the Efficacy of Diplomacy: The 
Marquis of Lansdowne’s ‘Peace Letter’ of November 1917,” The International History Review, no.1, 32 
(March 2010): 32-33. 
69 From a letter Lansdowne wrote to Wilson’s advisor, Colonel Edward House, in early November, as cited in 
Frank Winters, “Exaggerating the Efficacy of Diplomacy,” 36. 
272 
 
power of diplomacy to resolve disputes and secure a peaceful solution to European and 
Imperial conflicts.70 With that in mind, he urged for a negotiated end to the war. For 
Lansdowne, no victory would be worth the cost of the war’s continuation, which simply shed 
more blood while threatening the stability of Europe and Britain. He argued that “we are not 
going to lose this war, but its prolongation will spell ruin for the civilized world and an infinite 
addition to the load of human suffering.”71 Lansdowne feared that the necessary reparations for 
such a brutal war would make lasting peace impossible, since as dreadful as the Great War was, 
he was sure that “the next war [would] be even more dreadful than this.”72 The belligerents had 
to balance reparations with their impact on the defeated peoples, Lansdowne wrote, and that 
might mean asking for little or nothing at all. Ending the war and preventing future ones ought 
to be the Allies’ sole war aim.73 
Few British commentators agreed with him during wartime. When he published his 
letter in the Daily Telegraph, his plea for peace was widely denounced in British Parliament 
and British newspapers, though the press reaction among Allied powers varied from ignoring it 
to praise.74 While those deliberating over peace negotiations received Lansdowne’s note well,75 
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others in Britain denounced him as a “defeatist.”76 The UDC meanwhile praised Lansdowne’s 
vision and one of its members, British pacifist Bertrand Russell, noted optimistically that the 
“letter represents the first beginnings of a return to a sanity.”77 Still, Lansdowne’s letter 
ultimately did not have the impact that he hoped. The venerable politician later published two 
more letters in the press analysing Allied diplomacy as the end of the war drew closer.78 Their 
publication occurred in much better circumstances for the Allies than the first and the reaction 
to them improved considerably as a result. 
Bourassa’s comments on Lansdowne were brief but significant.79 Whereas Lansdowne 
was more concerned with ending the war in a way that was still beneficial to Great Britain, 
Bourassa saw the proposal as another initiative to stop the war before it caused greater harm. 
The first portion of his article reminded his readers of such and linked it to thoughts that the 
Pope had already expressed. The letter was merely “la traduction, dans le langage politique et 
humain, des diverses manifestations de la pensée du Souverain Pontife.”80 It mirrored the Papal 
peace, which aimed at stopping the terrible slaughter of the war as soon as possible; it was not 
a political or economic analysis of the disastrous cost of the war for England. In this case, 
Bourassa’s own Catholic values clouded his reaction to Lansdowne’s words. He saw what he 
wanted to see in the aristocrat’s writing. He compared it to Wilson’s grand claims of a peace 
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that would “make the world safe for democracy.” Lansdowne proposed a peace that was not 
“uniquement la seule paix juste et durable, c’[était] aussi la seule paix possible.” 81 To 
Bourassa, the President’s willingness to participate in the butchery in France had corrupted the 
American vision of peace and he welcomed new allies who understood the war’s 
senselessness. Instead, he heralded Lansdowne as a true supporter of peace because he called 
for the cessation of hostilities and killing by both sides without regard for political or military 
considerations.  
The war’s quick end was the best possible solution for humanity and Bourassa 
approved of Lansdowne’s five points to encourage peace negotiations.82 The journalist agreed 
that reassuring Germany that defeat did not mean destruction, politically or economically, 
would make the Germans more amenable to negotiations. Nonetheless, Bourassa noted the 
irony of the belligerents’ positions. The situation in late 1917 was a reversal from the previous 
year, and he asked if “les exploiteurs de chair humaine gagneront […] la partie cette année, en 
Allemagne, comme ils l'ont gagnée l'an dernier, en pays alliés?”83 The greatest impediment was 
not, he suggested, that one side feared a peace without victory; both the Allies and the Central 
Powers feared a peace with defeat. Just as the Allies had rejected losing the war through peace 
terms in 1916, Germany now refused to consider a peace that amounted to an Allied victory. 
Bourassa repeated Lansdowne’s belief that the Great Powers fought for security foremost, and 
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a longer war meant a greater chance of revolution and disorder. Bourassa warned that to ignore 
the cause of peace, which echoed “dans l’âme des millions d’êtres humains,” would lead to a 
war against any state that denied it and lead to universal civil war.84 Ultimately, Bourassa 
wanted to put an end to the tragic loss of hundreds of thousands of lives before more died. 
In a final appeal to his readers two days before the 17 December election, Bourassa 
lamented the sorry state of Canadian democracy and urged them to vote against Union 
government. He longed to see the former nationalistes who had ran for the Conservatives in 
1911 finally punished for their treason. “Il faut nettoyer la scène politique de leur présence et 
de leur contorsions,” Bourassa wrote.85 At least the election would allow Quebec to flush out 
its “disloyal” representatives, even if the process was a poor example of democratic 
government. “L’une des pires et des plus absurdes inconséquences du régime électoral,” he 
explained, was that “il est impossible de soutenir à la fois le meilleur candidat et la meilleur 
politique.”86 He told voters that the electoral contest had become a plebiscite whereby 
Canadians could either vote for conscription or vote against it. It was not a fair contest between 
policies and leaders. He advised Canadians to vote for the Laurier Liberals, who offered the 
best alternative to the Unionists. 
When election day arrived, the Union Government won a resounding victory in English 
Canada. Out the 264 seat Parliament, the Unionists took 152 seats and the Liberals took 82 
seats. Sixty-two of Quebec’s 65 seats went to the Liberals, where they garnered 73% of the 
popular vote. The Unionists swept the English speaking parts of the country. The Liberals fared 
better in the Maritimes, winning 10 out of 21 seats, but in Ontario they won only eight out of 
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82 seats. Borden, worried that the Liberals might benefit from rural objections to conscription, 
had promised farmers exemption from forced military service -- an action that helped the 
Unionists achieve such an overwhelming victory in English Canada. A single French Canadian 
Unionist candidate was successful, Conservative incumbent Dr. John Léo Chabot for Ottawa.87 
In the words of one Liberal candidate, “the 1917 election was essentially a one-party election, 
one party only in Quebec and one party only in other provinces.”88 The country divided 
between French and English, Unionist and Liberal, conscripted and voluntary service. 
After the result, Bourassa denounced the great danger of Union Government that 
ignored Canada’s racial divide and further threatened Canadian national unity. Bourassa 
reversed his previous position that the election had effectively been a plebiscite on 
conscription. Instead, he now proclaimed that the election was not just about conscription and 
it did not signify general acceptance of a war without limits. The promised exemption of 
farmers had led many of them to vote for Union Government, Bourassa argued, and thus a true 
referendum on conscription would have seen their vote go to the Liberals.89 Bourassa disagreed 
with those who argued the election demonstrated “l’isolement du Québec.” The truth, he 
explained, was that “les divers groupes et provinces du pays ont voté contre l’unionisme en 
raison directe de leur force de résistance à l’entraînement impérialiste.”90 True Canadians had 
voted against conscription, Bourassa insisted. He pointed to the West’s support for it, since 
they were newer and less traditional provinces with populations that had only “recently” 
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arrived in the country. The Prairies “ont perdu la notion des stabilités nationales.”91 Ultimately, 
the country’s disunity was not the fault of French Canada. Instead, the Union victory 
demonstrated that the rest of Canada was isolated from those who preserved its true character, 
like the French Canadians.  
Bourassa explained that Union Government would have the opposite result that its 
name implied. The Unionists had spent months denigrating French Canadians over the course 
of the election campaign and they had divided the country. Therefore, Bourassa wrote, French 
Canada was not isolated from the rest of Canada of their own accord. They had been the targets 
of anti-Catholic and anti-French rhetoric. “La prétendue ‘union nationale,’” Bourassa argued, 
“a désuni la nation canadienne et planté un nouveau germe de désagrégation dans le sol, déjà 
fort crevassé, de l’Empire britannique.”92 While Canada had dealt with racial and religious 
division before, Bourassa clarified that wartime had allowed the Unionists to weld English 
Canadian patriotism to the interests of a foreign power, Britain. Unlike previous conflicts 
between French and English Canadians, he explained, nobody could oppose the war without 
becoming traitors to the Canadian nation. Thus, supporting the war meant supporting Canada, 
and in turn, supporting Canada meant supporting Britain. The three were indivisible in the 
minds of English Canadian war supporters, and to reject one was to reject them all. Bourassa 
predicted that after the war that Liberals and Conservatives would cleanly divide along racial 
and regional lines, French versus English and East versus West. Confederation, he mourned, 
was broken.93  
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Even if French Canadians were present and influential in Union Government, Bourassa 
asserted that it could not repair the damage the election had caused. He no longer believed that 
French-speaking Canadians were in an equal partnership with English Canada. Any French 
Canadians in government were mere puppets of English Canadian politicians. Their role 
consisted of “à rompre les énergies de leur compatriotes, à endormir leur vigilance, à leur faire 
consentir d’humiliantes concessions, toujours sous le prétexte facile de concilier la majorité, de 
conserver leur influence dans le cabinet et d’obtenir pour la province de Québec sa part de 
dépouilles.”94 The supposed “isolation of French Canada” was not the result of French Canada 
turning its back on English Canada; English Canada turned its back on them, reneging on the 
implicit promise of equality and compromise that had been implicit in when it pushed through 
conscription. The will of the majority triumphed over the will of the minority. For Bourassa, 
the solution to problem of French Canada’s place in the Canadian democracy was clear: 
A tout le moins, la délégation de la province de Québec au parlement fédéral n’a 
aucune raison de se lier à aucun gouvernement, à aucune parti, avant d’avoir 
obtenu les conditions d’association absolument honorables pour elle-même, 
avantageuses sans excès pour la nationalité canadienne-française, profitables à 
toute la nation canadienne.95 
Quebec’s MPs had to represent French Canadian interests in the House of Commons since they 
could no longer trust the federal parties that drew support from English Canadian voters.  
In December 1917, Bourassa was effectively arguing that the Liberal Party had to 
become a French Canadian Party. In his mind, only a balance between French and English 
interests could guide Canada properly, and now he seemed to endorse the racial division that he 
had once strenuously rejected. The war undermined his vision of a united Canada. If the 
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English-speaking majority was not willing to listen to the French minority, then it was up to 
French Canadians to compel action, and the Liberal Party was the only vessel they had 
available. 
In the first month of 1918, Bourassa published his final book of the war, Le Pape 
Arbitre de la Paix. It collected his articles concerning Pope Benedict XV’s attempts to produce 
a peaceful end to the European conflict and reflected on the papal influence on other peace 
initiatives. Though largely comprised of articles written over the previous four years, it marked 
Bourassa’s final serious effort to discuss the possibility of peace, the international context of 
the war, and his last reflection on Pope Benedict XV. The final chapters were editorials from 
January 1918 addressing the war’s latest international developments. 
The first examined the latest effort by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George to 
present British war aims. At a speech on 5 January, Lloyd George responded to the Lansdowne 
Letter as well as the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that ended the war between Russia 
and the Central Powers. The Prime Minister outlined conditions that could end the war based 
on national self-determination and the establishment of an international organization to settle 
disputes after the war.96 Historians have disagreed whether Lloyd George was attempting to 
moderate British war aims to make peace viable, responding to the demands of British radicals 
while bolstering morale, or affirming the results of Brest-Litovsk as a formula for future peace 
deals.97 To an outside observer like Bourassa, it was a welcome statement that perhaps 
harkened further peace initiatives. At least, he maintained, it aligned more closely with the 
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Papal views on the matter. 
Bourassa perceived Lloyd George’ speech as an extraordinary evolution of the British 
position towards peace. Reading between the lines, Bourassa wrote, Lloyd George’s speech, 
the Lansdowne letter, and the Pope formed “un remarquable accord de fond.”98 Lansdowne, 
Bourassa agreed, had been correct in predicting terrible consequences by prolonging the war 
and Lloyd George was attempting to avert them. Still, many details about the speech did not 
impress Bourassa. Lloyd George’s affirmation that France and Italy would recover territory 
from the Central Powers drew Bourassa’s criticism because he anticipated that this would only 
lengthen the war and entail additional sacrifice. He added his familiar refrain that nationalities 
deserved autonomy among all states, not just those that formed the Central Powers. Yet despite 
its inconsistencies and shortcomings, Bourassa wrote, the speech was “la plus formelle faite 
jusqu'ici, du côté des Alliés, à une paix qui ‘ne profite pas à une seule des parties, mais à 
toutes’ — la seule paix ‘juste et durable’ appelée par le Pape.”99  
If Bourassa was impressed by Lloyd George’s speech, he was enthusiastic about 
President Woodrow Wilson’s “Program for World Peace” presented to American Congress on 8 
January. Wilson outlined his famous Fourteen Points to guide any possible peace settlements, 
proclaiming that “it is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to 
live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.”100 
His speech set out the points that would guide the Treaty of Versailles a year later and 
drastically transform the international system. Bourassa supported Wilson’s confirmation of 
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national self-determination and enthusiastically endorsed his peace program.101 Its fourteen 
points spoke to a new vision of the international system that resolved grave problems that had 
led to the outbreak of the First World War nearly four years earlier. Bourassa was caught in the 
“Wilsonian moment,”102 where it seemed possible that the war would bring about substantial 
reform to the international system and yield a new liberal international order that emphasized 
self-government and democracy.  
In a two-part series, Bourassa compared and contrasted Wilson with Lloyd George, 
focusing on Wilson’s call to “free oppressed nationalities.”103 Both aligned with Pope Benedict 
XV’s position by supporting a negotiated peace and rejecting the idea of annexation through 
conquest.104 All these commentators claimed to reject the subjugation of one nationality by 
another. Bourassa was glad that the statesmen had finally learned the lessons of history that 
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conquest only led to further conflict.105 Wilson’s vision was far grander than that of the British 
Prime Minister. While Lloyd George spoke specifically about peace, Wilson “encadre ses 
réclamations ou ses suggestions de faits dans des principes d'application générale,” allowing 
them to apply more broadly to the entire international system.106 Bourassa believed that the 
American President was extending a hand to Germany and acted in good faith towards the 
Central Powers. “Il la convie à se joindre à ce programme de réfection mondiale,” Bourassa 
wrote, “sans rien sacrifier de sa grandeur, de ses aspirations, de son régime même, pourvu 
qu'elle renonce à toute idée de domination et se contente d'une ‘place égale parmi les nations 
du monde.’”107 He saw in Wilson’s words an international system not based on fear and 
antagonism but on good will and justice, thus fulfilling the Catholic vision of international 
order espoused by Benedict XV. 
Bourassa concluded the book with an article titled “Triomphe et justification du Pape” 
that discerned the growing influence of the Papacy on international affairs. “Le monde a plus 
que jamais besoin du Pape,” he professed. He argued that the Papal position must have inspired 
both Lloyd George and Wilson, whether they admitted it or not. One way or another, “ils sont 
forcés d'emprunter davantage au programme de paix du Souverain Pontife.”108 Bourassa 
reviewed Pope Benedict’s various peace notes during the war and highlighted how the Pope 
had proposed a just and equitable peace that recognized national self-determination in an effort 
to forge a lasting and peaceful resolution to the war. “Que tout cela était vrai, fort, juste et 
infiniment plus pratique,” he concluded, “que tous les conseils de la haine, les efforts de la 
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force brutale et les roueries de l'astuce diplomatique!”109 Pope Benedict’s careful vision and 
impartial attitude had convinced the belligerent nations of the validity of his position over time. 
His enlightened analysis had shepherded the war’s participants towards the possibility of 
peace, and the Catholic leader deserved credit for helping to avoid further catastrophe. Only 
the Pope, Bourassa wrote, could finish the work he had started and finally guide the world 
safely towards an unbiased peace: 
Que la paix se fasse demain, ou que les nations, obstinées à leur perte, poursuivent 
leur oeuvre de suicide et de dévastation, ce n'est ni la paix allemande, ni la paix 
française, ni la paix anglaise, ni la paix américaine, ni la paix impérialiste, ni la 
paix démocratique, qui mettra fin au massacre: ce sera la paix chrétienne, ou la 
révolution sociale.110 
The ultramontane Bourassa relied heavily on Papal discourse as a crucial component to 
his judgements. While Bourassa engaged with Canadians who gauged the war’s political 
purpose through concepts of imperialism and democracy, Bourassa saw it entirely as a moral 
and religious issue. Whether Ontario Protestants111 or French Canadian Catholics of Quebec,112 
religious Canadians had to reconcile the war’s atrocities with their religious convictions. 
Bourassa did so by unquestioningly accepting the Pope’s position. Bourassa did not so much 
find the Vatican’s position in agreement with his own; rather he allowed the Vatican’s to define 
his own. In the introduction Le Pape, he noted that “je désavoue tout ce qui pourrait, dans mes 
déductions et mes jugements, apporter la plus légère altération à la pensée de l'auguste 
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Pontife.”113 Bourassa was not in his usual role of impassioned advocate, he was the humble 
interpreter. While Bourassa often cited other texts or writers to complement his arguments, he 
treated the words of the Pope as sacred. Pope Benedict XV was the inspiration for his ideas, a 
voice of moderation, and the spiritual and intellectual leader who steered his religious beliefs. 
None could compare to the righteousness of Pope Benedict. Throughout the war, Bourassa 
contrasted other -- sometimes faltering -- voices with that of the Papacy. The Pope’s 
consistency only further solidified his legitimacy in Bourassa’s eyes.  
A few English Canadian Catholic commentators shared Bourassa’s views. For example, 
Toronto Archbishop Neil McNeil’s 24-page pamphlet in February 1918 titled The Pope and the 
War sold over 5,000 copies and refuted accusations against the Holy Father, telling readers that 
“the Catholic Church is the only international power remaining unbroken by the conflict of 
nations and empires.”114 For most Anglophone Catholics however, the years-long battle over 
language education in Ontario had created so much tension between English and French 
speakers that they equally vilified Bourassa as Protestants did.115 The hierarchy of the French 
Canadian Church had originally committed to the war effort but only with the imposition of 
conscription did they align with the Pope’s position. Their decision to support the war was a 
source of strain for French Canadian Catholics, since many parish priests sided with 
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Bourassa’s wider view of the war.116 Bourassa was not unique among Canadian Catholics for 
contesting conscription or advocating the Papal position; but Bourassa alone publicly rejected 
the war itself based on a combination of Catholic devotion and critical inquiry.  
In the final weeks of January, Bourassa examined the failure of Lloyd George and 
Wilson’s tentative but positive remarks on the peace to establish negotiations. A two-part 
article, “Vers la Paix,” questioned the Central Powers’ reluctance to agree to a peace. He delved 
into Germany’s war aims and outlined what they still hoped to achieve from the war. Bourassa 
concluded that German Chancellor Georg von Hertling agreed with President Wilson and 
Prime Minister Lloyd George on almost every point of Europe’s territorial readjustment, 
except one: Alsace-Lorraine, where “le tort fait à la France [devrait être] réparé,” the Germans 
had no response but silence.117 This single issue blocked peace negotiations and it was the 
biggest challenge the two sides had to overcome. Until Germany was willing to negotiate, the 
war would continue. 
That meant that Canada and the Allies might soon face more difficult circumstances at 
home than on the battlefield. The terms of peace aside, two threats endangered the world of 
1918: famine and revolution. Bourassa warned that if the forces of a starving, ravaged people 
met “la panse monstrueuse et la bourse débordante” of the plutocracy before the ruined nations 
of the world could regain normalcy, then “malheur aux chefs d’État, malheur aux riches, 
malheur aux peuples, malheur au monde!”118 The terrible consequences of the war were deeper 
than a simple moral transgression. Continuing to fight the war to achieve security and power 
was at best idealistic and, at worst, suicidal. By 1918, the war stretched the morale and 
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cohesion of all the nations involved. The spectre of the Russian Civil War loomed, and the 
belligerent countries risked devastation that might prevent them from fighting any war.  
After the December federal election, the chance to end the war became a profoundly 
ethical issue for Bourassa. He focused entirely on international issues in the first months of 
1918. Despite his moral indignation that the war continued and over the actions of those who 
sustained it, Bourassa did not allow himself to forget the real political implications of war and 
peace on the international stage. It was not about attacking English Canadians, or British 
imperialism, or championing his province’s rights. His visceral reaction was rooted in his 
analysis of events, his Catholic faith and his confidence in Pope Benedict XV. It was more than 
a matter of political importance. Though his liberal nationalism shaped his political beliefs and 
the ideas he expressed, the devout French Canadian seemed ethically obliged to question why 
the war could not be ended. To evade such questions, as politicians did time and again, was 
morally dishonest.  
In the weeks before Easter 1918, Bourassa devoted much of his writing in Le Devoir to 
disseminating information revealed by Russia’s new Bolshevik government. On 22 November, 
1917, the Bolsheviks published the text of all treaties signed by the Allies and the former 
Czarist government. The UDC wasted no time in publishing the treaties as a pamphlet, noting 
that “our statesmen have given the world a steady flow of assurance that we have entered and 
sustained the war for unselfish aims, that we coveted no territory, and that we were not fighting 
for conquests or annexations,” and urged its readers to “critically examine the following 
treaties as a commentary on these wise intentions.”119 The publication had helped spur 
President Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George to offer a more moderate peace program 
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that January,120 and Bourassa welcomed the release of treaties that seemingly justified all of his 
claims about the war. He was determined to break the press silence on them and detailed their 
contents over four weeks from 21 February to 18 March. “Puisse cette confession forcée être 
au moins suivie,” he hoped, “chez tous les peuples et dans l’âme de tous les gouvernants, d’une 
sincère repentance et d’un salutaire ferme propos!”121 His examination repeated many of his 
arguments concerning the war, President Wilson, and the position of the Pope, as he detailed 
exactly where and how the secret treaties affirmed his views. 
Over the course of Easter Weekend, Bourassa published several editorials condemning 
female suffrage, which went to print while he was observing the religious holiday. As Quebec 
City rioted, he questioned whether giving women the vote truly improved democracy. He 
presented a series of philosophical, political, and practical arguments against female suffrage. 
The “social contract” included women in the family, not as voters, he argued.122 On 30 March 
he dismissed supporters of women’s suffrage as “les esprits superficiels et courts, incapables de 
saisir les relations des causes et des effets, les insouciants et les opportunistes, toujours prêts à 
concilier le bien et le mal, le faux et le vrai.”123 It was the last comprehensive analysis he 
offered Canadians before accepting the imposition of censorship later that month.  
His glib words of 30 March, though directed against suffrage supporters, could have 
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described his feelings towards the violent demonstrators who roamed the street that night. He 
repeated his counsel of August 1917, telling them that it was “ni légitime ni pratique de 
combattre” conscription with violence.124 No matter how justified the rioters may be in 
opposing conscription, Bourassa wrote, the primary duty of the state was to maintain public 
order. The government might enact legislation that was unfair or foolish, but it still played a 
vital role in protecting its citizens. Citizens, even ones facing unjust laws, “n’[ont] pas le droit 
d’y mettre obstacle par la violence, au détriment de l’ordre public.” “Les principes généraux 
d’ordre social,” he continued, “priment tous les griefs particuliers.”125 He feared armed 
insurrection against the government, an outcome that violated his belief in order and justice 
and promised far worse than anything Borden’s government had enacted. Bourassa’s 
categorical condemnation of the riots did not leave any room for rejoinders to his arguments.  
For months, the nationaliste journalist had faced the threat of censorship. Throughout 
the election campaign that fall and into the winter of 1917-18, citizens wrote to the Censor 
Office asking it to silence Henri Bourassa. During the tense months, leading up to the 
December election, Chief Press Censor E.J. Chambers refused to censor Le Devoir for fear that 
political opponents would see it as “an act of political warfare.”126 Chambers kept in contact 
with Georges Pelletier, one of Le Devoir’s editors, and through their communication agreed to 
temper Bourassa’s writing in the months leading up to April 1918.127 According to this 
correspondence, Bourassa changed the tone and content of his articles to make it more 
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amenable to the censor in the fall of 1917. Nonetheless, after the election ended, Chambers 
tried to stop Le Devoir’s publication for the duration of the war in February 1918 after 
Bourassa published his articles on the possibility of peace.  The government rejected 
Chambers’ suggestion.128  
Two weeks after the Quebec City Riots, Prime Minister Borden passed an Order-in-
Council that prohibited the press from publishing, or an individual from publicly expressing, 
“any adverse statement, report, or opinion concerning the action of the allied nations in the 
prosecution of the war.”129 Two days later, Bourassa explained to his readers that the 
government “qui porte l’entière responsabilité des mesures de guerre” believed that “le 
moment venu d’interdire toute expression d’opinion qu’il jugera propre à créer des discussions 
ou à alimenter des divergences d’opinion sur l’objet ou la conduite de la guerre.” “Il nous 
reste,” he concluded, “qu’à nous soumettre à cette décision des autorités et à laisser à l’avenir 
le soin de démontrer si elle est conforme aux meilleurs intérêts du pays.”130  
Bourassa wrote nothing for Le Devoir until October, except for a single article in May, 
and waited out the war’s end in uncharacteristic silence. His wife Josephine’s illness worsened 
and Bourassa grew depressed.131 He welcomed the new Apostolic Delegate, Archbishop Pietro 
di Maria, to Canada in October during such troubled times.132 When Borden left for Versailles 
                                                 
128 Cossette, La censure fédérale, 116-118. 
129 A description of the law is found in Canada, Sessional Papers of the Dominion of Canada, vol. 53 no. 1 (1918) 
23. The French text of the law is in Cossette, La censure fédérale, 141. Otherwise, the text of the Order-in-
council can be found at Library and Archives Canada, RG 2, Reel T-5034, Order-in-Council PC 915, 16 April 
1918. For one of the most recent discussions of censorship during the war, see Jeff Keshen, Propaganda and 
Censorship During Canada’s Great War, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1996). On 77, Keshen cites 
the May 1918 Order-in-Council PC 1241, which forbade any individual from persuading or inducing any 
person to resist or impede the Military Service Act (see Keshen, 66), as the reason for Bourassa’s silence. 
However, Bourassa writes in his paper a month earlier on 18 April 1918 about the new censorship laws in 
place and their impact on Le Devoir, and afterwards he published only one article until October 1918, which 
makes it seem likely that PC 915 was the reason. Cossette explains as much on 141-143. 
130 Henri Bourassa, “Nouveau Régime de Presse,” Le Devoir, 18 April, 1918, 1. 
131 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 603. 
132 Henri Bourassa, “Hommage au Délégue du Pape,” Le Devoir, 25 October, 1918, 1. 
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in early November to “take part in preliminary discussions respecting the terms of peace,” 
Bourassa lightly questioned his wisdom in abandoning Parliament.133 When word reached the 
journalist of the declaration of the armistice on 11 November, he feared the revolution growing 
in Germany and a return of “force brutale” in deciding worldly affairs. Bourassa declared it 
was time for prayer: 
Remercions Dieu d’avoir fait taire la voix meurtrière des canons, c’est-à-dire la 
voix de l’orgueil, de la haine, de la force brutale et aveugle. Demandons-lui de 
faire parler plus haut que jamais la voix de l’humilité, du repentir, de la raison 
éclairée par la foi, de la vraie charité sociale. Supplions-le d’éclairer la conscience 
des peuples et l’esprit des gouvernants.134 
His prayer marking the end of the war reflected on the world he had not seen for four terrible 
years. Now that the conflict was finally over, Bourassa prayed that humanity might emerge 
wiser from it so that they could “remettre l’ordre dans le chaos des ruines morales et 
matérielles annoncées par les folles passions des hommes.”135 So too would Canadians have to 
rebuild their fractured nation – but Bourassa would play little part in it.  
                                                 
133 Henri Bourassa, “Les Preliminaires de Paix: M. Borden et le Parlement,” Le Devoir, 9 November, 1918, 1. 
134 Henri Bourassa, “Paix et Revolution: Le doigt de Dieu – Le devoir de la prière,” Le Devoir, 11 November, 
1918, 1. 
135 Henri Bourassa, “Paix et Revolution: Le doigt de Dieu – Le devoir de la prière,” Le Devoir, 11 November, 
1918, 1. 
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Conclusion: Bourassa at Peace 
 
The end of the First World War in November 1918 brought welcomed tranquillity for 
most of its war-wearied participants. The conflict had torn out the heart of the Old World and 
laid its crass inhumanity bare for all to see. Few could claim Europe to be the enlightened 
continent that held the future of human civilization. The belligerent nations that emerged from 
the conflict began the long road to recovery and struggled to make sense of the experience, free 
from the dark cloud of war.  
For the French Canadian nationalist Henri Bourassa, the armistice changed little. The 
war had vanquished his vision of a bicultural and bilingual Canada unifying its English and 
French speaking peoples. He no longer saw the future for the Canada that he had struggled to 
create over two decades as a politician, writer, journalist, and political critic. Canada's war had 
unleashed forces far worse than the imperialism he had rallied against before 1914: the 
mismanagement of parliamentary government, rampant militarism, social unrest bordering on 
revolution, and growing secularism.  
Worse, his beloved wife and mother to their eight children, Joséphine Papineau, died 
after a long illness on 26 January 1919. Sir Wilfrid Laurier wrote his final letter to Bourassa 
mourning the passing of Joséphine. Bourassa replied, and Laurier received the letter two days 
before he died on 17 February. Their passing, one who had inspired Bourassa’s heart and the 
other his mind, was a devastating blow to the fifty-year old.1 His joie de vivre was gone. He 
withdrew from the active role he had played in Canadian politics for more than twenty years. 
                                                 
1 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa: La Vie Publique d'un Grand Canadien, (Montreal: Les Éditions Chantecler 
Ltéé, 1953), 606-608. André Bergevin, Cameron Nish and Anne Bourassa, Henri Bourassa, Biographie, Index 
des Écrits, (Montreal: Les Éditions de l'Action Nationale, 1966) LI.  
292 
 
 
The man who had been the beating heart of the French Canadian nationalist movement, whose 
evocative and passionate writing was republished in newspapers across the Dominion, whose 
words could entertain an ebullient audience for hours, was diminished. The war had taken 
away his hope of a better Canada, while cruel fate had taken away the love of his life as well as 
his former mentor-turned-nemesis. 
The comparison between Bourassa and Laurier is compelling. Politically, both were 
French Canadian Liberals, Canadian nationalists (though in different ways), and deeply 
involved in the politics of their time.  In character, both were passionate, evocative speakers, 
capable of inspiring others to follow them -- though Laurier was always willing to compromise 
to achieve his long-term goals.  Bourassa could never accept capitulation on his positions. They 
took different paths throughout their careers, though it once seemed like Bourassa would 
follow in Laurier’s footsteps.  Their opposing trajectories were often closer to each other than 
they would have admitted. Though Bourassa had spent the last decades opposing Laurier, their 
rapprochement over the course of 1917-18 revealed how much they had in common. In late 
summer of 1918, the two met on friendly terms for a final time at the home of Laurier’s close 
friend and Quebec MLA, L.O. David.2 In 1935, Bourassa was again a Member of Parliament, 
and when asked by Conservative MP I.D. MacDougall why he had betrayed Laurier, Bourassa 
reflected on his long relationship with his former leader: 
If my friend knew something more about the political history of the country, he 
would know that I fought Laurier when he was at the height of his popularity. 
When the Tory party was denouncing him from the Atlantic to the Pacific as the 
instrument of Catholicism and French domination, I stood by him. When he was 
the idol of Quebec, I stood almost alone against him in defence of the principle 
for which I have fought all my life. But when he was betrayed by his Liberal 
friends, when he was downtrodden during the war, I came to him and freely 
                                                 
2 Réal Bélanger, Wilfrid Laurier: quand la politique devient passion, 415-416; Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 
601-603. 
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tendered him a helping hand, not to carry but to go through the elections of 1917. 
... He knows now that although I fought him because of differences in principle, 
I loved him all my life; and he knew it then. The day I passed in his house in 
1917, when he was betrayed by men whom he had covered with honours and 
favours – I never received anything from him and never asked – that day he 
pressed me on his bosom and said to me: “Bourassa, what has happened to me to-
day you predicted eleven years ago. I know now where my true friends are to be 
found.”3 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the reconciliation was as complete as the one Bourassa 
outlined after the fact. Had Laurier forgiven his wayward protégé? Both had offered harsh 
criticisms of the other before and during the war, almost up to the moment when their reunion 
occurred. After Laurier’s death, Bourassa painted a picture of deep respect between the two 
that was not at all publicly evident before August 1917. 
The day after Laurier died, Bourassa wrote a straightforward and respectful editorial 
appealing to all Christians to pray for Laurier. It would be difficult, he lamented, to properly 
convey the man's greatness. He wrote: 
Dans la vie d'un chef d'état et de parti, l'historien consciencieux a le devoir de 
rechercher les multiples facteurs de son influence et de son action publique, de 
distinguer entre les actes volontairement posés et les causes subies ou simplement 
acceptées. Toujours difficile, cette tâche est particulièrement ardue dans un pays 
et à une époque où il n'existe à peu près pas d'opinion libre des passions de parti. 
Elle est presque impossible tant que vivent les contemporains d'un homme 
éminemment sympathique et charmeur, dont la force et l'influence tenaient plus 
à l'affection des coeurs qu'aux convictions raisonnées de l'intelligence.4 
Bourassa’s effusive praise is a stark contrast from his depiction of “Laurier the traitor” for 
much of the last two decades. Clearly, Bourassa had forgiven Laurier for his mistakes. 
Bourassa’s words are a useful warning for historians: Laurier so dominated his era that 
                                                 
3 Henri Bourassa, House of Commons Debates, 17th Parliament, 6th Session, Vol. 1, 22 January, 1935, 106-107. 
This was partially quoted by Omar Héroux in “Sir Wilfrid Laurier et Henri Bourassa,” Hommage à Henri 
Bourassa, (Montreal: Le Devoir, 1952) 73. 
4 Henri Bourassa, “M. Laurier,” Le Devoir, 18 February, 1919, 1. 
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he overwhelmed it. Few could separate the political career that had intertwined with his life for 
nearly fifty years. Historians could say much the same about the grieving Henri Bourassa. Like 
Laurier, his life and his legacy was so broad and far-reaching that to this day it remains difficult 
for historians to capture its entirety. 
This work has endeavoured to portray Henri Bourassa’s life during the First World War 
through the beliefs that he embraced and the ideas that he espoused. His ideas about the war’s 
international consequences were as rooted in his political and religious beliefs as his views 
about Canada itself. Historians have long acknowledged the impact of Bourassa’s religious and 
political beliefs on his role as a critic of Canadian society. Thus, as one of Canada’s most 
forceful war resisters, historians’ review of Bourassa’s vocal criticisms has traditionally been 
rooted in this domestic commentary on the war. Yet, his liberal and Catholic beliefs shaped and 
impelled an interpretation of the war’s international consequences. At home and abroad, he saw 
the state abusing its power and deceiving its people as militarism warped the societies at war. 
So too did he perceive the international system’s failure to avoid the war or work towards a 
peaceful resolution. Citing perspectives from Britain and the United States, Bourassa saw that 
the failure of the international system itself had caused the war to erupt and continue. The 
Great War proved to Bourassa that although the balance between the Great Powers of Europe 
had once brought stability and progress, it now promised only destruction as it collapsed. Their 
insatiable imperialism, unrelenting greed, and lust for power had corrupted the world. Bourassa 
agreed with Britain’s Union of Democratic Control for a new system of international 
arbitration, rooted in democratic and liberal ideas. In turn, he urged Canada and the people of 
the world to support peace proposals from the belligerent nations, concurred with the actions of 
American President Woodrow Wilson and praised the careful diplomacy of Pope Benedict XV. 
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Bourassa was paradoxically a French Canadian Catholic and a liberal Canadian 
nationalist. As a French Canadian, he saw his language, culture, and Catholic religion as 
inseparable parts of a whole. French was the language and Catholicism the faith of French 
Canada that had guided them over three centuries of inhabiting the North American continent. 
Bourassa was more devout than others were in that respect. The ultramontane Catholic 
accepted that the Catholic Church had to be the guiding force for society. In Quebec and in the 
world, Catholicism was a force for social order and progress. The Pope, as God’s 
representative on Earth, delivered the holy wisdom of God to humanity. Though Bourassa 
sometimes disagreed with the Quebec bishops’ interpretation of the Papal position, he never 
questioned the sanctity of their place within the province’s social hierarchy. Nor did he 
question Papal dictates, even when they opposed his own position.  
It might be easy to point out that he was a Catholic first and French Canadian second, 
but it was a distinction that Bourassa would have never made. Despite his devotion to Catholic 
authority, Bourassa tempered his religiosity with a deep admiration for British liberalism. It 
was not so contradictory -- both demanded a respect for social order and the rule of law and 
both sought to better society, though one by defending individual rights, and the other through 
Catholic duty. Liberal nationalism defended the right of the French Canadian Catholic 
community to exist within a largely English and Protestant dominion. His Canadian 
nationalism was in opposition to Canadian Imperialism as it was inherently bicultural and 
bilingual and included both of its French and English speaking peoples. Bourassa’s Canadian 
identity accepted the two as equally important to its formation. As proven by Confederation in 
1867, only the union of the two created something uniquely “Canadian.” Bourassa’s beliefs 
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overlapped seemingly without contradiction -- though not without a hierarchy,5 which the war 
gradually laid bare. 
As the war continued, Bourassa was less confident that the world could avoid moral 
deterioration and chaos that were antithetical to his Catholic faith and liberal ideals. Only the 
holy words of Rome, which proposed a system based on trust, goodwill and the word of God, 
could provide order. Bourassa did not necessarily imagine a Catholic world, but simply one 
that realised the truth and virtue of the Pontiff’s message. He increasingly found solace in his 
unshakeable faith as war supporters in Canada ignored his political beliefs. Faced with a 
deficient political culture at home and a crumbling international order abroad, Bourassa turned 
to Pope Benedict XV as the sole moral power capable of surpassing human interests and 
defending the common good of all people.  
The transforming effect of the war on Canada and the world deeply dismayed Bourassa. 
Militarism was overtaking the values of the world’s liberal democracies. From his perspective, 
his critics’ relentless attacks against his position and their accusations that he was unpatriotic or 
treasonous proved the pervasive nature of the militarism behind the Canadian war effort. The 
most ardent of the war supporters did not distinguish between the Canadian state and the war 
effort. According to this logic, Bourassa’s dissent was an attack on the nation itself. The 
expansion of state powers during wartime to organize the Canadian economy and industry, and 
eventually the individual through conscription, revealed the totality of the conflict. While other 
Canadians accepted these measures as necessary for the cause of victory, Bourassa rejected 
them as manifestations of the same Prussian militarism that the war meant to overturn in 
                                                 
5 Sylvie Lacombe, La rencontre de deux peuples élus : comparaison des ambitions nationale et impériale au 
Canada entre 1896 et 1920, (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2002) 124. 
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Germany.  
The difference between Bourassa’s position and the rest of Canada reflects historians’ 
own disagreement over the war’s causes.  Bourassa may have been correct in lamenting the 
structural causes to the war that were innate to, or accepted by, the international system of late 
19th and early 20th century Europe. Yet his belief that imperialism and militarism caused the 
war and sustained it allows little room for individual agency. On the other hand, the war could 
have been solely a result of decision-makers’ actions at the head of nations and armies. In that 
case, as other Canadians believed, the war was a legitimately defensive action against a 
German aggressor.6  Each necessarily created a different understanding of the war’s purpose in 
Canada, and in the case of Bourassa, a reaction unlike his contemporaries. Bourassa’s 
frustration over his inability to influence other Canadians is in better focus if we understand 
that his view of the war links it to militarism, imperialism, and other impersonal causes. His 
arguments and his rhetoric are out of touch with Canadians who not only do not understand the 
war as he saw it, but do not even conceive of the war in the same way.  
In this respect, Bourassa aligned with other international liberal dissenters from the war 
who pointed to systemic causes rather than individual ones. Consider the words of Bertrand 
Russell, perhaps the most famous British radicals to oppose the war. Like Bourassa, Russell 
gradually believed that the war was not a conflict between nations, but a great struggle between 
militarism and anti-militarism.7 As a member of the Union of Democratic Control imprisoned 
                                                 
6 Historian John F.V. Keiger reviewed the distinction between “structuralist” and “intentionalist” causes to the 
war, calling for future research to “be replaced by a more integrated analysis that brings together long-term 
and immediate causes so that a clearer picture of causality emerges from the given conditions with which 
governments necessarily live at various moments and the actions that they and individual decision-makers 
take.” See John F.V. Keiger, “The War Explained: 1914 to the Present,” A Companion to the First World War, 
John Horne ed., (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 21-24. 
7 This point is made in Richard Rempel’s introduction to Russell’s writing on Pacifism and Revolution, see 
Bertrand Russell, Pacifism and Revolution, 1916-18, Richard A. Rempel, ed., (New York: Routledge, 1995) 
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for his views during the war, Russell offered many of the same points as Bourassa in his 
wartime writing. “One of the most surprising things in this war,” Russell noted in 1916, “is the 
universal appeal to atavistic moral notions which, in times of peace, civilised men would have 
repudiated with contempt.”8 He echoed Bourassa’s fear that the war’s rampant militarism 
would wreak greater havoc than could be repaired after its end: 
The fear of defeat and the longing for victory have made men oblivious of the 
common task of Europe and of the work which Europe had been performing for 
mankind at large. In all that has made the nations of the West important to the 
world, they run the risk of being involved in a common disaster, so great and so 
terrible that it will outweigh, to the historian in the future, all the penalties of 
military defeat and all the glories of military victory. ... [If] the war lasts much 
longer, ... it is to be expected that a blind fury of destruction will drive us on and 
on until the good and evil of the old world have perished together in universal 
ruin. For this reason, [it is important to realise that] all that is detestable in the 
enemy is the result of war, is brought out by war, in a greater or lesser degree, on 
our side as well on the other, and will cease with the conclusion of peace but not 
before.9 
Neither Bourassa nor Russell saw a difference between a militarized democracy and the 
autocratic militarism of Germany. The result was the same. The Allied Powers and the Central 
Powers had lost the authority to claim the moral high ground after total war demanded greater 
sacrifices and state control.  
After the war, Russell and other dissidents turned to socialism and internationalism as a 
solution to militarism.10 Bourassa turned towards Rome. As he had stated repeatedly during the 
war, only the Pope remained uncorrupted by the influence of militarism. After the war, 
Bourassa saw a world overtaken by individualism and secularism. As individuals turned away 
                                                 
xlvi.  Rempel points to Bertrand’s 1917 pamphlet for the No-Conscription Fellowship as proof of Russell’s 
anti-militarism, see 493-494. 
8 Bertrand Russell, Justice in War Time, 2nd Edition, (London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1917) 3. 
9 Bertrand Russell, Justice in War, 105, 112. 
10 Richard Rempel terms Russell’s views as Guild Socialism in the introduction to Roads to Freedom written in 
late 1917 and early 1918, see Bertrand Russell, Roads to Freedom, Richard Rempel, ed., (New York: 
Routledge, 1996) vii.  
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from God, the Catholic social order threatened to dissolve. Réal Bélanger notes that after the 
war, Bourassa “the ideologist and moralist would prevail over the politician and journalist, but 
not completely replace them.”11 In 1922, he had a semi-private audience with Pope Pius XI and 
received his blessing.12 Four years later, Bourassa returned to Rome to have an hour-long 
private audience with Pius. This time, the Pope warned his follower about the dangers of 
devotion to nationalism and praised Bourassa’s position against Quebec nationalism. “A 
l’heure actuelle, le principal obstacle à l’action de la Papauté et de l’Église dans le monde,” 
Pius IX shared with Bourassa, “c’est la prédominance des passions de race dans tous les pays, 
c’est la substitution du nationalisme au catholicisme.” Bourassa left the meeting profoundly 
affected, and he disavowed his former actions and partially withdrew from public life. 13 
Though he continued writing articles on some international and constitutional issues, Bourassa 
gradually and voluntarily abandoned his role as the leader of the nationalist movement.  
With renewed vigour, Bourassa opposed the rising Quebec nationalist movement of 
L’Action Française during the 1920s, inspired by Pope Pius XI’s condemnation of extreme 
nationalism.  Consequently, he rejected the movement’s separatist aspirations. “The 
preservation of the faith,” Bourassa advised a new generation of French Canadian nationalists, 
“is more important than the preservation of any language, than the victory of any human 
cause.”14 Bourassa’s denunciation weakened their movement,15 and over the next two decades, 
Quebec nationalist Abbé Lionel Groulx replaced Bourassa as nationaliste leader. By the late 
                                                 
11 Réal Bélanger, “BOURASSA, HENRI,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 18, University of 
Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed October 12, 2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/ 
bourassa_henri_18E.html. 
12 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 637. 
13 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 692-693. 
14 Réal Bélanger, “BOURASSA, HENRI,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography. 
15 For the result of Bourassa’s position, see Catherine Pomeyrols, “Les intellectuels nationalistes québécois et la 
condamnation de l'Action Française,” Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, no. 73 (Jan. - Mar., 2002): 92-94. 
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1920s, Bourassa was clearly out of step with the emergent nationalist movement in Quebec. 
They no longer advocated for the Canadian nationalism that Bourassa and the nationalistes had 
supported for two decades, but rather a Quebec nationalism.16 
Bourassa himself had experienced much since his election alongside Wilfrid Laurier in 
1896. Some of his beliefs remained unchanged. He still believed in Catholicism, liberalism and 
moderate nationalism, but the hierarchy he applied to them was clearer as the ideas he chose to 
express changed considerably. He was no longer an ardent liberal nationalist, preferring to side 
unequivocally with the view from Rome.  
It is less clear how much his opponents during the war understood this transformation, 
or even the basis of his support and rejection of the war. Jules Fournier’s unpublished article 
from 1916 stands as a solid critique of Bourassa’s position from within the nationaliste 
movement. Why Fournier never published the article is unknown, but it highlights the war’s 
impact on the nationaliste movement and the shift away from Bourassa’s brand of liberal and 
Canadian nationalism. Historian Hélène Pelletier-Baillargeon considers the article a reflection 
of Fournier’s dissatisfaction with Bourassa’s role in the formation and continuation of the 
nationaliste movement itself,17 but it is equally a substantial criticism of Bourassa during the 
war. Fournier could not endorse any acceptance of the war effort as Bourassa did from August 
1914 until January 1916, and he perceived a contradiction in Bourassa’s support for Canadian 
participation while critiquing its character so completely. As Réne Durocher has argued, 
                                                 
16 For a more detailed examination of Quebec nationalism in the 1920s, see Susan Mann, Action française: French 
Canadian Nationalism in the twenties, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975). Groulx still 
acknowledged in 1952 that Bourassa played the “rôle de semeur, rôle de redresseur” as a foundational 
influence on the nationalist movement, see Lionel Groulx, “RUMILLY, Robert, Henri Bourassa, La vie 
publique d’un grand Canadien. Les éditions Chantecler Ltée, Montréal, 1953. In-8. 792 pages,” Revue 
d’histoire de l’Amérique française, no. 3 7 (1953): 450. 
17 Hélène Pelletier-Baillargeon, Olivar Asselin et son temps: le volintaire, (Québec: Édition Fides, 2001) 98. 
301 
 
 
Bourassa’s ambiguity over the war was partly due to the position of the Catholic Church and 
his anxiety over any apparent contradiction with them.18 
Even without knowing Bourassa’s difficulty in contravening the Church position, 
Fournier is unfair to Bourassa. While Bourassa offered careful approval of the war, he 
promised his readers on 2 September 1914 that he would “rechercher consciencieusement, en 
toute loyauté” the issues of the war that others ignored.19 This promise shaped Bourassa’s 
critiques in the months following, which Fournier held up as proof of an untenable and 
hypocritical position.  We should consider the promise an honest attempt to satisfy both his 
loyalty to the Church and to the nationalistes. Bourassa supported the war, but not 
unquestioningly, and he continued to follow the spirit if not the letter of the nationaliste 
movement. After all, because of his promise, Bourassa was the sole voice raising questions 
about the nature and extent of the Canadian war effort, resisting the war narrative that took 
hold throughout the rest of the country. 
To Bourassa, supporting the war was not as great a leap as Fournier believed. The 
nationalists who succeeded Bourassa within Quebec were not federalists who perceived the 
whole of Canada as united through the pact of Confederation. Instead, they saw Quebec as a 
unique entity that had agreed to enter Confederation, an agreement that had failed because 
English Canadian views were inherently opposed to theirs.20 Bourassa’s bicultural and 
bilingual nationalism could consider and endorse the position of English Canada, even if it was 
not one that he wanted. In the same way, Bourassa expected that English Canada would 
                                                 
18 René Durocher, “Henri Bourassa, les évêques et la guerre de 1914-1918,” Canadian Historical Association 
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19 Henri Bourassa, “Après la Guerre,” Le Devoir, 2 September, 1914, 1. 
20 Yvan Lamonde, Histoire Sociales des Idées au Québec 1896-1929, 272-273. 
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recognize and accept French Canadian differences. Thus English Canada’s failure to 
acknowledge French Canadian views on the war helped convince Bourassa to withdraw his 
support. The imposition of conscription underlined just how broken Confederation had 
become, but unlike Fournier, Bourassa never assumed that that division must occur. 
English Canadian intransigence during the war, particularly over the issue of 
conscription and the 1917 election, made Bourassa’s nationalist vision seem increasingly 
untenable. This explains his turn towards his faith after the conflict. “All that I asked [of the 
imperialists],” Bourassa wrote to J.S. Ewart in 1918, “was to take no advantage of the wave of 
blind enthusiasm to compromise the issue of interimperial relations. Far from responding to 
that offer of truce … [they] did their best to becloud the real issues of the war, to foster the 
blind hatred of everything German.” Instead, Bourassa was convinced of his “duty to denounce 
[the Imperialist Revolution] and open the eyes of the people on the true object of the war 
policy.”21 Of course, after four acrimonious years of warfare, hindsight coloured Bourassa’s 
perspective of the war’s beginning. Still, his complaint to Ewart reveals how he wished the war 
had unfolded. In his perfect world, a Canada not overtaken by the “imperialist revolution” 
could have offered its support to the European conflict and united its two people through the 
war effort rather than divide them. 
For some of the nationalistes, Bourassa’s distinctions were esoteric. Fellow nationaliste 
Olivar Asselin was still committed to their movement, but saw no problem in joining the 
Canadian Army in late 1915 to defend France against German aggression, not as part of a 
British or imperial effort. Asselin fought at the battle of Vimy Ridge and experienced firsthand 
                                                 
21 Henri Bourassa to J.S. Ewart, 18 January 1918, Bourassa Fonds, Library and Archives Canada. Bourassa uses 
the term Imperialist Revolution a sentence before to describe his perspective of how Canadians reacted to the 
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the terrible brutality of trench warfare. Writing to a friend in May 1917, he explained that his 
conscience had demanded he enlist, as “il y a eu trop de gens qui ont enrôlé les autres sans aller 
eux-mêmes au feu.” He did not regret the decision, but he discovered war was “une sale 
chose.”22 Asselin did not wholeheartedly accept the imperialist vision of the war – for instance, 
he and many other French Canadian soldiers opposed conscription.23 Instead, Asselin fashioned 
a nationaliste position in favour of the war.24 
 Outside of the nationaliste movement, the perception of Bourassa’s position assumes a 
strangely impersonal tone. Most of his critics did not comprehend the basis and motivations 
that lay behind Bourassa’s views on the war. Some did, such as Ferdinand Roy, whose L’appel 
aux armes et la Réponse canadienne-française rationally rejected Bourassa’s perspective on 
conscription as a path that would inevitably be detrimental to French Canadians’ place within 
Confederation.25 Most commentators simply rejected any position that did not endorse their 
views or, in the case of politicians, viewed Bourassa purely through a political lens. 
Political perspectives of Bourassa raise an interesting and unstated dilemma within the 
historiography. Bourassa was not a politician, but this did not stop politicians like Wilfrid 
Laurier and Robert Borden from fearing his impact on the fortunes of the parties that they led. 
Laurier wrote that he could not leave Quebec to the extremists, epitomized in his warning to 
Senator Raoul Dandurand in January 1915 that “Bourassa is playing with fire and if he thinks 
                                                 
22 Hélène Pelletier-Baillargeon, Olivar Asselin et son temps: le volontaire, 145-146. 
23 Hélène Pelletier-Baillargeon, Olivar Asselin et son temps: le volontaire, 182-183.  
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betraying Bourassa in such a way, see Hélène Pelletier-Baillargeon, Olivar Asselin et son temps: le volontaire, 
246-247. 
25 Ferdinand Roy, L’appel aux armes et la Réponse canadienne-française, (Quebec: J.P. Garneau, 1917) 34 and 
throughout. 
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that he will be able to extinguish it he may have a rude awakening.”26 Laurier was convinced 
that Bourassa’s wartime commentary was part of a campaign to manoeuvre himself against 
Laurier’s leadership of the province, as he had done since 1899. Borden also was cynical about 
Bourassa’s dissent. In 1915, as officials and the public demanded that Bourassa be censored, 
Borden remarked in his diary that “Bourassa would like nothing better. I would not be so 
foolish.”27 Both federal party leaders portray Bourassa as a sort of political mastermind or 
manipulator willing to become a martyr on the altar of oppressed nationalism. 
Though it is certain that Bourassa was a political agent, the cynicism imbedded in 
Laurier and Borden’s views speaks to a larger problem when considering Bourassa’s wartime 
commentary. Neither considered that Bourassa wrote because he honestly sought to dissect the 
issues of the national war effort in which Canada had engaged. They believed that Bourassa 
was like them, playing a political game for political victories. Bourassa, however, had no party 
he wanted to see in power or political influence to build. He was a political writer, not a 
politician, and had none of the concerns and responsibilities of those in the House of 
Commons. He was a journalist in 1914, and remained so throughout the war. Clearly, Bourassa 
had political goals in mind when he published his articles, but to ascribe solely political 
motivations to his writing is a disservice to the public discourse he offered.  
Bourassa believed that political issues ought to be debated publicly and argued rather 
than accepted without question on a politician’s word. His promise of 2 September 1914 
publicly established this obligation to his readers. When contemporaries limited their response 
to Bourassa solely within a political lens, they failed to appreciate fully Bourassa’s arguments 
                                                 
26 O.D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 467. Laurier wrote to Quebec Premier Lomer Gouin of 
handing Quebec to the extremists, see Oscar Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 512.  
27 Robert Borden Diary, 30 May, 1915. 
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about the war when he was a devoted public commentator in the truest sense of that title. His 
examination of international events revealed the breadth of his commitment: Canada was 
deeply involved in global affairs. For the first time, Canadians consider global events from a 
Canadian perspective and have something relevant to add. However, in Canada only Bourassa 
devoted weeks of editorials to American politics, international diplomacy, and other distant 
happenings that affected Canada even if they did not appear to directly affect Canadians. His 
readers were exposed to events of the war in greater detail than appeared in other newspapers, 
just as they were confronted with a Canadian perspective of them.  Bourassa’s writing was 
coloured by his beliefs to be sure, and sometimes weakened by them, but it is without question 
that Bourassa presented global affairs through a uniquely Canadian lens throughout the 
conflict. 
Bourassa’s opposition cemented his role as a grandfather to Quebec’s neo-nationalism 
movement and as a critic of the war. Afterwards his dissent was entrenched in a growing but 
divergent popular memory of the war in French and English Canada. As English Canadians 
championed the enduring purpose of the war for English Canada within Victorian ideals, 
French Canadians remembered the defeats in 1917 over conscription and the election victory of 
Union government as well as the Easter Riots.28 
Two historical works reveal his influence on these memories, Elizabeth Armstrong’s 
The Crisis of Quebec 1914-18 and Robert Rumilly’s biography, Henri Bourassa: La Vie 
Publique d’un Grand Canadien. Armstrong wrote in the 1930s and Rumilly during Bourassa’s 
                                                 
28 The two most well-known studies of English and French Canadian memory of the war are Jonathan F. Vance, 
Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), and Mourad 
Djebabla, Se Souvenir de La Grande Guerre: La Mémoire Plurielle de 14-18 Au Québec, (Montréal: VLB, 
2004). 
306 
 
 
final years, though it was published after Bourassa’s death in 1952.  
Armstrong was an American scholar and her work on Quebec was the first to consider 
Bourassa through a historian’s lens. She approached Bourassa as a case study for a larger 
examination of Quebec nationalism during the First World War. Bourassa became a political 
figure for Armstrong who was driven by his “dreams of French Canada as a proselytizing force 
which shall eventually bring the American continent back to the arms of Rome and to the 
glories of French civilization.”29 In her account, Bourassa was inhibited by his nationalism and 
Catholicism and unable to look beyond the borders of Canada or North America to understand 
the war’s greater purpose. Consequently, Armstrong considered Bourassa’s defining 
characteristics through questions relating to his Canadian nationalism, rather than a detailed 
examination of him as a wartime dissenter.  
Armstrong’s portrayal of Bourassa reveals his role in the English Canadian 
remembrance of the war. In the war’s immediate aftermath, men like Castell Hopkins, author 
of the Canadian Annual Review, preferred to minimize Bourassa’s influence other than as a 
contrast to these “true” French Canadians.30 As Jonathan Vance notes, English Canadians 
preferred to evoke men like Talbot Papineau, or 22nd Battalion Victoria Cross winners Joseph 
Kaeble and Jean Brilliant, to demonstrate Quebec’s service during the war.31 The war could 
then serve as an example of Canadian unity -- at least, an English Canadian vision of that unity. 
English Canadians and some French Canadians were convinced by the new national identity 
                                                 
29 Elizabeth Armstrong, Crisis of Quebec 1914-1918 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1937) 53. 
30 One only has to read Hopkin’s writing in the Canadian Annual Review to see this distinction. For example, 
from the 1917 volume, Hopkins wrote that Bourassa was engaged in “bitter and unscrupulous denunciation of 
Great Britain and the British people and soldiers in the War with the reiteration of every possible 
misconception as to Allied policy and action,” while on the other hand, “no man could die more gallantly for 
his country and Empire than Major Talbot Papineau,” Castell Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1917, 477, 
474. 
31 Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble, 253-254. 
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forged during the war, expressed by the “spirit of the trenches.”32 The soldier experience 
shaped English Canadian nationalism and memory of the war in the interwar period, and in 
comparison, they dismissed French Canadian opponents to the war like Bourassa as, in 
Armstrong’s words, “passive nationalists” who would never fulfil their national desires.33 
Bourassa’s French Canadian nationalism was not equal to the vigorous English Canadian 
nationalism that had proven its worth on the battlefields.  
Rumilly’s biography of Bourassa, written in French for a Quebec audience, described a 
completely different picture of Bourassa’s actions that reflects Quebec’s memory of the war. 
He opens his history remarking that Bourassa “rassemblait des atavismes qu'il faut bien appeler 
contradictoires.”34 It reflected a common theme throughout the work. Bourassa epitomized the 
best of French Canada. The traits that had propelled him to enter politics and defend French 
Canada were inherent to French Canadians themselves. Rumilly describes Bourassa in 1918, 
writing that he “n’a pas fondé un parti, et se ses atavismes l’entraînent dans la lutte politique, 
sa mystique, fortifiée dans les retraites fermées, lui inspire une conception plus haute.”35 This 
constant reference to Bourassa’s atavism is not derogatory, but integral to Rumilly’s 
                                                 
32 Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble, 228-230. 
33 Elizabeth Armstrong, Crisis of Quebec, 242-245. 
34 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 7. 
35 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 597. 
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portrayal.36 It exposes Bourassa’s own role in shaping Rumilly’s history.37 Rumilly had the 
opportunity to interview the nationaliste and his history reflects the fallibility of personal 
memory as much as it does a lack of analysis.38 Bourassa also gave a series of ten lectures 
during the Second World War and these “spoken memoirs” reviewed his life in detail. Rumilly 
relied on them for his biography, and in concluding the section on Bourassa’s spoken memoirs, 
Rumilly divided Bourassa’s career between his opposition to imperialism and his devotion to 
Catholicism, noting that “l’atavisme Papineau et l’atavisme Bourassa sont disputé la vie la plus 
riche de la première moitié du vingtième siècle, au Canada.”39 Just as Louis-Joseph Papineau 
inspired Bourassa to become a “grand Canadien,” now Rumilly mobilized Bourassa to inspire 
French Canadians to continue defending nationalism -- though a far different version than the 
one Bourassa had defined forty years earlier. 
Rumilly’s appeal to ingrained French Canadian traits likely reflects his close 
relationship with Abbé Lionel Groulx. Bourassa’s defacto successor within the Quebec 
nationalist movement defended inherently atavistic conceptions of the French Canadian race in 
North America and integrated them into his vision of Quebec nationalism.40 Rumilly echoes 
                                                 
36 It appears throughout Rumilly’s history of Quebec as well, for instance, “Henri Bourassa, en qui frémissait 
l'atavisme des Papineau,” Robert Rumilly, Histoire de la Province de Québec vol. IX F.G. Marchand, 
(Montréal: Montreal-Editions, n.d.) 117; or “Bourassa, personnalité complexe aux atavismes contradictoires, 
curieux mélange de doctrinaire réaliste et de mystique chrétien,” Robert Rumilly, Histoire de la Province de 
Québec vol. XX Philipe Landry, (Montréal: Montreal-Editions, n.d.) 86. Allegations of atavism were also used 
to criticise Bourassa. In 1911, a pamphlet denounced Bourassa’s position against Laurier during the election 
that, like Rumilly, cited Bourassa’s atavism as following in the footsteps of Papineau, though it argued that 
Papineau had failed to recognize the changing nature of the times, see L’oeil ouvert!: Bourassa et l’anti-
Laurierisme, pretention, haine et impuissance, lachete et ingratitude, (s.l:s.n) 8-9. 
37 Such as “Toutes les évolutions d'un peuple sont la résultante, harmonieuse ou incohérente, de ses mouvements 
antérieurs, de ses instincts ataviques,” Henri Bourassa, Que devons-nous à l'Angleterre?La défense nationale, 
la révolution impérialiste, le tribut à l'Empire, (Montréal, 1915) viii. 
38 Several mistakes are noted by Anne Bourassa, see Anne Bourassa and Patrick Allen, “Le Bourassa de Rumilly: 
Deux appréciations,” in La Pensée de Henri Bourassa, F.A. Angers ed., (Montréal: L’Action nationale, 1954) 
185-194. 
39 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 784. 
40 Frédéric Boily, La pensée nationaliste de Lionel Groulx , (Sillery, QC: Septentrion, 2003) 21-50. 
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Groulx’s beliefs about the French Canadian race. As a result, the Bourassa that Rumilly 
describes is not an individual struggling to express his ideas about Canada and the war. 
Bourassa becomes a symbol for Quebec’s struggle within the Canadian Confederation. The 
final pages of his work places Bourassa’s life in almost spiritual terms as Rumilly reminded 
Quebecois that “ainsi Bourassa, le grand Bourassa que nous venons de perdre, continue de 
nous protéger.”41 Rumilly’s work is barely less than hagiographic in its praise for the 
nationaliste leader, a fitting tribute to the man who had prepared the way for the Quebec 
nationalists to whom Rumilly’s biography would most appeal. 
Despite the flaws of Armstrong and Rumilly’s works, they provide insight into the 
context of their times. They represented a constructed memory of Bourassa’s career. Both 
misunderstand Bourassa’s role in the First World War as limited to domestic issues. 
Consequently, they emphasize Bourassa’s fierce nationalism, his place as a French Canadian 
and a Catholic, but not his international perspective that, despites its local Canadian lens, 
presented the world to his readers in a way unlike any of his Canadian contemporaries. 
When academic Canadian historians returned to the First World War and Henri 
Bourassa in the 1960s, misconceptions lingered as English and French Canadians dealt with a 
new generation of answers to the “French Canadian Question.” Battles over bilingualism, 
Quebec nationalism, and Canadian identity marked the Canada of the 1960s and kept 
Bourassa’s ideas and legacy at the forefront of political consciousness. Scholars rarely 
explicitly examined Bourassa's wartime career, with most historians focusing on his pre-war 
career. Claude Ryan, editor of Le Devoir, offered a useful snapshot of Bourassa’s historical 
significance on the centenary of his birth in 1968. He noted that Bourassa’s redemption in 
                                                 
41 Robert Rumilly, Henri Bourassa, 791. 
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English Canada as the prophet of an independent nation strengthened by the coexistence of its 
two founding peoples.42 To solve the “French question,” the Liberal government of Prime 
Minister Lester Pearson proposed a bilingual and bicultural Canada. Quebec was no longer an 
intransigent minority unwelcome under the umbrella of the ambiguous British-Canadian 
identity forged after the First World War. The new Canada influenced historians and the public 
alike as they searched for new foundational myths.43 Bourassa, whose support for a bilingual 
and bicultural Canada was a solution to a much different Canadian problem, was easily 
subsumed in the new story Canadians sought to tell about themselves.  
As Canada rethought what it meant to be Canadian, Quebecois were also reimagining 
their province and their perspective on Henri Bourassa. The province faced serious societal 
conflict in the aftermath of the transformative Quiet Revolution that modernized Quebec. A 
new historical consciousness was developing as historians debated the legacy of New France 
and Confederation on the Quebec of the 20th century.44 Most writers skipped over Bourassa's 
career as a subject for direct historical study, but reflected on many of the same themes of 
nationalism, clericalism, and survival. Claude Ryan reminded his readers that Quebecois were 
praising Bourassa on the anniversary of his birth as a unifying figure and the grandfather of a 
new Quebec nationalism even as English Canadians commended his bilingualism and 
                                                 
42 Claude Ryan, “Henri Bourassa devant l’histoire,” Le Devoir, 31 August 1968, 4. 
43 On British-Canadian identity in the 1960s, see Phillip Buckner, Canada and the End of Empire (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2004); José Eduardo Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 
1945-71 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); C.P. Champion, The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals 
and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). Each examined 
the disappearance of a British-Canadian identity and its consequences, though Champion suggests it was 
transformed instead of disappearing. 
44 The well-known debate between the Montreal and Laval school of historians over the character of Quebec's 
history is explored in detail by many, notably in English by Ronald Rudin's Making History in Twentieth 
Century Quebec (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). Ramsay Cook has also examined Quebec 
historians' influence on Quebec nationalism, such as Maurice Séguin and Michel Brunet, see for instance, 
Ramsay Cook, Canada and the French-Canadian Question (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966) 119-142. 
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biculturalism.45  
Bourassa was enshrined as a fundamental figure for both a new generation of English 
and Quebec nationalists, though it was a distorted view of him inherently framed by the 
context of Canada in the 1960s. Historians like Ramsay Cook portrayed Bourassa as a sort of 
modern Canadian nationalist. Cook and Robert Craig Brown used their contribution to the 
Canadian Centenary Series to emphasize that the crux of Bourassa’s position had been that 
Canada was more Canadian than British.46 Cook, who wrote extensively about “the French 
Canadian question,” portrayed Bourassa’s role in Quebec as a visionary of a unified Canada, 
though tainted by his nationalism and religion.47  
Recent scholarship on the First World War is not as bound as it once was to the 
commemorative narrative of the war that emerged in its aftermath, but Bourassa remains a 
stilted figure within the literature.  In English Canada, historians have moved away from 
exploring political and intellectual figures during the war or reflecting on the questions about 
national unity that Bourassa raised, though their lens has widened considerably since the 
1960s.48 Meanwhile, Quebec historians have not studied the First World War in detail, largely 
as a repudiation of its continuing resonance for English Canadian scholars as a national 
                                                 
45 Claude Ryan, “Henri Bourassa devant l’histoire,” Le Devoir, 31 August 1968, 4. 
46 Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1974) 274. 
47 Ramsay Cook, The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays on Nationalism and Politics in Canada, (Toronto: Macmillan, 
1971) 74-5; Ramsay Cook, Canada and the French Canadian Question, 122. Cook is never negative towards 
Bourassa, but the greater thrust of his arguments regarding the problems of Canadian nationalism (and French-
Canadian nationalism) is against both its existence and its justifications. Throughout his many essays on the 
subject, Cook did not investigate the First World War other than as the context behind problems that related to 
Canadian unity and the cultural and linguistic divides of the 1960s. Bourassa’s role as an international 
commentator is entirely ignored. 
48 For an excellent and review overview, see Mark Osborne Humphries, “Between Commemoration and History: 
The Historiography of the Canadian Corps and Military Overseas,” The Canadian Historical Review, no. 3, 95 
(September, 2014): 384-397. 
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moment for English Canadian identity.49 As different as the memories of Bourassa are in 
Quebec and in English Canada, both cast him in their nationalist theatre.  He is the opponent to 
the war that unified Canadians at Vimy Ridge in English Canada, and the dissenter who failed 
to prevent conscription, but ultimately nurtured the beginning of Quebec nationalism in French 
Canada. 
Certainly, historians have placed Bourassa in an influential role within Canadian 
history, but actually gauging his influence is difficult.  Countless French and English 
Canadians read his articles or heard his speeches. The venerable journalist directly influenced 
French Canadian nationalists during the Second World War, who organized Bourassa’s return 
to public lectures over the issue of conscription. The Bloc Populaire, a Quebec nationalist 
party, attempted to recreate a group of Quebec MPs who stood for Quebec’s interests just as 
Bourassa had attempted in 1911 and demanded in 1917. The Bloc brought together a disparate 
group of old and new nationalists, some of whom were more loyal to Bourassa’s vision, and 
younger ones who wanted to move away his religious nationalism. The party dissolved after 
the Second World War, failing to unify the old and new strains of French Canadian 
nationalism.50 There are also examples of Bourassa influencing English Canadian nationalists, 
such as George Grant who privately cheered Bourassa’s criticism of Prime Minister William 
Lyon Mackenzie King for aligning so closely with the United States during the Second World 
                                                 
49 Mourad Djebabla, “Historiographie francophone de la Première Guerre mondiale: écrire la Grande Guerre de 
1914-1918 français au Canada et au Québec,” The Canadian Historical Review, no. 3, 95 (September, 2014): 
407. 
50 Michael Oliver, The Passionate Debate: The Social and Political Ideas of Quebec Nationalism 1920-1945, 
(Montreal: Véhicule Press, 1991) 198-204; or as Oliver concludes on 179: “the Bloc populaire party which 
brought briefly together the varying elements, left and right, old and new, of French Canadian nationalism and, 
perhaps finally, demonstrated their incompatibility.” 
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War.51  Perhaps a better testament to Bourassa’s lasting impact is the Quebec term 
bourassisme, used to describe the ideas and beliefs of his generation of French Canadian 
nationalists.52  The ubiquity of Bourassa’s ideas contributes to the difficulty in categorizing 
him by historians and contemporaries alike.   
* * * 
Bourassa helped shape 20th century French and English Canada, but he remains a 
product of the 19th.  His ultramontane Catholicism mixed with Gladstonian British liberalism 
was a product of European thought a generation out of date by 1914, and certainly by 1918.  
He conceived of a Canada with united races of French and English, a distinctly different 
conception than the cultural unity envisioned by 1960s Canadians.  Bourassa’s belief in the 
implicit promise of equality between French and English at Confederation shaped his 
nationalism, but he had to accept the untenable nature of such a balance by 1918. By the war’s 
end, Canada had changed too much and too divided to create the sort of compromise Bourassa 
demanded. While his ideas may have evolved over the course of the war, his core beliefs 
remained unchanged.  
The war revealed the hierarchy Bourassa applied to his complex web of beliefs as a 
liberal nationalist and devoted ultramontane Catholic.  He aligned himself with radicals like the 
Union of Democratic Control, but made sure to couch reception of their ideas through the 
words of Pope Benedict XV. He critiqued the imposition of conscription as anti-democratic and 
                                                 
51 Scott Staring, “‘Not Heaven-Endowed to Run the World’: The British Empire in the Early Thought of George 
Grant,” Journal of Canadian Studies no.1, 45 (Winter 2011): 52 Fn 17.  A recent Master’s Thesis also 
explores the extent of Bourassa’s influence among English Canadians, see Benoit Longval, Au-delà des « 
jingos » et des « coquins » : Henri Bourassa et ses relations avec le Canada anglais (1896-1935), 
Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2014. 
52 Gabriel Martin, Dictionnaire des onomastismes québecois: les mots issus de nos mots propres, (Sherbrooke, 
Québec: Éditions du Fleurdelysé, 2013) 35-36.  Bourassisme often follows papineauisme, and precedes 
groulxisme.  
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illiberal, yet envisioned a religious Quebec society attached to the Catholic Church, not the 
state. He demanded that the Canadian state recognize the rights of its linguistic and religious 
Franco-Ontarian minority for the sake of national unity, but refused to moderate his own 
comments for the same effect. Achieving the national cohesion he envisioned was more 
important than building one that rejected his views. Time and again, Bourassa criticized the 
imperialist vision of the war that did not align with his beliefs about Canada and its place in the 
world. 
The great difficulty of historians in dissecting Bourassa’s positions, particularly during 
the First World War, is accepting the contradictory nature of them but not subsuming Bourassa 
within the powerful memory of the war itself. Despite the memory of war shaping modern 
Quebec and English Canadian nationalism, reading these movements back into the past is 
historical hindsight.  Despite Bourassa’s acceptance by modern English and French Canadian 
nationalists, he was an anti-modern figure who does not fit the role imposed upon him.  
Bourassa understood Canadian nationalism as a union of races, far different from its cultural 
conception in the latter half of the 20th century. He would have disagreed with modern 
Quebecois nationalism and their demands for protected privilege from the English majority. 
Bourassa preferred an equal contest between French and English Canadians where both could 
express their views. He did not want special status, but equal status.53 The great tragedy of the 
war was not necessarily the persecution of French Canadians, but that it demonstrated the 
power imbalance between French and English. Even minute details, like the fact that the 
renowned newspaper journalist refused to own or listen to radio,54 reveal a man firmly 
                                                 
53 Michael Oliver makes this distinction in The Passionate Debate: The Social and Political Ideas of Quebec 
Nationalism 1920-1945, (Montreal: Véhicule Press, 1991) 208. 
54 Henri Bourassa, House of Commons Debates, 17th Parliament, 6th Session, Vol. 1, 22 January, 1935, 105. 
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entrenched in the Canada of pre-1914.   
Bourassa’s passion and fiery rhetoric inspired enemies and allies alike.  Only 15,000 
subscribers read his writing in Le Devoir during the war years, but it was his name that English 
Canadians would have heard during the 1917 election.  French and English Canadians 
considered Bourassa the leader of the resistance to the war -- a claim demonstrated by how 
often critics and allies alike portrayed him taking a primary role in it.  Whether you agreed or 
disagreed with him, Bourassa provoked a reaction. He knew how to incite a response among 
Canadians. His particular combination of political and religious views only could have 
appeared in French Canada, but it is easy to overlook them in a Canadian context. Nonetheless, 
there is a uniqueness to his war experience compared to other international dissenters. Where 
else could a Catholic liberal nationalist advocate so strenuously against the war, and not only 
avoid imprisonment, but directly influence elections and political events?  Bourassa will was a 
prominent dissenter at home and given great latitude by authorities to promote his views 
because of his French Canadian context.  
In speeches to Parliament in 1935, on the cusp of retirement from political life, 
Bourassa reflected on his actions during the war:  
If I go out of public life with one feeling, with one conviction, it is this: a deep 
regret for man bitter words that I have used in my life, deep and sincere 
repentance for all my violences of language; but I hope they will be forgiven me 
by God and man because not once in my life have I attacked anybody unjustly, 
from my point of view at least, and without believing it was my duty to do so.55 
This sense of duty compelled Bourassa to public commentary, to dispute government actions, 
and to examine international events critically.  He was not afraid to anger his opponents, but 
sometimes he was too eager to reveal their falsehoods. Even as Bourassa sought the truth at all 
                                                 
55 Henri Bourassa, House of Commons Debates, 17th Parliament, 6th Session, Vol. 1, 22 January, 1935, 107. 
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costs, he did not necessarily recognize it every time. The First World War intensified his duty, 
turning his editorials into a fervent search for the true meaning and consequence to the war. 
The world at war was terrifying.  Events once debated calmly were suddenly a matter of life 
and death.  Old political issues took on new meaning and rancor.  For Henri Bourassa, an 
intense man by nature, the war years pushed him to new heights of analytical insight and 
depths of conspiratorial allegations. Yet as other Canadians failed to confront the issues and 
debates that should have taken place during such a serious time, Bourassa refused to ignore 
them. Bourassa’s war, fought through words on the page, was no less important to him than the 
one fought by Canadian soldiers on the battlefield. In his view, the only way for Canada to 
emerge stronger from the war, regardless of victory or defeat, was if Canadians could honestly 
and openly discuss the international and domestic challenges that confronted their nation.  
Bourassa looked out to the world first and foremost as a Canadian. All of his beliefs 
were enmeshed in a Canadian context. His views were not intrinsically correct, or unbiased, or 
even justified, but they represent the views of an individual Canadian concerning a global 
event.  Few Canadians have left a record of their views like Bourassa, let alone offered them 
publicly throughout the war years. Thus, he stands as one of the most prominent Canadian 
intellectuals to consider the global and local context of Canada at war. At the same time, 
Bourassa deserves recognition outside of Canada. This work has addressed his ideas as they 
were presented so that they might stand on their own – not simply as part of a domestic debate 
in Canada about its identity and the war, but as part of a larger international reaction against the 
Great War. Bourassa rejected the war for a wide variety of reasons, but concluded like so many 
commentators across the belligerent nations that peace and international reform required 
solutions to ensure that a war like it never erupted again.  Around the world, Bourassa and 
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others like him were part of a larger movement spurred on by the First World War, dissenters 
who helped to shape interwar politics and the League of Nations, as well as the politics of their 
country. The legacy of their efforts and the ideas they espoused profoundly affected the world 
that emerged after 1918, even if they did not succeed in their goals during the war years. 
Likewise, Bourassa did not win or lose his war on the battlefield, but in its lasting impact on 
Canadian history. Though he failed as a dissenter during the war itself, his influence on his 
country and province proved the success of his wartime career. While the splash might mark 
the stone’s speed, the ripples mark its size.
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